CPS Ref: AC-1527
i
ii
iii
iv
v
1998 28 1999 76 vi
vii
o o o viii
ix
x
......... i xi 1.1.. 1 1.2..... 3 1.3.. 4 2.1.. 5 2.2..... 5 2.3.. 6 2.4.. 10 2.5..... 19 2.6.. 19 3.1.. 21 3.2.. 21 3.3.. 22 3.4.. 26 4.1. 27 4.2... 27 4.3...... 35 4.4.. 37 4.5... 37 4.6.. 38 4.7.. 39 4.8.. 45 4.9...... 49 4.10.. 52 4.11... 56 4.12.. 59 4.13.. 62 4.14... 65 4.15...... 66 4.16.. 73 xi
5.1.. 75 5.2... 75 5.3...... 79 5.4.. 81 5.5.. 82 5.6...... 83 5.7.. 84 5.8... 84 5.9. 85 5.10. 85 5.11... 85 5.12...... 87 5.13.. 88 6.1.. 90 6.2... 90 6.3..... 92 6.4. 94 6.5. 94 6.6...... 96 6.7.. 98 6.8... 98 6.9. 100 6.10.. 101 6.11... 101 6.12...... 102 6.13... 103 6.14.. 104 7.1..... 105 7.2. 105 7.3.. 109 7.4... 114 7.5.. 123 8.1. 126 8.2. 128 8.3..... 131. 132 xii
1........ 140 2 -. 141 3 146 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 6a 6b 6c... 148. 151. 153 156... 160... 162 164... 166. 167. 169 7.... 173 8. 178 9a 9b 9c 10a 10b (ROE)... 179 (ROA). 180 Tobin Q. 181 (ROE) 182 (ROA) 183 xiii
10c 11a 11b Tobin Q.... 184 185. 186 xiv
1.1 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983 ( ) ( : ) ( : ) 1
(Williamson, 1991; Grossman and Hart, 1986) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 2
1.2 Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 Klein, 1998 Cravens and Wallace, 2001 Perry, 1999 3
1.3 4
2.1 2.2 Shleifer Vishny (1997) La Porta et al. (1997) 49 (La Porta et al., 1997) La Porta et al. (1998) La Porta et al., 1998, pp. 1118-1119) 5
2.3 Yafeh, 2000 Gul, 1999)Dewenter Warther (1998) La Porta et al. (1998) 6
(Prowse, 1996) Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Berglof and Perotti, 1994 Franks and Mayer, 2001; Gorton and Schmid, 1999 Claessens et al. (2000) ) 2,980 1996 Worldscope 7
2.3.1 (Claessens et al., 2000) Tsui and Lynn, 2001) 1996 84% (SCMP, September 2000) Tsui Gul (2000) 1998 1999 (SCMP, 2000) Tricker(1998) 8
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)La Porta et al. (1998) 2.3.2 (Grossman and Hart 1988)Morck et al. (1988) Klein (1998) 9
2.4 2.4.1 32 10 ) 396 10
2000 4 2 2.4.2 (SEHK, 1998) (SEHK, 1998) (HKSA, 1997b) 11
12 2.4.3 2.4.4 ( ) 3
2.4.5 ( First Report of the Working Group on Corporate Governance ) (HKSA, 1995) ( Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group ) (HKSA, 1997a) ( A Guide for the Formation of An Audit Committee ) (HKSA, 1997b) ( Directors Remuneration Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and Accountability ) (HKSA, 1999) ( Corporate Governance Disclosure in Annual Reports A Guide to Current Requirements and Recommendations for Enhancement ) (HKSA, 2001) ( A Guide for Effective Audit Committees (HKSA, 2002) (HKSA, 1995) (HKSA, 1997a) 13
(HKSA, 1997b) (1997b, p.4) (HKSA, 1997b) 4 2000 14
15 (HKSA, 1999)
(HKSA, 2002, pp.2-3) 16
(HKSA, 2002, pp.4-5) 5 Blue Ribbon ( Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee of Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ) (1999) 17
(HKSA, 2002, p.8) (HKSA, 2002, p.16) 18
19 2.4.6 (HKIoD, 2000) 2.5 2.6
20
3.1 3.2 La Porta et al., 1998 21
22 3.3 3.3.1
3.3.1.1 Journal of Accounting and Economics Journal of Accounting Research The Accounting Review Journal of Financial Economics Journal of Law and Economics Corporate Governance: An International Review Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 3.3.1.2 Cadbury Report (December 1992) Dey Report (December 1994) Greenbury Report (July 1995) Hampel Report (January 1998) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (April 1999) Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999) General Motors Corporation Corporate Governance Guidelines (1994) 3.3.1.3 / 23
