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2018 1 156 1 2 2 1. 233030 2. 233030 2005 ~ 2015 A F830. 2 A 1008-2506 2018 01-0015-12 1 2015 1 2017-07-18 71540004 BBSLDQDKT2017B02 1990-1993 - 1964-1 15

2018 1 2025 2015 1 2011 2 + Myers Majluf 1984 Lu 2012 3-4 2014 Putnam 1993 5-6 2011 7 R&D R&D R&D R&D 2015 8 16

1 1. 2012 9 2012 10 2015 11 Fazzari 1988 Jensen 1986 12-13 2007 14 2 2. Allen 2005 15 2015 11 2009 16 2007 17 3 17

2018 1 Treatment Model 2005 ~ 2015 A ST 1 Winsorize 2003 18 RESSET IFIND WIND 6 475 CSMAR 2017 19 1 1 1 Competition i t = α 1 Connection i t + α 2 Size i t + α 3 Lev i t + α 4 Grow i t + α 5 Tax i t + α 6 Share2_5 i t + α 7 Dual i t + α 8 Insti_share i t + α 9 MSH i t + Year + Ind + Constant + ε i t Competition Connection 1 Connection α 1 1 ε i t 1. 2003 18 2 2010 23 2. Connection 1 2015 24 1 2004 20 2008 21 2009 22 1 2 2003 18 1 2004 20 2010 23 2003 19% 5% 20% = 19% * 100 /95 18

10 2% 1 1 % 3 17 /3 ^1 /3-1 3 14 /3 ^1 /3-1 8 20 11 16 8 6 Competition Connection Size Lev Grow Tax Share2_5 Dual Insti_share MSH / / / / / 2 ~ 5 1 2 0. 043 8-0. 063 0 13. 4% 2% 2015 24 2015 11 2 Variables N Competition 6 475 0. 043 8-0. 063 0 0. 319 8-0. 331 4 1. 339 0 Connection 6 475 0. 134 1 0 0. 340 7 0 1 Size 6 475 7. 908 7 7. 873 6 1. 098 1 5. 081 4 10. 788 1 Lev 6 475 0. 445 0 0. 445 9 0. 190 0 0. 065 6 0. 870 4 Grow 6 475 0. 201 5 0. 120 5 0. 459 1-0. 422 3 3. 194 9 Tax 6 475 18. 617 2 16. 274 5 15. 065 0-38. 006 5 78. 534 5 Share2_5 6 475 15. 548 5 13. 600 0 10. 582 1 1. 030 0 43. 640 0 Dual 6 475 0. 210 3 0 0. 407 6 0 1 Insti_share 6 475 39. 424 2 39. 946 2 23. 237 7 0. 611 5 87. 362 4 MSH 6 475 0. 083 3 0. 000 2 0. 165 7 0. 000 0 0. 655 9 19

2018 1 3 Connection Competition 1% 1 Dual Share2_5 Insti_share Competition 1% Size Growth Competition 3 Competition Connection Size Lev Grow Tax Share2_5 Dual Competition 1 0. 091 *** 0. 50 *** 0. 15 *** 0. 23 *** - 0. 047 *** 0. 047 *** - 0. 069 *** Connection 0. 14 *** 1 0. 16 *** 0. 069 *** - 0. 027 * - 0. 002-0. 11 *** - 0. 036 ** Size 0. 52 *** 0. 16 *** 1 0. 36 *** 0. 013 0. 088 *** - 0. 056 *** - 0. 11 *** Lev 0. 15 *** 0. 068 *** 0. 35 *** 1 0. 064 *** 0. 14 *** - 0. 17 *** - 0. 097 *** Grow 0. 17 *** - 0. 027 * - 0. 017 0. 070 *** 1-0. 084 *** 0. 079 *** 0. 0091 Tax - 0. 045 *** 0. 0087 0. 050 *** 0. 12 *** - 0. 045 *** 1-0. 096 *** - 0. 049 *** Share2_5 0. 062 *** - 0. 100 *** - 0. 024 * - 0. 17 *** 0. 092 *** - 0. 086 *** 1 0. 085 *** Dual - 0. 058 *** - 0. 036 ** - 0. 11 *** - 0. 099 *** - 0. 006 9-0. 038 ** 0. 071 *** 1 Insti_share 0. 28 *** 0. 016 0. 28 *** 0. 057 *** - 0. 027 * - 0. 028 * 0. 074 *** - 0. 096 *** MSH - 0. 14 *** - 0. 095 *** - 0. 22 *** - 0. 28 *** 0. 032 ** - 0. 091 *** 0. 33 *** 0. 22 *** * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 4 1 0. 132 0 1% 4 Variables 1 2 3 4 Competition Competition Competition Competition Connection 0. 132 0 *** 11. 39 0. 132 0 *** 11. 34 0. 054 0 *** 5. 35 0. 067 1 *** 6. 76 Size 0. 149 3 *** 46. 34 0. 135 9 *** 41. 37 Lev - 0. 049 7 *** - 2. 61-0. 019 4-1. 02 Grow 0. 001 2 *** 4. 28 0. 001 2 *** 4. 58 Tax - 0. 001 6 *** - 6. 94-0. 001 3 *** - 5. 77 Share2_5 Dual Insti_share MSH 0. 001 9 *** 5. 60 0. 011 0 1. 32 0. 002 5 *** 14. 74 0. 066 7 *** 2. 65 Constant 0. 025 4 *** 5. 98 0. 093 2 *** 3. 96-0. 998 0 *** - 31. 99-1. 020 1 *** - 32. 52 Year&Ind N 6 475 6 475 6 475 6 475 Adj_R2 0. 02 0. 03 0. 29 0. 32 2 3 4 1 Connection 20

