: (,2003) ; 1996 ;,, ; 1996~2004 1993,, ; ( ), (,2000) (,2001),,, (2003) 2 (1993~, 1996),,,,,, - 136 -

( ) 2009 10 * 1996~2004 ~ 1993, 1994 4,, 1996, :, (,2007),Andrade (2001), (,2007), * (70532003) (05JA790085) : (05301040) ( NCET-07-0882) - 135 -

: (,2003) ; 1996 ;,, ; 1996~2004 1993,, ; ( ), (,2000) (,2001),,, (2003) 2 (1993~, 1996),,,,,, - 136 -

( ) 2009 10 (1997~),,,,, 1. (, 2006), 30, ( ) (,1999) (,2007) 1 (, 2007), (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; Shen and Zou,2006) (,2007) (,2006),, 2004, - 137 -

90% 95% 85% (Shen and Zou,2006),,, (,2004), (Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez, 2006),, (Fock and Wong, 2008; Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005),, ( ) (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Zhang et al.,2004),, : ( G ) 3 : (E) (S) (P) GDP (2007), (,2006;,2002), (,2007), (Naughtom,2000),,,, (, 2004) (,2001) - 138 -

( ) 2009 10, GDP (,2005a),, ( (,2004), 80%, 2. Shen Zou(2006),1994 ( ), (,2000) (,2006) ( (1989) ), (,2007) ( (,2005) Walder(1995),,2004) (2004),2004),, :,, (,2005), GDP - 139 -

, (,2004); U=G+C U,G,,C,, (E) U=, G+f(G,R),f GDP,, (C) (C), (,1997), (,2005),, ( ), (, 2001),,, (,2005b),,, 3. - 140 -

( ) 2009 10 (Cooper,1975) 2002 (,2004) 1994, 2004 7 (G),, (C) ( ) 3 ( ), 2004 7,, 20 80, 9 2005 4 11 1987 1992, 1993, 1994 ( ), 1996, 3-141 -

: 1996 2000,, 1999, 1999 輥 輯 訛 12 ( 1 ) 1 2000,,,3 8 3 1998, 1995,, 8 2001,4 1997 1997 1999 4 1996-142 -, : 輥 輰 訛, 1999 ; 1999 :2001 2003,2001 1 2003, 輥 輱 訛, :2003 2004 ( ),

( ) 2009 10 ;,,, 1997, 2003 5 2003 8 13 2003 9, 189 50 2003, 4,, ST ( ) ESOP( ),, ( ) 1993 2004, 4,,, (2004), 1997, 輥 輲 訛 1994 2,1996 4 1997, 1996, :,, 1999-143 -

,, 1, 4, 2001 1,,, (1998),, 30, ( MBO ESOP),,, (, 2001; Sun and Tong, 2003; Deng, Gan and He,,2003 2006) 90 1996 4 2.6 13 4%,,,, 1998 42, 12 1999 2003, 2000 1 2001 60, 10% 1998 4,, - 144 -

( ) 2009 10 ( ), ST 2,,,, ( ) (,2007) 輥 輶 訛, 輥 輷 訛 : (,2001) ( 輥 輳 訛,2001),, : ST,,2003, 輥 輴 訛 : ; 50,, ;, :,, ( ), 輦 輮 訛 2003 輥 輵 訛, - 145 -

, 輦 輰 訛 10 ESOP,, ( ),,ESOP,1998, 輦 輱 訛 (E),,, (S) 2001 (C), 2001 2001 輦 輲 訛, GDP (,2002) 1997,, 2002 2001, 輦 輳 訛, 2000 8 31, 74,, 輦 輯 訛 2000, 2001, - 146 -

( ) 2009 10, 2008 20 90, 輴 訛 輦 1998 10.66%, 9.34%, 6.99%, 7.87% 1999 6 ST,2 PT :,,,, PT PT PT PT PT 2000 19,, 2001 15 (,2002), ; (,, 2002),,20 90,,, 90 2002 11.5%1/9, ; 15.8% 17.4% 1 / 6 1 / 7; 17.8% 1/6 輦 輵 訛 (5.16%) :, 2004-147 -

1543 398 6800,, 2000 20 90, ( ) 輦 輶 訛,,, 2001~2004, 250 10% 3, 1998,, (,2005) 2000 12 14, 6,,1997~2001 2003 2003? - 148 -

( ) 2009 10 輦 輷 訛 :, GDP ;, ;,, 1996 2004, 2005 2005 4 1,2001 : 2001 IPO 2004 IPO,2003 2003,,2002 9 28 ( ), 2006 2008,2008 4 ; ( 1 ), (WGA), - 149 -

6 訛 輶 輥, (2009) ; 訛 輷 輥 2004, WTO, :,, 30, (,1998;,2004), 訛 輮 輦 4,,, 訛 輯 輦 2002 訛 輰 輦 2004, (2004) (2006) MBO 訛 輱 輦 :,, ; ;, 1995 6 2000 ( ) 訛 輳 輦 訛 輯 輥 2003 6 1999, 訛 輴 輦,3 30% 訛 輰 輥 5 6 700,,6 5, 訛 輵 輦 : 2004 :http://www.people.com.cn/gb/paper87/9759/898177.html 1996 訛 輶 輦 2003? 訛 輱 輥 訛 輲 輥, 訛 輲 輦 訛 輳 輥, 訛 輷 輦,2005 ( ), 2005 訛 輴 輥 25, ( 2002 15 8 ) (2007) 5 2005,, (1)Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E., 2001, New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, Journal of Economic 訛 輵 輥 Perspectives,15,pp.103~120. (2)Bahl, Roy and Jorge Martinez -Vazquez, 2006, Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization, World Bank Policy, Research - 150 -

