INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH GDP Crain Oakley 9 Kemmerling Stephan 10 Castells Solé-Ollé 11 Lambrinidis 12 Monastiriotis Psycharis

Similar documents
Oates U

JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS Wild t % 50% 15% % 19 17%

GDP % See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentiv

49 Schroeder & Aoki 2009 Li Bird & Ebel SSCI Journal of Public Economics Zhang & Zou DC cbe = + 2 DC be =

标题

( 1 2 ) ( ) ( )

World Bank World Bank 2000 Li Dong Torgler a 2010b 3 Huang 2002 GDP Blanchard Shleifer 2000 capture

2008 5,,,,,,,,,, (,2002),,,?,,,,,, 1994 : 1994,, ( GDP ),, (,2004),,,,,,, highly decentralized,, decentralization, ( ),,,, fiscal decentralization (re

Myers Majluf 1984 Lu Putnam R&D R&D R&D R&D


CHIPS Oaxaca - Blinder % Sicular et al CASS Becker & Chiswick ~ 2000 Becker & Chiswick 196

ULC ULC ULC ULC 1. 88

http / /yxxy. cbpt. cnki. net / % % %

elections. In addition, the positive CARs exist during the full event date that indicates the election bull run do happen in Taiwan. When incumbent go

Lech 1 2 Coffey and Jia Corporate Financial Performance CFP CSP CFP 9 Preston O Bannon 10 CSP CFP Margolis et al Sun abd

Microsoft Word Local government organization and finance in China.doc

Microsoft Word - bxyj2007_01_zongdi225.doc

% %

10 ( ) ( ) [5] 1978 : [1] (P13) [6] [1] (P217) [7] [1] (P19) : : [1] [4] (P1347) (P18) 1985 : [1] (P343) 1300 : [1] (P12) 1984 :

环境指标

32期

untitled

untitled

(1) ( 1965 ),, 1952 [9] 2.1 (2) 1 53 (E i ), 2 (P i ) (G E (G P, 31 (Q i ) 3, : G E (x,y)= (E i Q(x i, y i )) E i G P (x,y)=

「當前賦稅改革重點」相關問題研析 - 國家政策研究基金會

. OER

2008 Nankai Business Review 61

~

1 CAPM CAPM % % Wippern, aGebhardt Lee Swaminathan % 5.10% 4.18% 2 3 1Gebhardt Lee Swa

31 3 Vol. 31 No Research of Finance and Education May ,,, BS,,,,, ; ; ; ; : F : A : ( 2018)

United Nations ~ ~ % 2010

: ;,, 0 0, 60, 0 80,, 76 78, (Deregulation),,,, (Open Sky), (ACI),006.%.8%,.7% 008,, 000, ( ), ( )0, / 6, ; 8, ;, ; 7, ; 06, 6, 006 0, ( ) 0,.%; 0 60,


产 业 经 济 的 功 能 定 位 1993 年, 国 务 院 提 出 北 京 新 规 划 要 突 出 首 都 特 点, 发 挥 首 都 优 势, 积 极 调 整 北 京 的 产 业 结 构, 促 进 第 三 产 业 的 发 展 北 京 经 济 开 始 退 二 进 三, 第 三 产 业 快 速 发

2007 1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (,1994),, (,1996),,,?,??,, 103

A B A 18 A a 2007b

,,,,, (,1988: 630) 218

% % 33. 4% 11. 2% 2. 2% 0. 5% M


Zhang and Song 2003 Seeborg et al 2000 Wang et al Fan 2004 Roberts 2001 Roberts 2001 Bogue

Microsoft Word Improve the Intergovernmental Transfer from Central to Local Government in China -Zhihua Zhang- in Chines


a b

% % * ~ 14 % 15~ 64 % 65 %

Alexander & Wyeth Dercon 1995 ECM - Johansen Goodwin 1992 VEC Asche 1999 Gonzalez 2001 ECM Goodwin

20 79 Bateman APRA ATO GDP APRA % %

Microsoft PowerPoint Zhang Guohua.ppt [Compatibility Mode]

,,,,,,, :,,,,, ;,,,,,, : N = Y pr, dn N = dy Y - dpr pr, Y, N, pr,, (1),, ( : / ) :,, : t pr = e 1980 t = 1,t 9

1994 ~ % % 49% 2 GDP 1 2 Rawski GDP 1978 GDP 1978 =

: 3 :,,,,,,,,,,,, :, 30 9 %, (1994) (The Myth of Asiaπs Miracle),,,,, 1997,,,,, :,,,,, (1994) 1998, 1998,,,,,,, ( ),, :,?,? 3,, :100871, e

