从债券到股票的交叉参照

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1 2014 年 5 月 15 日 欧洲 策略焦点 从债券到股票的交叉参照 证券研究报告 股市势头的逆转以及债券收益率的下降引出了很多关于股票投资信号方面的问题 同时, 股市走高, 创下几年来的高点 我们不认为出现了显著的脱节 在本文的问答部分, 我们阐述了就该主题下几个问题的看法 长期艰难上涨股市创下几年来的高点, 而我们认为这符合潜在远期基本面逐步改善以及股市风险溢价温和持续下降 我们仍预计股市将走高, 受到盈利和股息增长 企业更积极利用现金以及股权成本逐步下降等因素的推动 周期性疲弱并非结构性我们的债券策略师认为, 债券收益率下降的大部分原因在于经济活动周期性疲弱以及欧元区通胀下降 虽然随着风险溢价的下降股市温和上涨, 但这种周期性疲弱体现在最近部分势头放缓以及周期股表现相对落后 然而, 我们认为债市和股市计入的长期增长预测最近没有结构性恶化 美国的 30 年期收益率目前处于其四年移动平均值, 而且在过去两年的大部分时间里一直远低于该水平 何处寻找价值然而, 随着周期性复苏显现, 我们的债券策略师认为收益率曲线的近端容易受到利率上升的影响 ( 特别是美国, 直至 2018 年实际短期利率预期为负 ) 就以往而言, 只要经济增长正在改善, 美国短期利率预期的上升往往不会对欧洲股市产生非常不利的影响 但这可能导致新兴市场资产以及那些在该市场上业务比重较大的欧洲股票出现新一轮疲软走势 我们仍推荐收益率和股息增长股票组合 (GSSTHIDY); 而且为了受益于周期性经济复苏, 推荐经营状况受发达市场影响较大的企业股票组合 (GSSTDMGR) 彼得 欧品海默 +44(20) peter.oppenheimer@gs.com 高盛国际 Sharon Bell, CFA +44(20) sharon.bell@gs.com 高盛国际 Christian Mueller-Glissmann, CFA +44(20) christian.muellerglissmann@gs.com 高盛国际 Anders Nielsen +44(20) anders.e.nielsen@gs.com 高盛国际 Matthieu Walterspiler, CFA +44(20) matthieu.walterspiler@gs.com 高盛国际 Anna Huang +44(20) anna.huang@gs.com 高盛国际 高盛与其研究报告所分析的企业存在业务关系, 并且继续寻求发展这些关系 因此, 投资者应当考虑到本公司可能存在可能影响本报告客观性的利益冲突, 不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素 有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息, 见信息披露附录, 或参阅 由非美国附属公司聘用的分析师不是美国 FINRA 的注册 / 合格研究分析师 高盛集团 全球投资研究

2 Is there a mismatch between bonds and equities? Over the past week, we have had many questions from equity investors about the move lower in bond yields and the implications for equities. Many worry that very low interest rates might be a warning to equity investors who are waiting for, and have paid up to some degree for, economic growth and improved profitability. In this Q&A, we try to give our take on the questions that have been raised. Q: Is there a mismatch between the signal from bonds and equities do you think? A: In our view, there hasn t been as much of a mismatch as it may appear. True US 30-year yields have fallen from over 4% at the start of the year to 3.6% today and volatility has also declined. It is also true that we saw a painful momentum unwind in equity markets over the past couple of months. Exhibit 1: US equities and bond yields over the past six months S&P year US yields Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 Dec-13 Jan-14 Feb-14 Mar-14 Apr Source: BIS, Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research However, the broader picture is that equity markets continue to grind higher and have done so over the past couple of years through different environments as bond yields rise and fall. The S&P has just hit a new all-time high, and this week the STOXX Europe 600 has risen to its highest level in six years and the FTSE 100 for 14 years. 全球投资研究 2

