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1 : CJS 33 : ; ; : PosesionOperationand GovernanceasThreeConceptual DimensionsofTownandTownship Enterprises:AnAtempt BacktotheClasicalSocialSciences QUJingdong Abstract:Through the review ofthe representative sociologicalstudies on ownershipoftownandtownshipenterprisesthisarticleatemptstousethree clasicaltheoretical concepts of posesion operation and governance to analyzetheformativeandtheoperational mechanismsoftown andtownship enterprises.intheaspectofposesiontheseenterprisescompromisediferent elements of public common and private ownerships. In the aspect of operationtheyutilizeland contractsenterprise contracts and thefinancial responsibilitysystemintheinstitutionalcontextofthetwo-trackregime.inthe * : (Author: QUJingdong InstituteforSocial DevelopmentCASS) qujingdong@yahoo.com.cn 1

2 aspectof governancethey fuse diferent mechanisms ofthe institutional knowledgeand moresdimensionstogetherandfreethetraditionalfamilial kinshiplinkageand customary resourcesfor reform and creativity in the practice.askeypositionofsocialprocesofmultipleelementsandmomentstown andtownshipenterprisesnotonlyprovideopportunitiesforinstitutionalinnovations butalsoembodytheinstitutionalspiritofreform periodwhichcombinestradition regimeandnew market mechanismand providesanenriched procesofsocial development.thisframework returning on the clasicalsocialtheories wil be conductivetoreflectionontheotherphenomenonoforganizationalandinstitutional changeinsocialandeconomicalreform. Keywords:townandtownshipenterprisesownership posesionoperation governance 30 : ; 2

3 : (2006) ( ) ( 2007) ( )

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5 : ( ) (2005) ( 2005:119) : ; 1. (Samuelson1954: ) 5

6 ( 2005:135) 2 (Dahlman1980) ( 2006) :(1) ( 2003) ;(2) (2007) ( 2000) ( 2010) 2. (2007:268) : 6

7 : (2005:128) : ; (2005) 90 ( ) (2005) ( 7

8 ) 3 : :Caldeira2008; :Cheung 1983; (1999)

9 : ( 2009) 6 (2005) 6. (2002) 9

10 ( 2005:8) 7 ( Coase1960; 2007) ( ) (2005) 7. ( Lin1995;Oi1992) 10

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14 ; ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1992) (2006) ( ) ( ) 90 ( ) ( 2005:37) 9 : 9. 14

15 : ; (2006) ( ) 15

16 ( p osesion) (naturalright)( 2007:131 2) p roperty propriety ( ) (Locke1989) : (Macpherson1962) : ( 1994; 1996: ) (self-interest) 10. : 1992;

17 : ( ) (hyper-rationality )( Heler1983) ( 1999) (2010a: 42-43) (Kornai1959) (Polanyi1957) (Kornai1980) 17

18 (2003) (corporation) ( ) ( ) (2007: ) 20 (1998) 18

19 : ( ) ( 1989) ( ) ( 2002) 14 : ; 14. (Zol1976) 19

20 ; (2010a) : ( 2005b) : (Streeck1982:72-73); (Oi1999; 2010) 15 (co- operation) 15. :Shue

21 : : 16 ( 1999) ( ) ( ) (Nee1989) 21

22 ( ) 19 ( ) 19. (1995:22) ( ) 22

23 : ( ) ( ) : ; ; ( 1995) 23

24 ; ( 2007:45-52) ; ; (capitalaccounting ) 20 :(1) ;(2) ;(3) : ( ); ( );(4) : ( ) ( ) (erwerb) (erwerbschance) (marketchance) (haushalt) ( Weber1978:96) 21. :(1) ;(2) ;(3) ;(4) ;(5) ( ) ( 2005a: ) 24

25 : 1. ( ) 2. 25

26 ( 2005b: ) : ; : ; (leveling ) 3. 26

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28 : ( ) 23 ( ) ; ; : ; ; : ( ) ( ) ; ; ( Yang Wang and Wils1992:1-37) 23. : 28

29 : ( 2010a:42-53) ( ) : ( ); ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) : (Tian2000: ) ( ) 29

30 ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( 2006) ( 2009) ; ( 2002;Oi1992) ( ) 30

31 : : ( ) ; ; ( ) ( ) ( ) : ; ; (nutzleistungen) (beschafungsmitel) ( 2005a:10 14) 31

32 (Oi1995) ( 2000) 25 (2006a2006b) 25. (2002) 32

33 : 26 (1999) ( 1999:86) ( 1999) 26. (2005) % 98% ( Zhou1996) 33

34 ( ) ( ) (1999:83) : ; ; ( g overnancestructure) ( 1998) 34

35 : ( ) (References) [G]// ( 3 ) : [M].. : [M].. : : [ J ]. (3): [ J ]. (2): [ J ]. (9): [G]// : [G]// [M].. : [ J ]. (4): : [ J ]. (4): [ J ]. (4): : [G]// ( 5 ) [ J ]. (2): [M]. : : [ J ]. (1): [ J ].. (1-3): [ J ]. (1): : 30 [ J ]. (6): P..2010a. [G]//.. :. 35

