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2008. 6,, : :,,,,,,,,, :,2008,,, :,2004,, :,1998,, :,2006,, :,2000, : B,,2007, :, :,2001,, :,2000,, :,2005,, 2004, :,2006a,, 2005, :,2006b, :, 2005-2006, : ( ),, 20
,2006,, 3,2003,, :,2005, :, 2 Baker, George, Robert Gibbons & Kevin Murphy 2001, Bringing the Market Inside the Firm? American Economic Review XCI. Blau, Peter M. 1963, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy ; A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. Kerr, Steven 1975, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal 18. Lipsky, Michael 1980, Street2Level Bureaucracy. New York : Russell Sage Foundation. March, James G. 1988, Decisions and Organizations. New York, N. Y. : Blackwell. Meyer, John W. & Brian Rowan 1977, Institutionalized Organizations : Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83. Michels, Robert 1968, Political Party. New York : Free Press. Milgrom, Paul &John Robert 1992, Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall. Pressman, Jeffrey L. & Aaron Wildavsky 1984, Implementation. Berkeley, CA : University of California Press. Tirole, Jean 1986, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies : On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2. 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press. 1992, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations. in Advances in Economic Theory : Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, (ed. ) by J. J. Laffont. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max 1946, From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology. Trans. by H. H. G. & C. W. Mills. New York : Oxford University Press. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York : Free Press. Wilson, James Q. 1989, Bureaucracy : What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York : Basic Books. : E - ( ) : 21
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (Bimonthly) 2008 6 Vol. 23 November, 2008 PAPER Collusion among Local Governments : The institutional logic of a government behavior Zhou Xueguang 1 Abstract: A salient governmental behavior in China is the collusion among local governments, that is, local governments often form alliances so as to sidetrack and compromise the original intentions of state policies. As a result, there are significant and persistent deviations and goal displacement in policy implementation processes. This article develops an organizational analysis and theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. The key arguments are as follows : In the Chinese government apparatus, collusion among local governments, though informal and illegitimate, has resulted from organizational adaptation to its institutional environments, hence acquired legitimacy and became highly institutionalized. The author argues that collusions among local governments are to a great extent unintended consequences of the centralization of authority and the enforcement of incentive designs in the Chinese government in recent years. Utopian Realism : Is it possible and desirable? Cheng Boqing 22 Abstract : Anthony Giddens proposes the outlook of utopian realism to capture the future2 orientation. As a critical theory without guarantees, is utopian realism possible and desirable? This article firstly explores the basic assumptions of Giddens s social theory, especially its philosophical anthropology. It is clear that the prospects of utopian realism are based upon the postulates of the knowledgeability of human agents and the double hermeneutic which characterizes social science. The tensions between utopianism and realism are then analyzed, and the difficulties in balancing the universalism of utopian realism with the contingency and heterogeneity of contemporary society are also mentioned. The implications and limits of utopian realism are showed by the case of Giddens s model of a democracy of the emotions. Finally, the article attempts to show the rhetorical strategy which Giddens uses to overcome the take2it2or2leave2it quality of his theory. Voluntary and Involuntary Job Mobility and Earnings Inequality in Urban China, 1993-2000 Wu Xiaogang 33 243