天 主 教 輔 仁 大 學 社 會 學 系 學 士 論 文 小 別 勝 新 婚? 久 別 要 離 婚? 影 響 遠 距 家 庭 婚 姻 感 情 因 素 之 探 討 Separate marital relations are getting better or getting worse? -Exp

:, ;,, Li Zhou (2005), Huang(2002) 1978,, ( GDP, FDI ),, ( ) ( ),,, (,, ),,,,, (,,1999),,????? :,,,,80, 1982 ( ),, 65, 80, 1982,Shleifer (19

标题

%

political-legal Max Weber Essays in Sociology


标题

be invested on the desilting of water sources and to paved canals with cement mortar while drinking water project can focus on the improvement of wate

% 82. 8% You & Kobayashi % 2007 %

2006 4,,,, TFP (,2003),, 90,,,, 2005,, ;,,,,,, (disembodied),,,, (,2003),,,,,, : y = Af ( k, l) : y, k, l, A, : = - -, ( ), ( ),,,,90,,,:,,,,,,,,,,,,,

Rauch JE SMSAs 10 Glaeser Scheinkman Shleiferll 11 Henderson 12 Moretti 13 Zhang D Wu F 14 Abel

% % % % % % % % : 11. 9: 12. 8:

GDP % % 10 43

Microsoft Word 专业学位培养方案.doc

股权结构对董事会结构的影响

2012 D A % %

一 一 带 一 路 建 设 开 拓 中 国 东 盟 合 作 战 略 机 遇 中 国 东 盟 合 作 在 过 去 的 黄 金 十 年 中 取 得 显 著 成 效, 相 继 签 署 了 全 面 经 济 合 作 框 架 协 议 货 物 贸 易 协 定 服 务 贸 易 协 定 投 资 协 定, 并 建 成

(),,,,;, , (Π, ), , , 5162 %, U , ,,1992, , : ;

EJCUS1002_04.doc


标题

20-25%,

Fudan Education Forum Vol.16 No.5 [2] [3] [4] 90 [5] [6] [7] Martha Nussbaum [8]

具有多个输入 特别是多个输出的 部门 或 单位 ( 称为 决策单元 Decision Making Unit 简称 DMU) 间的相对有效 8 性 C2R 模型是 DEA 的个模型 也是 DEA 的基础 和重要模型 假设有 n 个决策单元 DMUj( j = n) 每个 DMU 有 m

2011_1_核红.indd

44(1) (1) (4) (4) 63-88TSSCI Liu, W. Y., & Teele S. (2009). A study on the intelligence profile

92

% % 99% Sautman B. Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China The Case

16 31, %, 15 % 1949 ( 1), : 4 8, ;, , , 5, , 5. 05, 400kg,

与林老师对话

管 理 科 学 软 科 学 2013 年 6 月 第 27 卷 第 6 期 ( 总 第 162 期 ) 变 量 选 择 1 CAR i i CSP / 2 /

14 商 业 银 行 网 点 区 域 容 量 与 主 体 安 排 : 一 个 监 管 视 角 总 第 46 期 相 关 由 于 金 融 风 险 显 著 的 外 溢 特 征 和 负 外 部 性 效 应, 以 及 现 代 经 济 发 展 对 金 融 提 出 的 普 惠 要 求, 完 全 依 靠 市 场

Ansell Gash ~ ~ Rhodes ~ H. Haken 20 90

M 2 ΠGDP (1996) M2ΠGDP (2000) (2000) (2001) (2001) (2001) (2002) (2002) (2002) (2003) (2001) (2005) (2005) (2006) (2004) M2ΠGDP ; M2ΠGDP ; M2ΠG

( 2011) Shirley and Walsh(2001) ( 2011; 2011; 2010) ( 2010; 2011; 2012)??? 2003 ; ( ) ( ) : ( )26.8%; 18

~ ~ ~

untitled

护理10期.indd

Bairoch, ) (Angus Maddison,1926 ) (Bairoch, 1976, 1981), 1960, , 220, 228 ; , 447, 310, 178 (1993) (1988) Peter Brecke (

数 据 来 源 : 内 蒙 古 统 计 年 鉴 ; 内 蒙 古 自 治 区 或 各 市 公 布 的 2010 年 第 6 次 全 国 人 口 普 查 统 计 公 报

PowerPoint Presentation

08陈会广

专 题 聚 焦 URBAN HIGHLIGHTS HOT ISSUES 老 服 务 的 实 施 主 要 依 靠 市 场 运 营, 在 社 区 和 家 庭 等 场 所 由 中 介 组 织 专 业 机 构 提 供 服 务 三 是 稳 定 可 靠 的 制 度 化 的 多 元 化 的 资 金 投 入 四 是

