2002 10 : 3 ( 100871) :,,,,,,, : 20 80,,,,, (, ),,, ;, ;, ;, ;, ;,,,,,,?, (,2001),, (,1993) ;, (The Theory of Moral Sentiments),,,,,,, (Putnam,1993 ;,1998 ; Knack & Keefer,1997),,,, 3,, 100,, 100 59
: : (,1998),,,,,, ;,,,,,, ;,,,,,??,,,,, ;,, ; ;?,, (,2000),,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,, (Dore,1987),,,,,, (Putnam,1993,1995 ;,1998 ;Colman,1988 ; 1999) (Social capital),, (,1999),,,, ( Kreps,1986 ;Fudenberg & Tirole,1992 ;,2002),, :,, ;, ;,,, ;,, Fishman & Khanna (1999),,,, 60
2002 10,,,,,,,, (, ),,,,,, ;,, (a social seal of approval), ( ),, ( Knack Keefer, 1997),,,,,,,, 2000 15000, 5000 31,, 60 %,, 511 % ; 13 ( ), 3812 %, 1918 %, 3411 %, ( )? ( ) ( 1),,,,,, 2217 % ; 011 %,, ( 1) ;,,, T,, ( 2) : (1),,, ; (2), ( ),,,5719 %,,, 2319 %, ; (3),,, A B, A B, A B, B A,,,,,,,,, ( ) ;,, (World Values Survey),,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 61
: : 1 ( %) 1 2217 1615 817 418 317 21819 2 1616 1113 813 515 419 169 3 517 1012 915 716 517 11817 4 1011 612 715 618 518 11712 5 614 514 713 7 617 9612 6 315 511 711 613 519 7717 7 117 4 412 414 410 4919 8 119 211 212 214 218 3211 9 114 212 216 2 215 3011 10 019 118 212 218 312 2711 11 019 117 211 212 213 2413 12 114 1 1 116 116 1818 13 017 111 113 113 115 1519 14 111 016 1 113 211 1516 15 017 019 112 114 210 1515 16 017 112 1 112 111 1418 17 016 019 1 116 116 1414 18 015 017 112 118 116 1411 19 015 017 113 113 118 1316 20 016 1 019 111 111 13 21 014 018 019 116 115 1216 22 016 1 017 111 018 1211 23 017 017 018 1 019 1116 24 014 015 017 111 116 919 25 013 016 016 018 019 812 26 012 014 016 1 110 714 27 012 014 016 111 018 714 28 012 014 013 014 015 418 29 012 013 013 014 017 416 30 011 012 014 015 016 411 31 011 012 012 013 012 217 62
2002 10 63
: :,,,,, 1,,, ( ),,,,,,,,, ( ) 1. GDP GDP,, 8174, GDP, 0147 ; 10,,, GDP GDP ( 3), GDP 0190, 0191, 0177, 0163, 0159, 0190,, 0183 ( ), 0185 GDP,,GDP 0196 ; GDP, 0160,,, ( 2),,,,, :,,, 2.,,,,,, (, 1995),,,,, 64
2002 10 2 GDP,,, ( - 0124, - 0112),, 0155, 0163 ( 0169 0148),,,, ( ),,, (0151),,,,,,, (0159) ; (0167) ; (0167 0162) 3., ( 0189),, 0163 0151 GDP, 0180, - 0155-0156,,,, (, ),,, :, ;,,, ( ),, 1992,,, ( ),,, ( 1992 ),,,,, GDP 0166 65
: :,, ;,,,,,, ;,,, ;,,,,, ;, 4.,,, 0150 0161 0163 0181 3 GDP GDP ( ) ( ) ( ) (,,,,, ) 5344190 5374172 3851102 0147 0182 0195 1125 1137 12132 788179165 803132113 521364173 0110 0132 0149 0172 1115 72155 887180 896118 722106 0131 0157 0170 0185 1107 8152 (,,,,, ) 4913180 4946185 4613173 015 0165 0163 1102 1102 10105 444977187 460871191 14418181 0122 0110 0109 0129 0120 30131 793115 809126 125105 0156 0129 0127 0148 0147 5174 (,,,,, ) 5138176 5167195 5483109 015 017 0185 112 1123 11148 401650183 408048165 497054185 01052 01116 01079 0121 0119 16168 617109 618152 716175 0122 0133 0131 0150 0143 4104 (,,,,, ) 5200105 52281913 7722158 2 2102 2162 2155 219 33192 173853111 176537177 203013418 4190 3121 5164 4196 3168 993199 419189 423159 1432143 2114 1181 2141 2123 1189 31128 (,,,,,, ) 8388102 8440127 15979117 8174 7186 6177 5137 4161 110181 2324981158 234585915 53910432 67171 25186 7110 3120 1181 4577115 1581152 1584177 7440104 8170 5189 3115 21017 1148 74192 : ; 5,, 1 : GDP GDP, 0137, GDP,, 0168 ; GDP, 0142,, GDP, 0164 GDP,,, ( - 0122) 66
2002 10,,,,,,, GDP, ( 4), GDP, 4 1 2 3 4 5 ( ) 0116 (2146) 3 0108 (1117) 0116 (2133) 3 0116 ( - 7142) 3 3 4171 (4135) 3 3 4166 (4111) 3 3 4168 (3191) 3 3 / 1119 (2159) 3 1151 (3128) 3 1134 (3104) 3 1112 (2148) 3 1122 (1180) a ( %) 0146 (3183) 3 3 0150 (4129) 3 3 0106 (0117) - 0105 ( - 0106) - 8111-8123 - 7191-8113 8106 ( - 13127) 3 3 ( - 12104) 3 3 ( - 12156) 3 3 (12197) 3 3 ( - 7142) 3 3 Adj1 R 2 0156 0151 0151 0154 0154 : (1) ; (2) ; (3), 1, 0 ; (4) (1999) ; (5) (,2001) ; (6) (2000) ; (7) T, 3 3 99 %, 3 95 %,a 90 % 1.,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2. 4 5 ( 0169) ( ),, 5,, 4,,,,,, 67
: :,,,, 3.,,,,, 10 %,, 5 15 %,,,,,,,,,,,,, Fisman & Khanna (1999),,,,,,,, 4., 4,, 5 5 1 2 3 ( ) 0138 (2126) 3 0121 (2160) 3 ( %) 2146 (3114) 3 3 3-0147 ( - 1136) d ( Π ) 214 (5132) 3 3 1171 (4125) 3 3 3 ( 3 Π ) 0127 (1153) d 0153 (3178) 3 3 1100 (1177) a 1167 (3155) 3 3 1139 (2178) 3 3-9199 ( - 8143) 3 3-8170 ( - 11194) 3 3-7153 ( - 11191) 3 3 Adj, R 0152 0169 0162 : T, 3 3 99 % ; 3 95 % ;a 90 % ;d 80 % 4 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 5 3,, 16, 68
2002 10,,,,,, Fishman & Khanna (1999),,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,, :,,,, ;,,,,,,, (Merry,1984),, ;,,,, 10 %,, 10 %,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,, 69