3 Exhibit 2: Price performance of STOXX Europe 600 and FTSE 100 since June 2012 lows equities continue to grind higher STOXX Europe 600 FTSE 100 (RHS) Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research We do not see these movements as incongruous, however. Beneath the surface of the broader indices, equities have priced some cyclical weakness as cyclical stocks have generally underperformed defensives (see Exhibit 3). Exhibit 3: US and Europe Cyclicals vs. Defensives Cyclicals: Media, gen retailers, travel, leisure goods, chemicals, basic resources, construction & materials, industrial goods & services, autos & parts; Defensives: Food & beverages, tobacco, health care, food & drug retail, utilities US Europe 88 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research The gradual rise in the broader indices reflects an improvement in fundamentals (forward growth prospects and the inflation/policy backdrop) and is supported by a gradual but persistent decline in the equity risk premium (ERP). Our models suggest that the ERP will continue to fall further over the next three years as output gaps gradually narrow. While the effect of this should be somewhat offset by rising bond yields, the fall in the ERP is likely to dominate, allowing the real cost of equity to fall further (see Strategy Matters: Options for the Long Good Buy, April 24, 2014). 全球投资研究 3

4 Exhibit 4: Our macro model implies gradual further declines in ERP Market Implied ERP Macro benchmarked ERP Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Exhibit 5: We expect a decline in the real cost of equity 10 Real Cost of Equity Average Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. The combination should allow forward multiples to rise moderately over the next three years and, combined with earnings growth, drive equities higher. If bond yields don t pick up in the way that we expect, then P/E multiples could rise further than we are saying. But on our central forecast, we expect price returns through to end-2016 that annualize at 12% across Europe, implying a prospective total return around the 70th percentile compared with 3-year periods in history. Q: But aren t lower yields telling us that growth prospects are deteriorating? A: Our bond strategists do not think that the falls in long-term bond yields are really telling us anything very new. The 30-year yield now sits in line with its 4-year moving average and it has been much lower than this level over a good part of the past two years. Long-term growth expectations fell after the great recession, but have remained low and stable ever since they have not deteriorated meaningfully recently. Economists polled by Consensus Economics see US real GDP averaging 2.25% over the medium term (6-10 years), compared to an estimate of 3.00%-3.25% prior to 2007 (inflation is seen stable around 2%, in line with the central bank s target). 全球投资研究 4

5 Exhibit 6: US long-term real GDP growth 6-10 year growth from Consensus Economics US long term real growth Source: Consensus Economics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Q: But why have yields fallen then? A: For the most part, they have converged to our estimates of where they should be trading based on fundamentals. Francesco Gazarelli and our rates strategy team have shown using a model that relates the slope between 30-year and 10-year US Treasury yields to expectations on long-term nominal growth (which our bond strategists call GS-Curve ) that long-dated 30-year bond yields were too high at the start of the year. They have now moved to levels (around 80bp) that historical relationships with macro factors would describe as appropriate. The shift lower in yields is, they argue, consistent with the downward revisions in growth and inflation that we have seen in both the US and overseas. At the start of the year, the consensus for US real GDP growth in 2014 was 3%. The weak first quarter means that realized growth since the start of the year has been roughly half of what economists had predicted. At the same time, forecasts for Chinese growth have also receded, as have European inflation forecasts lower inflation is particularly important in driving longer-dated yields. Our bond strategists argue that earlier this year positions in the bond market were generally short and are getting squeezed out as weaker growth emerged in Asia and the US and as the BoE and ECB gave dovish messages. 全球投资研究 5

