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2003 5 ; ; ;,,,, 6 40 %,, :,!,,, :,1928 3 30,() 233 241 :,1928 2 12 46
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: ;, :,,,,,, :, 1978,394 :,1928 2 12,1928 3 15 49
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60 %, 1 1926110 425612 21589 97455 544656 192714 60 100 192813 22 1929110 266338 307568 79873 653779 1929112 276028 402356 84333 762717 1930110 274452 433942 84759 793152 1931111 303353 459723 94852 857928 1932112 358351 658530 98691 1115572 1933112 394086 796352 104660 1295098 1934110 435618 868939 104310 1408867 193519 468014 999685 106846 1574545 193615 498956 1002938 108228 1610122 193711 526977 1013019 110428 1650424 : (1),, 1993, 85 89 101 106 160 176 280 311 329 367 410 411 536 537 570 571 ; 55 93 (2) : 1937,192 194 (3) : 51
2003 5 1996,214 255 (4),() 19 (5) :, 1929,147 149 (6) 2 2 ( ),1930, : ; 1930 1937 1927 4 60,1928 3 22 1937 1 52, 16, 36 10 30, 1927 1936 1927 1 31990,1936 17233 ; 1927 5 236605,1936 80254, 1935,, 1 300, 1 990, (),93 1927,1927 1 10 ;,1929 1 1 1936, 3 52
2 1935 ( ) 1 300 1935 ( ) 1 990 1934 1 25 1934 1 65 1958 1 52 : (1) 1935 ( 24 ), B 89 ;1935 (),570 571 (2) 1934 ( 2 6,1937 6 ) (3) 1958,507, 3 1926110 1928112 1929110 1932111 1934111 1936112 12381 7575 10277 33330 17699 156915 55916 62775 88213 87202 80254 128394 7094 7199 5671 9195 3500 3600 7569 8223 6052 14488 34400 13784 20958 16244 21087 21327 1500 5610 510 4100 3309 4571 30000 14920 16080 16185 12236 17233 1700 10869 20881 16513 15410 20746 10187 11961 9715 7762 11902 53
2003 5 1926110 1928112 1929110 1932111 1934111 1936112 2266 6203 6234 5691 5718 7712 3225 5106 5563 14471 10514 9485 3200 14683 15508 12804 13473 17233 3223 12143 12530 23050 22791 30385 2147 8020 8060 6246 24716 27277 () 4000 1843 1770 1400 2189 2285 789 772 1161 1389 1450 5300 17128 17128 12073 12325 12488 4500 5106 7129 7233 7887 7445 3200 6616 8047 8976 2179 77 1076 1367 7221 513 2638 3576 3146 8672 11953 306 1153 283 838 2580 8000 36981 77 19144 509 7702 11266 7725 4000 451 8022 8189 4915 385 1052 1675 6818 315 468 739 340 225 365 3600 1664 1787 1675 4024 4079 3200 2008 963 3326 3177 1996 1120 506 2109 247 : (1),79 81 101 54
104 122 124 362 366 436 437 506 507 558 608 ;,78 112 (2),,739 :1932 1936 ;1936 1926 10, ( ) 70 %, ( ) 15 %, 1935 8, () 1618 %, ( ) 6 2716 %, ( ) 3111 %, 2515 % ( ) 6 1/ 3? 1929,, 1929 1, 16,, ; 1, 20, 55
2003 5 1924, 1929, 2 5, 1932,,, 1938, 10, :, 1985,663 ( ),1930 3 56
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2003 5,40 % 10 % 30 : 30 ; 50 ; 200 5 1929 1931 1932 1932 1933 1933 1934 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1014 1718 2019 012 615 1413 811 713 216 112 014 314 116 312 813 1512 512 215 1515 1112 514 1918 1711 1518 5119 2317 2718 1714 1015 518 610 1714 511 214 715 2113 3214 3118 2418 2914 3515 116 019 314 118 217 316 115 015 413 510 511 917 814 711 812 117 011 516 416 1511 916 2015 716 813 :1872 1949 1992 169 66
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,,, 100006 :,1928 8 25 79
Modern Chinese History Studies No. 5, 2003 The Hong Kong and Macao Main Bureau of t he Royalist Society and the Movement to Rescue the Emperor S ang B ing (1) During the movement to rescue the Emperor in 1900, the Royalist Society established its main bureau in Hong Kong and Macao. With the substantive sup2 port of He Dong, He Tingguang and other prominent people in Hong Kong and Macao, the bureau took advantage of this favorable location to pursue such pro2 jects as raising money, gathering its members together, and buying and trans2 porting weapons. The bureau also tried every means possible to coordinate and manage its internal relations and its relations with other reformist elements, with revolutionaries, and with the British authorities in Hong Kong. In order to carry out these important tasks, the Society concentrated many of its key members in the Hong Kong and Macao main bureau to work together in a coordinated fash2 ion, and continually strengthened their forces. Unfortunately, Kang Youwei s students were not able men, and their relations were very complicated and ridden with conflicts. The various directors of the bureau were not up to their responsi2 bilities, and as a result the members of the Royalist Society could not