3,,,,,, 1872,,,, 3 2004 ( 04BZS030),, 1
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1928 716,1935 6 2682 1928 2 1935 6 1966, 2174, 7014 %, 94137 % 4, 1961, 59 1929,30, 30,, 4,1976,627,,,,, 3 (1993,12 ),, 2
, :,,,, :,,,,,, 1935 (1905),, 1908,1912,1928,,1917,1935,,,1917 59129 %,1921 72164 %,1922 88187 %,1923 1926 97147 %, 11, 1988,355 356 3
2005 5, 1916,,,,,,,:,,,,,,,,,,,, (1928),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1928 500, 2500 1/ 5 1935,,,1982, 86 87 4
20 30,, 1935,,, 1935 3 28,,,:( ) :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,, :,,,,,,,,,140 :(1), 1991,383 5
2005 5,,,,,,,,,?, :1935 3 22,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934,97570, 42500, :,,1976,194 ) (1),385 6
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :, ;,,,,,,,, : 26,818 823,(3),2055 2056, (3),2094 2076 2077 7
2005 5,,, ;,,,,,,,, 1,1931 1934 : 1 : 1931 1932 1933 1934 7210 6415 3210 2514 2114 2610 2919 2913 14518 14814 21219 26515 013 012 15514 23912 23912 27510 47516 :: (,1940 ),300 ; :,4 (1936 5 25 ),2,1988,210,,,,,(3),2129 2130 8
,1931 1934 4,,4600,1935,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,, 1996,462 435,,,,,,,,,,142 141 :,195 9
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,50 %,, 50 % 50 %,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,195 1935 5 2 2 (1),170 :3,12 1935 5 2 27, :, (1),173 10
:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934, :, 2001,5 11
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,:,,,,,,,1998 6 1934 6 3, 3,1023 12
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, : 2 (1934 6 ) ( ) 54 20000 40 25000 41 30000 55 5000 44 10000 43 30000 53 35000,,,,,, 13
2005 5 50 15000 ( ) 44 10000 35 15000,1936 45 30000 46 10000 1935 47 10000 59 10000 5000 53 25000 56 5000 53 10000 42 50000 48 25000 49 10000 70000 62 20000 58 10000, 41 10000 57 25000 15000, 46 5000 5000 10000 41 15000 59 6000 62 15000 :,69 70 14
, 1000,,,,, 1000, 100, 10,5911,5911 %,,,,, 1934 3,,4 18,6 4 24,5 28 5 31, 6 2,,,,, :, 25,,,26,,,,,,,,326 327,64 67 15
2005 5,,,,, 4,,, 1936 12,,,,,,,,, 1939,,,,,,,,,, 1943 12,,,,,,,,,1947 9 19, 3,1024 1025,, 3 5 101 16
,,1934 6 1937 7 3,, :,,,,,,,1936 12 31, 3280,1000,1936, 191,,?,,,,,,,,,,,,112 :T1V1, 3,1034 3,1034 17
2005 5, 1934 7,,( ),,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,(1934 ) 25,2 3 16 17 18
,,,,,,,,,,40,,, :,,,,20 30,,, 7 22,1934 6 6,94 19
2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1972,4,7,, 2003 20 40,,2003,1942,, 69158 %(3, 1419 ),, 20
,,,, 5 5 : 800, 200 ; 600, 300 ; 480, 48 ; 60, 12 ; 20, 4,, 1960, 564, 30 %,, 30 %,, 5 : 3 1948 9 10 11 5 : ( %) ( %) 80000 20000 2510 363145 11817 60000 30000 5010 514 01018 2000 400 2010 014 01100 48000 4800 1010 37710 71854 6000 1200 2010 38118 31182 196000 56400 2818 784143 11391 : :,1948 11 8 ( ),6 3,1948 9 10 11,5 21
2005 5 784143, 2 %, 377, 8 %, 514, 0102 % 4000 11 8,10 26, 40, 1948 9 27?,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1948 10 31 ( ),2 22
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2005 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,?,1948 9 27,, 1,1948 10 11,B014/ 005,1, 17,1949 3 1,B014/ 005,173 24
, 1949 (2 ) :,,,,,,,,,,:,,,,,,, ;,,,,, ;,,,,,,,B015/ 182/ 101 25
2005 5, :,,,,, 200433 : (1868 1945),2005 7,62,58 1868 1945, 1890 1927 1937 1942,, 26
Modern Chinese History Studies No. 5, 2005 On the Route to Forming State Capital Joint Stock Companies during the Nanjing Government Period Zhu Yingui (1) The joint stock system is fundamentally a way of organizing capital. In modern China, joint stock companies did not all fit into the same category, due to differences in the nature and source of their capital, the times when they came into being and the ways they were assembled. Under the Nanjing Government, joint stock companies in the state capitalist mold made up one important category of modern Chinese joint stock company. During the Nanjing Government period, joint stock companies were mainly formed through compulsory investment, through selling off shares in state2owned enter2 prises, or were directly formed as proto2state capital joint stock companies. Because of differences in goals, methods and timing, these state capital joint stock companies had a far from consistent effect on socio2economic life. Remote Control : A Study of Chiang Kai2shek s Use of Handwritten Per2 sonal Orders Zhang Ruide (27) Chiang Kai2shek s use of handwritten personal orders (i. e. orders directly from Chiang which bypassed the usual bureaucratic mechanisms) had the following charac2 teristics : First, the huge number of handwritten personal orders issued by Chiang was just an expedient wartime measure. After 1950, the number of handwritten personal or2 ders he issued decreased dramatically. Even before 1950, Chiang repeatedly urged his subordinates to avoid issuing handwritten personal orders themselves as much as possi2 ble. For this reason, it is difficult to claim that Chiang did not have any respect for proper procedure. Second, the handwritten personal orders Chiang issued covered all manner of issues, and only occasionally bypassed the normal chain of command. Those few which both bypassed the chain of command and exhibited relatively serious prob2 lems were limited to battle orders. Third, the affinity of military leaders for bypassing the chain of command in battle was the result of habits developed commanding small u2 nits over a long period of time, as well as the result of a lack of training and experience in commanding large units. For this reason, an affinity for bypassing the chain of com2 mand in battle was by no means limited to Chiang alone ; it was a widespread phe2 nomenon. Furthermore, if we look at Chiang s extensive use of handwritten personal orders in the context of China s difficult material circumstances during the war, we can see that there seems to have been no better alternative at the time. 1