( ) 2017 4 ( 206 ) 361005,,,, Wild t,,, ; ; ; Wild F062. 6 A 1672-6049 2017 04-0036-11 1-2 3-4 Persson and Zhuravskaya 5 Li and Zhou 6 4 7 8 Opper et al. 9 10 GDP 2017-04-20 2017-06-05 1988 36
JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 11 12 19992014 Wild t 13-14 15 19982002 16 30% 50% 15% 17 18 10% 19 17% 20 21 22 23 24 284 20032008 25 37
2006 2010 60 20 80 1990 7 Huang 26 7 27 28 29 19 15 GDP GDP 1 18 30 11 2 5 18 31 38
JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 3 19992014 285 4 1 334 20002015 Persson and Zhuravskaya 5 1 0 761 57% 43% 5% 4. 95% 2010 2010 GDP GDP GDP 1 1 4 526 0. 574 9 0. 494 4 0 1 4 379 52. 207 2 3. 818 3 38. 333 3 61 4 523 4. 455 5 1. 831 9 1 11 4 526 0. 816 0. 387 6 0 1 4 526 0. 292 1 0. 454 8 0 1 4 526 0. 050 6 0. 219 2 0 1 4 213 0. 509 4 0. 5 0 1 4 526 0. 464 0. 498 8 0 1 3 587 2. 76 0. 673 4 0. 735 4 7. 405 GDP 4 326 9. 599 9 0. 876 9 7. 414 6 13. 055 7 4 337 5. 807 4 0. 678 2 2. 659 6 7. 130 5 3 836 0. 358 6 0. 193 7 0 1 GDP 4 264 0. 120 9 0. 055 5-0. 488 1. 463 4 392 0. 189 3 0. 055 2 0. 015 8 0. 497 4 4 393 10. 207 3 0. 639 1 7. 113 1 11. 481 1 4 130 4. 057 7 1. 477 2-0. 510 8 8. 616 7 4 376 6. 438 1 0. 994 5 0 9. 543 2 432 9. 758 1 1. 701 6 0. 693 1 14. 403 3 39
y ct = αlocal ct + β'x it + ζ p + t + μ ct 1 y ct local ct 1 0 X ct GDP 25 ζ p t ( ) 19992014 26 1 0 3 32 3 1 1 1 5 ( ) 2 25 GDP 1 40
JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 2-0. 001 3-0. 013 4 ** 0. 075 7 * 0. 046 4 * 0. 052 6-0. 58-2. 03 1. 74 1. 68 0. 59-0. 003 * 0. 009 9 0. 017 6-0. 029 3 0. 031 6-1. 78 0. 92 0. 73-0. 90 0. 43-0. 000 6 0. 009 4-0. 066 7-0. 106 * - 0. 022 5-0. 15 0. 5-1. 1-1. 86-0. 2-0. 002 8-0. 002 1-0. 056 3 ** - 0. 046 5-0. 056 6-1. 22-0. 25-2. 23-1. 38-0. 65 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 26 26 26 26 26 N 3 414 3 414 3 174 3 404 213 8 adj. R 2 0. 513 0. 964 0. 843 0. 752 0. 484 : ; *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ; Y 3 1 0. 004-0. 016 6 0. 082 3 0. 12 0. 227 0. 63-0. 95 1. 07 1. 59 1. 11-0. 001 2 0. 000 7-0. 001 4-0. 016 5-0. 038-0. 93 0. 18-0. 07-0. 97-1. 14-0. 002 6 0. 009 6 0. 018 1-0. 024 1 0. 045 2-1. 67 0. 9 0. 79-0. 71 0. 62-0. 000 6 0. 009 3-0. 066 8-0. 106 * - 0. 026 4-0. 15 0. 50-1. 10-1. 87-0. 23 adj. R 2 0. 513 0. 964 0. 843 0. 752 0. 484 2-0. 001 4-0. 013 4 * 0. 076 * 0. 048 * 0. 053 6-0. 65-2. 04 1. 75 1. 74 0. 60-0. 021 9 0. 003 9 0. 000 5 0. 16 0. 143-0. 72 0. 04 0. 00 1. 23 1. 49 0. 022 0. 005 6-0. 069 1-0. 275 * - 0. 17 0. 66 0. 06-0. 50-1. 95-1. 07 adj. R 2 0. 513 0. 964 0. 843 0. 752 0. 484 :, ; *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 19 41
