RESEARCH REPORT A Survey on the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance of Companies Listed in ShenZhen Stock Exchange 2003.12.05 0086

...1 ABSTRACT...2...3...6...6...9...10...10...17...25...32...34...36...37...38...38...38...48...56...57

2002 5 5 1

Abstract This study examines the effectiveness of corporate governance for companies listed in ShenZhen Stock Exchange. This study measures the effectiveness of corporate governance with two composite indicators, financial performance and information disclosure quality, derived from a theoretical model on the effectiveness of board governance developed by He Weidong (2003). Based on data from a comprehensive survey of 397 listed companies, this study empirically tests how the interactions between different governance mechanisms affect the effectiveness of corporate governance. This study concludes that (i) the abuse of control rights by blockholders may seriously impair the effectiveness of corporate governance, (ii) the board of directors with the majority of independent non-executive directors may improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, (iii) the supervisory board plays a role of rubber stamp in most circumstances and make minor contributions to the effectiveness of corporate governance, and (iv) listed companies can benefit from their expenses on public image and social responsibility Key Words: Corporate Governance, Independence of Non-executive Directors, Effectiveness of Board Governance. 2

2002 5 500 397 80% 70 2 3

400 4

1 5

( 3 ) 1 (1) (2) (3) 30% 50% (4) (5) 6

2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 3 (1) (2) (3) 7

4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 8

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 9

5 1 1-1 70% 10

1-1 314/69% 83/21% (T ) ** ** * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 2 1-2 2.5% 11

1-2 136/34% 261/66% (T ) * ** ** 36/26% 100/74% (T ) ** 2 * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 3 60% 4 12

50% 50% 1-3 155/56% 124/44% (T ) * ** ** * 30% 50% * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 1-3 13

(Voting rights) (Cash flow rights) ( ) 5 (68%) 20% 14

6 1-4 24/22% 83/78% (T ) * * ** 10% 50% * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 15

1-4 (78%) 1-5 1 0.33** 1-0.33** -0.43** 1-0.01-0.09 0.09 1 0.2** 0.11* -0.26** 0.08 1 1 0 1 0 30% 1 50% 0 1 0 10% 1 50% 0 * 0.05 ** 0.01 1-5 16

7 12 17

1 18% 40% 8 2 87% 8% ( ) 18

3 4 5 5% 92% 19

5% 6 2-1 2-1 0.04 0.02 0.18** -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.13* 0.15** -0.05 0.07 0.05 0.11* 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01 * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 20

2-1 7 2-2 2-2 97/25% 285/75% (T ) ** * ** * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 21

8 42% 58% 87% 13% 9 60% 40% 62% 36% 22

10 2-3 2-3 250/73% 94/27% (T ) ** * 220/56% 176/44% (T ) ** ** * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 11 23

2-4 1 0.29** 1 0.46** -0.41** 1 0.01 0.02 0.06 1-0.10-0.04-0.03 0.02 1-0.05 0.62-0.21** 0.08-0.09 1-0.01-0.1 0.02-0.07-0.07-0.05 1 0.07-0.06-0.04-0.06-0.06 0.12 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 5% 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 24

2-4 12 10 2001 25

1 85% 15% 2 68% 44% CEO 37% 3 1 26

( ) 3-1 109/61% 70/39% (T ) 159/55% 132/45% (T ) * * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 3 61% 1-2 34 (9%) 1/3 (90%) 1/3 T 27

4 66% 34% 5 28

91% 64% 89% 38% 120 3-2 102/58% 75/42% (T ) ** ** 119/41% 171/59% (T ) ** * * 0.05 ** 0.01 2001 ( ) 29

6 (86%) 7 20000 20000 50000 61% 50000 13% 39 T ( ) 8 30

31 90% 75% 20% 90% 71% ( ) 9 41% 56% (92%) 15% 14% 7% 7%

10 1 3 ( 3 ) ( 5 ) 59% 2 32

99% ( 3 ) ( 3 ) 3 48% 19% 17% 9% 7% ( ) ( ) 4 5 (91%) (4%) 6 (81%) 33

2/3 1 39% 1 46% 39% 5% T 2 51 (77%) 40 ( ) T 3 64% 34

T 4 (85%) T 5 224 56% 66 16% T ( ) 5 ( ) 6 35

36 65% 5 45% ( ) 1% T 5 ( ) 41% 30% 12% 8% 7% 1 74% 26% 59% 28% 58% 22% 12% (96%) 10% 43% 29% 13% (70%) 50% ( )