6 Exhibit 7: The 10s-30s slope has realigned to macro relationships Slope between 10-year and 30-year US Treasuries and GS Curve estimate bps /- 1 std dev. -10 GS Curve 'Fair' Value -30 Current Market Pricing Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research At the same time, in the US at least, 10-yr Treasury yields trade just above their 4-year moving average. Again our strategists fair value models (Bond Sudoku), which are based on a regression model using global macro factors, suggest that yields are now close to fair value given the expected level of short rates, growth and inflation over the next 12 months. However, as the chart shows, they continue to believe that the rates will rise above these current estimates over the next few months as stronger data emerges. Exhibit 8: US yields close to fair value US 10-year government bond yields: actual and Sudoku model estimate % Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research +/- 1 std dev. US 10-yr yield Sudoku 'Fair' Value Current Market Pricing GS Forecast Q: But equity markets have largely ignored the move, why? 全球投资研究 6

7 A: To the extent that the bond market has readjusted to lower inflation expectations on more dovish central banks, the move in equities is consistent. But, like the longer end of the bond market, equities do not seem to be pricing lower structural growth. Reversing our multi-stage DDM to back out implied annualised real earnings growth 20 years forward (by fixing the ERP at a stable rate), we find that longer-term expectations have been actually rising since the worst period of the European crisis, albeit from a very depressed base in Europe. Exhibit 9: Implied future growth rate in Europe Assuming a 3.5% ERP longer-term assumptions are rising (from a very depressed base) STOXX Implied earnings growth Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Again this makes sense longer-dated bond yields have adjusted down having overshot relative to the fundamentals in our view, while longer-dated growth assumptions in the equity market have risen gradually from a very depressed base. Q: Will Cyclicals remain under pressure? A: No, we see this as temporary. Our global leading indicator GLI has just moved into expansion territory (see Global Economics Weekly: What to expect when expanding: Equity upside, EM unlikely to lead, May 7, 2014). An expansion of the global industrial cycle, led by DM, should be better for companies operationally levered into DM growth. 全球投资研究 7

8 Exhibit 10: The GLI, with growth positive and acceleration no longer negative, is on the cusp of Expansion GLI Acceleration 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00% Recovery Mar-14 Apr-14 Expansion May-13 Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug % Feb-14 Sep-13 Oct % Jan-14 Nov-13 Dec % Contraction Slowdown -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% GLI Growth Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Q: So are there remaining risks in the rate markets for equities? A: Our bond strategists argue that German Bunds have fallen to well below their macro benchmarked fair value and the EUR yield curve has flattened and is negative on bund yields; they expect them to rise to 2.25% by end In other markets, such as the US, the risk is more at the front end. In particular, short-term real rates are still priced to be negative until 2018 in the US. Exhibit 11: Forward price negative real rates until OIS rates minus inflation swap rates % United States -1.0 Euro Area -1.5 United Kingdom -2.0 FED Projections Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research We see this as risky if growth picks up to above 3% over the remaining quarters of the year as we expect. 全球投资研究 8

9 Q: So what would happen to equities if US short rate expectations were to rise? A: Initially it would probably push up the entire term structure to around 30-40bp above the forwards in 10s and 30s by the third quarter. Such a shift would help the dollar strengthen against the majors. We forecast the euro to drop to 1.30 against the dollar in 12 months time. Other things equal, this would help European equities. But, in our view, if the rise in yields were a function of higher growth expectations, it should have a relatively benign impact on equities. Historically at least, the initial rises in short rates that have resulted in a flattening yield curve have tended to be fairly benign for equities. Exhibit 12: European equities during periods of US yield curve flattening driven by the short-end rising...initial rises in rates do not tend to be bad for equities Start date End date bp change in yield % change in % change in Length 10 year bond yield (%) 2 year bond yield (%) Annualised % % change in curve slope (10y-2y equities in 12 change in equities in first 6 (months) equities Start date End date Start date End date yield) months prior equities months Aug-80 Sep May-88 Apr Apr-94 Jan Nov-98 Feb Jul-03 Mar Average Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research From a purely technical perspective, the impact would depend a lot on what happens to the equity risk premium at the time. As Exhibit 13 shows, a rise in the nominal risk free rate (shown here as a blended average between 10-year gilt yields and bunds) from current levels of 1.8 to, say, 2.1 would reduce fair value on the SXXP by around 6%. However, this could easily be more than offset by a modest fall in the ERP. In previous phases of rising interest rate expectations over the past three years, there has been a positive correlation with equity returns (that is higher yields have coincided with higher equity prices). Exhibit 13: Fair value level for STOXX Europe 600 Sensitivity table is centered around current values of our macro benchmarked ERP and the current level of the nominal bond yield. Nominal risk-free rate Equity Risk Premium 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 8.5% 9.0% 0.6% % % % % % % % % % % Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Q: What about EM assets? 全球投资研究 9

