2005 4 3 ( 100084) : 1998 2002,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4),; (5) ( ),(2003),,,,,,, 1997 1, 20,, ST,,,,:? ( ) 3 (70473046) 77
:,?,, Modigliani Miller (1958), Jensen Meckling (1976),Grossman Hart (1986) Hart Moore (1990), La Porta (1998,2000),,,,,,,, : (,2001), (,2002), (,2002), (,1999) (,2001),,,,,,,,,,( ), ( ),,,,,,,,, : H1 :; H2 : ; H3 :,, 10 % 10 %, 78
2005 4 H4 :,, 1997 5,, 6, 1997,,,,,,,,,, 1998 2002 A, 12, : (), (), ( ), ( ), ( ), (), (),(), ( ), (), (),,, 11,,,,,,,, 20 %, 1 1998 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 352 0. 43 428 0. 52 0. 46 557 627 0. 55 673 0. 56 415 0. 50 495 0. 54 572 0. 54 650 0. 57 692 0. 57 192 0. 23 262 0. 28 343 0. 32 431 0. 38 447 0. 37 114 0. 14 158 0. 17 222 0. 21 251 0. 22 290 0. 24 64 0. 08 80 0. 09 103 0. 10 114 0. 10 126 0. 10 201 0. 24 281 0. 3 417 0. 39 505 0. 44 552 0. 46 206 0. 25 301 0. 33 413 0. 39 547 0. 48 671 0. 55 36 0. 04 48 0. 05 60 0. 06 75 0. 07 70 0. 06 16 0. 02 23 0. 02 26 0. 02 33 0. 03 29 0. 02 228 0. 28 309 0. 33 339 0. 32 385 0. 34 379 0. 31 75 0. 09 91 0. 10 121 0. 11 139 0. 12 134 0. 11 670 0. 81 820 0. 89 964 0. 91 1067 0. 94 1125 0. 93 A 827 NA 925 NA 1062 NA 1141 NA 1212 NA : A 79
:?,,,,,,, ( 2) 2,,, 70 % 2 5895 1440 3999 220 84 152 ( %) 24. 43 67. 84 3. 73 1. 42 2. 58 6763 1848 4396 230 94 195 ( %) 27. 33 65 3. 4 1. 39 2. 88 6302 1005 4618 402 102 175 ( %) 15. 95 73. 28 6. 38 1. 62 2. 78 1426 196 1139 42 16 33 ( %) 13. 74 79. 87 2. 95 1. 12 2. 31 689 135 525 13 5 11 ( %) 19. 59 76. 2 1. 89 0. 73 1. 6 3045 446 2365 143 36 55 ( %) 14. 65 77. 67 4. 7 1. 18 1. 81 4284 2030 1947 155 40 111 ( %) 47. 39 45. 45 3. 62 0. 93 2. 59 393 95 266 20 3 9 ( %) 24. 17 67. 68 5. 09 0. 76 2. 29 164 45 89 17 1 12 ( %) 27. 44 54. 27 10. 37 0. 61 7. 32 3019 921 1835 130 41 92 ( %) 30. 51 60. 78 4. 31 1. 36 3. 05 600 63 518 17 0 2 ( %) 10. 5 86. 33 2. 83 0 0. 33 80
2005 4 3, 1998 2002,,40 %,,,, 10 % 30 % 2002,398 10 % 10 %,3 % 4 % 1998 2002, 10 % 50 90,,,,,,,, 3 ( %) 0 10 10 30 30 50 > 50 ( %) 1998 13 204 273 351 842 45. 24 44. 44 1999 8 233 302 394 938 45. 37 44. 54 2000 8 280 334 463 1087 45. 26 44. 55 2001 9 298 325 432 1066 44. 00 43. 33 2002 10 356 361 476 1205 43. 50 43. 00 1998 593 233 13 NA 842 7. 71 4. 53 1999 650 270 14 1 938 8. 30 4. 88 2000 728 333 21 NA 1087 8. 34 4. 99 2001 704 338 19 NA 1066 8. 46 5. 08 2002 779 398 24 1 1205 8. 87 5. 59 1998 789 50 NA NA 842 3. 19 1. 88 1999 881 55 NA NA 938 3. 25 1. 91 2000 1009 77 NA NA 1087 3. 29 1. 87 2001 983 82 NA NA 1066 3. 31 1. 83 2002 1111 90 NA NA 1205 3. 43 1. 96 1.,, :0 30 % ( ),30 % 50 % () 50 % 100 % (), ;, ( ) 81
: (ANOVA),, 4 4,,, 30 %, 4,,,1 %,,, 4 ( %) 0 30 30 50 50 100 ANOVA 1466 1574 2078 53. 68 62. 94 298. 88 33. 87 333 0. 0205 0. 0337 0. 0817 40. 72 333 40. 22 93. 25 304. 52 13. 04 333 0. 0278 0. 0495 0. 0759 8. 98 333 48. 36 69. 22 121. 43 5. 19 333 0. 0662 0. 0500 0. 0472 1. 54 0. 33 0. 92 5. 96 10. 56 333 0. 0004 0. 0006 0. 0041 11. 78 333 9. 87 52. 23 38. 48 1. 11 0. 0077 0. 0611 0. 0234 0. 95 333 12. 33 7. 15 28. 37 1. 58 0. 0087 0. 0077 0. 0082 0. 02 164. 79 285. 69 797. 63 26. 21 333 0. 1312 0. 2026 0. 2405 3. 21 33 : 333 1 %, 33 5 %, 3 10 % 2.,,,, 4 4,,, 5,,4. 7,,3. 2,, 1. 8, 82