18 2 3 3 33-34 1 4 3 17 4 A - 0. 077 7 * - 0. 205 ** 0. 186 0. 343-0. 355-1. 83-2. 54 1. 12 1. 57-1. 12-0. 004 7 0. 017 3 0. 039 1-0. 026 9 0. 021 2-1. 38 1. 26 0. 82-0. 45 0. 16 0. 017 4 *** 0. 970 *** 1. 299 *** 0. 728 *** 0. 879 *** 3. 76 61. 16 16. 75 14. 38 6. 39 adj. R 2 0. 580 0. 959 0. 849 0. 725 0. 436 B - 0. 005 9 0. 005 6 0. 346 *** 0. 184 *** 0. 217-1. 3 0. 44 5. 63 2. 92 1. 24-0. 001 9 0. 005 7 0. 050 6-0. 009 3 0. 039 9-0. 71 0. 52 1. 27-0. 29 0. 4-0. 001 3 0. 005 4-0. 331 ** - 0. 182 * 0. 074 2-0. 17 0. 24-2. 27-1. 96 0. 28 0. 010 3 ** 0. 935 *** 1. 177 *** 0. 769 *** 0. 859 *** 2. 46 66. 61 19. 41 13. 54 8. 49 adj. R 2 0. 473 0. 969 0. 854 0. 779 0. 531 :, ; *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 42
JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 35 5 1 5-0. 007 9-0. 073 6 * 0. 064 4-0. 263 * 0. 411 * - 0. 94-2. 04 0. 36-1. 74 1. 93-0. 002 2 0. 003-0. 000 4-0. 005 8 0. 128-0. 79 0. 3-0. 01-0. 1 1. 25 0. 002 4 0. 021 4 * 0. 012 6 0. 111 * - 0. 147 * 0. 85 1. 88 0. 21 1. 94-1. 96 0. 001 3 0. 009 5-0. 092 2-0. 133 * - 0. 030 7 0. 37 0. 69-1. 19-1. 85-0. 31-0. 023 5 * 0. 064 4 1. 263 *** 1. 363 *** 0. 979 *** - 1. 90 1. 01 5. 19 7. 32 3. 22 Y Y Y Y Y 26 26 26 26 26 N 2 824 2 822 2 615 2 812 1 904 adj. R 2 0. 524 0. 971 0. 845 0. 756 0. 500 :, ; *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ; Y 2 6 2 3 26 Angrist and Pischke 36 Cameron et al. 37 Wild t 30 t Moulton 7 Wild t P 1 http / /news. gmw. cn /newspaper /2016-10 /01 /content_116698988. htm 43
6 A 0. 000 7-0. 0356 ** 0. 072 8 0. 041 8 0. 062 6 0. 22-2. 44 0. 94 0. 74 0. 58 0. 000 3-0. 020 1 0. 007 5-0. 015 3 0. 083 1 0. 07-1. 55 0. 10-0. 27 0. 87-0. 004 1 0. 04 0. 002 6 0. 011 9-0. 022 5-1. 09 1. 49 0. 03 0. 14-0. 15 adj. R 2 0. 513 0. 963 0. 840 0. 748 0. 483 B - 0. 001 4-0. 0107 * 0. 097 6 ** 0. 043 3 0. 040 1-0. 56-1. 67 2. 32 1. 51 0. 45-0. 000 3 0. 016 6 0. 074 7 0. 024 4-0. 214-0. 08 1. 47 0. 6 0. 47-1. 27 0. 001 2-0. 022 5-0. 17 0. 019 7 0. 121 0. 17-1. 23-1. 2 0. 34 0. 65 adj. R 2 0. 513 0. 964 0. 843 0. 752 0. 484 :, ; *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 7 P A Wild 0. 53 0. 03 0. 096 0. 104 0. 602 B Wild 0. 034 0. 226 0. 000 0. 002 0. 276 C Wild 0. 198 0. 652 0. 000 0. 01 0. 218 D Wild 0. 374 0. 088 0. 912 0. 094 0. 05 :, GDP 44
JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 1 BLANCHARD O J SHLEIFER A. Federalism with and without political centralization China versus Russia J. IMF staff papers 2001 48 171-179. 2 XU C. The fundamental institutions of China's reform and development J. Journal of economic literature 2011 49 1076-1151. 3. J. 2005 4 101-105. 4. J. 2007 7 36-50. 5 PERSSON P ZHURAVSKAYA E. The limits of career concerns in federalism evidence from China J. Journal of european economic association 2016 14 338-374. 