10 A: Rising rate expectations in DM could trigger further weakness in EM. European stocks with high EM exposure would weaken under this scenario and we remain fairly cautious on EM exposure particularly in expensive staples such as food as well as capital goods and basic resources. As Noah Weisberger from our macro markets team has shown, growing GLIs and economic momentum were consistent with EM equity outperformance prior to the Great Recession. Since then, the reverse has generally been true as EM growth has tended to be weaker. The gap between the US PMI and China PMI spread, for example, is currently about the 90th percentile. DM countries are also facing better inflation fundamentals and looser financial conditions. Recently, the relative performance of European stocks with high EM exposure has tracked the overall EM vs. DM trade closely. For example, the EM rally in March/April, which coincided with expectation of an improving China outlook, fueled outperformance in EM-exposed consumer and industrial stocks in Europe. However, the subsequent disappointment in China data led to an unwind both in EM equities as well as European stocks with EM exposure. As we have shown previously, the EM/DM trade has largely been driven by two factors: China activity and broad financial conditions. It is the latter of these two factors, evidenced by a compression in EM 2-year swap spreads, which has led to modest EM outperformance in recent days. From a European standpoint, this compression in EM yields has curbed the underperformance of EM-exposed consumer stocks. As we mention above, this basket may be at risk if US short rate expectations rise as we expect. Exhibit 14: European stocks with high EM exposure has tracked overall EM vs. DM trade EM Exposed Industrials (GSSTBRCI vs. STOXX 600) EM Exposed Consumer (GSSTBRCC vs. STOXX 600) MSCI EM vs. MSCI World 85 Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 Dec-13 Jan-14 Feb-14 Mar-14 Apr-14 Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Exhibit 15: EM vs. DM trade partly driven by broad financial conditions MSCI EM vs. MSCI World EM Swap Spreads (2yr, RHS, inverted) 65 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% Q: Any other thoughts about the yield and equity relationship? A: We continue to like stocks that generate high shareholder returns through a combination of value and dividend growth. Our yield plus dividend growth basket Bloomberg ticker GSSTHIDY continues to outperform the broader market and we think remains attractive. The basket has a median dividend yield of 4.2% and expected dividend growth averaging 10% and 9.5% for this year and next, respectively, using our analysts numbers. At the same time, we like companies operationally levered into a DM cyclical recovery (GSSTDMGR). Both of these strategies fit well when we compare valuation with future growth as 全球投资研究 10

11 Exhibit 16 shows below. For details please see Strategy Matters: Where has all the value gone?, 5 May Exhibit 16: The growth/value mix for different market slices Average earnings growth for FY3 compared with current 12m fwd P/E for different baskets m Fwd P/E STOXX Europe Growth / Value trade off Food & Bev Peripheral Euro Core Euro area area PHHG Stable growers Utilities EM exposure High DY + growth (GSSTHIDY) Banks Technology DM growth (GSSTDMGR) -10% - 0% 0% - 5% 5% - 10% 10% - 15% 15% - 20% 20% - 30% > 30% Earnings growth bands (FY3) Source: I/B/E/S, Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 全球投资研究 11

12 Equity baskets disclosure The Securities Division of the firm may have been consulted as to the various components of the baskets of securities discussed in this report prior to their launch; however, none of this research, the conclusions expressed herein, nor the timing of this report was shared with the Securities Division. The ability to trade the basket(s) discussed in this research will depend upon market conditions, including liquidity and borrow constraints at the time of trade. 全球投资研究 12

