* 2003 2000 /1984 101 * 07BSH010 48
2009 90 / 2008 Montinola et al. 1995 1. 49
2010. 3 2. 3. 4. 5. institutionalized 1993 M Weingast 2008 /1995 M Weingast 2008 /1995 50
- Rodden & Rose-Ackerman 1997 2007 2008 2008 2007 2007 52 2008 Cai & Treisman 2006 2009 / / / 51
2010. 3 2001 5-8 2007 /1993 / 2007 /1993 100 / 2007 /1993 60 / 52
/ / / / 1. / 2. / / / 2007 /1979 27-28 / / 2003 2004 2008 53
2010. 3 / / Walder 1995 Li & O Brien 1999 Street-level discretion selective policy implementation Shue 1988 / 2000 253 / / / / 2003 16 54
/ 2007 M U 2002 /1986 2008 /1958 2009 55
2010. 3 2008 2002 /1962 M M M 56
2006 207 1984 30 57
2010. 3 2008 20 / 1994 196 1. 58
1997 434 2004 2009 2. / / 2006 /1937 368 59
2010. 3 3. 1995 /1894 1986 /1923 1. 2. 3. / 4. 60
2008 / / / 61
2010. 3 1984 1958 1984 1984 1990 1958-1984 1984 2007 /1984 365-366 2006 2005 8 62
70 1. 15% 2. 3. 4. 5. 63
2010. 3 2001 490-493 1 1989 118-119 1989 2004 134 1 30 70 80 2009 37-38 70 70 64
1 1961 1979 1 2005 2006 124 2000 /1984 65
2010. 3 1992 1993 /1960 1993 368 2000 1961 1978 1 1958 66
1 1958-1978 1958 82 62 20 1959 135 100 35 1960 89 50 39 1961 51. 8 19. 8 32 1962 40. 9 7. 9 33 1963 40. 2 4. 2 36 1964 44. 6 4. 6 40 1965 29. 3 5. 3 24 1966-1969 1970 63. 99 67. 6 26. 69 27. 6 37. 3 40 1971 78. 85 92 39. 05 39. 1 38. 3 52. 9 1972 93. 83 110. 6 46. 03 46 47. 8 64. 6 1973 107. 25 126. 4 55. 5 54. 8 52. 5 71. 6 1974 129. 25 151. 3 66. 83 66. 8 62. 2 84. 5 1975 169. 42 197. 8 86. 8 86. 8 82. 6 111 1976 243. 53 123. 93 119. 6 1977 322. 69 175. 29 147. 4 1978 381. 97 211. 87 170. 1 1958-1965 1990 1958-1960 17 1958-1965 1970-1978 1949-1979 108 1970 1990 21 1949-1979 1993 545 2007 /1961 355 67
2010. 3 1970 1990 167 1993 369 1978 10 2006 35 1980 1978 120. 45 1981 100. 22 17% 1984 1978 1984 1985 1 1979-1983 1980 11 1 1978-1987 1991 68
1981 5 1982 11 1984 420. 22 1994 10 / / 69
2010. 3 1979-1983 1984-1990 1998 1984 1998 35 70
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 2006 196-202 2002 40% 40% 50% 20% 71
2010. 3 GDP 1994 80 72
20 90 1. 1996 2. 2004 3. / / 73
2010. 3 4. 1994 3 / 2009 2009 / 2000 212 2009 2008 151 / 74
1 1 2006 75
2010. 3 1993 1994 1994 1997 1999 1990 90 76
/ 77
2010. 3 / 90 GDP / 2009 78
2006 2009 2009 D. 2002 /1962 2009 /2000 1972 /1894 1997 2001 2009 4 1989 1993 1949-1989 1994 2007 /1961 2004 2006 2006 2000 /1984 79
2010. 3 2007 /1984 < > 2008 2009 30 2008 2006 /1937 1986 /1923 2007 /1993 1993 /1960 < > 1959 12-1960 2 8 2000 2002 /1986 2006 2003 2008 /1993 M B. R. Weingast 2008 /1995 2005 2001 2009 30 6 1998 2003 4 2004 1998-2002 2008 2007 6 1993 2006 2004 2007 2007 /1979 2009 5 2008 80
3 2004 1993 2008 /1958 2006 2000 2005 2008 < > 2008 1990 1992 1978-1987 1991 2006 3 2009 3 2007 7 1996 6 2008 6 2009 6 Cai Hongbin & Daniel Treisman 2006 Did Government Decentralization Cause China s Economic Miracle World Politics 58 4. Li Lianjiang & Kevin J. O Brien 1999 Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China. Comparactive Politics 31 2. Montinola Gabriella Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast 1995 Federalism Chinese Style The Political Basis for Economic Success in China. World Politics 48 1. Rodden Jonathan & S. Rose-Ackerman 1997 Does Federalism Preserve Markets Virginia Law Review 83 7. Walder Andrew G. 1995 Local Governments as Industrial Firms An Organizational Analysis of China s Transitional Economy. American Journal of Sociology 101 2. Shue Vivienne 1988 The Reach of the State Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford California Stanford University Press. 81
Strive for Autonomy An institutionalism analytic framework about the rise and fall of rural collective enterprises Xiong Wansheng 48 Abstract Based on review of the market-preserving federalism theory and the history of the rise and fall of collective enterprises this article proposes an alternative institutionalism analytic framework to interpret the rise and fall of rural collective enterprises. Different from the interpretation which has often been generalized as competition for growth this new framework highlights the grass roots governments' effort for maintaining and expanding the poor and valuable political autonomy in the extra large scale centralized system. This paper argues it is just the strife for autonomy that has propelled the collective enterprises to develop endogenously from the grass roots society. The grass roots governments' failure ended the collective enterprises' prosperity. Expansion of Higher Education and Inequality in Opportunity of Education A study on effect of Kuozhao policy on equalization of educational attainment Li Chunling 82 Abstract There is a debate about education expansion' impact on inequality of educational attainment. During 1999-2002 the Chinese government adopted a policy to increase enrolment in higher education. This resulted in a five-fold increase in the number of college students and the expansion of opportunity for higher education doubled in five years. The paper based on sub-data drawing from 1% population sample survey data of 2005 and using logit models examines the impact of higher educational expansion during this period on inequalities of classes Hukou status ethnic and gender in China. The author tests the validity of the MMI hypothesis EMI hypothesis and RCT theory in the Chinese context. The results show that inequalities of higher education among classes ethnic groups and sexes have not declined during the sharp expansion of higher education but inequality of higher education between people born in urban and rural areas has increased during this period. Charity Gospel and Nationalism in the Public Sphere The leprosy relief in modern HangZhou Zhou Donghua 114 Abstract The disease s relationship with social-culture especially with colonialism and nationalism is catching more and more concern in the academia. This paper tries to explain the relationship of the missionary medical and Chinese social-culture by telling the story of the leprosy relief in modern Hangzhou. Missionary medical played a very important role in the leprosy relief of the Modern China. By building shelters 244