2010 2016 415. 8 3. 0 2016 2013 2015 350. 0 363. 6 384. 1 2. 58 2. 67 2. 79 2013 2015 307. 9 326. 7 340. 4 2. 26 2. 40 2. 50 2016 1 2 1 2 138
Bumpass et al. 1990 Sweeney 1997 2015 1998 Glen. H. E social links Giele & Elder 1998 CFPS 2010 Becker. G. S Easterlin R. A Oppenheimeer V. K marriage market gains to trade Becker 1973 utility 139
2018. 1 Becker 1973 Becker 1981 Easterlin 1978 theory of marriage timing Oppenheimer 1988 Sweeney 1997 Goldscheider & Kaufman 2006 2015 140
Goldman et al. 1984 Bumpass et al. 1990 Coleman 1988 1 social links 1 141
2018. 1 80% 2000 1998 1998 2000 142
2002 2015 1. 1 1. 2 1. 3 1. 4 Sweeney 1997 Ivanova et al. 2013 2015 143
2018. 1 1. 5 1. 6 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 3 3. 1 144
CFPS 2010 CFPS 25 25 95% CFPS / / 2014 CFPS CFPS 2010 CFPS 432 408 27 36 18 2 923 852 1. exposure 2010 7 censoring 145
2018. 1 2. 1 6 1 846 0. 51 0. 50 846 3. 43 1. 76 1 12 842 3. 91 5. 84 0 100 1 = 765 1. 11 0. 82 2 = 3 = 846 1. 43 1. 02 0 7 846 5. 51 6. 87 0 35 844 0. 88 1. 27 0 10 839 2. 84 5. 89 0 100 846 0. 84 0. 37 0 = 1 = 846 0. 56 0. 50 0 = 1 = 716 23. 73 4. 20 11 49 760 32. 89 7. 98 13 68 844 0. 48 0. 50 0 = 1 = 623 9. 03 1. 41 2. 30 13. 46 1 = 2 = 844 1. 97 0. 96 3 = 846 1. 56 1. 00 3 = 4 = 1 = 2 = 4 = 5 = 3. 146
Weibull Kaplan-Meier K-M K-M K-M log-rank 1 - a T α = - 0. 5 S t ln S t ln S t Cox AFT ln - ln s t ln t logt i = β 0 + β 1 x 1 + + β k x k + σε logh t = alogt + β * 0 + β * 1 x 1 + + β * k x k 147
2018. 1 6. 9 0. 46 1 - a 0 ~ 5 1 - b 5 5 16. 93 p > 0. 000 1 - c 10 6. 95 p > 0. 000 1 - d 29. 72 p > 0. 000 1 Kaplan-Meier 148
1. 2 26. 74% 3. 4% 1. 1 36. 87% 42. 25% 1. 3 22. 26% 8. 88% 1. 5 2. 2 149
2018. 1 2 23. 81% 2. 2 2 Weibull 0. 238 *** - 0. 047 0. 245 *** - 0. 049 0. 237 *** - 0. 049-0. 339-0. 238-0. 393-0. 242-0. 461 * - 0. 243-0. 578-0. 302-0. 483-0. 306-0. 549 * - 0. 308 0. 024 ** - 0. 011 0. 030 *** - 0. 011 0. 033 *** - 0. 011 ** 0. 196-0. 08 *** - 0. 090-0. 02 0. 205 ** - 0. 087-0. 094 *** - 0. 02-0. 242 *** - 0. 087-0. 006-0. 007 0. 201 ** - 0. 085-0. 093 *** - 0. 02-0. 272 *** - 0. 089-0. 007-0. 007 0. 499 ** - 0. 254-0. 580 *** - 0. 184-0. 547 *** - 0. 186-0. 528 *** - 0. 186-0. 398 * - 0. 223-0. 325-0. 225-0. 354-0. 225-0. 525-0. 363-0. 518-0. 355-0. 631 * - 0. 357-0. 090 *** - 0. 031-0. 093 *** - 0. 031-0. 099 *** - 0. 031 150
0. 066 *** - 0. 02 0. 066 *** - 0. 02 0. 067 *** - 0. 02-0. 067-0. 208-0. 016-0. 211-0. 064-0. 214 0. 125-0. 076 0. 154 ** - 0. 078 0. 148 * - 0. 076 0. 168-0. 232 0. 034-0. 237-0. 005-0. 242 0. 189-0. 283 0. 016-0. 292-0. 037-0. 292 0. 013-0. 381-0. 028-0. 386-0. 030-0. 387 0. 441-0. 305 0. 438-0. 309 0. 492-0. 309 0. 462-0. 291 0. 402-0. 298 0. 450-0. 301 0. 564-0. 419 0. 312-0. 447 0. 334-0. 452-0. 012-0. 531-0. 011-0. 525 0. 048-0. 531 Constant - 5. 981 *** - 1. 06-6. 038 *** - 1. 074-6. 189 *** - 1. 071 Log likelihood - 402. 210-395. 925-393. 801 LR chi2 20 94. 900 100. 740 104. 990 Prob > chi2 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 N 398 395 395 1 *** p < 0. 001 ** p < 0. 01 * p < 0. 05 + p < 0. 1 2 3. 2 64. 71% 3 151