13 信息披露附录 申明 我们, 彼得 欧品海默 Sharon Bell, CFA Christian Mueller-Glissmann, CFA Anders Nielsen Matthieu Walterspiler, CFA Anna Huang, 在此申明, 本报告所表述的所有观点准确反映了我们对上述公司或其证券的个人看法 此外, 我们的薪金的任何部分不曾与, 不与, 也将不会与本报告中的具体推荐意见或观点直接或间接相关 高盛信息披露 评级分布 / 投资银行关系 高盛投资研究部的全球研究覆盖范围 评级分布 投资银行关系 买入 持有 卖出 买入 持有 卖出 全球 32% 53% 15% 53% 47% 40% 截至 2014 年 4 月 1 日, 高盛全球投资研究部对 3,662 种股票评定了投资评级 高盛给予股票在各种地区投资名单中的买入和卖出评级 ; 未给予这些评级的股票被视为中性评级, 根据纳斯达克 / 纽约证券交易所的披露要求, 这些评级分别对应买入, 持有及卖出 详情见以下 公司评级, 研究行业及评级和相关定义 部分 美国法定披露 任何本报告中研究企业所需的特定公司法定披露见上文 : 包括即将进行交易的承销商或副承销商,1% 或其他股权, 特定服务的补偿, 客户关系种类, 之前担任承销商或副承销商的公开发行, 担任董事, 担任股票做市及 / 或专家的角色 高盛通常担任本报告中涉及的固定收益证券的做市商, 并常作为这些证券的交易对手 以下为额外要求的披露 : 股权及重大利益冲突 : 高盛的政策为禁止其分析师 分析师属下专业人员及其家庭成员持有分析师负责研究的任何公司的证券 分析师薪酬 : 分析师薪酬部分取决于高盛的盈利, 其中包括投资银行的收入 分析师担任高级职员或董事 : 高盛的政策为禁止其分析师 分析师属下人员及其家庭成员担任分析师负责研究的任何公司的高级职员 董事 顾问委员会成员或雇员 非美国分析师 : 非美国分析师可能与高盛无关联, 因此可以不受纳斯达克 2711 条 / 纽约证券交易所 472 条对于与所研究公司的交流 公开露面及持有交易证券的限制 美国以外司法管辖区规定的额外披露 以下为除了根据美国法律法规规定作出的上述信息披露之外其他司法管辖区法律所要求的披露 澳大利亚 : Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd 及其相关机构不是澳大利亚经授权的存款机构 (1959 年 银行法 所定义 ), 因此不在澳大利亚境内提供银行服务, 也不经营银行业务 本研究报告或本报告的其他形式内容只可分发予根据澳大利亚公司法定义的 " 批发客户 ", 在事先获得高盛许可的情况下可以有例外 在撰写研究报告期间,Goldman Sachs Australia 全球投资研究部的职员可能参与本研究报告中所讨论证券的发行人组织的现场调研或会议 在某些情况下, 如果视具体情形 Goldman Sachs Australia 认为恰当或合理, 此类调研或会议的成本可能部分或全部由该证券发行人承担 巴西 : 与 CVM Instruction 483 相关的信息披露请参阅 根据 CVM Instruction 483 第 16 条, 在适用的情况下, 对本研究报告内容负主要责任的巴西注册分析师为本报告开头部分标明的第一作者, 除非报告末另有说明 加拿大 : Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. 是高盛集团的关联机构, 因此被包含在高盛相关的特定公司信息披露中 ( 定义见上文 ) 如果 Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. 