1% 1 R 2 Tax Share2_5 Insti_share MSH 2008 2012 25-27 1. OLS 2017 28 Prob Connection = 1 = c 1 + χ z + κ Convar + ε 1 Competition = c 2 + α Connection + β Convar + δ λ + ε 2 ε 1 ε 2 λ Inverse Mills Ratios z Connection Competition 2017 19 Rate_ind Rate_pro 5 5 Variables Rate_ind IV Rate_pro IV 1 2 3 4 Connection Competition Connection Competition Connection 0. 201 2 *** 6. 28 0. 110 3 *** 4. 97 Rate_ind Rate_pro 3. 985 0 *** 4. 25 3. 925 7 *** 16. 95 Listage 0. 035 5 *** 8. 36 0. 031 4 *** 6. 95 Size 0. 238 4 *** 11. 25 0. 129 6 *** 35. 87 0. 240 4 *** 11. 10 0. 133 9 *** 39. 30 Lev - 0. 211 8 * - 1. 71-0. 018 6-0. 97-0. 216 2 * - 1. 70-0. 019 2-1. 01 Grow - 0. 001 4-0. 72 0. 001 2 *** 4. 62-0. 002 1-0. 72 0. 001 2 *** 4. 62 Tax - 0. 001 3 *** - 5. 89-0. 001 3 *** - 5. 78 Share2_5 0. 001 9 *** 5. 72 0. 001 9 *** 5. 65 Dual 0. 011 9 1. 43 0. 011 5 1. 39 Insti_share 0. 002 5 *** 14. 97 0. 002 5 *** 14. 82 MSH 0. 080 5 *** 3. 16 0. 071 2 *** 2. 82 IMR - 0. 745 9 *** - 4. 37-0. 025 5 ** - 2. 17 Constant - 3. 757 3 *** - 14. 37-0. 996 8 *** - 31. 01-3. 698 0 *** - 17. 76-1. 012 9 *** - 32. 14 Year&Ind Observations 6 475 6 475 6 475 6 475 21

