2014 5 175 2014 9 Comparative Economic & Social Systems No. 5 2014 Sep. 2014 D08 A 1003-3947 2014 05-0082-14 1 / 2 1 Bo 2002 2010 2 20 80 2008 2013
83 2004 2007 2010 / / / Kornai1993 hierarchy Weber1958 Williamson 1979 chain of command Downs 1994 Tullock 1992 Lazear1998 Li & Zhou 2005 2008 promotion ShihAdolph & Liu2012 2009 2011 Landry 2003 Opper & Brehm 2007 2005 1 formal rankings 2006 Lieberthal1988 Li & Zhou 2005 2009 2011 Landry 2003 Opper & Brehm 2007 2005 2009 2010 2010 / 1
84 2014 5 2012 4 31 2010 2013 1 Li & Zhou2005 2009 1 2010 2012 / / / / / / / / / 1 2 1 2010 20 3 1 2010 223 2 ShihAdolph & Liu 2012 3 1
85 2008 44 ~ 56 / / / / 1 1994 2011 / 2 2 21. 23% 60% 2 1994 ~ 2011 29 58 28 31 19. 86% 39. 73% 19. 18% 21. 23% * 3 4 9 142 1. 90% 2. 53% 5. 70% 89. 87% * 2 1 2013 329 2 2010 31 20 4
86 2014 5 1. 2008 44 ~ 56 2003 23 ~ 52 1 / Lieberthal2004 Chapter 7 / Huang 2002 2013 328 / / 2 / 2. 1 1942 2 / / / bureaucratic ranks party ranks ShihAdolph & Liu 2012 166
87 career concerns 1 discount rate 1. Bo 2002 Shih et al. 2012 2013 2 / 3 cross - posting 4 2. 100 1 Holmstrom 1982 2 2002 Shih 2012 Shih 2013 DID 3 2 1997 Li 2008 4 PSC ACC CC
88 2014 5 22 ~ 25 7 ~ 9 1 /3 1 3 300 344 ~ 376 / 7% 7 3. 6 ~ 7 1 /5 1 /5 20 1 /5 4 2 /3 4. 7 3. 2 2 3 3 / 300 100 20 100 * 20 4 7 4. 7 3. 2 * 4. / Status / Prospect Index /SPI 31 1 2 1994 2012 4. 55 4. 18 13
89 / 1998 2012 2010 16 257 / 126 / 131 / / 4 / Provincial Secretary Status /Prospect IndexPSSPI 5 / Provincial Chief Executive Status /Prospect IndexPCESPI 4 / 1 1 100. 00 50. 00 10. 00 160. 00 22. 12 182. 12 1 100. 00 55. 00 5. 00 160. 00 22. 12 182. 12 1 100. 00 46. 67 13. 33 160. 00 22. 12 182. 12 4 69. 00 40. 00 0. 00 109. 00 22. 12 131. 12 5 30. 25 32. 35 5. 00 67. 60 22. 12 89. 72 6 38. 00 24. 12 1. 33 63. 45 22. 12 85. 57 7 38. 00 13. 33 0. 00 51. 33 22. 12 73. 45 8 7. 00 31. 18 6. 00 44. 18 22. 12 66. 30 9 32. 00 11. 18 0. 80 43. 98 22. 12 66. 10 10 7. 00 26. 18 5. 00 38. 18 22. 12 60. 30 11 25. 60 4. 94 4. 00 34. 54 22. 12 56. 66 12 7. 00 21. 88 4. 64 33. 52 22. 12 55. 64 13 7. 00 10. 00 5. 00 22. 00 22. 12 44. 12 14 7. 00 12. 35 2. 00 21. 35 22. 12 43. 47 1 1 5 10 5 10 2 2008 ~ 2012
90 2014 5 15 7. 00 8. 94 1. 60 17. 54 22. 12 39. 66 16 7. 00 8. 23 0. 00 15. 23 22. 12 37. 35 17 7. 00 5. 68 1. 33 14. 02 22. 12 36. 14 18 7. 00 4. 70 2. 08 13. 78 22. 12 35. 90 19 7. 00 6. 67 0. 00 13. 67 22. 12 35. 79 20 7. 00 6. 18 0. 00 13. 18 22. 12 35. 30 20 7. 00 6. 18 0. 00 13. 18 22. 12 35. 30 20 7. 00 6. 18 0. 00 13. 18 22. 12 35. 30 23 7. 00 4. 70 1. 44 13. 14 22. 12 35. 26 24 5. 83 4. 12 0. 67 10. 62 22. 12 32. 74 25 7. 00 1. 57 1. 33 9. 90 22. 12 32. 02 26 7. 00 2. 35 0. 00 9. 35 22. 12 31. 47 26 7. 00 2. 35 0. 00 9. 35 22. 12 31. 47 28 7. 00 1. 57 0. 53 9. 10 22. 12 31. 22 29 7. 00 1. 88 0. 00 8. 88 22. 12 31. 00 30 7. 00 1. 57 0. 00 8. 57 22. 12 30. 69 30 7. 00 1. 57 0. 00 8. 57 22. 12 30. 69 22. 12 14. 63 2. 29 39. 04 61. 16 46. 10 0. 75 * 5 / 1 30. 25 40. 00 11. 00 81. 25 7. 58 88. 83 2 7. 00 14. 90 0. 00 21. 90 7. 58 29. 48 3 7. 00 6. 82 8. 00 21. 82 7. 58 29. 40 4 7. 00 4. 10 5. 00 16. 10 7. 58 23. 68 5 7. 00 7. 35 0. 00 14. 35 7. 58 21. 93 6 7. 00 6. 82 0. 00 13. 82 7. 58 21. 40 7 7. 00 4. 70 1. 28 12. 98 7. 58 20. 56 8 7. 00 4. 70 1. 07 12. 77 7. 58 20. 35 8 7. 00 4. 70 1. 07 12. 77 7. 58 20. 35 8 7. 00 4. 70 1. 07 12. 77 7. 58 20. 35 11 7. 00 5. 54 0. 00 12. 54 7. 58 20. 12 12 7. 00 4. 70 0. 53 12. 23 7. 58 19. 81 13 7. 00 3. 53 1. 60 12. 13 7. 58 19. 71 14 7. 00 4. 70 0. 00 11. 70 7. 58 19. 28 14 7. 00 4. 70 0. 00 11. 70 7. 58 19. 28 16 7. 00 3. 76 0. 00 10. 76 7. 58 18. 34 17 7. 00 3. 13 0. 00 10. 13 7. 58 17. 71 18 5. 83 3. 13 1. 07 10. 03 7. 58 17. 61 4