The 27th Annual Board of Directors Study conducted by Korn/Ferry International (2000) Audit Committees Good Practices for Meeting Market Expectations published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999). The Structure of Boards at S&P 1500 Companies published by Russell Reynolds Associates & Investor Responsibilities Research Center (1999). Board Committees: Considerations, Structures and Uses in Effective Governance published by American Society of Corporate Secretaries (2000). Corporate Governance and the Board What Works Best published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000). CG Watch Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets published by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001). Board of Directors Global Study published by Egon Zehnder International (2000) 3.3.2 3.3.3 24
3.3.4 INED Qual : CEO : ED : NED : INED : FAM : FAM SH : AC : ACNMEM : ACNINED : ACNNED : ACMTG : TR : RC : RCNMEM : RCNINED : RCNNED : RCMTG : NC : NCNMEM : NCNINED : NCNNED : NCMTG : 25
3.4 1 1998 Tsui and Gul (2000) 26
4.1 ( ) 4.2 / Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report, 1992) Where were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (Dey Report 1994) The General Motors Corporation Corporate Governance Guidelines (GMC Guidelines, 1994) Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (Greenbury Report, 1995) Committee on Corporate Governance (Hampel Report, 1998) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999) Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Blue Ribbon Committee Report, 1999) 27
1980 MaxwellPollypeck BCCI (Financial Reporting Council) Sir Adrian Cadbury Cadbury Cadbury (Cadbury)1992 1994 Dey (Dey) Dey Dey Bosch (1995) Vienot (1995) King (1994) Peters (1997) (General Motors Corporation) 1994 (GMC 28
Guidelines, 1994) (CalPERS) 1995 Greenbury (Greenbury) Greenbury Calbury Hampel Cadbury Greenbury 1998 1 Hampel (Hampel) CadburyGreenbury Hampel (Hampel Report, 1998, para 1.14) 29
1999 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance) (OECD, 1999)Blue Ribbon (Blue Ribbon Committee Report (Blue Ribbon), 1999) (1999) (Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance) Blue Ribbon 2001 11 ( Guidelines for Good Corporate Governance Practice ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 30
4.2.1 Cadbury Cadbury Hampel Hampel Cadbury Hampel 31
32 Cadbury Hampel Dey 4.2.2 Hampel
4.2.3 Cadbury Hampel 4.2.3.1 Cadbury Blue Ribbon Cadbury Dey 2 Blue Ribbon Blue Ribbon Blue Ribbon 2 33
4.2.3.2 Cadbury 4.2.3.3 Blue Ribbon Dey 3 Cadbury Blue Ribbon Blue Ribbon Dey 34
4a 4.3 ( ) 4.3.1 (HKSA, 1997b): ( ) 35
4.3.2 ( ) 3 4.3.3 4 3 2002 4 Gul Tsui (2000) 36
4.3.4 4.4 4.5 37
4.6 Cadbury Cadbury ( ) 4.14 38
4.7 4.7.1 ( ) (1985)(Companies Act) (2000) (Financial Services and Markets Act) 1998 (Company Law Review Steering Group) 1998 3 (Department of Trade and Industry) 2001 7, 5 6 5 6 3 39
(Combined Code)( ) CadburyGreenburyHampel (1998) Hampel CadburyGreenbury 40
( soft law ) 7 ( ) 12.43A 1 (12.43A(a)) 1 ( ) ( ) (12.43(b)) 7 3.2 41
4.7.2 (D.1) (D.2) (D.3) 4.7.2.1 8 4.7.2.2 (D.2) 8 42
(D.2.1) Cadbury Cadbury Rutteman 1994 ( Internal Control and Financial ReportingEvidence for Directors of Listed Companies in the UK ) Rutteman Turnbull (1999) Turnbull Turnbull 1999 9 ICAEW Turnbull (1999) o o o o o 43
o Rutteman (1994) D.2 o o 4.7.2.3 D.3.1 D.3 Cadbury D.3.1 Cadbury D.3.2 ( ) ( ) 1997 ICAEW ( Audit Committees: A Framework for Assessment ) Cadbury Greenbury 44
4.8 4.8.1 (Cheeseman, 2000) 40% 500 (The Delaware General Corporation Law) 45
9 ( ) ( )(Securities and Exchange Commission) 1933 (Securities Act)1934 (Securities Exchange Act) 1933 1934 1934 1933 1934 9 3.2 46
1933 / (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations -NASDAQ) / ( ) ( ) Blue Ribbon(1999) (1994) (American Law Institute) ( Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations ) The Business 47
Roundtable (1997) ( Statement on Corporate Governance ) (CalPERS) 4.8.2 Blue Ribbon (1999) ( 303.01) ( 4350(d)) 10 / 10 48
( 303.01) ( 4350(d)) 4.9 (Corporations Law) (1989) (Australian Securities Commission Law) 221 (s229) 231232 (s246, s461, s1324)? (Australian Securities and Investment Commission) 49
