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1 Appendix I: Letters to CETC, HBFEC, Chen Quanguo, and Wang Mingshan February 11, 2019 Mr. Xiong Qunli Chairman China Electronics Technology Group 27 Wanshou Road, Haidan District Beijing, China Mr. Wang Tienmeng Chairman Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Co., Ltd. 21 Changsheng Street, Luquan Economic Development Zone Shijiazhuang, China Re: Collection and use of personal data in Xinjiang Dear Chairman Xiong and Chairman Wang, Human Rights Watch is an independent nongovernmental organization that monitors and reports on compliance with international human rights standards in more than 90 countries around the world. We have been reporting on and advocating solutions to human rights abuses in China for over 20 years. We are currently researching the collection and use of personal information by the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. The research is intended to show whether and how Chinese authorities have complied with domestic law and fulfilled their obligations to protect privacy rights under international human rights law. Human Rights Watch understands that China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC ) has supplied a policing and big data platform called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. We also understand that Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Company (HBFEC, ), a company partly owned by CETC, has developed a mobile app for police officers and government officials to send information to and receive information from the central IJOP system. In the interest of thorough and accurate reporting, we are writing to request further information and other perspectives you may have about your activities in this regard. We would appreciate your response to the following questions: CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 58 AMSTERDAM BEIRUT BERLIN BRUSSELS CHICAGO GENEVA - GOMA JOHANNESBURG KIEV KINSHASA LONDON LOS ANGELES MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW YORK PARIS SAN FRANCISCO SÃO PAULO SEOUL SILICON VALLEY STOCKHOLM SYDNEY TOKYO TORONTO WASHINGTON ZÜRICH

2 1. Can you confirm that CETC and HBFEC are designated suppliers of the IJOP system and app used by the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau? If so, can you provide further details about those contracts with the government? 2. Based on our examination of the IJOP system, we understand that the app prompts police officers and government officials to collect a wide range of personal information from people in Xinjiang. Can you confirm that this is the case, and, if so, can you: a. Provide details on what kinds of information government officials are collecting through the IJOP app? b. Explain who is subject to such information collection? c. Describe the intended use of such information? 3. We understand that the IJOP app is also used to identify certain problematic individuals, vehicles, or events, and sends officials to investigate and provide feedback. a. Can you confirm that this is the case? If so, can you provide details about these tasks or investigations? b. Can you provide details about precisely how the IJOP system conducts its analysis, and how it identifies problematic people? 4. One government WeChat article acknowledged that the IJOP system is contributing data and analysis that have been used to identify targets to be detained in political education centers in the ongoing Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Extremism. Can you explain how IJOP systems analytics contribute to the detention of people in these facilities? 5. Do you review past sales to ensure your products and services are not used inappropriately, such as by violating international or domestic human rights standards, including privacy? If so, what steps do you take if issues are identified? 6. Do you have any policies and procedures in place to evaluate the design, production, marketing, or use of your products in light of human rights standards? If so, can you provide us details? 7. Did your company conduct any due diligence to determine whether there might be any adverse human rights impact from its use by authorities in Xinjiang? To be able to reflect your response in our forthcoming publication, we would welcome a response to these questions and any other comments you may have by March 4, Thank you for your assistance in these matters. Sincerely, Arvind Ganesan Director, Business and Human Rights Division Human Rights Watch Sophie Richardson China Director Human Rights Watch 59 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

3 March 21, 2019 Chen Quanguo Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chinese Communist Party Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 2 Jiankang Road, Tianshan Qu, Urumuqi , Xinjiang Re: Collection and Use of Personal Data in Xinjiang Dear Party Secretary Chen, Human Rights Watch is an independent nongovernmental organization that monitors and reports on compliance with international human rights standards in more than 90 countries around the world. We have been reporting on and advocating solutions to human rights abuses in China for over 20 years. We are currently researching the collection and use of personal information by the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. The research is intended to show whether and how Chinese authorities have complied with domestic law and fulfilled their obligations to protect privacy rights under international human rights law. Human Rights Watch understands that the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC ) has supplied a policing and big data platform called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. We also understand that Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Company (HBFEC, ), a company partly owned by CETC, has developed a mobile app for police officers and government officials to send information to and receive information from the central IJOP system. In the interest of thorough and accurate reporting, we are writing to request further information and other perspectives you may have about your activities in this regard. We would appreciate your response to the following questions. 1. Can you confirm that CETC and HBFEC are designated suppliers of the IJOP system and app used by the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau? If so, can you provide further details about those contracts with the two companies? 2. Based on our examination of the IJOP system, we understand that the app prompts police officers and government officials to collect a wide range of personal information from people in Xinjiang. Can you confirm that this is the case, and, if so, can you: a. Provide details on what kinds of information government officials are collecting through the IJOP app? b. Explain who is subject to such information collection? c. Describe the intended use of such information? 3. We understand that the IJOP app is also used to identify certain problematic individuals, vehicles, or events, and send officials to investigate and provide feedback. a. Can you confirm that this is the case? If so, can you provide details about these tasks or investigations? CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 60

4 b. Can you provide details about precisely how the IJOP system conducts its analysis, and how it identifies problematic people? 4. One government WeChat article acknowledged that the IJOP system is contributing data and analysis that have been used to identify targets to be detained in political education centers in the ongoing Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Extremism. Can you explain how IJOP systems analytics contribute to the detention of people in these facilities? To be able to reflect your response in our forthcoming publication, we would welcome a response to these questions and any other comments you may have by April 3, Thank you for your assistance in these matters. Sincerely, Sophie Richardson China Director Human Rights Watch Cc: Wang Mingshan, Chief of Police Security Department of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 61 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

5 Appendix II: Screens Related to Supervision of Officials Fig.28: A screenshot entitled leader supervision showing how supervisors can keep tabs on lower-level officials as they accomplish IJOP-related tasks. CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 62

6 Fig.29: A screenshot entitled my score evaluates officials progress accomplishing IJOP-related tasks. 63 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

7 Appendix III: Screens Related to Search Function Fig.30: Screenshot showing how officials can search for information about people. CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 64

8 Fig.31: Screenshot showing how officials can access the full profile of a given individual. 65 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

9 Appendix IV: Screens Related to Filing Reports Fig.32: Screenshot showing how officials can search for incident reports filed concerning suspicious vehicles, objects, people, or about internal migrants. CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 66

10 Fig.33: This is how officials can log an incident report. 67 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

11 Fig.34: Screenshot showing details of an incident report. CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 68

12 Fig.35: This is how officials can log a report about a person they find problematic. 69 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MAY 2019

13 Fig.36: This is how officials can log an object they find problematic. CHINA S ALGORITHMS OF REPRESSION 70

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