3 :,,,1950 ; 1950,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3 (1930 1949) (NSC91 2411 H 001 070), 2002 5 17 47 2002 6 27 29,,,,, 27
2005 5,, (),1936 1,1948 4,, 120, :(Lloyd Eastman ), (),, ( ),,,,,, :,, ;, ;, 2000, :,,,1950 ; 1950,,,,,,,,,,, :, : 8,1996,955 Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction : Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937 1949 (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 146. :,,, 1991,123 28
,,,,,,,,, ; ;,,,,,,,( ) (),?,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 117, 29
2005 5 ;,,,,,, ( ),,, 2000, :,1948,,,, ;,,,,1942,,,,,,,,,0431/ 3720. 01 01 ;,,,, 043/ 6 ;:,,1992, 41,,0431/ 3720101 01 ;,,,043/ 6 30
,1942,, 1945 12,,,1941 ;1945 3,, 7,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,0421/ 3720101 01 ;,,,043/ 6 :,,1998,290 :,,1986,549 :, 36,1991,30 31
2005 5,,1937,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,( General Joseph Stilwell),,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,1971,115 164,:,, 1991,96 :, 36,30 31 :,,121,549,135 32
,,,,, 1942 6,:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,289 290 Theodore H. White (ed. ), The Stilwell Papers (New York : Schocken Books, 1948),p. 125. :,:19,,1984,210 33
2005 5,,,,,,1944,50,,,,,,,, 1938,,, 9,, ;,,, 1935,,, 3 31,,,,,,,,, 50,,1993,11,:,, 1991,106 : (1949 1950), ( ) 7,2002 4,363 364 34
,,, :,1942,,,,,,,,,, 8,,, 1941 12,,,,,,,, 1942 12 4,,,,, ;, :, 3, 1996,313 1942 7,,,,0431/ 3720. 02 01 1941 12 30,,,,0431/ 3720. 02 01 1941 12 30,,,,0431/ 3720. 02 01,,, 0161. 42/ 4450. 01 01 35
2005 5,, (),,,,, (1945 1949 ),,,,,,,,,,,,, : (),,,,, 0161. 42/ 4450. 01 01 : 9,, 1989,142 143 36
,,,,,,,, (),,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :, 3 3,1948 3,15,,,,,1941,5,,769/ 2217 37
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,, 1947,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1948, (),,:,, 1989,121 122 :,24, 1995 6,741 772,,,,,,, 9,146 147 ; Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters : The Chinese Civil War, 1946 1950 (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 9 10. 38
: (: ),,,,,,,, ;, ;,,,,,,,,,,,, 1941, :,,, 1980,39 :,,39 40 Donald G. Gillin, Warlord : Yen Hsi2shan in Shansi Province 1911 1949 ( Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 258 259.,:,, 1991,97,:,, 1996,155 156 ;:,, 1989,622,155 156 39
2005 5,1945 1,,, (),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,1942,180 ; :,1943,119 122,,,,1979,225 226,: (),, 1992,146 40
,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,, 14,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1944 5 5,,,,, 20,, :,,122 123 :, 7, 1996,632 633, 7,672 :, 8,953 : 4,,1985, 280 41
2005 5,:,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1948 7 13, 1948,, 6,,7,, 7 13,, : :(),, ( ),, (), 253 254 42
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,??,,,,,,,,,,,,:,,, 1937 10,,,, 6, :, ( ) 101,1961 9, 10 43
2005 5,,, 1939 10 10,,,,,,, (, ) (, ), 1938,,,,,, :?,,;,,,, ;,,,(),,,1941,,,,,,,,,, :,( )!,550,: (),,1992,129 :, 6,1964 4,139 44
,1944,,,,,,,,,,,,,(),,,, 1940,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,550, Barbara W. Tuchman Tuchman, Stilwell and American Experience in China, 1911 45 (New York : Macmillan Co.,1970), p. 357. :, 1987 2,91,,0431/ 3720. 01 01 45
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ; ( ),,,,,,,,,,, 2,,,,,,,, 36,31 32,549 :,1985,299 300 46
1940, 1947,,,, ( ),,,, 1948 12,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1950,, :, 8,951 :, 7,140 47
2005 5, :,,,,,,, ;, ;,,,,1950 ; 1950,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 48
,,,,,,,, : :,1919 1937,, 2005 1,20,18 1978, :,, 1920 1930,,,, 49
Modern Chinese History Studies No. 5, 2005 On the Route to Forming State Capital Joint Stock Companies during the Nanjing Government Period Zhu Yingui (1) The joint stock system is fundamentally a way of organizing capital. In modern China, joint stock companies did not all fit into the same category, due to differences in the nature and source of their capital, the times when they came into being and the ways they were assembled. Under the Nanjing Government, joint stock companies in the state capitalist mold made up one important category of modern Chinese joint stock company. During the Nanjing Government period, joint stock companies were mainly formed through compulsory investment, through selling off shares in state2owned enter2 prises, or were directly formed as proto2state capital joint stock companies. Because of differences in goals, methods and timing, these state capital joint stock companies had a far from consistent effect on socio2economic life. Remote Control : A Study of Chiang Kai2shek s Use of Handwritten Per2 sonal Orders Zhang Ruide (27) Chiang Kai2shek s use of handwritten personal orders (i. e. orders directly from Chiang which bypassed the usual bureaucratic mechanisms) had the following charac2 teristics : First, the huge number of handwritten personal orders issued by Chiang was just an expedient wartime measure. After 1950, the number of handwritten personal or2 ders he issued decreased dramatically. Even before 1950, Chiang repeatedly urged his subordinates to avoid issuing handwritten personal orders themselves as much as possi2 ble. For this reason, it is difficult to claim that Chiang did not have any respect for proper procedure. Second, the handwritten personal orders Chiang issued covered all manner of issues, and only occasionally bypassed the normal chain of command. Those few which both bypassed the chain of command and exhibited relatively serious prob2 lems were limited to battle orders. Third, the affinity of military leaders for bypassing the chain of command in battle was the result of habits developed commanding small u2 nits over a long period of time, as well as the result of a lack of training and experience in commanding large units. For this reason, an affinity for bypassing the chain of com2 mand in battle was by no means limited to Chiang alone ; it was a widespread phe2 nomenon. Furthermore, if we look at Chiang s extensive use of handwritten personal orders in the context of China s difficult material circumstances during the war, we can see that there seems to have been no better alternative at the time. 1