1989 (Listing Rules) (777 1114 ) (Australian Institute of Company Directors) (1995) ( Code of Conduct ) (Australian Investment Manager s Association) (1997) ( Corporate Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations and A Statement of Recommended Corporate Practice ) 50
(Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants) (Business Council of Australia) (Law Council of Australia) (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia) (Securities Institute of Aus tralia) Henry Bosch ( Corporate Practices and Conduct )(1995)( Bosch ) 2001 9 4.10 9 (Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices) 4.10.3 ( ) ( ) 51
( ) 1997 (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program - CLERP )( 1999 (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act) ( ) 4.10 4.10.1 ( ) ( (Company Acts)) ( (1975)(Canadian Business Corporations Act ) ) 18 52
( ) 11 (Civil Code) 11 Canadian Environmental Protection Act) Fisheries Act) Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), Excise Tax Act), Canada Labour Code) (Unemp loyment Insurance Act) ( Income Tax Act) 53
(Canadian Securities Administrators) / 12 Dey 1994 Dey Dey Dey Dey Dey 12 (The Canadian Venture Exchange)( ) (Montreal Stock Exchange)( ) 54
4.10.2 (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants) (CICA et al., 2001) 474 (2) Cadbury Blue Ribbon 55
4.11 4.11.1 ( the Act ) (1965 ) (Companies Act) (1966) (Companies Regulations) (1948) (1961) (Uniform Companies Act) (1993) (Securities Commission Act) (1983) (Securities Industry Act) 1993 1976 56
( 18 70 ) 4.11.2 1997-8 1999 - (Report of the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance ) (Listing Requirements) 13 ( ) 13 2001 1 57
4.11.3 132(1) 4.11.4 (2000 3 ) (Code on Corporate Governance )() (Malaysian Institute of Accountants) 58
59 4.12 (1928) (1968) ( ) ( ) /
(Liu, 2001) 15 60
o o o o o o o o o o 61
14 15 4.13 4.13.1 50 (Companies Act ) (Listing Manual ) 289 (Securities Industry Act (Monetary Authority) / 14 15 62
/ 21 4.13.2 2001 4 16 (Code of Corporate Governance) 4.13.3 Yeo Koh (2001) 16 (Ministry of Finance) (Monetary Authority of Singapore) (Attorney-General s Chambers) 63
/ / 4.13.4 201B ( ) (201B(10))201B(5) 64
65 4b 4c 4.14 4d 96% 88%
/ 50% 4.15 Kirk Panel (1994) Cendant Corporation Sunbeam 17 ( Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Fama and Jensen 1983) Pincus et al. (1989) ( ) 17 1998 4 Cendant Corporation Sunbeam Cendant Sunbeam Enron 66
( ) (Gul, 2001, pp.36-37) 4.15.1 Pincus et al. (1989) 100 1986 Collier Gregory (1999) 1989-1990 142 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 67
4.15.2 Deli Gillan (2000) 1998 1,150 ( ) ( ) ( ) Song Windram (2000) Cadbury (Financial Reporting Review Panel )1990-2000 27 18 19 18 27 19 68
McMullen (1996) ( ) 1982-1988 219 Defond Jiambalvo (1991) (The National Automated Accounting Research System)35 (Accounting Trends and Techniques) 1977-1988 20 41 4.15.3 Klein (2000a) 1992 1993 803 Klein 50% 21 20 (Accounting Principles Board(APB) Statement No. 20, para 13)? 21 69
( ) ( 50% ) Klein (2000b) 1991-1993 683 ( ) 22 ( )( ) Carcello Neal (2000) ( ) ( ) 233 1994 ( Zmijewski s (1984) 28%) Vicknair et al. (1993) 1980-1987 100 22 70
Wright (1996) (Reports of the Association for Investment Management and Research Corporate Information Committee) 1989 (69 )1993 (82 ) 151 23 Menon Williams (1994) 23 71
200 1986-1987 Beasley (1996) 75 1980 1991 24 75 ( ) Peasnell et al. (2000) ( ) 1993-1995 1,271 (1) (2) 24 1. 2. 72
4.15.4 4.16 (1) (2) (3) 25 25 2002 73
74
5.1 SCMP, 24 September 2001, p.1 5.2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report, 1992) Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (Greenbury Report, 1995) Committee on Corporate Governance (Hampel Report, 1998) Where were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (Dey Report, 1994) 75
The General Motors Corporation Corporate Governance Guidelines (GMC Guidelines, 1994) Cadbury (Cadbury) Greenbury (Greenbury) Hampel (Hampel) 5.2.1 5.2.1.1 Greenbury ( Hampel) 76