: :,, Knack & Keefer (1997) 29,, ( 7 ), 115 ; ( 4 ), 8,, (,2001),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Coleman,J.,1988,Social Capital in the creation of Human capital,american Journal of sociology,xciv,95 100. Dore, R., 1987, Taking Japan Seriously, Stanford University, Stanford. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole, 1992, Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge. Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer, 1997, Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff?A Cross2Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1251 1288. Kreps, Divid, 1986, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Technological Innovation and Business Strategy, ed. By M. Tsuchiya, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. Merry, Sally Engle, 1984, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in Donald Black (ed. ) Toward A General Theory of Social Control, New York : Academic Press. Putnam, R., 1993, Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University. Princeton University. Fishman,Raymond, and Tarun Khanna, 1999, Is Trust A Historical Residue? Information Flows and Trust Levels, Journal of Economic Be2 havior and Organization. Vol, 38, 79 91.,1998 : : ( ),,1999 :, (, ),,1993 : ( ),,2000 :,,1998 : ( ),,2000 : ( ),,1997 : ( ),,2001 :,,2002 :, 1,2002 :, 2,1999 : ( ), ( : ) ( : ), 20, 50 % 70
Trust in China : A Cross2Regional Analysis Zhang Weiying & Ke Rongzhu ( Guanghua School of Management,Peking University) Trust has been widely recognized as social capital, a very important determinant for economic growth and social progress, com2 plementary to physical capital and human capital. It is often argued that Chinese communities are low2trust ones and China is now in trust crisis. Using a cross2regional survey, this paper analyzes how trust affects regional economic performances such as GDP growth rate, size distribution of the firms, FDI inflow in China. The paper also shows that cross2regional differences in trust de2 pends on possibilities of repeated transactions, marketization, transportation facilities, education, size of government officials, and so on. Key Words :Trust ; Economic2performence ; Information JEL Classification :D830,C730,C130 Foreign Direct Investment and Open Endogenous Economic Gro wth Cheng Huifang ( Zhejiang University of Technology) This paper analyses the correlation between Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI) and open economic growth in three different income countries in the context of new growth theory. The research indicates that FDI generates technology spillover and technical progress and is an important spring of open economic growth. Open endogenous growth is driven by technical innovation and technology sp2 illover of domestic investment and FDI. This paper sets up the model of foreign direct investment2led open growth and tests the ef2 fect of FDI on economic growth in a cross2country regression framework. The results of 65 countries show that the growth enhancing effects of FDI are more significant in high2income countries than those of middle and low income. In addition, FDI has positive ef2 fects on increasing total factor productivity and economic growth in China, which links scale of FDI inward and human capital. Key Words :Foreign Direct Investment ;Technology progress ;Open economy ; Endogenous growth JEL Classification :F210,F430,O330 Kno wledge Representation, Kno wledge Complementary and Game2theoretical Equilibria of Intellectual Property Rights Wang Dingding (CCER,Peking university) Knowledge complementarity is understood as the ultimate reason for strong increasing returns in knowledge economy, and comple2 mentarity can be hypothesized by super2modularity. With super2modularity and Tarski2Zhou fixed2point theorem, the conventional general equilibrium theorem can be replaced by equilibria2existence theorems of games on a concept - lattice. Pricing of intellectu2 al property rights is understood in this paper as a game on a complete concept lattice, therefore can be analyzed within the Tarski2 Zhou framework. There are many applications with this new approache, but mainly one can establish what Becker did for partial2 equilibrium analysis the Chicago producer2consumer choice model for the general equilibrium case. Key Words : Knowledge representation ; Knowledge complementarity ; Equilibria JEL Classification :C62,C70 96