MEMO

文章

: Gordon (1983) (horizontal interaction), Wilson (1986), ;Wildasin (1988),, Lee (1997),, (residential2base) (native2base),, (free rider) (psychic atta

% 50% 72. 7% 80% M = Katharina Pistor John Armour


m 3 /a t /a m 3 /a t /a 4 t 6 t 8 t t 10 t 8 t 3

Transcription:

2015 2 75 400044 1 2 3 F810. 4 A 1671-9301 2015 02-0100-11 DOI:10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2015.02.010 1-2 3-4 5-6 2014-11-02 2015-01-14 1988 1964 12CJL041 2013-47-12 14YAZH064 100

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 3 1 2 7-8 1 GDP 1 2 3 Crain Oakley 9 Kemmerling Stephan 10 Castells Solé-Ollé 11 Lambrinidis 12 Monastiriotis Psycharis 13-14 Kemmerling Stephan 15 Zheng 16 101

Esteller Solé 17 Kappeler V lil 18 Kappeler 19 1990 ~ 2009 20 3 20 21 7 1 2 3 1 22 7 3 23 24 Eyraud Lusinyan 25 3 1 4 5 2 102

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 4 5 1 = = 2012 = + = - 2012 = + - 2013 = - Eyraud Lusinyan 2013 = 1 - = + = - + + + = 2010 + + = - 3 1995 ~ 2010 1 2 22 http / /ihome. ust. hk / ~ sochenshuo /research _cn. htm 3 2004 2004 1995 ~ 2004 23 24 23 24 103

4 4 5 24 23 24 5 1995 ~ 2010 1 - + 1-2 1-24 23 24 23 2005 3 23 1. 104

lnptrinv = c 1 + α 1 frlc + β 1 frlc fsy t dq + γ 1 frlc lnpfdi + η 1 X + ε 1 ptrinv frlc fsy pfdi i t t dq X 3 GDP ε 2. lnptrinv = c 2 + α 2 frlr + β 2 frlr zzb t dq + γ 2 frlr lnpfdi + η 2 X + ε 2 ptrinv frlr zzb pfdi i t t dq X 1 ε 3. lnptrinv = c 3 + α 3 frjll + β 3 frjll n t dq + γ 3 frjll lnpfdi + η 3 X + ε 3 ptrinv frjll pfdi i t n t dq X 1 ε 1. ptrinv 26 2. frlc frlr frjll 1 fsy zzb pfdi 3. GDP pgdp pgmc pcor open GDP t 2002 1 0 dq 1 2 0 n frijj 0 0 1 60 2010 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH GMM Hansen AR 1 AR 2 GMM 105

2 0. 717 Llnptrinv 0. 676 0. 704 0. 708 0. 684 0. 617 15. 15 13. 97 14. 54 11. 33 8. 74 10. 75-3. 095 frlc - 2. 820-3. 133 0. 248-1. 134-0. 563-3. 41-3. 55-3. 30 0. 28-0. 72-0. 70-0. 368 frlc fsy - 0. 52-0. 947 frlc fsy t - 0. 776 ** - 0. 619-1. 597-4. 15-2. 63-1. 57-5. 74-0. 593 frlc fsy t dq - 2. 96 0. 528 frlc lnpfdi 0. 509 0. 548-0. 000352 0. 136 0. 154 3. 01 3. 27 2. 92-0. 00 0. 50 0. 86 lnpgdp 0. 270 3. 39 0. 355 4. 34-0. 0301 lnpgmc - 0. 73 2-0. 0816 lnpcor - 1. 26 0. 0398 0. 96-0. 0115-0. 18 0. 297 3. 49 0. 0407 0. 82-0. 0577-0. 80-0. 292 lnpfdi - 0. 292-0. 332-3. 00-3. 35-2. 96 lnopen - 0. 0498-0. 0545-0. 83-0. 91-0. 977-2. 826-1. 15-3. 15-0. 0529-0. 82 0. 431 4. 47-0. 0254-0. 62-0. 0243-0. 25 0. 0504 0. 52-0. 0320-0. 69-1. 834 ** - 4. 918 ** - 2. 16-2. 95 0. 440 5. 14-0. 0689-1. 26-0. 177 ** - 2. 70-0. 0754-0. 49 0. 0443 1. 07-2. 816 * - 2. 23 0. 490 5. 88 0. 0498 1. 12 0. 0597 0. 88-0. 0786-0. 73-0. 109 ** - 2. 35-5. 849-4. 89 446 446 446 120 150 176 Hansen 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 AR 1 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 013 0. 003 0. 002 AR 2 0. 329 0. 664 0. 538 0. 051 0. 321 0. 170 t ** * 1% 5% 10% Hansen AR 1 AR 2 Arellano - Bond 2002 2002 GDP 1995 ~ 2004 3 1995 ~ 2010 1995 ~ 2004 3 2002 2002 106