77 Greenbury 5.2.1.2 Greenbury Cadbury Hampel Hampel Dey Dey Greenbury Dey
Cadbury Greenbury Hampel Hampel Dey 5.2.1.3 Cadbury Greenbury Hampel Hampel Greenbury Dey 78
5.2.1.4 Cadbury Hampel 5a 5.3 Greenbury Report, 1995 (The National Association of Corporate Directors ) (2000) -Blue Ribbon ( Blue Commission on 79
80 Executive Compensation )
5.4 (Financial Times, April 8, 2002) 81
5.5 203.01(D) S- K Item 402(j)) ( S-K Item 402(k)) S-K 402 14A8 o o o 82
83 o o 5.6 Bosch (1995)
9 ( 4.10.3) 5.7 Dey Dey Dey 5.8 84
5.9 5.10 (2001)(Singapore Code of Corporate Governance ) 5.11 5c 85
100% 86
5.12 (Evans and Evans, 2001) Conyon Peck (1998) 1991 1994 100 Anderson Bizjak (2000) 87
88 EvansEvans (2001) 5.13
o o o 7 Enron (401(k) ) Proctor and Gamble (94.7%) (81.5%) Pfizer (85.5%) (The Economist, 2001, December 15, p. 62). 8 6.13 89
6.1 6.2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report, 1992) Where were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (Dey Report, 1994) The General Motors Corporation Guidelines (GMC Guidelines, 1994) Committee on Corporate Governance (Hampel Report, 1998) The Final Report of the Joint Committee on Corporate Governance (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Canadian Venture Exchange, 2001) Cadbury (Cadbury) 90
Cadbury 1 ( / ) Dey (Dey) 2 Hampel (Hampel) (1994) Dey /Cadbury ( ) Hampel ( The Final Report of the Joint Committee on Corporate Governance ) (CICA et al., 2001) 3 1 Cadbury 2 3 91
92 Dey Cadbury (1992) Hampel Hampel 6a 6.3 1980 1990 / /
93 / / ( ) 6.11
6.4 A.5 4 6.5 6.5.1 (1994) 3A.04 6.5.2 ( ) 4 94
95 2001 1995 6.5.3 3,000 8,000 100
6.6 6.6.1 Bosch (1995) 9 ( 4.10.3) o o o ( ) 6.6.2 ( ) 96
97 13,000 ( ) 6 ( Implementing a Compliance Program ) (www.companydirectors.com.au)
98 6.7 Dey Dey 6.8 6.8.1 (2000)
( ) / 6.8.2 (15.09 ) ( ) 5/2001 5 (Practice Note) (Mandatory Accreditation Program ) ( Continuing Education Program) 1.5 5/20015.1 5 2001 1 31 2001 2 15 99
( 16.16 16.17 ) (Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 6 ) (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants)2001 10 (ACCA Diploma in Corporate Governance) (MICG Diploma in Corporate Governance) 6.9 6 1998 3 (www.micg.net). 100
6.10 新 加 坡 規 管 架 構 新 加 坡 沒 有 法 例 或 規 管 性 質 的 規 定 要 求 公 司 設 立 提 名 委 員 會, 但 要 求 上 市 公 司 提 供 聲 明 表 示 是 否 有 依 循 新 加 坡 企 業 管 治 守 則 (2001), 或 交 代 沒 有 遵 守 的 原 因 守 則 建 議 在 新 加 坡 證 券 交 易 所 上 市 的 公 司 設 立 提 名 委 員 會 委 員 會 應 由 最 少 三 位 董 事 組 成, 大 多 數 成 員, 包 括 主 席 要 獨 立 於 公 司 設 立 提 名 委 員 會 的 目 的 是 令 委 任 董 事 的 程 序 透 明 及 評 估 董 事 會 的 效 能 提 名 委 員 會 應 以 書 面 訂 明 其 成 員 的 職 責, 並 要 每 年 披 露 成 員 名 單 (Yeo and Koh, 2001) 委 員 會 的 職 責 是 就 以 下 事 宜 向 董 事 會 提 出 意 見 : 所 有 董 事 委 任, 包 括 獨 立 董 事 長 ; 董 事 的 再 提 名 ; 獨 立 董 事 的 表 現 評 估, 特 別 注 意 他 / 她 履 行 公 司 董 事 職 務 時 的 獨 立 性 及 表 現 我 們 將 不 同 司 法 管 轄 區 對 提 名 委 員 會 的 法 例 及 規 管 性 質 規 定 進 行 比 較, 載 於 附 錄 6b 6.11 調 查 結 果 概 要 附 錄 6c 概 述 在 本 研 究 探 討 的 司 法 管 轄 區 內 進 行 的 各 項 調 查 結 果 大 多 數 調 查 的 對 象 是 整 體 的 企 業 管 治 措 施, 而 非 單 獨 針 對 提 名 委 員 會 有 一 點 必 須 注 意 的 是, 各 項 調 查 所 涉 及 的 範 圍 並 不 相 同 ; 故 此, 在 各 司 法 管 轄 區 進 行 的 調 查, 所 得 的 資 料 不 一 定 可 互 相 比 較 101
74% 1% 6.12 Evans Evans (2001) 500 214 7 7 6 30 102
6.13 Dey ( ) ( The Final Report of the Joint Committee on Corporate Governance ) (CICA et al., 2001) Dey / 103
104 6.14 ( ) 60% / ( ) 6.13 / /
105 7.1 1999 7.2 1 ( ) 7.2.1 1
7.2.2 ( ) ( ) Blue Ribbon ( ) ( ) 106
( ) ( ) 7.2.3 ( ) 7.2.4 107
10% 80% ( ) ( ) ( ) 7.2.5 2 2 108
7.3 100 32% ( 32 ) 7.3.1 ( 7 ) 7.3.1.1 / 109
59% 38% 3% ( 7.1) 7.1 3% 38% 59% 34 7.3.1.2 68% 71% 19% 10% ( 7.2) 110
7.2 19% 10% 71% 7.3.1.3 50% 55% 24% 21% ( 7.3) 111
7.3 24% 21% 55% 7.3.2 ( 7 ) 7.3.2.1 30% 30%25% (50% ) ( 7.4) 112
7.4 30% 45% 30% 50% 25% 7.3.2.2 7.3.2.3 / 113
7.3.2.4 7.3.2.5 53% 7.3.2.6 1999 7.4 1999 566 566 1999 100 1998 3 1999 3 1998 Tsui and Gul (2000) 114
7.4.1 7.4.1.1 1999 60% (342) ( 7.5) 7.5 40% 60% 100 1998 1999 1998 28 1999 76 14% (342 48 ) 1999 48 294 (86%) ( 7.6) 115