向其客户分发该研究报告, 则 Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. 已批准本报告, 并同意承担有关责任 香港 : 可从高盛 ( 亚洲 ) 有限责任公司获取有关本报告中所研究公司的证券的额外资料 印度 : 有关本研究报告中的研究对象或所提及的公司的进一步信息可能来自高盛 ( 印度 ) 证券私人有限公司 日本 : 见下文 韩国 : 可从高盛 ( 亚洲 ) 有限责任公司首尔分公司获取有关本报告所研究公司的证券的额外资料 新西兰 : Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited 及其关联机构并非 1989 年新西兰储备银行法定义的 注册银行 或 存款机构 本研究报告以及本报告的其他形式内容只可分发给 2008 年财务顾问法案定义的 " 批发客户 ", 在事先获得高盛许可的情况下可以有例外 俄罗斯 : 在俄罗斯联邦分发的研究报告并非俄罗斯法律所定义的广告, 而是不以产品推广为主要目的的信息和分析, 也不属于俄罗斯法律所界定的评估行为 新加坡 : 可从高盛 ( 新加坡 ) 私人公司 ( 公司编号 : W) 获取有关本报告中所研究公司的证券的额外资料 台湾 : 本信息仅供参考, 未经允许不得翻印 投资者应当谨慎考虑他们自身的投资风险, 投资结果由投资者自行负责 英国 : 在英国根据金融市场行为监管局的定义可被分类为私人客户的人士参阅本报告的同时应当参阅高盛以往对本报告研究企业的研究报告, 并应当参考高盛国际已经发给这些客户的风险警告资料 该风险警告资料复本, 以及本报告中采用部分金融辞汇的解释可向高盛国际索取 欧盟 : 与欧盟指令 2003/126/EC 第四章 (1)(d) 和第六章 (2) 有关的披露信息可参见 其中列明了欧洲在管理投资研究方面利益冲突的政策 日本 : 高盛证券株式会社是依据 金融工具与交易法 在关东财务局注册 ( 注册号 :No. 69) 的金融工具交易商, 同时也是日本证券业协会和日本金融期货业协会的成员 股票买卖需要缴纳与客户事先约定的佣金及消费税 关于日本证券交易所 日本证券交易商协会或日本证券金融公司所要求的适用的信息披露, 请参见与公司有关的法定披露部分 公司评级 研究行业及评级和相关定义 买入 中性 卖出 : 分析师建议将评为买入或卖出的股票纳入地区投资名单 一只股票在投资名单中评为买入或卖出由其相对于所属研究行业的潜在回报决定 任何未获得买入或卖出评级的股票均被视为中性评级 每个地区投资评估委员会根据 25-35% 的股票评级为买入 10-15% 的股票评级为卖出的全球指导原则来管理该地区的投资名单 ; 但是, 在某一特定行业买入和卖出评级的分布可能根据地区投资评估委员会的决定而有所不同 地区强力买入或卖出名单是以潜在回报规模或实现回报的可能性为主要依据的投资建议 潜在回报 : 代表当前股价与一定时间范围内预测目标价格之差 分析师被要求对研究范围内的所有股票给出目标价格 潜在回报 目标价格及相关时间范围在每份加入投资名单或重申维持在投资名单的研究报告中都有注明 研究行业及评级 : 每个行业研究的所有股票名单可登陆 通过主要分析师 股票和行业进行查询 分析师给出下列评级中的其中一项代表其根据行业历史基本面及 / 或估值对研究对象的投资前景的看法 具吸引力 (A): 未来 12 个月内投资前景优于研究范围的历史基本面及 / 或估值 中性 (N): 未来 12 个月内投资前景相对研究范围的历史基本面及 / 或估值持平 谨慎 (C): 未来 12 个月内投资前景劣于研究范围的历史基本面及 / 或估值 全球投资研究 13