2018. 1 4. 3-1. 128 p < 0. 001 67. 63% 1. 4-1. 010 p < 0. 001 63. 58% - 1. 089 p < 0. 001 66. 34% 0. 794 p < 0. 1 9. 99% 0. 788 p < 0. 1 14. 08% 3-1. 010 *** - 0. 376-0. 487 ** - 0. 239-0. 470 * - 0. 243-1. 089 *** - 0. 409-0. 558 * - 0. 302-0. 568 * - 0. 31 0. 033 *** - 0. 011 0. 032 *** - 0. 011 0. 033 *** - 0. 011 ** 0. 222-0. 087 0. 498 *** - 0. 148 0. 202 ** - 0. 085 0. 506 ** - 0. 254 0. 484 * - 0. 253 0. 274-0. 373-1. 128 *** - 0. 34 0. 029-0. 309-0. 872 + - 0. 481 + 0. 794 * - 0. 447 * 0. 788 + - 0. 422 152
* - 0. 378 ** - 0. 161 * 0. 394-0. 509 Constant - 5. 756 *** - 1. 07-6. 581 *** - 1. 092-5. 882 *** - 1. 141 Log likelihood - 391. 762-391. 210-393. 504 LR chi2 20 109. 070 110. 170 105. 580 Prob > chi2 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 N 395 395 395 1 *** p < 0. 001 ** p < 0. 01 * p < 0. 05 + p < 0. 1 2 3 3 0. 029 0. 498 p < 0. 001 64. 54% - 0. 378 p < 0. 01 33. 07% 1. 6 3-0. 872 p < 0. 1 58. 19% 3. 1 0. 274 0. 394 5. 153
2018. 1 4-1. 029 p < 0. 001 64. 26% 0. 252 p < 0. 001 39. 95% 0. 213 p < 0. 001 23. 74% - 0. 332 0. 055 p < 0. 01 29. 39% 1. 2 4 0. 107-0. 068 0. 213 *** - 0. 05 0. 235 *** - 0. 049 0. 031 *** - 0. 011 0. 019-0. 015 0. 030 *** - 0. 011-0. 004-0. 007-0. 006-0. 007-0. 013-0. 008-1. 029 *** - 0. 395-0. 332-0. 249-0. 327-0. 224 * 0. 252 *** - 0. 088 * 0. 055 ** - 0. 024 * 0. 096 *** - 0. 024 Constant - 5. 306 *** - 1. 12-5. 944 *** - 1. 087-6. 348 *** - 1. 088 Log likelihood - 389. 662-391. 383-387. 267 LR chi2 20 113. 270 109. 820 118. 050 Prob > chi2 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 N 395 395 395 1 *** p < 0. 001 ** p < 0. 01 * p < 0. 05 + p < 0. 1 2 154
3 0. 235 p < 0. 001 26. 49% - 0. 327 0. 096 p < 0. 001 36. 57% 2. 3 6. - 0. 582 p < 0. 001 44. 12% 46. 79% 9. 43% 6. 93% 15. 95% CFPS 2010 155
2018. 1 156
1998 2016 2016 2000 157
2018. 1 2000 2015 CFPS2010 4 2002 4 2014 2 2015 2 2017 2016 Becker G. S. 1973 A theory of Marriage Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81 4. 1981 A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge MA Harvard University Press. Bumpass L. J. Sweet & T. C. Martin 1990 Changing Patterns of Remarriage. Journal of Marriage and the Family 747-756. Coleman J. S. 1988 Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. Ameircan Journal of Sociology 94 S95 - S120. Easterlin R. A. 1978 What Will 1984 Be Like Socioeconomic Implications of Recent Twists in Age Structure. Demography 15 4. Giele J. Z. & G. H. Elder 1998 Methods of Life Course Research Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches CA Sage Publications. Gieryn T. F. 2000 A Space for Place in Sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 26 1. Goldman N. C. F. Westoff & C. Hammerslough 1984 Demography of the Marriage Market in the United States. Population Index 5-25. Goldscheider F. & G. Kaufman 2006 Willingness to Stepparent Attitudes about Partners Who Already Have Children. Journal of Family Issues 