2005 4, 5,, 3.,, (LOGIT),,, 1, 0 (LgSH) D2,D3 (Size) (Lev),,Size,Lev 6 Panel A Panel B 5 10 % 1 2 3 ANOVA 3363 1292 282 160. 90 117. 33 60. 85 2. 44 3 0. 0589 0. 0312 0. 0151 11. 18 333 156. 80 79. 86 87. 93 5. 21 333 0. 0594 0. 0333 0. 0229 6. 34 333 91. 64 79. 68 23. 09 1. 25 0. 0526 0. 0571 0. 0239 1. 3 3. 08 2. 75 0. 00 0. 72 0. 0020 0. 0022 0. 0000 0. 83 44. 95 18. 16 6. 61 0. 7 0. 0399 0. 0151 0. 0061 0. 3 11. 83 25. 11 3. 51 0. 8 0. 0103 0. 0033 0. 0014 1. 99 469. 20 322. 87 182. 00 4. 69 333 0. 2231 0. 1423 0. 0694 3. 33 33 : 333 1 %, 33 5 %, 3 10 % 6 Panel A, 1 %,Panel B,,,, 4.,, D2 :1,0 ;D3, 2 1, 0 D1 :1, 0,, D2 D3 83
:,, 1, D - D - HHI HHI,,( 1 %),, D - HHI 1, 0 (D - HHI 0, ) 7 D - HHI 0 1 6 Panel A Int. - 10. 7735-8. 3367-3. 2620-7. 4344-3. 4663-2. 3890-5. 9902 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0253) ( < 0. 0001) LgSH 0. 0370 333 0. 0305 333 0. 0081 333 0. 0426 333 0. 0078 33 0. 0174 333 0. 0320 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0122) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) Size 0. 4102 333 0. 3092 333 0. 0905 333 0. 0671 0. 0309-0. 0725 0. 2466 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0009) (0. 4365) (0. 4838) (0. 1891) ( < 0. 0001) Lev - 0. 0010-0. 0023-0. 0002-0. 0215-0. 0001 0. 0006-0. 0023 (0. 7642) (0. 6003) (0. 9211) (0. 4486) (0. 9837) (0. 7787) (0. 4276) 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 Pr > ChiSq < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 0. 0002 < 0. 0001 Panel B Int. - 10. 3575-8. 1723-3. 2023-8. 0309-3. 4382-2. 2813-5. 8671 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0348) ( < 0. 0001) D2-0. 3583 333-0. 3739 333-0. 1603 33-0. 1295-0. 1434-0. 4927 333-0. 2838 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0375) (0. 5943) (0. 2576) (0. 0046) ( < 0. 0001) D3-0. 9117 333-0. 6438 333-0. 4189 333-1. 7178 3-0. 3505-0. 5426-0. 6670 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0085) (0. 0889) (0. 1873) (0. 1196) ( < 0. 0001) Size 0. 4829 333 0. 3781 333 0. 1091 333 0. 2092 33 0. 0502-0. 0300 0. 3168 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0135) (0. 2457) (0. 5777) ( < 0. 0001) Lev - 0. 0032-0. 0049-0. 0003-0. 0208-0. 0001 0. 0006-0. 0038 (0. 5472) (0. 4003) (0. 8806) (0. 3380) (0. 9585) (0. 7889) (0. 3073) 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 4959 Pr > ChiSq < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 0. 0097 0. 3193 0. 0326 < 0. 0001 : 333 1 %, 33 5 %, 3 10 % 84
