2007 3,,,,,, 1997 ( 1997 ),,,,,,,,,,,,, (2001), (2004), % 102 %,,,?,? 80 ( Hurd and Shoven,1985 ;Nelissen,1987) ;,Feldstein Liebman (2002) Bore

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1 : 3 :,, 2002, , : 1997 ;2005, ,, ; 2005,, :,, (Aaron, 1966 ; Diamond, 1977 ; Atkinson, 1987 ;, 1998) :, ;,, ;,,,,,,,,;,,,, ; 3,,, com. cn FUJ I XEROX,,,,, 70

2 2007 3,,,,,, 1997 ( 1997 ),,,,,,,,,,,,, (2001), (2004), % 102 %,,,?,? 80 ( Hurd and Shoven,1985 ;Nelissen,1987) ;,Feldstein Liebman (2002) Borelia (2004) 1997, (2005 ) 1997, ,?,2002, ,,,: (2001) (2001) (2001) (2001) (2001) (2001) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2004) (2005) (2005) (2005),,, 71

3 : ;, ;,,,,,, 10,,,,,, : 2002,,,;,, ( ), ln W i = + Y i + 1 A i + j DP ji + i (1) j ln W i i, Y i,a i, DP i 2 A 2 i + (,1), i,(2) -, (Cohort Effect),(3), 72 ln ^W i = ^ + ^ Y i + ^ 1 A i + ^ 2 A 2 i + ^ j j DP ji + ^ i (2),, ^^ i :(1) i i,,,,,,king Dicks2Mireaux(1982), (1) i i = i + v i, i, v i, i v i,,, 2 2 v, i (1), i ^ i = [ Π( v) ] ^ i,, 2 2 v King Dicks2Mireaux(1982) Π( v) 015, Π( v) 015

4 R- 1 L TW i = {[ ^W i ( s) (1 + g s ) ( s- a) ]Π(1 + r s ) ( s- a) } (3) s = a 0 i L TW i i a 0 R - 1 (2002 ) ; ^W i ( s) i s ; a 0 ; a ; R ; g s i s ; r s,g s, ,1978 ;r s, ,g s r s ( ) 1997, ;, 15,;, 15,,,,, 20 60, ,26 64, ,,, ;,1997, (4) (5) (6) 2005,, (7) (8) 1. (1997 ) D L TBB i = { gw m ( i, s - 1) 012 (1 + g) ( s- R) Π(1 + r) ( s- a) } (4) s = R L TBB i i R D 2002 ; D ; gw m ( i, s - 1) i s (1997 ) L TPB i 10 R- 1 = { t = 1 s = a- 5 ^w i ( s) (1 + g) ( s- a) 0111 (1 + Ir) ( R- 1- s) Π(1 + r) ( s- a) } r L TPB i i 2002 ; Ir ( t - 1) (5),60 : ; (2001), % (2001) (2001) (2002),Ir 4 % 73

5 : 3. D 1 L TTB i = TB i ( s) s = R 1 + r L TTB i i R D 2002 ; TB i, ( s- a) TB i = 113 % L i gw m ( i, R- 1) Q i 113 % ;L i i 1997 ; gw m ( i, R - 1) i ; Q i i 4. (2005 ) D L TBB i = { ( gw m ( i, R- 1) + Q i )Π2 Y insu( i) s = R 1 % (1 + g) ( s- a) Π(1 + r) ( s- a) } (7) Y insu( i) i ; 5. (2005 ) L TPB i D R- 1 = { t = R s = a- 5 ^w i ( s) (1 + g) ( s- a) 0108 ( a + Ir) ( R- 1- s) Π(1 + r) ( s- a) } 1 Y rem ( i) r Y rem ( i) i ; %, 3 %, 8 %,,,28 %,,2004 9, 18 % %, , 300 %, 300 % ;60 %, 60 % ( ) 2002 ; 2002, 26072,20 59,8576 ( t - 1) (6) (8) (2001) 29 46, = ;= ; 74

6 , ( 1), , , ( ) , , : , , ΠΠ , Π , % 10 % ,

7 : 35 1, , 2 :, 1997,,2005 ; , 2005, , 333, ,, 1 % 315 % , , , R : % 5 % 10 % ( Π ) HCSE(heteroscedasticity consistent standard error) 50 59, : , : ;,30 70 % 30 34,40 ;, 45,,, 45,,

8 : (1) = (- )Π 100 (2) 2002 ; (a) (: %)

9 : 2 (b) (: ) , 45, 45,, (,2001), 2005, 1997,, 45 40, 3,, 1997,Π 35 30, ; Π,1997,, 15, 78

