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. Barzel 982 2. Leland & Pyle 977 L - P 3. Merry 984 gossip 2003 8% 4% 7
200. 6 2009 Spence 973 Rothschild & Stiglitz 976 Macauley 963 Ellickson 99 2003 8
Kreps et al. 982 200 80 90 9
200. 6 2 3 4 2 3 4 986 986 28 995 7 986 986 7 983-984 984 7 2 984 344 80 980 0 9 987 333 20
2007c 2005 Spence 973 2
200. 6 22
2 33 3 2 3 980 984 9 986 0 29 986 4 86.. 6 989 985 3 24 988 990 236 99 992 8 994 994 2 2008 993 2 993 22 3 27 6 993 22 23
200. 6 20-30 987 8. 6-2. 9 00 993 5. 2 2 70 988 24. 6 3 89 985 79. 4 4 50 999 4. 6 5 2639 998 30. 0 6 2000 995 50. 2 7560 995 89. 9 2006 7 56 2008 2002 22 2008 3800. 4 564. 7 8 984 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 30 20-30 987 30 00 993 89 985 8 986 9 25 999 6 32745 282085 25743 28967 33 7929 998 8. 7 7. 6 995 995 7560 4860 2000 660 999 930 2008 2008 2008 24
2007b 995 6 00 2. 529% 20 3 4. 4% 300 993 6 394 2. 6 7. 2 2 2 0% 25
200. 6 200. 9. 3 984 994 5 988 984 997 984-997 984-990 99-997 2008 984-997 2 984-997 2008 993 26
984-989 989 992-995 995 997 2 984-997 984 0 984 985 2 989 986 986 7 986 27
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987 7 4% 458% 988 022 275 994. 3 236 2008 36-37 989 6 679. 8 268. 7 56. 9 300 294. 9 65. 8 6 75. 25 776. 8 988-990 2 5 50% 989 3 50% 2 000 800 50 5% 988-995 9 5% 00% 2008 37-38 50% 0% 0% 0% 20% 7. 2% 3% 29
200. 6 25% 0% 0% 993 29-34 990 990 3 9 99 99 8 3 8 0 993 34-35 990 4 59 3 85 989 9 2 89 3 30
2008 4 99 990 3 9 50% 99 43 8 658 764 50 6 3 553 865 50% 6 7 60% 2 8 4 99 993 36 2008 42 992 993 4800 99 200 992-994 8 994 5 2. 6% 0% 992 992-995 990 0 99 993 5 0 993 22 3
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995 3 3 995 87 993 995 4 994 995 995 5 4 8 6 / 995 87 995 33
200. 6 995 2. 03% 6. 79% 995 48. 83 24. 5 7. 48% 2 995 2 997 997 8 8 25 998 22 7. 7% 34 20. 6% 33 22. 4% 998 9 0 25 998 2 7 29 6 8 2 NY 995 5 20 9 2 00% 27 30% 8-9 9 20% 23 338 48% 3643 92% 34
2000 22 5 6 2007c 999 2 28 28% 999 30% 2 90% 3 5 9% 4 2005 9. 4% 2007c 90 2% 3% 3 9% 995 2 998 995 4000-6000 997 8 25 2 2006 50 26 26 997 83 998 5 996 3 94-95 8 7 997 4 30 557 997 4 2 2006 2007c 35
200. 6 30 5 24 03 00 30 70 2000 2 28 6 6-2 9 59 900 000 38% 2 20% 3 3% 82% 4 93% 97% 200 6 430 2748 67% 7 6 5 3 988 2002 2 9 2003 4 9 999 200 8 3750. 6 368 40 280 2003 2002 36
999 2 8 4 999 2 5 000 988 0 994 6 995 6 30 900 97. 58 7 2 30 4 200. 9. 3 200 9 3-5 7-8 2005 37
200. 6 9 3 7. 99 5 000 7705 4000 7 9 4 4 9 4 0 9 5. 34 2. 52 4000 9 30 3. 72 9 30 2 3 6. 28 2. 6 4% 3. 05 49% 0. 63 0% 5. 55 88% 0. 73 2% Diamond & Dabvig 983 D - D Gorton 985 Jacklin & Bhattacharya 988 2005 2005 38
2005 D - D Goldstein & Pauzner 999 5 988 8 8 989 8 5 5 2 3000 00 2000 00-2 2 2007b 50 00 39
200. 6 993 45 4 28 2 26 77 2008 83 993 0. 57 995 2007b 6 995 995 6-2 995 06 25 25 23 4 996 996 4 4 24 955 4. 65 4 996 73 2. 24% 6342 379 996 3 26. 5000 3000 3 8000 2 2. 3. 500 800 4. 993 3000-2 996 3000-5000 3 40
5335. 5 7947. 75 996 0023. 53 6037. 26 996 4 50% 2. 3% 6. 55 992-994 3 994 994 233 AAA 2 996 3 3 2 2 0 996 4 0 40742 66. 42% 4074. 2 4 550 998 96 998. 9 200 7 42 777 2003 3 9 200 200 54 4. 9 990-997 2 992 993 4
200. 6 2 990-997 990 42 5 73 445 585 363. 64. 6 99 43 5 028 67 684 494. 53. 39 992 43 5 64 233 040 86. 3. 2 993 49 7 2467 2463 502 487. 00. 0 994 5 9 4780 696 305 4080. 69. 75 995 5 20 756 9229 4865 6002. 82. 8 996 5 20 0024 232 6037 8000. 8. 76 997 5 20 0759 7642 6263 0858. 6. 58 3 990-997 993 993 994 3 990-997 3 993-997 993 994 995 996 997 0 5 8 8 9. 3008 2. 082 2. 456 4. 03 6. 490. 998. 9. 8240 2. 5093 3. 5596 42
3 993-997 3 993 5 2 995 3 997 9 996 9 987 3 30 8 500 500 0% 500 5% 2008 99 500 0% 2% 20 3 2 3 3 993 9 7 3000 50 993 20% 50% 500 0% 5%. 2. 3. 90 43
200. 6 998 2002 3 / 6 80 90 / 996-2008 4 4 997 998 4 / / 996-2008 44
4 / / / / / / / / 996 7. 2829 4. 03. 82 4. 3827 2. 5093. 747 997 0. 2635 6. 4684. 58 5. 8484 3. 5596. 643 998 4. 406 9. 029. 566 7. 60 4. 5908. 656 999 5. 3658. 4468. 342 0. 0200 6. 302. 635 2000 24. 3900 4. 2300. 74 6. 8900 9. 300. 84 200 29. 700 6. 2600. 794 7. 800 0. 000. 763 2002 62. 487 22. 2357 2. 807 49. 354 5. 2483 3. 237 2003 83. 8928 34. 087 2. 466 56. 9950 23. 8297 2. 392 2004 04. 9260 38. 567 2. 750 65. 2567 28. 6622 2. 277 2005 5. 274 55. 8000 2. 066 82. 8830 36. 7000 2. 258 2006 30. 748 75. 0447. 735 92. 4023 54. 2585. 703 2007 64. 693 09. 0854. 509 5. 3926 74. 8304. 542 2008 2. 5000 56. 2000. 354 48. 5500 0. 9000. 458 2009 302. 0000 234. 0000. 29 208. 0000 54. 0000. 35 2002 / 2 2002 / 2002-2005 2 2006 2 2002 2006 2002 3 22 7 5% 3 2006 8 / 2002 3 22 2002 62. 4 40. 7 78. 3% 36. 3% 45