2005 4 7 a D - HHI = 1 b D - HHI = 0 T D - HHI = 1 D - HHI = 0 T 52. 58 46. 29 0. 28 5. 57 333 0. 0319 0. 0113 3. 17 333 5. 62 333 73. 30 104. 64-0. 72 3. 09 333 0. 0318 0. 0455-0. 57 3. 1 333 79. 15 31. 02 2. 68 333 2. 47 333 0. 0780 0. 0297 3. 08 333 2. 47 333 4. 50 0. 01 2. 73 333 2. 88 333 0. 0049 0. 0000 2. 49 33 2. 87 333 32. 20 9. 37 1. 55 1. 22 0. 0266 0. 0090 1. 47 1. 19 60. 69 5. 14 1. 23-1. 08 0. 0063 0. 0027 0. 96-1. 08 302. 42 196. 46 1. 2 5. 58 333 0. 1796 0. 0983 2. 41 33 5. 51 333 : 333 1 %, 33 5 %, 3 10 % 8 Int. - 6. 0631-8. 7009-6. 7421 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) LgSH 0. 0253 333 0. 0222 33 0. 0326 333 (0. 0002) (0. 0274) (0. 0009) D - HHI 0. 3335 33 0. 4267 3 0. 4380 33 (0. 0344) (0. 0758) (0. 0391) Size 0. 2548 333 0. 3729 333 0. 2815 333 ( < 0. 0001) ( < 0. 0001) (0. 0004) Lev - 0. 0014-0. 0018 0. 0651 (0. 5532) (0. 5490) (0. 1486) 940 420 520 Pr > ChiSq < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 < 0. 0001 : 333 1 %, 33 5 %, 3 10 % 7,,,,,, 1 % 8, D - HHI 1,,,,,, 85
:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,( 25 %),,,,,,,, (5 ),,,,2001 :, 11, 3,1999 : 1997, 9, 47,2001 :,,2004 :,, 3, 425,2002 : :, 9, 31,2003 :, Coase, R. H., 1937, The Firm, the Market and the Law, University of Chicago Press. Grossman, S.J. and O. D. Hart, 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy(94), 691 719. Hart, Oliver and John Moore, 1990, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy(98), 1119 1158. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics(3), 305 360. ( 128 ), 4 5 6,, 86
,,,,,,,,, 20,,,,240,,,,,,,, (: ) (: ) ( 86 ) La Porta, R., Lopez2de2Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy (106), 1113 1155. La Porta, R., Lopez2de2Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R., 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics(58), 3 27. Modigliani,F. and M. H. Miller, 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48 (3), 261 297. Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy 94 (3), 461 488. Related Party Transactions, Corporate Governance And State Ownership Reform Chen Xiao Wang Kun (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University) Abstract :This study empirically examined the relationship between related party transactions and the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms. As a result, we find that the monetary amount and likelihood of the related party transactions between the largest shareholderπs group and the listed company are positively correlated with the share proportion controlled by the largest shareholder. More importantly, our results show that increasing the number of controlling shareholders and decreasing the controlling gap between them will decrease the likelihood and extent of related party transactions. Our results imply that the reduction of state ownership is not the only way to improve corporate governance of the listed firms and to protect the interest of individual investors. In present stage, it might be a more feasible choice to transform the ownership structure from sole controlling shareholder to multiple controlling shareholders. Key Words : Corporate Governance ; Related Party Transaction ; Ownership Structure ; Sole Controlling Shareholder ; Multiple Controlling Shareholders JEL Classification : G320 (: ) (: ) 128