10 2007 3, (), 35 Π 30 % 40 %,,, 2005,,,Π, 3( a) 3( b) 2002, ,, 1997, , 35, 1 % 10 % 2005, ,,1 % 315 %, 2005,, 1997,, 2005, , 1997,,,,, Π,,;,,, ,,,,,,, 79

11 :,, :,,,,,, ,,2003 :,, 1,2005 :,3,2004 :,2,2005 :,,,2002 :,,,2001 :,,2001 :,,1998 :,,2003 :, 6,2004 :,9,2001 :,,,2001 :,,2001 :,5,2005 : GDP, 6,2001 :, 5,2001 :,5,2001 :, 1 1,2003 : :,8,2003 :,10 Aaron, H.J., 1966, The Social Insurance Paradox, Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, 32, Atkinson, A. B., 1987, Income Maintenance and Social Insurance, in Alan J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein,eds., Handbook of Public Economics, North2Holland, Vol Borelia, M., 2004, The Distributional Impact of Pension System Reforms :An Application to the Italian Case, Fiscal Studies, 25, 415 Diamond, P. A., 1977, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 8, Feldstein, M. and J. B. Liebman, eds., 2002, The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform, University of Chicago Press. Hurd, M. D. and J. B. Shoven, 1985, The Distributional Impact of Social Security, in D. A. wise ed., Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice, University of Chicago Press. King,M. A. and L2D.L. Dicks2Mireaux, 1982, Asset Holdings and the Life2Cycle, Economic Journal, 92, Nelissen,J., 1987, The Redistributive Impact of the General Old Age Pension Act on Lifetime Income in Netherlands, European Economic Review, 31, ( 91 )

12 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001, Microeconomics, 5 th Edition, Prentice Hall. Weitzman, Martin L., 1976, The New Soviet Incentive Model, Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, p Weitzman, Martin L., 1980, The Ratchet Principle and Performance Incentives, Bell Journal of Economics, 11. Jointly Deciding Contract Target : An Improvement of Weitzman Model Hu Zuguang ( Zhejiang Gongshang University) Abstract :The paper analyzed the principal2agent theories at home and abroad that are mainly confined in theoretical analyses and are not easy to be used in practice, briefly reviewed relevant literatures on deciding contract profit target and put forward the Model of jointly deciding contract target after a case study of principal2agent problem in an American company. The paper analyzed the differences and links between the Model of jointly deciding contract target and Weitzman Model of ratchet effect and proved mathematically some propositions for the Model of jointly deciding contract target, described the mechanism of motivation by benefits in deciding the company profit target. Finally the paper made a comparison between the Model of jointly deciding contract target and the Model of incentive design in an American economics textbook. The paper tries to replace the dynamic models of repetitively bargaining in deciding contract target with the once2and2for2all dynamic model based on the Model of jointly deciding contract target. Key Words :Principal2agent Theory ; Model of Jointly Deciding Contract Target ; Weitzman Model of Ratchet Effect ; Model of Incentive Design JEL Classification :L140,L200, G300 ( : ) (: ) ( 80 ) The Distributional Effects of Public Pension Reform in Urban China He Lixin ( Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University) Abstract :Using the micro data of the NBS Urban Household Survey 2002, this paper studies quantitatively the distributional effects of Public Pension Reform in urban China, from intra2generational and inter2generational perspectives, by measuring lifetime net benefits that urban employees obtain under the public pension system in 1997 and the newest one announced in December 2005, respectively. The results indicate that the regressive income transfer existing before implementation of the reform is improved as a consequence of the 1997 reform. However, the Act of 2005 Reform generates the obvious inclination of the regressive income transfer among people who exceed 40 years old in On the other hand, from the viewpoint of inter2generational distribution, the inter2generational inequality resulted from 1997 reform is greater than that from 2005 reform. More over, all generations would receive higher lifetime net benefits under the Act 2005 Reform, but it must be based on sustainable pension system and participants full pension contribution during their duration of employment. Key Words :Pension Reform ; Income Distribution ; Generational Inequality JEL Classification : H550, D310, I380 ( : ) (: ) 91

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::,,,,,,;,,,, (difference2in2difference) : (1) 20 80,,, (2), (Modigliani Cao, 2004) (Kraay, 2000) (3),,,, 100,30 40,, (),, Modigliani Cao (2004) 2008 10 : 3 : 1995 1999 (CHIPS),20 90 1995 1997,, : ;, - 014-013 ;,35 49,, : 1995 1997,,, 8 %,20 %, 5815 % 75 %5815 %,,, :,,,;,,,,,,,,, 90,,, 3,,, :srvnlx @gmail. com ;,, : 200433, :jfeng @fudan. edu.