30 009 006 600 00433 zhaochen@ fudan. edu. cn 08BJL008 985 B0 YES 0 9 3
009 009 Chen et al. 0 0 Xu0 008 GDP 007 008 005 Li and Zhou005 Blanchard and Shleifer00 Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya007 GDP GDP 008 005 008 7 0 9 4
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP Lazear Rosen 98 004 007 005 Li and Zhou005 0 9 5
self - enforcing e e e e G Y G 0 9 6
e G = e Y Y = e G + e + ε GDP Benhabib and Rustichini996 Wan006 005 ε N 0σ 3 C e = C e + e = 0. 5b e + e b maxpw + - P w - C e + e e e P W w P e W - w = b e + e 3 P e W - w = b e + e 4 3 4 004 3 0 9 7
U r 3 U r = Y + λg = e e + e + λe + ε 5 λ λ GDP GDP GDP i i j P = Prob Y i > Y j = Prob e i e i + e i + ε i > e j e j + e j + ε j Weingast 009 00 0 0 9 8
= + - ei ei +ei -ej ej -ej +εi - e i e i e - εj σ e - εi σ dε j dε i 6 槡 πσ 槡 πσ e i = e j e i = e j 3 4 + e^ W - w = b e^ + e^ 7 槡 πσ 槡 πσ e^ W - w = b e^ + e^ 8 e^ e^ GDP e^ = 9 - φ e^ = φ - 0 - φ φ = W - w 槡 πσ b φ φ < φ < < φ < 9 0 > e^ e^ φ φ φ φ - λ + 3λφ - λφ EU^ = e^ e^ + e^ + λe^ = - φ b 0 9 9
φ φ e^ > 0 P W - w = e^ W - w < b e^ + e^ e^ 槡 πσ e^ = 0 e^ = φ φ U 5 U r η 4 U = U r + η = e e + e + λe + ε + η η N 0 σ 3 i 4 P = Prob U i > U j = Prob e i e i + e i + λe i + ε i + η i > e j e j + e j + λe j + ε j + η j de U^ + λ - λφ φ = > 0 dφ - φ 3 3 GDP GDP 4 λ = 0 σ = 0 3 6 GDP λ σ 0 9 0
= + - + - + - ei ei +ei +λei -ej ej -ej -λej +εi +η i -η j - πσ e - ε j σ e - ε i σ e - η i πσ σ e - η j σ dε j dε i dη i dη j 3 e i e i e i = e j e i = e j 3 4 + e ~ W - w = b e ~ 槡 π 槡 σ + e ~ 4 + σ λ + e ~ W - w = b e ~ 槡 π σ + e ~ 5 + σ 槡 e ~ e ~ e ~ e ~ = + λ - ψ - λ 6 = + λ - ψ - 7 W - w ψ = 槡 π σ 槡 + σb GDP φ ψ ψ φ GDP { } ψ > max - λ - λ e ~ - e ~ - e^ - e^ = λ 8 ~ 4 6 7 6 7 GDP φ ψ 0 9
ψ λ > ψ - λ e ~ = 0 e ~ = λψ ψ λ < ψ - λ e ~ = ψ e ~ = 0 ψ EU^ > EU ~ GDP EU ~ > EU^ GDP a = 槡 σ + σ σ a > a 0 9
EU ~ = e ~ e ~ + e ~ + λe ~ = + λ a a - φ - λ 9 GDP λ a φ EU^ = EU ~ a φ φ + λ - φ a = 槡 槡 + λ - φ - + λ - φ a φ λ a φ φ a 0 a λ = φ a φ σ a σ a φ σ σ deu~ da = - + λ aφ < 0 EU^ a - φ 3 deu~ dφ = + λ a > 0 a - φ 3 0 9 3
σ σ σ σ 3 3 ~ 4 λ λ GDP 0 λ a λ = φ - φ [ φ + λ - φ ] 槡 + λ - φ [ 槡 + λ - φ - + λ - φ ] φ λ φ a λ λ σ σ GDP 4 0 9 4 > 0 λ
4 ~ 4 GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP 0 9 5
GDP GDP 0 9 6
GDP 006 009 0 0 005 008 009 4 009 0 007 00 4 0 008 004 6 007 7 008 005 BenhabibJ. and RustichiniA. Social Conflict and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth996 pp. 9-46. BlanchardO. and ShleiferA. Federalism with and without Political Centralization China Versus Russia. IMF Staff Papers0048pp. 7-79. ChenZ. SunY. Z. NewmanA. and XuW. EntrepreneursOrganizational MembersPolitical Participation and Preferential Treatment Evidence from China. International Small Business Journal0forthcoming. EnikolopovR. and ZhuravskayaE. Decentralization and Political Institutions. Journal of Public Econom- 0 9 7
ics0079pp. 6-90. LazearE. and RosenS. Rank - Ordered Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts. Journal of Political E- conomy9889pp. 84-864. LiH. and ZhouL. Political Turnover and Economic Performance The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China. Journal of Public Economics00589pp. 743-76. WanG. LuM. and ChenZ. The Inequality Growth Nexus in the Short and Long Runs Empirical Evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics00634 4 pp. 654-667. WeingastB. R. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism The Implications of Fiscal Incentives. Journal of Urban Economics00965 3 pp. 79-93. XuC. G. The Fundamental Institutions of China s Reforms and Development. Journal of Economic Literature0forthcoming. A. 7 8 6 e i e i P = + e - 槡 πσ + - πσ ei ei + ei - ej ej - ej + εi e i - e - 槡 πσ ei ei + ei - ej ej - ej + εi σ e - 槡 πσ εi σ dε i + e i P = + σ e - εi σ dε i e i e i = e j e i = e j P 槡 πσ e^ e - ε i σ dε i + e^ = 槡 πσ + e^ + P = - πσ e^ e - ε i σ dε i e^ = 槡 πσ e^ 3 4 7 8 e^ GDP B. 4 5 3 e i e i P = e i + - + - + - πσ e - η i σ e - η j σ dε i dη i dη j + e i P = e i + - + - + - πσ e - η j σ dε i dη i dη j + e i P = e ~ + - + - + - πσ e - η i σ e - η j σ dε i dη i dη j + e ~ = λ + e ~ 槡 π σ P = + σ e ~ + 槡 e^ e - ei ei + ei + λei - ej ej - ej - λej + ε i + ηi - ηj σ e - ei ei + ei + λei - ej ej - ej - λej + ε i + ηi - ηj σ - + - + - πσ e i - = e - ε i σ πσ e - ε i σ e - η i πσ σ e - ε i + ηi - ηj σ e - ε i + ηi - ηj σ e - ε i σ πσ e - ε i σ πσ e - η i σ e - η j σ dε i dη i dη j λ + e ~ = 槡 π σ 槡 + σ 4 5 λ + e ~ e槇 e槇 0 9 8 0 5