14 暂无评级 (NR): 在高盛于涉及该公司的一项合并交易或战略性交易中担任咨询顾问时并在某些其他情况下, 投资评级和目标价格已经根据高盛的政策予以除去 暂停评级 (RS): 由于缺乏足够的基础去确定投资评级或价格目标, 或在发表报告方面存在法律 监管或政策的限制, 我们已经暂停对这种股票给予投资评级和价格目标 此前对这种股票作出的投资评级和价格目标 ( 如有的话 ) 将不再有效, 因此投资者不应依赖该等资料 暂停研究 (CS): 我们已经暂停对该公司的研究 没有研究 (NC): 我们没有对该公司进行研究 不存在或不适用 (NA): 此资料不存在或不适用 无意义 (NM): 此资料无意义, 因此不包括在报告内 全球产品 ; 分发机构 高盛全球投资研究部在全球范围内为高盛的客户制作并分发研究产品 高盛分布在其全球各办事处的分析师提供行业和公司的股票研究, 以及宏观经济 货币 商品及投资组合策略的研究 本研究报告在澳大利亚由 Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd(ABN ) 分发 ; 在巴西由 Goldman Sachs do Brasil Corretora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A. 分发 ; 在加拿大由 Goldman Sachs Canada Inc 或高盛集团分发 ; 在香港由高盛 ( 亚洲 ) 有限责任公司分发 ; 在印度由高盛 ( 印度 ) 证券私人有限公司分发 ; 在日本由高盛证券株式会社分发 ; 在韩国由高盛 ( 亚洲 ) 有限责任公司首尔分公司分发 ; 在新西兰由 Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited 分发 ; 在俄罗斯由高盛 OOO 分发 ; 在新加坡由高盛 ( 新加坡 ) 私人公司 ( 公司号 : W) 分发 ; 在美国由高盛集团分发 高盛国际已批准本研究报告在英国和欧盟分发 欧盟 : 高盛国际 ( 由审慎监管局授权并接受金融市场行为监管局和审慎监管局的监管 ) 已批准本研究报告在英国和欧盟分发 ;Goldman Sachs AG 和 Goldman Sachs International Zweigniederlassung Frankfurt( 由联邦金融监管局监管 ) 可能也会在德国分发 一般性披露 本研究报告仅供我们的客户使用 除了与高盛相关的披露, 本研究报告是基于我们认为可靠的目前已公开的信息, 但我们不保证该信息的准确性和完整性, 客户也不应该依赖该信息是准确和完整的 我们会适时地更新我们的研究, 但各种规定可能会阻止我们这样做 除了一些定期出版的行业报告之外, 绝大多数报告是在分析师认为适当的时候不定期地出版 高盛是一家集投资银行 投资管理和证券经纪业务于一身的全球性综合服务公司 高盛全球投资研究部所研究的大部分公司与我们保持着投资银行业务和其它业务关系 美国证券经纪交易商高盛是 SIPC 的成员 ( 我们的销售人员 交易员和其它专业人员可能会向我们的客户及我们的自营交易部提供与本研究报告中的观点截然相反的口头或书面市场评论或交易策略 我们的资产管理部门 自营交易部和投资业务部可能会做出与本报告的建议或表达的意见不一致的投资决策 本报告中署名的分析师可能已经与包括高盛销售人员和交易员在内的我们的客户讨论, 或在本报告中讨论交易策略, 其中提及可能会对本报告讨论的证券市场价格产生短期影响的推动因素或事件, 该影响在方向上可能与分析师发布的股票目标价格相反 任何此类交易策略都区别于且不影响分析师对于该股的基本评级, 此类评级反映了某只股票相对于报告中描述的研究范围内股票的回报潜力 我们以及我们的关联机构 高级职员 董事和雇员, 不包括股票分析师和信贷分析师, 将不时地对本研究报告所涉及的证券或衍生工具持有多头或空头头寸, 担任上述证券或衍生工具的交易对手, 或买卖上述证券或衍生工具 在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的司法管辖区内, 本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约 本报告不构成个人投资建议, 也没有考虑到个别客户特殊的投资目标 财务状况或需求 客户应考虑本报告中的任何意见或建议是否符合其特定状况, 