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 3 0. 731 Llnptrinv 0. 696 0. 721 0. 732 0. 688 0. 577 17. 45 15. 78 16. 72 12. 78 10. 59 10. 07 0. 614 frlr * 0. 551 0. 612 * 1. 930-0. 0309-0. 267 1. 97 1. 48 1. 77 1. 05-0. 03-1. 04-0. 222 frlr t - 0. 602 * - 0. 348 * - 0. 274-3. 45-1. 73-1. 99-4. 14 2002-0. 0671 frlr t dq ** - 2. 15-0. 114-0. 0529-0. 0892-0. 228 0. 0839 0. 146 frlr lnpfdi ** - 1. 67-0. 62-1. 10-0. 97 0. 51 2. 24 0. 258 lnpgdp 0. 316 0. 271 0. 432 0. 399 0. 556 3. 72 4. 70 4. 03 5. 49 5. 79 8. 21-0. 0276 0. 0151-0. 00479-0. 0367-0. 0267 0. 0490 lnpgmc - 0. 70 0. 34-0. 12-0. 98-0. 48 0. 77-0. 138 lnpcor * - 0. 118-0. 138 * - 0. 0562-0. 197 * 0. 0426-2. 02-1. 60-1. 82-0. 65-1. 91 0. 50 0. 0867 lnpfdi * 0. 0495 0. 0678 0. 0868 * - 0. 000452-0. 104 * 1. 78 0. 84 1. 20 1. 81-0. 01-1. 80-0. 0677-0. 0498-0. 0597-0. 0357 0. 0313-0. 117 lnopen * - 1. 13-0. 85-0. 96-0. 55 0. 84-2. 12 2002-2. 959-3. 852-3. 229-4. 810 ** - 3. 549-6. 590-3. 57-4. 71-3. 98-3. 14-3. 59-6. 62 446 446 446 120 150 176 Hansen 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 AR 1 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 013 0. 004 0. 002 AR 2 0. 681 0. 672 0. 941 0. 079 0. 508 0. 492 2 4 2002 2002 n = 1 n = 1 2002 2002 GDP 107

4 n = 1 n = 1 Llnptrinv frjll frjll n frjll n t 0. 719 16. 86-0. 560 ** - 2. 16 0. 719 16. 73-0. 563 ** - 2. 21-0. 0368-0. 23 0. 719 15. 75-0. 819-3. 02-0. 498-2. 97 0. 705 15. 05-0. 545 * - 1. 93 0. 719 16. 73-0. 600 ** - 2. 32 0. 0368 0. 23 0. 717 16. 80-0. 582 ** - 2. 39 0. 0458 0. 47 0. 717 16. 86-0. 586 ** - 2. 40 frjll n t dq - 0. 514 0. 0265-2. 19 0. 59 frjll lnpfdi 0. 0957 * 0. 0992 * 0. 177 0. 0995 0. 0992 * 0. 0955 0. 0957 1. 69 1. 85 2. 78 1. 57 1. 85 1. 67 1. 68 lnpgdp 0. 268 0. 267 0. 327 0. 292 0. 267 0. 270 0. 269 3. 87 3. 88 4. 07 4. 01 3. 88 3. 86 3. 87 lnpgmc - 0. 0323-0. 0341-0. 0205-0. 0108-0. 0341-0. 0321-0. 0326-0. 85-0. 87-0. 52-0. 25-0. 87-0. 86-0. 87 lnpcor - 0. 119 * - 0. 122-0. 102-0. 0637-0. 122-0. 122 * - 0. 121 * - 1. 71-1. 67-1. 53-0. 85-1. 67-1. 72-1. 71 lnpfdi 0. 0259 0. 0269 0. 0178 0. 0180 0. 0269 0. 0269 0. 0271 0. 82 0. 87 0. 52 0. 50 0. 87 0. 86 0. 86 lnopen - 0. 0586-0. 0588-0. 0710-0. 0589-0. 0588-0. 0585-0. 0584-0. 95-0. 96-1. 10-0. 87-0. 96-0. 96-0. 95-2. 751-2. 720-3. 388-3. 337-2. 720-2. 765-2. 759-3. 34-3. 22-3. 68-3. 46-3. 22-3. 35-3. 35 446 446 446 446 446 446 446 Hansen 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 AR 1 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 AR 2 0. 581 0. 586 0. 930 0. 462 0. 586 0. 632 0. 642 2 1 2 3 108