2018 1 1 2 Rate_ind 3 4 Rate_ pro IMR Connection Rate_ind Rate_pro Connection Connection 2. 6 1 2 1 Adj_Compet 2 Nolist_con 3 Cluster Robust Connection - - 868 4 6 - - Variables 1 2 3 4 Adj_Compet Competition Competition Competition Connection 0. 067 2 *** 6. 81 0. 067 1 *** 2. 77 0. 060 2 *** 4. 01 Nolist_con 0. 048 3 *** 4. 77 Size 0. 135 8 *** 41. 62 0. 137 1 *** 42. 08 0. 135 9 *** 13. 25 0. 189 8 *** 25. 97 Lev - 0. 020 3-1. 08-0. 018 4-0. 98-0. 019 4-0. 52-0. 034 9-0. 77 Grow 0. 001 2 *** 4. 46 0. 001 2 *** 4. 62 0. 001 2 *** 2. 88 0. 011 9 *** 5. 65 Tax - 0. 001 2 *** - 5. 60-0. 001 2 *** - 5. 40-0. 001 3 *** - 4. 64-0. 002 1 *** - 4. 41 Share2_5 0. 001 9 *** 5. 68 0. 002 0 *** 6. 11 0. 001 9 ** 2. 37 0. 003 1 *** 4. 12 Dual 0. 010 2 1. 23 0. 012 8 1. 57 0. 011 0 0. 79 0. 028 2 1. 44 Insti_share 0. 002 4 *** 14. 44 0. 002 4 *** 14. 24 0. 002 5 *** 6. 68 0. 003 7 *** 9. 78 MSH 0. 067 2 *** 2. 68 0. 062 6 ** 2. 53 0. 066 7 * 1. 66 0. 078 3 1. 24 Constant - 1. 134 8 *** - 36. 43-1. 029 3 *** - 33. 06-1. 020 1 *** - 13. 01-1. 454 4 *** - 20. 71 Year&Ind Observations 6 475 6 395 6 475 1 736 Adj_R2 0. 31 0. 32 0. 32 0. 41 3. 2015 11 2016 29 Pr Connection = 1 = β 1 Size + β 2 Lev + β 3 Grow + β 4 Listage + β 5 Rate + Year + Contant + ε Size Lev pscore pscore 22

ATT 7 Panel A 7 Panel A Variable T Competition 0. 157 0. 025 0. 132 0. 012 11. 390 ATT 0. 157 0. 107 0. 050 0. 019 2. 620 Panel B Variables T Size 8. 364 7. 829 0. 535 0. 041 13. 120 8. 364 8. 337 0. 027 0. 055 0. 480 Lev 0. 478 0. 442 0. 037 0. 007 5. 180 0. 478 0. 473 0. 005 0. 009 0. 580 Growth 0. 345 0. 564-0. 219 0. 456-0. 480 0. 345 0. 962-0. 617 0. 781-0. 790 Listage 11. 540 9. 607 1. 933 0. 190 10. 190 11. 540 11. 364 0. 176 0. 238 0. 740 Rate 0. 159 0. 130 0. 029 0. 002 13. 850 0. 159 0. 161-0. 002 0. 003-0. 540 Connection Soe Soe_connection 8 1 Connection 1% 2 Connection 16. 77 Soe_connection 2015 11 23

2018 1 8 Variables 1 2 3 Competition Competition Competition Connection 0. 119 1 *** 9. 50 0. 016 4 1. 09 0. 099 5 *** 6. 91 Soe 0. 0118 1. 40 Soe_connection - 0. 060 3 *** - 3. 10 Size 0. 095 0 *** 23. 57 0. 180 5 *** 33. 84 0. 135 7 *** 40. 93 Lev - 0. 007 5-0. 34-0. 061 3 * - 1. 95-0. 022 1-1. 16 Grow 0. 001 3 *** 4. 12 0. 001 1 ** 2. 45 0. 001 2 *** 4. 57 Tax - 0. 001 1 *** - 3. 76-0. 001 4 *** - 4. 36-0. 001 2 *** - 5. 62 Share2_5 0. 001 6 *** 3. 75 0. 001 9 *** 3. 74 0. 001 9 *** 5. 76 Dual - 0. 002 2-0. 25 0. 028 5 1. 60 0. 012 1 1. 43 Insti_share 0. 001 8 *** 8. 57 0. 003 5 *** 13. 00 0. 002 5 *** 14. 60 MSH 0. 010 5 0. 42 0. 916 9 *** 3. 36 0. 071 7 *** 2. 75 Constant - 0. 718 1 *** - 17. 51-1. 377 9 *** - 28. 59-1. 027 4 *** - 32. 65 Year&Ind N 3 428 3 047 6 475 Adj_R2 0. 27 0. 38 0. 32 East = 1 East = 0 1 East_connection Market_connection 8 9 1 Connection 1% 2 Connection 11. 41 p 0. 000 7 East_connection Market_connection 1East East = 1 0 Market 24

