2018 3 94 233030 30 20002015 F061. 5 F062. 1 A 1671-9301 2018 03-0053-11 DOI:10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2018.03.005 1 1994 2018-02-22 2018-04-26 1981 13&ZD025 1708085MG172 KJ2018A0442 2017ZD003 53
2 3 4 5 Oates 6 7 8 2 9 10 U 11 10 12 13 54
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 14 2007 2016 12 11 2018 14 55
H1 4 15 16 U 56
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 17 H2 10 18 POLLUTION it = β 0 + β 1 POLLUTION it -1 + β 2 ED i t + β 3 CONTROL + ε it 1 POLLUTION ED CONTROL t ε it β i 1. POLLUTION 1 2 1 2000 2000 2015 30 2. 10 2 2015 ED ED it = LEPP it /POP it [ NEPP t ] 1 - GDP it /GDP t 2 /POPt 2 LEPP it i t NEPP t t POP it i t POP t t GDP it i t 57
GDP t t 3 4 2000 2015 30 3. 19 GDP 3 2000 20 21 INDUS 22 URBAN 4 2015 23 NR 24 1 INS 25 OPEN 1 20002015 16 30 480 1 20002015 POLLUTION 480 1. 31 1. 15 0. 04 772 ED 480 0. 97 0. 36 0. 28 2. 29 EAD 480 1. 004 0. 38 0. 39 2. 42 EMD 480 0. 94 0. 52 0. 13 2. 53 ESD 480 1. 01 0. 37 0. 10 2. 56 URBAN 480 0. 48 0. 15 0. 20 0. 90 GDP 480 2. 74 2. 6 0. 28 10. 80 INDUS 480 0. 40 0. 08 0. 27 0. 80 2 58 NR 480 0. 64 0. 90 0 4. 84 INS 480 40 30. 62 0 121 OPEN 480 5 9. 98 0. 01 70. 28
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1 STATA 13 GMM GMM 2 2 2 1 ~ 6 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 L. POLLUTION 0. 917 *** 0. 883 *** 0. 856 *** 0. 874 *** 0. 902 *** 0. 877 *** 91. 55 72. 10 20. 01 23. 55 29. 96 50. 09 ED - 0. 052 *** - 0. 035 *** - 0. 060 *** - 0. 058 *** - 0. 047 *** - 0. 051 *** - 6. 16-13. 09-3. 89-3. 66-4. 55-3. 18 GDP 0. 000 2-0. 002 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 006 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 011 *** 0. 51-3. 21 7. 25 8. 25 3. 26 4. 45 GDP^2-0. 000 03-0. 000 3 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 76-6. 31-7. 92-7. 99-4. 56-5. 25 INDUS 0. 222 *** 0. 207 *** 0. 228 *** 0. 217 *** 0. 202 *** 24. 41 15. 44 11. 13 6. 13 4. 78 NR 0. 017 *** 0. 017 *** 0. 015 *** 0. 018 *** 8. 59 7. 57 7. 72 10. 31 OPEN - 0. 018 *** - 0. 020 *** - 0. 009 * - 9. 03-10. 21-1. 80 URBAN 0. 013 0. 005 0. 73 0. 17 INS - 0. 000 5 ** - 2. 49 _CONS 0. 109 *** 0. 040 *** 0. 066 * 0. 045 0. 016 0. 048 * 9. 22 4. 13 1. 68 1. 47 0. 69 1. 93 N 450 450 450 450 450 450 AR 1 0. 002 1 0. 001 7 0. 002 3 0. 002 1 0. 002 0 0. 002 2 AR 2 0. 208 8 0. 346 3 0. 203 6 0. 214 5 0. 231 1 0. 210 4 Sargan test 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 t z*** ** * 1% 5% 10% U 20 2 59
1% 22 3 10 EAD EMD ESD LEAP it LEMP it LESP it i t [ ] EAD it = LEAP it /POP it NEAP t /POP [ ] EMD it = LEMP it /POP it NEMP t /POP [ ] ESD it = LESP it /POP it NESP t /POP NEAP t NEMP t NESP t t 2 2 3 3 2 4 6 2 5% 60 t t t 1 - GDP it /GDP t 3 1 - GDP it /GDP t 4 1 - GDP it /GDP t 5 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 L. POLLUTION 0. 899 *** 0. 910 *** 0. 847 *** 0. 872 *** 0. 909 *** 0. 880 *** 36. 85 39. 12 25. 28 28. 09 51. 54 61. 81 EAD - 0. 032 *** - 0. 022 ** - 2. 92-2. 42 EMD - 0. 040 *** - 0. 031 *** - 4. 49-3. 22 ESD - 0. 031 *** - 0. 036 *** - 6. 33-4. 81 GDP 0. 004 0. 006 *** 0. 002 0. 006 *** - 0. 0009 0. 004 *** 1. 01 3. 15 1. 58 3. 09-0. 00 2. 63 GDP^2-0. 001 ** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 000 *** - 0. 001 *** - 0. 000 4 * - 0. 001 *** - 2. 14-3. 96-3. 06-4. 23-1. 80-3. 67 INDUS 0. 187 *** 0. 147 *** 0. 153 *** 0. 176 *** 0. 159 *** 0. 155 *** 6. 22 3. 51 5. 73 7. 17 3. 27 6. 75 NR 0. 012 *** 0. 014 *** 0. 012 *** 0. 013 *** 0. 012 *** 0. 015 *** 9. 06 11. 43 7. 34 7. 51 7. 13 9. 84 OPEN - 0. 017 *** - 0. 017 ** - 0. 022 *** - 0. 013 *** - 0. 020 *** - 0. 011 ** - 7. 09-2. 48-7. 88-2. 78-9. 29-2. 35 URBAN 0. 004 0. 001 0. 003-0. 002 0. 065 *** 0. 060 * 0. 13 0. 03 0. 19-0. 11 3. 19 1. 95 INS - 0. 000 2-0. 000 4 ** -0. 000 4 *** - 1. 53-2. 47-3. 50 _CONS 0. 025 0. 024 0. 087 ** 0. 054 0. 006 0. 039 *** 0. 91 0. 80 2. 22 1. 59 0. 31 2. 73 N 450 450 450 450 450 450 AR 1 0. 002 7 0. 002 5 0. 002 5 0. 001 9 0. 002 5 0. 002 8 AR 2 0. 261 7 0. 251 8 0. 297 8 0. 286 9 0. 245 8 0. 234 7 Sargan test 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 1. 000 0 t z*** ** * 1% 5% 10%