200. 6 46
2005 6 2003 949-999 2006 2007a 2007 2007b 2007c 984-200 2009 2008 2008 2002 2 2 993 3 2003 7 4 9 987 2005 5 200 997 2 47
200. 6 998 5 995 2003 200 2003 2004 2004 2009 2 993 99 Barzel Yoram 982 Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets. Journal of Law and E- conomics 25. Diamond D. W. & P. H. Dybvig 983 Bank Runs Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. The Journal of Political Economy 9 3. Ellickson Robert 99 Order without Law. Cambridge Harvard University Press. Godstein I. & A. Pauzner 999 Endogenous Probability of Bank Runs in a Rational Expectations Model. mimeo. Tel Aviv University. Kreps D. P. Milgrom. J. Roberts & R. Wilson 982 Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27 2. Leland H. E. & D. H. Pyle 977 Information Asymmetries Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance 32 2. Macauley Stewart 963 Non-Contractual Relations in Business A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review 28. Merry S. 984 Rethinking Gossip and Scandal. In D. Black ed. Toward a General Theory of Social Control. Vol Fundamentals. Orlando Academic Press. Podolny Joel M. 2005 Status Signals A Sociological Study of Market Competition. Princeton University Press. Rothschild M. & J. E. Stiglitz 976 Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 4. Spence M. 973 Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 3. 48
decomposition by groupings to analyze the causes of income inequalities during these 20 years and to test several assumptions in relation to important and relevant arguments popular in China. Then in order to test a comprehensive hypothesis put forward in this paper the paper use the Sharpley-Value decomposition approach based on semi-logarithmic linear regression to estimate the contributions of factors to the total income inequality. Putting the factors into a united model of decomposition the factors having important effects on income inequalities are found in the analysis of regression. Results of the analyses show that the causes of income inequalities are very complicated in China among which the mechanisms of economic marketization play main roles meanwhile the structural-institutional factors irrelevant to the process of marketization also have important effects and the contributions of other factors mix effects of marketization mechanisms and non-marketization mechanisms together. Government Credit as Signal Information mechanism of private depository institution in Wenzhou and Taizhou after reform Zhang Xiang 6 Abstract Why the private depository institutions didn t develop as successful as other private enterprises in China How do the government s financial regulation policies influence the private depository institution development after reform This paper tries to address how the information mechanism which named governmentcredit signaling mechanism in this paper may help us to understand the rise and decline of the private depository institution. Because of high debt ratio high measurement cost of depository financial products and the limitation of gossip mechanism the reputation mechanism which relies on repeated games and good property rights protection is very important to depository institution. Facing the strict market access and operation regulations from the central government the private bankers have less incentive and more difficulties to invest on reputation. The private bankers may use the supports from the local government as signals to attract potential depositors and establish reputation. This government-credit signaling mechanism determines that both the depositors and the private bankers are very sensitive to the changes of policies. The data and cases from Wenzhou and Taizhou support the deductions of the above explanations. The Reach of Danwei Mobilization An analysis on urban residents charitable giving to Project Hope Bi Xiangyang Jin Jun Ma Mingjie & He Jiangsui 49 Abstract Analyzing the data from The Social Impact Assessment on Project Hope in Two Decades this paper explores the effects of danwei mobilization on charitable 244