27 10. Ivanova K. M. Kalmijn & W. Uunk 2013 The Effect of Children on Men's and Women's Chances of Re-partnering in A European Context. European Journal of Population /Revue Européenne De Démographie 29 4. Oppenheimer V. K. 1988 A Theory of Marriage Timing. American Journal of Sociology 94 3. Putnam R. D. 2016 Our Kids The American Dream in Crisis NY Simon & Schuster. Sweeney M. M. 1997 Remarriage of Women and Men after Divorce The Role of Socioeconomic Prospects. Journal of Family Issues 18 5. 158
and usage of different media e. g. Television Newspaper the Internet. Among different media uses mediation effect of the Internet is the highest then followed by television and newspaper. On the contrary radio and magazine have not played a significant role. The result suggests the rising of new media and the falling of traditional media in the socialization process as well as inspires policy-making and implications on the improvement of residents' environmental concern by utilization of different media. Does Social Links Affect the Probability of Chinese Adults' Remarriage Wu Yiwen 138 Abstract Social links exert a great influence on individual's remarriage probability from the structural perspective. This paper explores the effects of social structure on the remarriage opportunity by analyzing the relationship between remarriage chances and family relationships friends' networks and working networks. Applying the event history analysis and using data from the Chinese Family Panel Study 2010 we find that these three links have significant effects on remarriage chance after controlling other variables. In the factor of family relationships relative size and the pressure of parenting increase the probability of individual's remarriage. In terms of working relationship the working experience apparently enhances the chance of remarriage. Among the network of friends however the intimate association with friends delays the timing. Meanwhile the effects of social links on the remarriage behavior also have the sexual and rural-urban differences. The Personal Identification and Mothering Practices under Structural Constraints A Qualitative Case Study on the Career Break of Middle-class Mothers Cai Ling 159 Abstract This research explores and analyzes the identity construction and action of middle-class mothers through narrative method and from institutional ethnography perspective. Based on 15 in-depth interviews of stay-at-home mothers it finds that they recognize their decisions as voluntary choices though we argued them as choice gap under structural constrains. Meanwhile they also work part-time which helps establish positive self-identification to avoid being labelled as traditional housewives. However mothering identity and the career break consolidate the existing gendered and market-oriented childcare system to some extent. They also strengthen the low state intervention on childcare. It calls promotion of social change for the care and work compatible. 245