86% 3-10 (98%) T 37

2003 1 Mintzberg 1983; Monks & Minow 1995 38

Fama & Jensen (1983) 8-20 (Melone 1994;Lawrence 1997) Pettigrew(1992) 39

2 1 1 2 3 40

2 Katz&Kahn 1978; Summers et al 1988; Zaccaro & Dobbins 1989 41

3 1 Lorsch (1989) 2 42

(Amason 1996) Watson & Michaelsen(1988) Wanous&Youtz (1986) Schweiger Sandberg & Regan (1986) Mace (1986) 3 Eisenhardt Kahwajy & Bourgeois 1997; Jackson 1992; Milliken & Vollrath 1991 43

Cohen& Bailey (1997) Wageman (1995) Weick & Roberts (1993) Eisenhardt (1989) McGrath et al (1995) 4 Hogg (1996) Janis (1983) 44

5 6 Milliken& Martins (1996) 45

1 2 (Mace 1986) 3 46

4 47

48 1. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. 2. A. B. 1) 2) 3) 4 5 6 1 2 1 2 3. 30% 30% 30% -50% 50% 50% 4. A B C D 5. A.50% 50% B.10% 10% -50% C. 1 2

[ ] 1 A. B. C. 5 D. E. 2. A B C D 3. A 1/2 B 1/3 1/2 C 1/3 D 1/3 4. A. B. 1 30% 2 30% 30% -50% 3 50% 50% 5. A 5 B 5 C 5 D 5 6. 7. A B 1 2 3 4 49

8. A 10% 10 50% B 10% C 1 2 9 1 2 [ ] A. 10% 10 50% B. 10% C. 1 2 3 10. A B C 11. A B C D 12. A B C D 1 1 1 1. A. B. C. D. E. F. 50

2. A. B. C. D. 3. A. B.1 2 C. 2 1 3 D. 1 3 4. A. B 1 C. 2 D. 3 E 4 5. A. B. C. D. E. 6. A. B. C. D. 7. A.2 B.2 2 5 C.5 5 10 D.10 10 8. A. B. C D. 51

9. A. B. C. D. 10. A. B. C. D. E. 1. A. B. 2. A.1 B.2 C.3 3 3. A. B. 4. A. B. C. D. E. 5. 6. 52

7. A. B. C. 8. A. B. 9. A B 10. 1. A. B. C. D. E 2. A. B. C. 3. A. B. 1 2 3 4 5 53

4. A. B. 1 30 2 30 50 3 50 5. A B C D 6. A B C A B D A B 7 A. ; B., C. 8 A. B. C. D. 9 A. + B. + C. D. + E. 10 A. 3 B. 3---5 C. 5---8 D.8---10 54

E. 10---12 F. 12---15 G. ( 15 ) 11 A. B. 1)1% 2)1%---3% 3)3%---5% 4)5%---10% 5)10%---20% 6)20%---30% 7) ( 40% ) 55

397 11.7 0.87 8.18 16.3 397 0.45 0.21 0.175 1.73 397 0.07 0.56-5.2 1.5 397-1.47 12.98-22 10.5 397 0.09 0.07-0.04 0.46 397 0.12 0.32-1.34 1.6 397 0.01 0.07-0.66 0.19 397 0.02 1-6.25 3.45 397 76 9 23 98 / ( - ) / / /( * ) =0.28X +0.33X +0.18X +0.21X +0.31X / / 1 100 2001 56

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