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1 ( ) : :,, /,, ; /,, ;,,,,,, ;,,, : :?,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( Tirole,1994),, ;,? :,,,,, 41

2 :, ( ), ;,,,, (Ah2 gion Bolton,1992), :,,, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( Fama,1980 ; Holmstrom,1982),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (,1995), ;,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,, /,, ; /,, ;,, Lazear (1989) Mil2 grom(1988),,,, ( ), 42

3 2000 6,,,,, ;,,,,,,i = 1,2,,, ( ) : j, y j B j,j = 1,2, y j ( ), i i,i = 1,2 0 i 1, , 1 = 2 = 0, B j j, ;,, B j, y j,, B 1 B 2,,, y j, : y j = f (a 1,a 2 ; 1, 2 ) 1 (a 1 + a 2 ), 1 = (1) 2 (a 1 + a 2 ), 2 a i i, i i,,,,, i (power2seeking investment), b i 0, :,,,,,, (, ) ;,, 1 2 (power function) : 1 = 1 b (2a) 2 = 2 b (2b), 1 2 ; 1 > 0 2 > 0, ( ),, b i i, i,,,,,,, ( 2 ), i = i + i b i + i, 4

4 :,,,1 2, 1 > 2, : 2-1 < 1 b 1-2 b 2 () G( 2-1 ) g ( 2-1 ) 2-1, ( 1, 2 ; b 1,b 2 ),1 : P 1 ( 1, 2 ;b 1,b 2 ) = prob ( 1 > 2 ) = G( 1 b 1-2 b 2 ) (4a),2 : P 2 ( 1, 2 ;b 1,b 2 ) = prob ( 2 > 1 ) = G( 2 b 2-1 b 1 ) (4b),, i y j + B i, a i b i C i (a i,b i ), C i (a i,b i ), : C i a > 0,C i b > 0,C i aa > 0,C i bb > 0, a i b i (substitutes), C i ab 0 a i, b i, C i ab = C i aa = C i bb, (C i ab) 2 C i aac i bb, 1 : 1 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) + B 1 - C 1 (a 1,b 1 ), 1 U 1 = 1 2 (a 1 + a 2 ) - C 1 (a 1,b 1 ), 2, 2 : 2 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) - C 2 (a 2,b 2 ) 1 U 2 = (6) 2 2 (a 1 + a 2 ) + B 2 - C 2 (a 2,b 2 ) 2, a i b i (i = 1,2), i, i, i B i i a i b i a i b i (i = 1,2) ( 1, 2 ; 1, 2 ; 1, 2 ;B 1,B 2 ),, : (1) y j + B j B 1 = B 2, ; (2), b 1 = b 2 = 0,, ; () : = C 1 a (a 1,0) = C 2 a (a 2,0),,,,,, (, ;, ),, B, (b i > 0),, (allocation effect), (distribution effect), (5),,, 44

5 (dissipation effect) 1 : maxeu 1 = G( 1 b 1-2 b 2 ) 1 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) a b (1 - G( 1 b 1-2 b 2 ) ) 1 2 (a 1 + a 2 ) + G( 1 b 1-2 b 2 ) B 1 - C 1 (a 1,b 1 ) (7) (7), G(. ) 1,1 - G(. ) 2,, 1, 1 ( a 1 > 0,b 1 > 0), : a 1 G(. ) (1 - G(. ) ) 1 2 = C 1 a (a 1,b 1 ) (8a) b 1 g (. ) 1 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) + g (. ) 1 B 1 = C 1 b (a 1,b 1 ) (8b) (8a) ( ) ( ) ; (8b) (, ) ( ), (8b), g (. ) 1 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) : 1 > 2,, ; ;, 2 : a 2 G(. ) (1 - G(. ) ) 2 2 = C 2 a (a 2,b 2 ) (9a) b 2 g (. ) 2 2 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 2-1 ) + g (. ) 2 B 2 = C 2 b (a 2,b 2 ) (9b) (8) (9) (a 1,b1,a1,b2 ), : 1 = 2 =, 1 = 2 =, 1 = 2 =,B 1 = B 2 = B,C 1 (.,. ) = C 2 (.,. ) = C(.,. ),,,,,, ( ),,, :a 1 = a 2 = a,b 1 = b 2 = b : = C a (a,b ) g (0) B = C b (a,b ) a (,,,B) b (,,,B) (10),, : 9a C aa C ab 9 C ab C bb 9b = 0 9, C aa C bb > C 2 ab, : 9a 9 C 9b = (C aa C bb - C 2 ab) - 1 bb C ab - C ab C aa 0 = (C C bb aac bb - C 2 ab) C ab 9, B 1 B 2,,,, ;,, (10) (11) 45

6 : C aa,c bb,c ab > 0, (C aa C bb - C 2 ab) > 0, 9a 9 > 0,9b 9 < 0,, 9a 9 > 0,9b 9 < 0,9a 9 < 0,9b 9 > 0,9a 9B < 0,9b 9B > 0, : 1 :, (1) /,, ;,,,,, (2) /,,,, B, /,,,,,, / B,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,?,?,, B, 1,,,,,,, ( ), ( ), ( ), ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 46

