90 2011 7 1 90 90 90 * 30 1984 1989 4 *

2011 6 1993 1997 1992 1998 2003 5

2004 2007 2008 2010 2008 6

2011 6 * 33% 21% 19% 18% 3% 8 5% * 7

- - - 8

2011 6 * 1921 2011 90 90 90 90 90 1921 1949 1949 16 12 43 1949 200 0. 8 4. 7 5. 2 2. 2 1949 100 44 23. 6% 35 62 1952 679 1978 3645 1986 1 1991 2 2001 10 2010 397983 40 1979 2010 9. 9% 3 2000 2005 2008 2010 1952 119 2010 29762 40. 3 1950 62 1978 1132 2010 8 1952 1. 39 1978 1. 67 2010 28473 * 9

2010 54648 1949 3. 8 409 1949 2 1952 119. 8 2010 16. 0 11. 5% 22 7 220 2010 19. 8% 2010 17. 1 1952 191. 2 2010 29. 9 1949 125 8. 3% 1949 0. 32 2010 32. 4 12 2. 03 43 42065 2010 9. 1 1949 3. 2 401 48. 7 2010 7. 4 12. 4 68. 8% 1949 1. 5 2010 32940 3 1949 1349 1988 0. 3 2010 8. 59 3G 2010 4. 57 1978 1950 11. 3 2010 29728 2630 14. 0% 5. 5 15779 2868 14. 2% 5. 8 13948 2404 13. 9% 2009 1979 2010 1 1993 18 2003 29 2010 590 2000 1949 100 2010 19109 1949 44 2010 5919 1. 5 22639 1978 57. 5% 67. 7% 2010 35. 7% 10

2011 6 41. 1% 2010 13. 1 2000 25. 2 188. 9 8. 7 71. 2 6. 3 136. 5 2000 30. 6 10. 4 21. 1 1978 2. 5 2007 1479 2007 2008 4007 2010 2688 2010 25673 43206 13376 96. 3% 80% 20% 9 500 2010 252 1978 1949 35 2005 73 2008 2010 90 62 62 11

* 1949 2010 GDP GDP GDP 1 /10 GDP GDP GDP 10 GDP GDP - - 75% 2008 12 *

2011 6 1949 20% 80% 20% 2009 46% 2029 80 66% 2 /3 1000 20 1000 20 1000 1978 12 20 80 13

* 1957 1978 1956 6 1957 2 1956 2001 14 *

2011 6 20 80 20 80 20 80 90 44 15

Inequality Aversion or Reciprocity An Investigation of Two Kinds of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game Chen Yefeng a b Zhou Yean c and Song Zifeng d a School of Economics Zhejiang University b School of Economics and Business Administration Beijing Normal University c School of Economics Renmin University of China d Development Research Center of the State Council Abstract This paper sheds light on how to test social preferences behind the responders rejection in the ultimatum game when the proposers offer a positive allocation. Employing a set of ultimatum game experiments and gathering the experimental data from Zhejiang and Beijing respectively we make an investgation about the impact of intention-based reciprocity preferences and outcomes-based inequality aversion to human behavior s decision. Through a mini ultimatum game in which the responder can signal different information about the intentions of the proposer we found that the identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. The result shows that the reciprocity preferences play an important role in people s decision. Meanwhile we investigate the mechanism of the inequality aversion through a set of modified ultimatum games. We found that there are 38% and 89% responders behavior in guarantor game and impunity game respectively can not be explained by the inequality aversion theory. The result shows that people prefer the intention of allocation more than the outcomes of allocation which also means that the fairness of allocation process is more important than the fairness of allocation outcomes. Key Words Inequality Aversion Reciprocity Ultimatum Game JEL Classification C72 C92 C81 D71 檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵檵 15 1959 60 44