91 19 7. 00 2. 82 0. 00 9. 82 7. 58 17. 40 19 7. 00 2. 82 0. 00 9. 82 7. 58 17. 40 21 7. 00 1. 88 0. 64 9. 52 7. 58 17. 10 22 7. 00 2. 35 0. 00 9. 35 7. 58 16. 93 22 7. 00 2. 35 0. 00 9. 35 7. 58 16. 93 22 7. 00 2. 35 0. 00 9. 35 7. 58 16. 93 25 5. 25 2. 35 1. 00 8. 60 7. 58 16. 18 26 7. 00 1. 57 0. 00 8. 57 7. 58 16. 15 27 7. 00 1. 18 0. 00 8. 18 7. 58 15. 76 27 7. 00 1. 18 0. 00 8. 18 7. 58 15. 76 29 4. 67 1. 57 1. 07 7. 30 7. 58 14. 88 30 7. 00 0. 00 0. 00 7. 00 7. 58 14. 58 30 7. 00 0. 00 0. 00 7. 00 7. 58 14. 58 7. 58 4. 98 1. 11 13. 67 21. 25 13. 04 0. 61 5 1. / 4 31 / 6 100 6 6 6 19 2 ~ 3 12 3 7 2. /
92 2014 5 3 12 / 3 18 / 2013 2002 1. cross examination 4 56. 66 11 182. 12 35. 79 19 / CCindex 1 ~ 6 1 1 1 0. 829 0. 440 2 1969 1997 1998 ~ 2012
93 & 0. 829 *** 0. 440 * & 1. 2. 1969 1997 3. * ** *** 5% 1% 0. 1% 1 / / 2. / 3 6 6 1 0. 7 6 / Cronbach's Alpha 15 ~ 17 15 ~ 17 0. 805 0. 703 0. 749 0. 720 / 15 16 16 17 15 16 16 17 Correlation Coefficient 0. 572 ** 0. 696 ** 0. 760 ** 0. 823 ** 1. Cronbach s Alpha 0. 7 / 0. 7 2. * 0. 5 ** 0. 01 / 1
Li & Zhou2005 / 2012 1978 ~ 2008 2012 2 30 47 2013 1978 ~ 2010 2008 60 2008 12 10 12 2007 2007 5 19 31 2010 2010 12 13 26 2008 2008 3 16 26 2007 2007 1 81 96 2007 2007 9 18 31 2007 2007 11 91 103 2007 2004 4 9 2014 5
95 2004 6 33 40 2007 2007 7 36 50 2008 2007 2007 1 83 96 2008 2010 BoZ. 2002. Chinese Provincial Leaders Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949. ArmonkNY M. E. Sharpe. GuoG. 2007. Retrospective Economic Accountability under Authoritarianism Evidence from China. Political Research Quarterly. 60 3 378 90. HuangY. 2002. Managing Chinese Bureaucrats An Institutional Economics Perspective. Political Studies. 50 61 79. LandryP. 2003. The Political Management of Mayors in Post - Deng China. Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. 17 31 58. LiH. and L. - A. Zhou2005. Political Turnover and Economic Performance The Incentive Role and Personnel Control in China. Journal of Public Economics. 89 1743 62. OpperS. and S. Brehm2007. Networks versus Performance Political Leadership Promotion in China. Working paperlund University. ShihV. C. Adolphand M. Liu2012. Getting Ahead in the Communist Party Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China. American Political Science Review. 106 1 166 87. Distinguishing the Political Rankings of China's Provincial Leaders Geng ShuZhong Lingna & Pang Baoqing Shanghai University of Finance and EconomicsShanghai Abstract Since the model of competitive appointments was proposedlots of publications have targeted the issue of how promotion affects the performance of China's local officials. But not many of them have touched upon the question of what really counts in a promotion. Without the proper clarification of that issuehowever there is no way to make sure whether those research findings are analytically rigorous and robust. Given this limitation this paper aims at establishing an index system to distinguish the political rankings of China's provincial leadersby taking into account of the officials' Party ranks and promotion potentials. After calculating all sorts of weighted averages the paper offers two full rankings of China's provincial leaders. As a by - product the authors also find that there are additional ranks within the official government ranks. Key words Bureaucracy Hierarchy Political Ranking Competitive Appointment