2006 1,,;,,,,,, (Denis and McConnell,2003), (2003),,,,,,, Tobin s Q, : (1) Tobin s Q (Lang and Stulz,1994), (,2002),,,,Tobin s Q ; (2) Tobin s Q ; (3)

: 3 :, :,,,,,,, :,Xu Wang(1999),,,,,, (1999),Tobin s Q U, (2002) U,,,,,(2005) U U,, (2001),;,,Sun Tong (2003),,, Wei Xie Zhang(2005), Tobin s Q, U,Tobin s Q,,,, 3,,:510275,:mnsxy @mail. sysu. eud. cn ;,,, 90

2006 1,,;,,,,,, (Denis and McConnell,2003), (2003),,,,,,, Tobin s Q, : (1) Tobin s Q (Lang and Stulz,1994), (,2002),,,,Tobin s Q ; (2) Tobin s Q ; (3) Tobin s Q,,,,,,,,(2004),, (2000),,, (2001),,,,, :, ;; ;; Djankov and Murrell (2002),Megginson and Netter (2001),Shirley and Walsh(2000), (,2000 ;,2001 ;Sun and Tong,2003), Tobin s Q (,1999 ;,2001 ;Wei Xie and Zhang,2005) (2005),,,Tobin s Q,, (2001), 91

: 1999 2003, :, ; ;, 4845,, 813,671,2469,892 1 1 ( ) 54 %(56 %),, ( ) 59 % (60 %),( ) 56 % (58 %), 49 %, ( ) 46 % (45 %) Π,,,,,,,,( ) 1 SAMB SOECGs SOELGs PRIVATE ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 49133 58175 56148 49120 54126 (49139) (60100) (58117) (49129) (55155) 1164 1151 1160 2121 1171 (1100) (1100) (1100) (2100) (1100) 42105 52160 48195 34152 45164 (39137) (54191) (50136) (29148) (45143) 7128 6115 7153 14168 8161 (13182) Π 0126 0119 0125 0156 0130 (0151) : 5 % SAMB ;SOECGs ;SOELGs ;PRIVATE 4 %,,,,, 92

2006 1 (),,,,,,, :( ROA) ( CFOA) ( ROS ) ( AT) ( CGS) ( EXP) ( GRO) ( S EMP) ( A EMP) 2, 2,, ROA t Πt CFOA t Πt ROS t Πt, AT t Πt,, CGS t Πt, EXP t Πt CGS EXP ( t - t - 1,CGS EXP, GRO )Πt - 1 ;, S EMP t Πt ;, AEMP t Πt : t = 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 CSMAR,S EMP AEMP 80 % ;,,,IAOP (),,30 %( ), 30 % 50 %(), 50 % (),( T ) (Mann2Whitney U ),3 3 : 1 (0,30 %) 2 [30 %,50 %) 3 [50 %,1) 1vs 2 2vs 3 1vs 3 ( ) ( ) ( ) T ( Z ) T ( Z ) T ( Z ) IAOP - 01053 ( - 01007) - 01024 ( - 01014) 01049 (01019) - 11580 ( - 01230) - 51573 3 3 3 ( - 51309 3 3 3 ) - 51760 3 3 3 ( - 51046 3 3 3 ) 1273 1465 2107 : IAOP 3 3 3 1 % 93

: 3,,, () : IAOP it = 0 + 1 PFS H it + 2 PFS H 2 it + it, IAOP, PFSH, 4 (1) (2),,,,F, PFSH,,, 4 (3) 4 :, : IAOP (1) (2) (3) SIZE LEV IOS (p ) (p ) (p ) EFN SIZE Constant - 01118 (01008) - 01138 (01000) - 11583 (01000), PFSH 01201 (01329) 01302 (01000) LEV PFSH 2 01109 (01618),, PFSAMB 01095 (01059) PFSOECG 01257 (01000) PFSOELG 01137 (01000) (Hutchinson and Gul,2003),, PFPRIVATE 01250 (01000) SIZE 01074 (01000) ( IOS), LEV - 01201 (01000), IOS 01345 (01000), EFN 01047 (01000) (Durnev and Adjusted R 2 01013 01013 01133 Kim,2005), F 321404 641570 931832 ( EFN), EFN 4845 4845 4845,,1, 0,4 (3) PFSAMB PFSOECG PFSOELG PFPRIVATE,, 4 (3),,, ( IAROA), 94

2006 1 (incentive effect),(entrenchment effect),,(public benefits of control),;,, (private benefits of control) Durnev Kim (2005) () 4 (3),,,,01257 01250,, 01137,,01095,,,, : (1),;,,, (2),;, (3) ;, (4),,,, (),,,,,,,,, () Shleifer Vishney(1986),(),,, ( Π1) 95

: ( Π1),5 %5 % 5 5 : A :( Π ) 1 :1 2 :1 1 vs 2 ( ) ( ) T (Z ) IAOP - 01067 ( - 01007) 01007 (01002) - 31216 3 3 3 ( - 21061 3 3 ) 432 4413 B :5 % 1 : 2 : 1 vs 2 ( ) ( ) T (Z ) IAOP - 01029 ( - 01003) 01024 (01006) - 41067 3 3 3 ( - 21578 3 3 3 ) 2192 2653 : IAOP T,Mann2Whitney U 3 3 3 1 %, 3 3 5 % 5 A (B ),(), () Shleifer Vishney (1986),,, : (1),;,, (2),,,,,, ;,, ;(2004),,, (3),,,,,, (),,,,, : IAOP it = 0 + 1 POSAMB it + 2 POSOECG + 3 POSOELG + 4 POPRIVA TE + 5 POFOR + 6 POFIN + 7 POMUL T + 1 SIZE it - 1 + 2 L EV it - 1 + 3 IOS it + + 4 EFN it + it, IAOP, SIZE L EV IOS EFN, POSAMB POSOECG POSOELG POPRIVATE POFOR POFIN POMUL T 96

