2011 10 * N031 A 0257-5833 2011 10-0115-11 030006 Epistemic epistemological contextualism Theory of Knowledge 1 20 relevant alternatives RA 2 3 2011-06-11 * 09FZX011 0905502 1 2 2010 10 3 Argument from Ignorance AI 1 Peter Unger 1975 Ignorance A case for skepticism AI 1 H 2 H O C O H O AI AI Argument from possibility 1 Hind 2 Hind Oind 3 Oind 4 Oind O 5 O ind 115
2011 10 1. 1 h h 2 h p p p 1 2 1 - Peter Unger 2 1 2 3 2. 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 4 S P S S S P 1 S S 1 2 3 4 s q s q h s h P. Unger Ignorance A Case for Skepticism. New York Oxford University Press 1975 p. 95. http / /plato. stanford. edu /entries /contextualism - epistemology /3. 2. S. Schiffer Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1996 96 pp. 317-333 From Contextualism to Contrastivism Philosophical Studies 2004 119 1-2 pp. 73-103. 116
2011 10 1 3. 2 A S P S P A P S A A Nozick Robert subjunctive conditionals account SCA SCA SCA P P P S P P S P SCA 3 S P S P SCA H P H P H P 1 Keith DeRose Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1992 52 4 p. 917. 2 3 Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review 1995 104 1 pp. 4-7 p. 18. 117
2011 10 SCA S P S P P S P M 1 S P P S P P M M S P P S M P S M S P M M SCA M SCA S S SCA SCA P P 2 SCA comparative conditional 3 a b b a b a S P S A B S S A P S B P S B P S P A 2 S P S Q S Q S P S Q S P S P S P S P S 1 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1981 p. 179. 2 3 Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review 1995 104 1 p. 23 pp. 30-32. 118
2011 10 P P S S S P S Q S Q S P S P S Q SCA subjunctive conditional contextualism SCC SCC 1 2 3 SCC 1 3 3 p p p 1 p SCA S P S P 2 3 1 3 2 3 Rule of Sensitivity S P S P O H H O H 2 2 H H O H 1 2 Ibid reprinted in Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield eds. Skepticism A Contemporary Reader. Oxford Oxford University Press p. 193. H H 119
2011 10 1 1 O 1 2 Fred Dretske Mark Heller Stewart Cohen David Lewis 1. 2 S P P P S P P Q P Q P P 3 S Q Q Q Q S Q Q Q S Q 1 Q S Q 2 Q S Q 3 S Q S Q 4 S Q S Q S Q S Q 5 1 T 2 T T 1 Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review 1995 104 1 p. 37. 2 3 Fred I. Dretske The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge in Perception Knowledge and Belief Selected Essays. Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 p. 52 p. 57. 4 Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p. 112. 5 Mark Heller Relevant Alternatives and Closure Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1999 77 pp. 196-208. 120
2011 10 3 T T Expanded Relevant Alternatives ERA S P P P S P ERA T T T T S 1 S T T T T S P P P ERA P P 2 ERA P ERA ERA T T T T T T T T ERA T T T 3 4 5 1 2 1 Mark Heller Relevant Alternatives and Closure Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1999 77 p. 200. 2 2009 5 3 5 Heller M. 1999. The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti - Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology p. 115 116. 4 121
2011 10 1 2. 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 3 Q H S S H S Q 2 S Q p h H r 3 d d d d S q h h 4 S S e e e e q 122 1 Heller M. 1999. The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti - Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology p. 127. 2 3 4 Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p. 101 102 103.
2011 10 S q S q q 1 p h S h h 2 S P R R P S P R R P 3 rule of accommodation conversational score S P S P 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p. 102 p. 103 p. 113. S. Cohen Contextualism Skepticism and The Structure of Reasons Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology 1999 p. 57. D. Lewis Scorekeeping in a Language Game Journal of Philosophical Logic 1979 8 pp. 339-359. Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review 1995 104 1 p. 9. lottery paradox Henry Kyburg 1961 1 2 123
2011 10 1 2 3 1 2 3 Williams M 1 1 2 3 S P S 4 2 3 1 2 3 2 4 5 1 4 6 1 2 3 4 1 4 1 2 M. Williams Is Contextualism Statable Philosophical Issues 2000 10 Skepticism pp. 80-81. D. Lewis Elusive Knowledge Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1996 74 4 p. 551. 3 4 R. Feldman Contextualism and Skepticism Philosophical Perspectives 1 Epistemology1999 p. 110 p. 111. 124
2011 10 p S P S P S P S P P S P S P Skeptical Paradox and Its Solving Strategy of Epistemic Contextualism Wei Yidong Abstract: The form and justification of knowledge is an important problem of epistemology in our times, on which epistemic contextualism and skepticalism debate for a long time. Contextualists argue that the form and justification of knowledge depends on its context, that is, knowing or not - knowing can be justified in its context. But skepticalists think that knowing or not - knowing does not depend on its context, and that knowledge does not need to be justified. For this purpose, skepticalists put forward a skeptical paradox challenging the ideas of contextualism. At the same time, contextualists develope different forms such as conditional contextualism and relevant alternative contextualism to refute skepticalists. No matter what the outcome of the debate, skeptical paradox provides an opportunity for the development of epistemic contextualism. Keywords: Epistemic Contextualism; Skeptical Paradox; Conditional Contextualism; Relevant Alternative Contextualism 125