7.6 1999 1% 3% 7% 3% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 86% 100 1998 1999 ( 286 ) 100 1998 1999 115 ( 342 1999 34%) (71%) (24%) 5% 100 1998 28 1999 (1998 10 ) 64% (28 18 ) (1998 50%)29% (1998 50%)7% (1998 0%) 116
342 89%1999 4 30 100 1998 100 342 205 39 100 1998 14 100 8 7.4.1.2 2% (566 10 ) 1999 100 1998 1999 1998 100 4 2 1 1 1999 100 5 2 2 1 4 26% 117
1999 5 100 1998 8 7.4.1.3 566 1999 100 1998 100 1999 1999 (1998 ) 1999 1998 7.4.2 566 1999 5 30% 118
1999 (60%) (342 ) (7% ) 1999 2% 1% 100 1998 1999 1999 (1998 28 1999 76 ) 1998 1999 1998 1999 7.4.3 7.4.3.1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (ROE) (ROA)Tobin Q 119
( ) 7.4.3.2 1999 1999 Tobin Q 6 566 408 7 ( ) 9a 9c ( Tobin Q ) 6 Tobin Q (Tsui and Lynn, 2001) 7 158 120
10a 10c / 1999 7.4.3.3 Gul (2002) Gul (see Gul, 1999; Gul and Tsui, 1998; 2001) 8 8 = x x ( Gul and Tsui, 1998 Gul, 2001) 121
Gul (2002) 566 355 9 11a 11b Carcello et al. (2000) ( ) 9 211 122
Gul (2002) 1999 ( ) Gul (2002) Dalton et al. (1998) (273) Gul (2002) ( ) 7.5 123
124 ( ) 1999 100 ( ) 1998 1999 1999 408
125
126 8.1
127 1999 1999 (Gul, 2002)
128 ( ) 8.2 8.2.1 ( )
129 8.2.1.1
130 ( ) ( 6.5.3 ) ( 6.6.2 ) 8.2.2
( ) 8.3 / 131
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1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Asian Corporate Governance Association) 1 (Accounting Standards Board ) 2 ( Financial Reporting Council) 3 (Financial Services Authority, Listing Authority) 1 (The Conference Board, Global Corporate Governance Research Center) 2 (National Association of Corporate Directors) 3 (United States Securities and Exchange Commission) 4 Korn/Ferry (Korn/Ferry International ) 1 (Australian Stock Exchange) 2 (Australian Institute of Company Directors ) 3 (CPA Australia) 4 ( The Treasury, Corporate Governance and Accounting Policy Division) 1 ( Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) 2 (Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance) : 1. 2. 140
2 - I A. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 141
2 () B. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 142
2 () C. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 143
2 () II? A. : 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 / 1 2 3 4 5? B. : 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 144
2 () C. : / 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 D. : 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 E. : 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 F. : 1 2 3 4 5 145
3 ( Cadbury 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 146
3 () 9. a. b. c. (i.) (ii.) (iii.) (iv.) (v.) (vi.) d. ( ) e. f. g. ( ) h. i. 10. 147
4a Cadbury Greenbury Hampel Blue Ribbon Dey (1992) (1995) (1998) (1999) (1994) (1994) 1. 1 2 AC AC AC AC 2 AC (i) AC (ii) AC 2. --- AC AC AC NEDs NEDs AC AC: NED: : 1. Greenbury 2. 3. 148 148
4a () Cadbury Greenbury Hampel Blue Ribbon Dey (1992) (1995) (1998) (1994) (1999) (1994) 3. 3.1 --- --- AC 3.2 --- --- --- --- 3.3 --- --- --- --- 149 149
4a () Cadbury (1992) Blue Ribbon (1999) Dey (1994) 3.4 AC AC AC AC AC AC. 3.5Greenbury (1995) AC AC. 4. Blue Ribbon (1999) AC AC AC 150 150
151 4b (Company Act)201 (Canadian Business Corporations Act ) [NYSE 303.01 NASD 4350(d)] KLSE (Listing Rule )15.10 (1) NED NED
4b () / ( ) ( ) 14(14) NED ( ) 4.10.2 12.43A 2 1 S1.D.3.1 NED NED NYSE NASD Reg. S-K / ( ) S-K 1933 1934 KLSE 152
4c 1. LR LR LR LR LR AC HKSA 2. ( ) - - - - - - ( ( ) NED (LR) - -NED - - - 1. NED - INED INED INED ) - NED INED (LR/CCG) - - - INED - - - HKSA - NED - (CCG) INED NED INED AC LR CCG ( ) BPG ( ) HKSA 153
4c () 3. -INED (-INED -INED ( - ) 1. ) -INED 4. AC (HKSA). 5. ( - - 1. ) - AC (HKSA) AC (HKSA) (BPG). - - - - - - - - - - (CCG) - NED INED AC LR CCG ( ) BPG ( ) HKSA 154
4c () HKSA 2001 LR BPG CCG LR LR LR CBCA LR - - / ( ) 155
