CHEN Feng Abstract:Sincethelaunchofthereformoftaxesandfeesin2002thecentral governmenthasissuedaseriesoffavorablepoliciesforfarmersandtookalotof

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1 CJS 35 : : : DOI: /jcnki /c The HierarchyofProfitDivisionand Grasroots Governance Involution: The Logic of Rural Governance under the BackgroundoftheResourceInput * : ; (Author:Chen FengColaborativeInnovation CenterofBeijingSociety-Building & Social Governance;Schoolof HumanitiesandSocialSciencesBeijing Universityof Technology) chenfeng-0110@163com ** (13ZDA06) (14SHC025) (X ) [Thisresearchissupportedbythe SocialScienceFoundMajorProgramofBeijing(14SHC025)theSocialScienceFoundProgram ofbeijing(14shc025)thehumanitiesandsocialsciencefundprogramofbeijinguniversity oftechnology(x )] ; ; 95

2 CHEN Feng Abstract:Sincethelaunchofthereformoftaxesandfeesin2002thecentral governmenthasissuedaseriesoffavorablepoliciesforfarmersandtookalotof resourcestothecountrysideindustrystartedtosupportagricultureitbringsnew opportunityforruraldevelopmentandruralgovernancewhichgainssupportofthe broadmassesoffarmersinawayitalsohelpsconsolidatetherulingfoundationof Chinese Communist Partyand enhance the legitimacy ofthe state power Howeverthepoliticaleficiencyofthereformoftheagriculturaltaxesandfeeshas quicklyreducedandtheresourceinputtothecountrysidedidnotachievethe desiredefectontheonehandgrass-rootsorganizationscannotundertaketop- downinputedresourcesefectivelyandconnectscateredfarmersontheother handthenon-cooperationbetweenoficialsandthefarmersoftenendedupwith predicamentofgovernanceofthe nailhouse intheconstructionoftheproject Underthisbackgroundgrass-rootsorganizationsmainlypresenttwobasicformsof governancesomevilagecadreswereafraidof accident anddidthingspassively so much so that some even avoided theinput of resourcesfor the vilage constructionothervilagesmainlywereruledbytherichandthegreyblackforces Theyactivelyfightforresourcesandprojectsandtakeavarietyofmeanstosolve the nailhouseholds andgainsomebenefitsfromtheprojectorpoliticalcapitalfor thedevelopmentoftheirindividualeconomybothgovernanceformshaveeroded thenationalresourcesandlocalpublicresourcesandtheauthorityandlegitimacyof grassrootsorganizationsfurtherdeclineontheresourcesinputchainaprofit divisionhierarchyhasbeenformedamongpeopleinvolvedinpowerrent-seeking localsocialforcesoftherichandthegreyblackforcesopportunisticandinterest- oriented farmers and so on Ordinary people should have been the biggest beneficiariesoftheinputresourcesbutthehierarchalprofitdivisionimpairsthe interestsofthebroadmassesoffarmersbuttheyarereluctanttoprotestasthe resourcesaremainlyinputfromtheabovenotextractedfromthemgrassroots governanceissuferingfrominvolutionfundamentalyitisresultedfrom the tensionbetweentheoppressivesystem andefectivegovernanceandithappens duringthetransformationoftheruralsocietiesfromunderintegritygovernanceto undertechnologygovernancehoweverthecounterbalancerelationsofinterests andresponsibilityamongthestategrass-rootsorganizationsandfarmersproduce fractureanditisdificultfortheinputresourcestoproducemaximumefectiveness andimprovetheconditionoftheruralgovernanceonthecontrarytheinput 96

3 resourceshelpnourishaprofit-sharinggroupandthehierarchalprofitdivisionofthe grass-rootssocietyhasputruralgovernanceintoanewdilemma Keywords:resourcestheorderofprofitdivisioninvolutionruralgovernance powertechnologygovernance 2002 ( 2001; 2005) ( 2005) ( 2006) ( 2011) ( 2005) 1 1 (2010) 97

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24 ; ( 2007) (References) 2011a : [M] : 2011b [J] (2): a [J] (8): b : [J] (1): : [J] ( )(6):

25 2001 [J] (3): : [J] (4): [D] 2007 [D] 2008 [M] : 2011 [J] ( )(2): : [J] (7): [J] (5): [G]// ( 5 ) : : [J] (6): K [J] (2): [J] ( )(3): : [M] : 2002 [M] : 2005 [J] 2005(4): [J] (3): : [J] (1): [M] : 2011 [M] : [J] (6): : [J] (5): [M] : 2009 ( )[D] 2009 [J] (3):31-32 ( )[M] : 2011 [J] ( )2011(3): [J] (5): [J] (2): [M] : 2003 [J] (4): a : [M] 2007b [M] : 119

26 : [Z] ( 7 ) 2003 [J] (4): : [M] : 2011 [J] ( )(2): [J] (1): ( )[D] [M] : 2001 : [J] (6): [J] (4): : [J] (9): [J] (3): [J] (6): [J] (8): : [J] (10): : ( )[M] : BernsteinThomas Pand Xiaobo Lü2003Taxation without Representation in Contemporary RuralChinaNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress OiJeanChun1995 TheRoleoftheLocalStateinChina stransitionaleconomy China Quarterly144(12): PengYusheng2001 Chinese Vilagesand TownshipsasIndustrialCorporations: OwnershipGovernanceand MarketDiscipline American JournalofSociology 106(5): ShueVivienne1998TheReachoftheState:SketchesoftheChineseBodyPolitic StanfordUniversityPress WalderAndrew G1995 LocalGovernmentsasIndustrialFirms:An Organization AnalysisofChina stransitionaleconomy American JournalofSociology 101 (2): WedemanAndrew1997 StealingFrom China'sFarmers:InstitutionalCorruptionand the1992ioucrisis China Quarterly152(12): : 120

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犪狀犱狅犳犲狉犺犻犵犺狆狅狑犲狉犲犱犪狀犱犱犻犳犲狉犲狀狋犻犪狋犲犱犻狀犮犲狀狋犻狏犲狊狋狅狊狌犫犮狅狀狋狉犪犮狋狅狉狊. 犎狅狑犲狏犲狉, 犻狋犮犪狀犪犾兼论官吏分途与层级分流现象社会 2016 1 CJS 第 36 卷周黎安摘要 : 本文重新梳理了行政发包制理论中行政与发包的关系, 将政治晋升机制正式引入行政发包关系, 定义了行政内部发包与行政外部发包的组织边界在此基础上, 本文重