以及 ( 若有必要 ) 寻求专家的意见, 包括税务意见 本报告中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动 过去的表现并不代表未来的表现, 未来的回报也无法保证, 投资者可能会损失本金 外汇汇率波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响 某些交易, 包括牵涉期货 期权和其它衍生工具的交易, 有很大的风险, 因此并不适合所有投资者 投资者可以向高盛销售代表取得或通过 取得当前的期权披露文件 对于包含多重期权买卖的期权策略结构产品, 例如, 期权差价结构产品, 其交易成本可能较高 与交易相关的文件将根据要求提供 所有研究报告均以电子出版物的形式刊登在我们的内部客户网上并向所有客户同步提供 并非所有研究内容都转发给我们的客户或者向第三方整合者提供, 高盛也并不对由第三方整合者转发的我们研究报告承担任何责任 有关某只证券的所有研究报告或数据, 请联络您的销售代表或登陆 披露信息可以查阅 或向研究合规部索取, 地址是 200 West Street,New York,NY 高盛版权所有 2014 年未经高盛集团公司事先书面同意, 本材料的任何部分均不得 (i) 以任何方式制作任何形式的拷贝 复印件或复制品, 或 (ii) 再次分发 高华证券信息披露 一般披露 本报告在中国由高华证券分发 高华证券具备证券投资咨询业务资格 本研究报告仅供我们的客户使用 本研究报告是基于我们认为可靠的目前已公开的信息, 但我们不保证该信息的准确性和完整性, 客户也不应该依赖该信息是准确和完整的 我们会适时地更新我们的研究, 但各种规定可能会阻止我们这样做 除了一些定期出版的行业报告之外, 绝大多数报告是在分析师认为适当的时候不定期地出版 高盛高华为高华证券的关联机构, 从事投资银行业务 高华证券 高盛高华及它们的关联机构与本报告中涉及的大部分公司保持着投资银行业务和其它业务关系 我们的销售人员 交易员和其它专业人员可能会向我们的客户及我们的自营交易部提供与本研究报告中的观点截然相反的口头或书面市场评论或交易策略 我们的自营交易部和投资业务部可能会做出与本报告的建议或表达的意见不一致的投资决策 本报告中署名的分析师可能已经与包括高华证券销售人员和交易员在内的我们的客户讨论, 或在本报告中讨论交易策略, 其中提及可能会对本报告讨论的证券市场价格产生短期影响的推动因素或事件, 该影响在方向上可能与分析师发布的股票目标价格相反 任何此类交易策略都区别于且不影响分析师对于该股的基本评级, 此类评级反映了某只股票相对于报告中描述的研究范围内股票的回报潜力 高华证券及其关联机构 高级职员 董事和雇员, 不包括股票分析师和信贷分析师, 将不时地对本研究报告所涉及的证券或衍生工具持有多头或空头头寸, 担任上述证券或衍生工具的交易对手, 或买卖上述证券或衍生工具 在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的地区, 本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约 本报告不构成个人投资建议, 也没有考虑到个别客户特殊的投资目标 财务状况或需求 客户应考虑本报告中的任何意见或建议是否符合其特定状况, 以及 ( 若有必要 ) 寻求专家的意见, 包括税务意见 本报告中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动 过去的表现并不代表未来的表现, 未来的回报也无法保证, 投资者可能会损失本金 外汇汇率波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响 全球投资研究 14

15 某些交易, 包括牵涉期货 期权和其它衍生工具的交易, 有很大的风险, 因此并不适合所有投资者 投资者可以向高华销售代表取得或通过 取得当前的期权披露文件 对于包含多重期权买卖的期权策略结构产品, 例如, 期权差价结构产品, 其交易成本可能较高 与交易相关的文件将根据要求提供 北京高华证券有限责任公司版权所有 2014 年未经北京高华证券有限责任公司事先书面同意, 本材料的任何部分均不得 (i) 以任何方式制作任何形式的拷贝 复印件或复制品, 或 (ii) 再次分发 全球投资研究 15