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 4 6 2016 12 11 2018 20 90 2 20 90 20 30 20002015 1 2 3 U 1 26 2 61
3 1 2 2016 2015 2015 3 1. J. 2013 12 17-29. 2 OYONO P R. Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations the case of Cameroon's forests in the Congo Basin J. Journal of environment and development 2005 14 2 1-15. 3. J. 2008 7 7-17. 4. J. 2014 10 105-113. 5. J. 2014 4 88-110. 6 OATES W. A reconsideration of environmental federalism R. Resources for the future discussion paper 2001. 7 FALLETH E I HOVIK S. Local government and nature conservation in Norway decentralisation as a strategy in environmental policy J. Local environment 2009 14 3 221-231. 8 SIGMAN H. Decentralization and environmental quality an international analysis of water pollution levels and variation J. Land economics 2014 90 1 114-130. 9 BANZHAF H S CHUPP B A. Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities new results and an application to US air pollution J. Journal of public economics 2012 96 5 /6 449-464. 10. J. 2014 1 31-43. 11. J. 2017 3 133-144. 12. J. 2016 6 107-115. 13. J. 2017 4 20-26. 14. J. 2017 9 33-49. 15. J. 2012 6 23-32. 16. J. 2016 5 62
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 19-28. 17 PORTER M E VAN DER LINDE C. Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship J. Journal of economic perspectives 1995 9 4 97-118. 18. 34 J. 2016 6 58-67. 19. J. 2006 11 48-58. 20. J. 2010 5 37-47. 21. J. 2007 6 12-16. 22. J. 2010 8 66-78. 23. J. 2017 1 4-12 + 23. 24. J. 2015 12 3-10. 25. J. 2015 4 99-125. 26. J. 2011 9 8-13. Emission reduction effect of environmental decentralization from the perspective of the river chief system LI Qiang School of Economics Anhui University of Finance and Economics Bengbu 233030 China Abstract Whether environmental policy should be formulated by the central government or local government and whether the effect of the central government's environmental policy is better than that of local government is essentially a choice on decentralization or centralization of environment. Based on the innovation of Chinese river chief system this paper argues that the essence of river chief system lies in environmental decentralization and explains the internal mechanism of environmental decentralization from the perspective of local government 's behavior. Then we employ System Generalized Method of Moments to investigate the impact of environmental decentralization on environmental pollution in China using panel data of 30 provinces cities districts in China from 2000 to 2015. The results show that environmental decentralization plays a more conducive role on reducing the level of environmental pollution than environmental centralization which means that environmental decentralization is an effective measure to achieve the ambition of energysaving emission reduction and green development in China. The robustness test of environmental administrative decentralization environmental supervising decentralization and environmental monitoring decentralization show that environmental decentralization in administrative supervisory and monitoring is conducive to reducing the level of environmental pollution in our country which further indicates that environmental decentralization is important to help save energy. This study provides new research ideas and theoretical support for environmental governance and the river chief system implementation in China it has important reference value for the orderly advancement of environmental governance in China and also provides theoretical basis for formulating scientific and reasonable policies of environmental governance. Key words environmental decentralization environmental centralization environmental pollution emission reduction effect the river chief system 63