4d Korn/Ferry International Board of Directors Study in Ernst & Young: Corporate Governance Survey Australia and New Zealand 2000 Patrick Callaghan & Associates and Korn/Ferry International: Corporate Board Governance and Director Compensation in Canada A Review of 2000 Toronto Stock Exchange and Institute of Corporate Directors: Report on Corporate Governance 1999 2000 1999 1999 1999 238 112 324 635 200 N/A N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A N/A 51% 100% N/A 100% 100% 5 N/A N/A N/A 4 N/A N/A N/A NED 3 N/A N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 45% N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A 69% N/A: 156
4d () PricewaterhouseCoopers/ KLSE Corporate Governance: 1998 Survey of Public Listed Companies PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia Board of Directors: A Survey on Remuneration and Practices 2001 Singapore Institute of Directors/Egon Zehnder International Singapore Board of Directors Survey 2000 157 OECD/World Bank/ADB: Third Asian Roundtable on the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A Comparative Review of Board Committees in Asia 2001 OECD/World Bank/ADB: Third Asian Roundtable on the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A Comparative Review of Board Committees in Asia 2001 1998 2001 1999 2000 1999 304 114 290 102 271 N/A N/A N/A N/A : 42% N/A N/A 26% N/A 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% >2 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 4 3 NED N/A N/A N/A 3 N/A NED N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NED N/A N/A 78% N/A 79% N/A:
4d () 68% 60% N/A N/A N/A 65% ED86% INED 25% INED N/A: 158
4d () Korn/Ferry International European Board of Directors Study 1998 Korn/Ferry International 26 th Annual Board of Directors Study Korn/Ferry International 27 th Annual Board of Directors Study Korn/Ferry International 28 th Annual Board of Directors Study The Conference Board Director s Compensation and Board Practices in 2000 Russell Reynolds Associates and the Investor Responsibility Research Center 1999-2000 Board Practices Survey The Structure and Compensation of Boards of Directors of US Public Companies 1998 1999 2000 2001 2000 2000 450 (157 902 917 902 2322 12,139 /1202 ) /754 N/A Super Composite 1500 N/A N/A N/A N/A. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 88% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% N/A 4 4 4 4 N/A N/A 4 4 4 N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A INED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50% NED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 85% N/A: 159
5a Cadbury (1992) Greenbury (1995) Hampel (1998) (1994) 1. ( 2 3) RC RC RC 1 2. RC RC NEDs RC RC NEDs NED RC: NED: : 1. 2. Dey RC RC RC RC 3. 160
5a () Cadbury Greenbury (1995) Hampel (1992) (1998) (1994) 3. RC RC RC Articles of Association) NED NED RC RC --- --- 4. RC RC --- --- --- --- --- --- 161
5b 1., HKMA RC CCG MCCG CC 2. --- - - - INED --- --- --- NED - INED NED (MCCG) INED (LR) (CCG) 3. --- - (LR) -INED (CCG) --- -INED --- --- --- 4. --- --- --- ( --- --- --- (CCG) INED) RC NED INED CCG ( ) MCCG LR HKMA SEC (USA) CC 162
5b () 5. - --- - - - SEC --- - - - - (LR) - RC - - - -: - - - RC - - - (HKMA) - (LR/MCCG) (CCG) (LR) - - - HKMA LR LR LR LR ( ) RC NED INED CCG ( ) MCCG LR HKMA SEC (USA) CC 163
5c Korn/Ferry International Board of Directors Study in Australia and New Ernst & Young: Corporate Governance Survey Zealand 2000 Patrick Callaghan & Associates and Korn/Ferry International: Corporate Board Governance and Director Compensation in Canda A Review of 2000 The Conference Board: Top Executive Compensation: Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States 2000 1999 1999 1999 238 112 324 102 200 70% 15% N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A N/A 51% 80% 69% 93% N/A 4 N/A N/A N/A 4 3-4 N/A N/A NED 3 N/A N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A NED N/A 96% N/A N/A NED N/A 57% N/A N/A N/A: 164
5c () 50% 60% 2/3 87%1998 ED NED 87% 26% 85% 9% 8% 95% 165
6a Cadbury (1992) Hampel (1998) (1994) Dey (1994) 1. NC NC NC 2. NC --- NC NED NED 3. NED --- --- NC --- --- --- --- --- --- NC NC: NED: : 166