7 2000 6,,,,,,, 1,,,,,,,,, :,, 1 2,, i > 0, i b i,,, (8a), (8b), (9a) (9b), 1 2 (a 2,b 2 ), (8a) (8b) : 9a 1 9b 1 = M - G(. ) (1 - G(. ) ) 2 - g (. ) 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) M - 1, 9a 1 = 1 M 9b 1 = 1 M - ( G 1 + (1 - G) 2 ) (g 2 1 ( 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) + B 1 ) - C 1 bb) + (g 1 1 ( 1-2 ) - C 1 ab) (g 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) ) (12) (1) C 1 aa (g 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) ) + ( G 1 + (1 - G) 2 ) (g 1 1 ( 1-2 ) - C 1 ab) (14), M > 0,g 2 1 ( 1 (a 1 + a 2 ) ( 1-2 ) + B 1 ) - C 1 bb 0,, 1 2, 9a 1 > 0 ; 9b 1 < 0 1 2, 1, 1 > 2, (1), ( C 1 ab ),,, 1 ( C 1 ab = 0,, (1) ) (14), 47

8 :, 1 2, 9b 1 / 1,, 1 2, 1, C 1 ab = 0, 1 > 2, 1, 1 = 0,,, 1 > 0, 1 2, 1 ( ), 1,,, 1 > 2, 1 ( ), 1,, 1 2,,,,,,,, i (b j b i b i ),, i b i,,, 1, : a = C 1 a (a 1 1,0) a = C 2 a (a 1 2,0) (15),a 1 j 1 j 1 : u 1 1 = 1 1 (a a 1 2) + B 1 - C 1 (a 1 1,0) 2, : a = C 1 a (a 2 1,0) (16) a = C 2 a (a 2 2,0) (17),a 2 j 2 j 1 : u 2 1 = 1 2 (a a 2 2) - C 1 (a 2 1,0), 1 u 1 1 > u < 2, 1 2,a 2 1 > a 1 1,a 2 2 > a 1 2,C 1 (a 2 1,0) > C 1 (a 1 1,0), u 1 1 u 2 1, : 1 1 (a a 1 2) + B 1 - C 1 (a 1 1,0) 1 2 (a a 2 2) - C 1 (a 2 1,0) (18) 1 : 1 1, 1 ; 1 < 1, 1 1 ( 1 1, 1 = 1) (18),,,,,,, 1 (18), : 48 1 (a a 1 2) + 1 = - 1 (a a 1 2) - 2 (a a 2 2) > 0 (19) 1 9a 1 1

9 (a a 2 2) = (a a 1 2) - 2 (a a 2 2) < 0 (20) 2 9a = (a a 1 2) - 2 (a a 2 2) < 0 (21) 1 9a a = - 9B 1 1 (a a 1 2) - 2 (a a 2 2) > 0 (22), : 2 : 1 < 2, (1) 1 : 1 1, 1 ; 1 < 1, 1 : (2),, B 1, 1 2,, ( ),,, 2 :,, ( 1 ) ;,, ( ) ( ) ;,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1979,,,,,,,,,,,, 49

10 :,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1995,, Ahgion,P.,and Bolton,P.,1992, An Incomplete Contracts Approcah to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies,59 : Fama,E.,1980, Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy,88 : Holmstrom,B.,1982, Managerial Incentive Problems2A Dynamic Perspective,Memo,Northwestern University. Lazear,E.,1989, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, Journal f o Political Economy,97 : Milgrom,P.,1988, Employment Contracts, Influcence Activities,and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Econo2 my,96 : Tirole,Jean,1994, The Internal Organization of Government, Oxf ord Economic Paper,46 :1 29. ( : ) ( : )

11 Property Right Structure and the Struggle for Power with in the Enterprise Zhang Weiyi ng The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the struggle for power within the firm is related to ownership strucutre. The underlying premise of the paper is that private control benefits attached to the manageri2 al position induce firm members to contest for power while power2seeking effort s hurt productive ef2 fort s. Ownership works t hrough balancing cont rol benefit s wit h monetary incentives. This paper shows that increases in the insiders ownership of the firm can help mitigating the severity of power2seeking through dampening the incentive for contestants with low2ability to join the struggle for power. This paper sheds some lights on understanding the nature of struggle for power inside the firm in general and inside t he SO Es of t ransitional economies in particular. The policy implications for alleviating inter2 nal struggle for power in the context of China are also examined. Marx and North :A Comparison of Two Different Explanations about the Origin and Essence of Social Institution L i n Gang & L i u Y uanchun This paper compares Marx s and North s different explanations about t he origin and essence of social instit ution. At first,it examines t he internal logical consistency of t hese two explanations respectively, t hen test s t heir consistency wit h relevant historical and archaeological fact s. This comparison comes to the conclusion that North s explanation,building up on t he hypot hesis of self2interested human behav2 ior,holding that institutions are the outcomes of individuals cost2benefit calculation and free trading, and considering the essence of the institution as free contract,is lack of internal consistency and incon2 sistent with historical and archeologican facts. Marx s explanation starts from the productive practice of humankind,reduces the origin of social institutions to people s relations in social production and the processes in which people build up social organizations, norms and rules t hat suit s to t heir existing rela2 tions in production and uphold t hem, holds t he essence of instit ution is t he interest relations among dif2 ferent groups,strata and classes in the social system of labor division and coordination. Marx s explana2 tion constit utes a t heoretical system wit h rigorous internal consistency and st rongly supported by his2 torical and archaeological fact s % 21 % ; 018 % 21 % ; 51 4 ; 65 6 y 0 y 0 y 0 y 0 78

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572 ( ) 9 (1997),,,,,, (, 1997),, (, 1998), (, 2006),,,,,,,, (, 1997),, ( Naughton, 1994) (Lipton and Sachs, 1990 ;, 2004 ; ),,, (, 1997) (1998),,,,,, 9 2 2010 1 ( ) China Econo mic Quarterly Vol19, No12 J anuary, 2010 3,,, 2 451,,,,,,,, ( ),, (, 2005), 1 (, 1996a), (, 2004), : W + q, W, ( ), q,, : ( ),,, 3 :,, 510632 ; E2mail :zqx831118 @163. com, (08J