9 Variables 1 2 3 4 Competition Competition Competition Competition Connection 0. 108 6 *** 8. 05 0. 023 8 * 1. 66 0. 028 2 * 1. 94 0. 076 4 *** 7. 55 East 0. 032 8 *** 4. 29 East_connection 0. 078 7 *** 4. 05 Market 0. 010 7 *** 4. 71 Market_conection 0. 013 2 *** 2. 58 Size 0. 129 9 *** 32. 62 0. 154 1 *** 26. 66 0. 136 0 *** 41. 56 0. 136 6 *** 41. 70 Lev 0. 024 7 1. 02-0. 101 7 *** - 3. 32-0. 015 3-0. 81-0. 014 3-0. 75 Grow 0. 001 5 *** 4. 08 0. 000 7 * 1. 86 0. 001 2 *** 4. 57 0. 001 2 *** 4. 62 Tax - 0. 001 3 *** - 4. 54-0. 001 2 *** - 3. 88-0. 001 3 *** - 5. 80-0. 001 2 *** - 5. 65 Share2_5 0. 000 4 1. 08 0. 005 0 *** 8. 93 0. 001 9 *** 5. 70 0. 001 9 *** 5. 74 Dual 0. 001 4 0. 14 0. 033 2 ** 2. 23 0. 008 2 0. 98 0. 006 7 0. 81 Insti_share 0. 002 5 *** 11. 89 0. 001 9 *** 6. 38 0. 002 4 *** 14. 16 0. 002 4 *** 14. 20 MSH 0. 070 0 ** 2. 30-0. 016 7-0. 36 0. 048 6 * 1. 92 0. 048 1 * 1. 90 Constant - 0. 953 0 *** - 23. 31-1. 160 3 *** - 23. 00-1. 028 9 *** - 32. 60-1. 005 2 *** - 32. 07 Year&Ind N 4 178 2 297 6 475 6 475 Adj_R2 0. 33 0. 35 0. 33 0. 33 2009 30 1. J. 2015 2 64-72. 2. J. 2011 11 72-77. 3 MYERS S C MAJLUF N S. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have J. Journal of Financial Economics 1984 13 2 187-221. 4 LU Z ZHU J ZHANG W. Bank discrimination holding bank ownership and economic consequences evidence from China J. Journal of Banking & Finance 2012 36 2 341-354. 5. + J. 2014 11 109-126. 6 PUTNAM R D. The prosperous community J. The American Prospect 1993 4 13 35-42. 7. J. 2011 5 171-183. 8. J. 2015 7 116-134. 9. J. 2012 8 17-24. 10. J. 2012 3 151-157. 11. J. 2015 2 205-228. 12 FAZZARI S M HUBBARD R G PETERSEN B C et al. Financing constraints and corporate investment J. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988 1 141-206. 13 JENSEN M C. Agency costs of free cash flow corporate finance and takeovers J. The American Economic Review 1986 76 2 323-329. 14. - J. 2007 9 25

2018 1 103-110. 15 ALLEN F QIAN J QIAN M. Law finance and economic growth in China J. Journal of Financial Economics 2005 77 1 57-116. 16. J. 2009 12 27-39. 17. J. 2007 3 35-40. 18. J. 2003 3 5-13. 19. J. 2017 6 91-100. 20. J. 2004 4 72-77. 21. J. 2008 1 26-31. 22. J. 2009 9 122-126. 23. J. 2010 3 149-157. 24. J. 2015 12 1-10. 25. J. 2008 7 107-112. 26. J. 2012 1 105-119. 27. J. 2012 1 1-12. 28. J. 2017 1 155-173. 29. J. 2016 8 175-190. 30. J. 2009 8 4-17. Integration of Industry and Finance and Entity Enterprise Competitiveness An Empirical Analysis from the Sample of Manufacturing SHENG An-qi 1 WANG Shun 2 SHENG Ming-quan 2 1. Institute of Anhui's Economic and Social Development Research Anhui University of Finance & Economics Bengbu 233030 2. School of Accounting Anhui University of Finance & Economics Bengbu 233030 China Abstract Real economy is the foundation of economic development. The paper uses manufacturing enterprises in China's Stock Market A-share listed company from the year 2005 to 2015 as the research sample to discuss the influence of integration of industry and finance on competitiveness. The study finds that building financial stakes association to realize the integration of industry and finance does promote the level of competitiveness of the entity enterprise and that positive competitiveness effect is still significant after a series of control of endogeneity and robustness such as treatment effect model and propensity score matching method. Further research shows that the competitive effect of integration of industry and finance is also influenced by the context of internal and external system of the entity enterprise and the competitive effect of integration of industry and finance will be more prominent within the sample group where private sample group and area system environment are more perfect. Keywords integration of industry and finance financing constraints financial stakes association institutional environment enterprise competitiveness entity enterprise manufacturing 26