6b 1. CCG MCCG HKMA NC (LR) NC (LR) 2. - - - - NED - --- - --- NED - NEDs (LR) (NED) (HKMA) NED (LR) - INED - INED (CCG) (MCCG) (INED) (LR) 3. --- -INED (LR) -INED (CCG) --- --- --- --- NED (LR) 4. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- (HKMA). 5. --- --- - --- - NC --- - NC --- - (LR) - (LR) NC NED INED CCG ( ) MCCG LR HKMA 167
6b () HKMA LR LR LR (1998 6 )( ) Company Manual) ( ) 168
6c Country Korn/Ferry International Board of Directors Study in Australia and New Zealand 2000 Ernst & Young: Corporate Governance Survey 169 Patrick Callaghan & Associates and Korn/Ferry International: Corporate Board Governance and Director Compensation in Canada A Review of 2000 Toronto Stock Exchange and Institute of Corporate Directors: Report on Corporate Governance 1999 2000 1999 1999 data 1999 238 112 324 635 200 N/A N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A N/A 51% 33% 32% 26% (65% 33% ) 2 N/A N/A N/A 4 3-4 N/A 3-5 NED 3 N/A N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A NED N/A 91% N/A N/A NED N/A 64% N/A >66% 24% NED N/A N/A 23% 22% 19% (40%) (33%) N/A:
6c () PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia Board of Directors: A Survey on Remuneration and Practices 2001 Singapore Institute of Directors/Egon Zehnder International Singapore Board of Directors Survey 2000 OECD/World Bank/ADB: Third Asian Roundtable on the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A Comparative Review of Board Committees in Asia 2001 OECD/World Bank/ADB: Third Asian Roundtable on the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A Comparative Review of Board Committees in Asia 2001 2001 1999 2000 1999 114 290 102 271 N/A N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A 26% N/A 15% 1% 7% 4% 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 N/A 5 NED N/A N/A N/A N/A NED 100% N/A N/A N/A NED 100% N/A N/A N/A 50% N/A 70% 52% ED 48% NED 30% ED NED (6%) N/A: 170
6c () Korn/Ferry International European Board of Directors Study 1998 Korn/Ferry International 26 th Annual Board of Directors Study Korn/Ferry International 27 th Annual Board of Directors Study Korn/Ferry International 28 th Annual Board of Directors Study The Conference Board Director s Compensation and Board Practices in 2000 Russell Reynolds Associates and the Investor Responsibility Research Center 1999-2000 Board Practices Survey The Structure and Compensation of Boards of Directors of US Public Companies 1998 1999 2000 2001 2000 2000 450 (157 902 917 902 2322 12,139 /1202 ) /754 N/A Super Composite 1500 N/A N/A N/A N/A. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A : N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 54% 74% 74% 73% 46% 67% N/A 3 3 3 2 N/A N/A 3 3 3 N/A N/A NED N/A 3 3 3 N/A N/A NED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A INED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 40% INED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 88% N/A: 171
6c () 82% ED 72% 10% 10% NED N/A NED NED / NED ( 5.5 ) ( 5.5 ) 77% 77% ( 63% ( 55% ) ( 62% ) ( ) ) ( 33% 27% ) ( 65% 35%) 10% NED ( 5.5 ) 77% ( ) N/A N/A: 172
7 I D. (5 = ) 4.78 3.84 4.77 3.84 3.39 4.47 4.06 3.66 3.19 4.71 173
7 () E. (5 = ) 3.47 3.06 3.56 3.25 4.03 3.06 4.13 3.38 2.97 174
7 () F. (5 = ) 2.97 2.84 3.29 3.53 2.94 2.81 2.37 3.48 3.03 2.71 175
7 () II? A. (5 = ) 4.61 3.97 3.45 / 3.71 B. (5 = ) 3.65 3.32 2.45 2.61 2.97 4.03 4.35 176
7 () C. (5 = ) /4.32 4.26 4.26 4.06 2.87 D. (5 = ) 3.03 4.06 2.39 E. (5 = ) 4.48 3.53 F. (5 = ) 3.61 177
8 ( 1999 12 31 ) Franklin Warren McFARLAN Leslie BOYD ( ) 178
9a (ROE) (N = 408) ROE = a + b 1 AC + b 2 CR + b 3 MBRATIO + b 4 DE + b 5 LAT + b 6 FC + b 7 INDUSTRY + e INTERCEPT AC CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE -1.63 0.10 0.01-0.06-1.01 0.12 0.10-0.15-0.09-0.11-0.01 0.11 0.05-0.03-0.09 T- -7.13*** 2.18** 1.05-10.10*** -4.90*** 7.51*** 1.24-2.09** -0.80-1.45* -0.11 1.18 0.39-0.35-1.08 F- 14.28*** Adj R 2 0.314 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 179