Working Paper. (3)Cooper, J., 1975, Strengthening the Congress: An Organizational Analysis, Harvard Journal of Legislation, 12, pp.307~ 68. (4)Fock, Achim and Christine,Wong, 2008, Financing Rural Development for a Harmonious Society in China: Recent Reforms in Public Finance and Their Prospects,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. (5)Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, 2005, Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style, Journal of Public Economics 89, pp.1719~1742. (6)Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N., 2001, The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives, American Economic Review,911, pp.225~239. (7)Shen Chunli and Heng -fu Zou, 2006, Fiscal Decentralization in China Potential Next Steps, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. (8)Walder, Andrew G., 1995, Local Governments as Industrial Firms, American Journal of Sociology,101,pp.263~301. (9)Zhang Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang, 2004, Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China,Journal of Public Economics,Volume 88, Issue 12, December, pp.2857~2871. (10)Barry Naughton: :,2000 (11), ( ) 2009 10 FDI,,2007 3 : (35) :,2002 :,1997,2009 2 (12) :,2003 (13) :,,2001 12 (14) : :,2005,,2007 3 (15) : :,,2006 (16) :, ( ) 2005 9 :http://www.jingji.com.cn/show.aspx?id=535 (17) :,,2004 1 (18) :,2005 2007 2 (2) (19) : (44),,2004 4, : :,2005a 2 (20) : (45) : :,,,2007,2005b 2 (21) : (46) :,,,2000 5,2003 5 4 (47) : (22) ( ):,,2002, 1989 : 12, (48) :,1994,,2004 1 (23) : :,,2004 10 (24),2003 (25) :,2001 (26) :,1999 (27) : :,,2003 5 1 (28) : :, 2003 3 (29) :,,2004 2 (30) : :,,2007 4 (31) :,2007 (32) : :,,2004 8 (33) :, ( ),1999 11 (34) : (36) :, 1 (37) :,2001 (38) :,2001 (39) : (40) :,1998 7 (41) :,,1998 12 (42) : :,2003 (43) :,, (49) :,,2004 10 (50) : :,,2006 4-151 -

MANAGEMENT WORLD No.10 2009 A Study on the Relationship between the Effects of the Organizational Innovative Climate and those of Motivational Preference, on Employees Innovative Behavior by Liu Yun and Shi Jintao In terms of the definition of the innovative climate, two approaches have been generally adopted: the cognitive schemata approach and the shared perception approach. There are two kinds of work motivation: the situational motivation and the trait motivation. The former includes two kinds of orientations the intrinsic motivation and the extrinsic motivation orientation. The trait motivation involves the individual preference for motivational factors, including the intrinsic motivational preference (IMP) and the extrinsic motivational preference (EMP). The results of our study show that both the IMP and the EMP positively moderate the innovative behavior, that the EMP positively adjusts the relationship between the innovative climate and the innovative behavioral and that the IMP, however, negatively adjusts the said relationship. In other words, the stronger the IMP is, the weaker the impact of the innovative climate on the innovative behavior; the weaker the IMP, the greater the effect of the innovative climate on innovative behavior. The stronger the EMP, the greater the effect mentioned above. The Public Governance of Local Governments and the Transfer of the Control Right of the State-owned Listed Companies by Tan Jinsong, Zheng Guojian and Peng Song By the discussion about the case of the significant restructuring, during the years 1996-2004, of the listed companies led by the city government of Shenzhen, we have, mainly from the aspect of the regional public administration, analyzed the motivation behind the participation of the Shenzhen government in the restructuring of the local listed companies and analyzed the essential impact of the institutional climate on the different ways of restructuring adopted by the government in different periods. By our study, we have found that, from the point of view of the target of restructuring, the above-mentioned restructuring experienced two phases: the passive restructuring of the lossmaking enterprises and the voluntary restructuring of industry-oriented enterprises; from the perspective of the transferees, there were approximately four stages: the restructuring of the enterprises under the leadership of the city government, then, the restructuring of the local private enterprises, then the restructuring of enterprise managers, finally, the restructuring of enterprises run by those from other places. By our analysis, we have further discovered that, after the reform of the decentralization of authority, the local-government s fulfillment of the responsibility for good public administration, which resulted in the forms of expression of and their change in the main performance of the local officials, was the direct cause for the local-government active participation in the restructuring of local enterprises, and that the political climate, polices, regulations, the market environment, the system environments such as that of the resources of local enterprises, and the change in the constraint from the administration, were the fundamental root of the different ways of behavior in restructuring. Editor in Chief: Vice Chief_Editor: General Editor: President: Sponsor: Add: Tel: Li Kemu Tian Yuan,He Shaohua,Lu Jian & Jiang Dongsheng Xie Yue Gao Yanjing Development Research Centre of the State Council,P.R.C. No.8 Dazhongsi,Donglou,Beijing,China (010) 62112235 62115760 MANAGEMENT WORLD Original Name:ADMINISTRATIVE WORLD - 188 -