2006 1, 6 : SAMB SOECGs SOELGs PRIVATE : IAOP ( p ) ( p ) ( p ) ( p ) ( p ) Constant - 11614 (01000) - 11759 (01000) - 11071 (01003) - 21023 (01000) - 01518 (01330) POSAMB - 01036 (01768) 01223 (01474) - 11223 (01005) 01047 (01783) 01101 (01710) POSOECG 01294 (01095) 01242 (01653) 01608 (01234) 01358 (01087) 01049 (01920) POSOELG - 01024 (01778) 01051 (01793) - 01440 (01122) 01076 (01483) 01013 (01959) POPRIVATE 01001 (01992) - 01122 (01520) - 01233 (01520) - 01030 (01786) 01059 (01756) POFOR 01307 (01084) 01078 (01908) - 01878 (01210) 01513 (01006) - 01081 (01892) POFIN - 01356 (01045) 01005 (01990) 01139 (01813) - 01227 (01309) - 01977 (01033) POMULT - 01083 (01303) 01006 (01976) - 01206 (01397) 01048 (01647) - 01236 (01226) Adjusted R 2 01127 01152 01104 01124 01138 F 651142 141225 81051 321677 131952 4845 813 671 2469 892 : 6,: (1), 10 %, 5 %, ; (2), ; (3),,; (4),,; (5),,, (),,,,,,,,,,, 97

:,,,,,,, 4 (3) 6 ( 7),, 1999 2001,2002 2003,IAOP,,, 7, 4,(4), : IAOP 6,, : IAOP (,) ( p ) ( p ) () C - 11521 (01000) Constant - 11549 (01000) :,, ;, PFSAMB 01103(01040) POSAMB - 01037 (01762) PFSOECG 01261(01000) POSOECG 01288(01102) PFSOELG 01138(01000) POSOELG - 01027 (01756) PFPRIVATE 01242(01000) POPRIVATE - 01014 (01865) POFOR 01313(01079) POFIN - 01352 (01047) POMULT - 01092 (01254), 1999-01007 1999-01007 2000-01036 2000-01036, 2001-01009 2001-01010 2002 01020 2002 01022, 2003 01021 2003 01021 Adjusted R 2 01134 Adjusted R 2 01128, Prob( F2statistic) 01000 Prob( F2statistic) 01000 :,,,,, 98

2006 1,, 6,,,,, ( IAROA) IAOP,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,;,,, (),,,,,2005 :,2,2000 :,8,2001 :,11,2002 : :,11,2003 :,3,2004 :, 3,2002 :,12,1999 :,12,2005 :,5,2004 :?,10,2001 :,12 Denis,D.,and J. McConnell,2003,International Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 :1 36. 99

: Djankov,S., and P. Murrell,2002, University of Maryland. 1493. Enterprise Restructuring in Transition : a Quantitative Survey, Working Paper, The World Bank and Durnev,A.,and E. Kim,2005,To Steal or not to Steal :Firm Attributes,Legal Environment,and Valuation, Journal of Finance 60 :1461 Hutchinson,M. and F. Gul,2003,Investment Opportunity Set,Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance 182 :1 20. Lang,L.,and R. Stulz,1994,Tobin s Q,Corporate Diversification,and Firm Performance, Journal of Political Economy 102 :1248 1291. Megginson,W.,and J. Netter,2001,From State to Market :a Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39 : 321 389. Shirley,M.,and P. Walsh,2000,Public vs. Private Ownership :the Current State of the Debate, Working Paper,The World Bank. Shleifer,A.,and R. Vishny,1986,Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy 94 :461 488. Sun,Q.,and W. Tong,2003,China Share Issue Privatization :the Extent of Its Success, Journal of Financial Economics 70 :183 222. Wei,Z.,F. Xie,and S. Zhang,2005,Ownership Structure and Firm Value in China s Privatized Firms :1991 2001, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 :87 108. 98. Xu,X. and Y. Wang,1999,Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, China Economic Review 10 :75 Ownership Concentration,Outside Blockholders,and Operating Performance : Evidence from China s Listed Companies Xu Liping a,xin Yu b and Chen Gongmeng c (a,b :School of Business,SYSU ; c :School of Accounting and Finance,HKPOLYU) Abstract:By identifying the types of blockholders,this study investigates the ownership concentration,outside blockholders and their effects on operating performance for china s listed companies. We find that, there is a linear, rather than a nonlinear relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration, and the positive association holds for all groups. Therefore incentive effect,not entrenchment effect,exists for the largest shareholders. Particularly,the positive effect is highest in the listed companies controlled by SOEs affiliated to the central government ( SOECGs) and by private entities ; is in2between in the listed companies controlled by SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs) ; is lowest in the listed companies controlled by state asset2management bureaus ( SAMB). In the meantime, having outside blockholders is generally associated with lower firm performance ; however,the effects of various outside blockholders on firm performance,and these effects in various types of listed companies are significantly different. Key Words :Ownership Concentration ; Outside Bolckholders ; Ownership Structure ; Operating Performance JEL Classification : G320 ; G380 (: ) (: ) () 2006 3 9,() (),,: 27 ( ) (),:250100 E2mail :: shiying @sdu. edu. cn:0531 88364000,88364128, 100 ( ) 2005 1 8