36 b. : [G]//.. : : [ J ]. (1): [M].. : : [G]// ( ). : [M].. : [M] a. [M].. :..2005b. [M].. : : [G]// [ J ]. (1): [ J ]. (5): : [M]. : : [ J ]. (1): a. : [ J ]. (3): b. [M]. : : ( )[M] ( ): [M]. : [ J ]. (3): [ J ]. (5): : [ J ]. (4): [ J ]. (6): : [M]. : : [ J ]. (2): a. : [M] b. : H [ J ]. (5): CaldeiraRute MyLandYourSocialTransformation :Conflictswithinthe LandlesPeopleMovement(MST)RiodeJaneiroBrazil. J ournalof RuralStudies 24(2): Cheung Steven N.S TheContractualNatureofFirm. J ournaloflaw and Economics26(1):1-21. CoaseRonaldH TheProblemofSocialCost. J ournaloflaw and Economics3 (Oct.):1-44. DahlmanCarlJ.1980.TheOpen FieldSystem and Beyond:A PropertyRightsAnalysisof an EconomicInstitution.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPres. GrosmanSanfordJ.and OliverD.Hart An AnalysisofthePrincipal-Agent 36

37 : Problem. Econometrica51(1):7-45. FeherFerencAgnesHelerandGy rgy Markus.1983.Dictatorship Over Neds:Analysis ofsovietsocieties.oxford:basilblackwel. JensenMichaelC.and Wiliam H.Meckling TheoryoftheFirm:Managerial BehaviorAgencyCostsandOwnershipStructure. J ournaloffinancialeconomics3 (4): Kornai J nos.1959.over-centralizationin EconomicAdministration :A CriticalAnalysis Basedon Experiencein Hungarian LightIndustry translatedbyjohnknapp.london: OxfordUniversityPres. Kornai J nos.1980.economicso fshortage.amsterdam:northholand. LinNan LocalMarketSocialism:LocalCorporationinActioninRuralChina. Theoryand Society24(3): Locke John.1989.An Esa yconcerning Human Understanding.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPres. MacphersonCrawford Brough.1962.ThePoliticalTheoryofPosesiveIndividualism: HobbestoLocke.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPres. NeeVictor A Theoryof MarketTransition:From Redistributionto Marketsin StateSocialism. American SociologicalReview54(5): Oi JeanC FiscalReformandtheEconomicFoundationsofLocalStateCorporatism inchina. WorldPolitics45(1): Oi JeanC TheRoleoftheLocalStateinChina stransitionaleconomy. The China Quarterly144: Oi JeanC.1999.RuralChina Takeso ff : InstitutionalFoundationsofEconomicReform. Berkeley : UniversityofCaliforniaPres. PolanyiKarl.1957.TheGreatTransformation.Boston:BeaconPres. SamuelsonPaulA ThePureTheoryofPublicExpenditure. ReviewofEconomics and Statistics (36)4: ShueVivienne.1988.TheReachoftheState.StanfordCalif.:StanfordUniversityPres. StreeckWolfgang OrganizationalConsequencesofNeo-CorporatistCooperationin WestGermany In G.LembruchandPhilippeC.Schmiter (eds.) TrendsToward CorporatistIntermediation pp london :Sage. TianGuoqiang Property Rightsand NatureofChina scolectiveenterprise. JournalofComparativeEconomics28 (2): WeberMax.1978.Economyand Society : An OutlineofInterpretiveSociology editedby GuentherRothandClausWitich.Berkeley : UniversityofCaliforniaPres. Yang Xiaokai Wang Jiangou and Ian Wils Economic Growth CommercializationandInstitutionalChangesin RuralChina China EconomicReview3(1):1-37. ZhouKateXiao.1996.HowtheFarmersChanged China:PowerofthePeople.Boulder: WestviewPres. ZolRainer.1976.Der Doppelcharakterder Gewerkschaften.Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp. : 37

responsibilitysystemintheinstitutionalcontextofthetwo-trackregime.inthe aspectofgovernancetheyfusediferent mechanismsoftheinstitutional knowled

responsibilitysystemintheinstitutionalcontextofthetwo-trackregime.inthe aspectofgovernancetheyfusediferent mechanismsoftheinstitutional knowled 2013 2 CJS 33 渠敬东 : ; ; : PosesionOperationand GovernanceasThreeConceptual DimensionsofTownandTownship Enterprises:AnAtempt BacktoClasicalSocialSciences QU Jingdong Abstract:Throughthereview oftherepresentativesociologicalstudieson