communi2 cate well or cooperate with each other. Incompetent management and ineffectual leadership not only made them miss the opportunity to successfully pursue the movement to rescue the Emperor, but also sewed the seeds for the incessant inner conflicts of the Royalist Society s later years. The Guomindang s Organizational Degeneration after t he 1927 Purge W ang Qisheng (38) In the historiography of the 1927 purge, the Guomindang praises it asa movement to safeguard the Party and save the nation, while the Chinese Com2 munist Party denounces it asa counterrevolutionary coup d etat. Both parties focus on the heavy blow this movement dealt the CCP, and ignore its direct im2 pact upon the Guomindang itself. For the Guomindang, the purge was an elimi2 nation of able men in the Party. The injury to the Guomindang over the course of the purge was no less than the loss to the CCP. After the purge, there was no one to whom local party power could be entrusted, and local tyrants, evil gentry, opportunists and corrupt elements were allowed to encroach upon the local power base, and use the Party to oppress local society. On the eve of World War II, the Guomindang s rank and file still had not recovered its pre2purge membership. The geographical distribution of party members did not match the Party s region2 al political power bases. The state of Party affairs and organization has been aptly 1
described as the Party is in the upper classes, but not in the lower classes ; the Party is in the cities, but not in the countryside ; the Party is on the coast, but not in the interior. Before the War, the majority of the Guomindang s party members were from the middle or upper classes. The Guomindang did not edu2 cate its party members to be a model for all society, but recruited people who al2 ready were or had potential to be in power. A study of prewar public opinion s view of the Guomindang can help us revise the idea that the Guomindang s loss of support among the people only became clear during the late war years and postwar period. Reasons for t he Failure of t he Fift h Anti2encirclement Campaign : An Investigation not Focusing on t he Chinese Communist Party s Military St rategy Huang Daox uan (80) The Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party s fifthencirclementand Anti2encirclementcampaigns from 1933 to 1934 constituted a total war be2 tween two political powers with independent territories, governments and social organizations. The war ended in failure for the CCP. Aside from the widely known problem of unwise military strategy, the failure of the CCP was related to changes in the Guomindang s strategies and tactics. Not only that, quite apart from left2leaningsubjective factors, the mistakes in the CCP s military strate2 gy were themselves also closely related to pressure from the Guomindang. As a protracted war of attrition waged by the Guomindang and met by the CCP, the campaign found the Soviet Area hard put to provide the personnel, material and other war resources needed for a protracted campaign of attrition. The erosion of the CCP s political resources under theleftist leadership further prevented the CCP from making full use of its fighting abilities. All of these factors affected the ultimate outcome of the war to some extent. The Representatives of t he Communist International and t he Anti2 Christian Movement in China Tao Feiya (114) The Anti2Christian Movement in China in the 1920s was a political struggle directed by the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Far Eastern Bu2 reau of the Communist International, sponsored and led by the CCP and joined by members of the Guomindang and other organizations. The Russian Communist Party and the Communist International regarded the steady development of Christianity and growing pro2american feeling among Chinese youths as obstacles to getting the Chinese people to follow the Russian road of revolution. Therefore, the aim of the Anti2Christian Movement was to combat Western religious forces in China, weaken the West s influence, arouse nationalist feelings in young Chi2 nese, and extend the influence of the Communist Party among Chinese youths. The movement s policy was to use the fight against Christianity to achieve its 2