6 LI H ZHOU L A. Political turnover and economic performance the incentive role of personnel control in China J. Journal of public economics 2005 89 1743-1762. 7. J. 2007 9 18-31. 8. J. 2011 1 110-122. 9 OPPER S VICTOR N BREHMM S. Homophily in the career mobility of China's political elite J. Social science research 2015 54 332-352. 10. J. 2010 12 13-26. 11. J. 2013 12 130-156. 12. J. 2015 2 11451172. 13. J. 2007 9 142-151. 14. J. 2014 6 62-66. 15. J. 2011 6 146-156. 16. J. 2011 3 72-88. 17. J. 2013 1 50-62. 18. J. 2013 12 43-51. 19. J. 2016 3 1303-1328. 20. J. 2006 2 49-55. 21. J. 2007 3 4-12. 22. J. 2010 8 4-15. 23. J. 2013 3 32-37. 24. J. 2013 1 693-718. 25. J. 2013 6 157-180. 26 HUANG Y S. Managing Chinese bureaucrats an institutional economics perspective J. Political studies 2002 50 61-79. 27. J. 2007 11 91-103. 28. J. 2012 2 120-142. 45
29. J. 2013 9 30-42. 30. J. 2012 2 18-30. 31. J. 2010 12 60-69. 32. M. 2003 200-202. 33. J. 2016 2 941-962. 34 JAMES KUNG ZHOU T T. Feed thy neighbor political elites and regional favoritism during China's great leap famine R. Working paper 2016. 35. J. 2016 11 153-165. 36 ANGRIST J D PISCHKE J. Mostly harmless econometrics an empiricist's companion M. Princeton University Press 2009 200-201. 37 CAMERON C A JONAH B G DOUGLAS L M. Bootstrap-based improvements for inference with clustered errors J. The review of economics and statistics 2008 90 414-427. Local officials and social expenditure WANG Dingxing School of Economics Xiamen University Xiamen 361005 China Abstract Local governance is key to understand the development of China. In this paper through describing the origins of party secretary we find that local promotion of party secretary significantly reduces the number of teachers in primary and secondary school expands the output of the construction industry and increases the road area and this conclusion has nothing to do with natural feelings and local knowledge. The municipal party secretary who is promoted from local mayors leads a significant reduction in the proportion of science and education expenditure and the number of teachers. With the sharply expansion of urban-rural gaps local promotion will increase the number of teachers in primary and secondary school but reduce the amount of environmental management investment. It is found that the conclusion of this paper is still significant by using the Wild clustered t statistic. A policy proposal for this article is to design a top-to-bottom diversified dynamic official assessment mechanism so that local promotion will increase the welfare of the people and show the advantages of local governance. Key words local promotion urban-rural gap construction industry Wild statistics 46