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1. J. 2011 5 93116. 2 Straub S. 2011 Infrastructure and Development A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature The Journal of Development Studies 47 5 683708. 3. J. 2007 3 419. 4. J. 2010 8 415. 5. J. 2013 10 6882. 6. J. 2013 4 5969. 7. J. 2012 5 4557. 8. J. 2011 12 3545. 9 Crain W. M. and L. K. Okley 1995 Politics of Infrastructure Journal of Law and Economics 38 1 117. 10 Kemmerling A. and A. Stephan 2002 The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political Economy Evidence from A Panel of Large German Cities Public Choice 113 3 403424. 11 Castells A. and A. Sole-Olle 2005 The Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment The Role of Equity Efficiency and Political Factors European Economic Review 49 5 11651205. 12 Lambrinidis M. Psycharis Y. and A. Rovolis 2005 Regional Allocation of Public Infrastructure Investment the Case of Greece Regional Studies 39 9 12311244. 13 Monastiriotis V. and Y. Psycharis 2009 Types of Public Investment and the Regions A Spatial Economic Analysis of Government Spending on Greek Prefectures over the Period 19762005 In III World Conference of Spatial Econometrics 8-10th July 2009 University of Barcelona Spain. 14 Monastiriotis V. and Y. Psycharis 2014 Between Equity Efficiency and Redistribution An Analysis of Revealed Allocation Criteria of Regional Public Investment in Greece European Urban and Regional Studies 19 445462. 15 Kemmerling A. and A. Stephan 2008 The Politico-economic Determinants and Productivity Effects of Regional Transport Investment in Europe EIB papers 13 2 3660. 16 Zheng X. Li F. Song S. and Y. Yu 2013 Central Government's Infrastructure Investment Across Chinese Regions A Dynamic Spatial Panel Data Approach China Economic Review 27 264276. 17 Estelle M. A. and A. S. OLLE 2005 Does Decentralization Improve the Efficiency in the Allocation of Public Investment Evidence from Spain Documents de treball IEB. 18 Kappeler A. and T. Valila 2008 Fiscal Federalism and the Composition of Public Investment in Europe European Journal of Political Economy 24 3 562570. 19 Kappeler A. S. Albert S. and T. Anderas 2013 Does Fiscal Decentralization Foster Regional Investment in Pro- 109

ductive Infrastructure European Journal of Political Economy 31 1525. 20. J. 2007 3 412. 21. J. 2012 5 7279. 22. J. 2012 6 4359. 23. J. 2010 6 108124. 24. GDP J. 2013 3 108121. 25 Eyraud L. and L. Lusinyan 2013 Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Fiscal Performance in Advanced Economies Journal of Monetary Economic 60 5 571587. 26. J. 2012 3 6077. 1 22 22 2 Eyraud Lusinyan 25 3 Fiscal Decentralization and Local Transportation Infrastructure Investment Incentives Analysis Based on the Perspective of Inter-regional Financial Configuration Li Sensheng Zhang Zongyi School of Economics and Business Administration Chongqing University Chongqing 400044 China Abstract Rational distribution of transportation infrastructure related to the balanced development of regional and urbanrural linkage benign but it was failed to provide a reasonable explanation of inter-regional transport infrastructure investment gap evolution from the perspective of fiscal decentralization and transfer payments. Based on the configuration of the central government inter-regional perspective explore the central and local fiscal impact on the relationship between the local transport infrastructure investment incentives. The study found 1 from the perspective of inter-regional fiscal configuration can better interpret the evolution trend of per capita investment in transportation infrastructure gap between the various regions after reform of the tax system 2 the limited role of inter-regional fiscal equilibrium configuration to lessen the investment gaps in various regions mainly reflected in the significantly inhibitory effect of financial net outflow and no significant role in promoting by financial net inflow 3 in the process of central government inter-regional configuration effect investment in transport infrastructure lateral competition between local governments play an inhibitory role. At the public transport infrastructure investment incentive level we should pay attention to the influence of two-way flow characteristics of the central and local fiscal relations and the impact of competition the role of local government laterally further reform the financial transfer payment system and promote financial system fit with the run of market mechanism. Key words fiscal decentralization investment in transport infrastructure inter-regional fiscal configuration transfer payments lateral competition 110