9b (ROA) (N = 408) ROA = a + b 1 AC + b 2 CR + b 3 MBRATIO + b 4 DE + b 5 LAT + b 6 FC + b 7 INDUSTRY + e INTERCEPT AC CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE -0.67 0.02-0.00-0.01-0.42 0.05 0.04-0.05-0.02-0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00-0.05 T- -8.09*** 1.36* -0.00-6.32*** -5.72*** 8.62*** 1.29* -1.87** -0.50-0.88 0.16 0.73 1.15 0.12-1.55* F- 10.88*** Adj R 2 0.254 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 180
9c Tobin Q (N = 408) Tobin Q = a + b 1 AC + b 2 CR + b 3 MBRATIO + b 4 DE + b 5 LAT + b 6 FC + b 7 INDUSTRY + e T- INTERCEPT AC CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 0.45 0.04 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.03-0.04-0.33-0.38-0.17-0.13-0.25-0.13-0.12-0.20 1.43* 0.68 1.35* 24.43*** 0.08 1.24-0.33-3.40*** -2.31*** -1.58* -0.84-1.87** -0.80-1.11-1.63** F- 46.75*** Adj R 2 0.611 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 181
10a (ROE) (N=220) ROE = a + b 1 INED_DUM + b 2 LNACNMEM + b 3 CR + b 4 MBRATIO + b 5 DE + b 6 LAT + b 7 FC + b 8 INDUSTRY + e INTERCEPT INED_DUM LNACNMEM CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE -1.77 0.09 0.28 0.02-0.04-0.97 0.10 0.08-0.10-0.10 0.07-0.02-0.01 0.12 0.09-0.10 T- -7.66*** 1.37* 3.23*** 2.39*** -6.74*** -5.24*** 6.92*** 0.96-1.52* -0.93 0.96-0.19-0.06 1.01 1.17-1.37* F- 10.80*** Adj R 2 0.402 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 182
10b (ROA) (N=220) ROA = a + b 1 INED_DUM + b 2 LNACNMEM + b 3 CR + b 4 MBRATIO + b 5 DE + b 6 LAT + b 7 FC + b 8 INDUSTRY + e INTERCEPT INED_DUM LNACNMEM CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE -0.68 0.04 0.11 0.01-0.01-0.44 0.04 0.05-0.03-0.00 0.04-0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05-0.05 T- -7.36*** 1.39* 3.17*** 2.23** -4.44*** -5.85*** 6.53*** 1.41* -0.92-0.05 1.28-0.12 0.11 1.22 1.77** -1.62* F- 8.54*** Adj R 2 0.341 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2t ( ) 183
10c Tobin Q (N=220) Tobin s Q = a + b 1 INED_DUM + b 2 LNACNMEM + b 3 CR + b 4 MBRATIO + b 5 DE + b 6 LAT + b 7 FC + b 8 INDUSTRY + e INTERCEPT INED_DUM LNACNMEM CR MBRATIO DE LAT FC PROPERTY TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 0.35 0.07 0.38 0.03 0.22 0.27 0.01-0.13-0.37-0.51-0.14-0.23-0.56-0.14-0.05-0.36 T- 0.74 0.54 2.11** 1.56* 19.84*** 0.71 0.32-0.80-2.68*** -2.34*** -0.89-1.08-3.06*** -0.57-0.33-2.33*** F- 30.34*** Adj R 2 0.668 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2t ( ) 184
11a (N = 355) = a + b 1 LAT + b 2 SUB + b 3 CR + b 4 DE + b 5 ROA + b 6 FOREIGN + b 7 OPIN + b 8 YE + b 9 BIG5 + b 10 AC + b 11 BOD_SIZE + b 12 CEOCHAIR + b 13 P_INED+ e T- INTERCEPT LAT SUB CR DE ROA FOREIGN OPIN YE BIG5 AC BOD_SIZE CEOCHAIR P_INED 3.19 0.21 0.12-0.02 0.19 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.25-0.13 0.02-0.03 0.22 8.34*** 7.21*** 5.73*** -1.92** 0.51 0.04 1.80** 0.22 0.31 1.29* -1.47* 1.32* -0.36 0.74 F- 16.56*** Adj R 2 0.364 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 185
11b (N = 188) = a + b 1 LAT + b 2 SUB + b 3 CR + b 4 DE + b 5 ROA + b 6 FOREIGN + b 7 OPIN + b 8 YE + B 9 BIG5 + b 10 LNACNMEM + b 11 INED_DUM + b 12 CEOCHAIR + b 13 BOD_SIZE + + b 14 P_INED+ e T- INTERCEPT LAT SUB CR DE ROA FOREIGN OPIN YE BIG5 LNACNMEM INED_DUM CEOCHAIR BOD_SIZE P_INED 3.03 0.20 0.15-0.04 0.08-0.24 0.32 0.03-0.08-0.07 0.46 0.08-0.03 0.02 0.03 5.35*** 5.08*** 5.25*** -1.58* 0.15-0.54 1.48* 0.09-0.67-0.27 1.96** 0.47-0.24 0.66 0.07 F- 10.87*** Adj R 2 0.425 *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 1 2 t ( ) 186
: AC INED_DUM LNACNMEM ROE ROA Tobin s Q CR DE FC LAT MBRATIO AUDFEE SUB FOREIGN OPIN YE BIG 5 BOD_SIZE CEOCHAIR P_INED 1 = 0 1 = 50% 0 ( ), (Tsui and Lynn, 2001), 1 = 0, 1 = 3 31 0, 1 = 0, 1 = 0 187
PROPERTY FINANCE TRANSPORT ELECTRONIC, 1 = 0, 1 = 0, 1 = 0, 1 = 0 CONSTRUCTION, 1 = 0 DISTRIBUTORS ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD, 1 = 0, 1 = 0, 1 = 0 188