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12 : :,, Knack & Keefer (1997) 29,, ( 7 ), 115 ; ( 4 ), 8,, (,2001),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Coleman,J.,1988,Social Capital in the creation of Human capital,american Journal of sociology,xciv, Dore, R., 1987, Taking Japan Seriously, Stanford University, Stanford. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole, 1992, Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge. Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer, 1997, Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff?A Cross2Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Kreps, Divid, 1986, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Technological Innovation and Business Strategy, ed. By M. Tsuchiya, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. Merry, Sally Engle, 1984, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in Donald Black (ed. ) Toward A General Theory of Social Control, New York : Academic Press. Putnam, R., 1993, Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University. Princeton University. Fishman,Raymond, and Tarun Khanna, 1999, Is Trust A Historical Residue? Information Flows and Trust Levels, Journal of Economic Be2 havior and Organization. Vol, 38, ,1998 : : ( ),,1999 :, (, ),,1993 : ( ),,2000 :,,1998 : ( ),,2000 : ( ),,1997 : ( ),,2001 :,,2002 :, 1,2002 :, 2,1999 : ( ), ( : ) ( : ), 20, 50 % 70

13 Trust in China : A Cross2Regional Analysis Zhang Weiying & Ke Rongzhu ( Guanghua School of Management,Peking University) Trust has been widely recognized as social capital, a very important determinant for economic growth and social progress, com2 plementary to physical capital and human capital. It is often argued that Chinese communities are low2trust ones and China is now in trust crisis. Using a cross2regional survey, this paper analyzes how trust affects regional economic performances such as GDP growth rate, size distribution of the firms, FDI inflow in China. The paper also shows that cross2regional differences in trust de2 pends on possibilities of repeated transactions, marketization, transportation facilities, education, size of government officials, and so on. Key Words :Trust ; Economic2performence ; Information JEL Classification :D830,C730,C130 Foreign Direct Investment and Open Endogenous Economic Gro wth Cheng Huifang ( Zhejiang University of Technology) This paper analyses the correlation between Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI) and open economic growth in three different income countries in the context of new growth theory. The research indicates that FDI generates technology spillover and technical progress and is an important spring of open economic growth. Open endogenous growth is driven by technical innovation and technology sp2 illover of domestic investment and FDI. This paper sets up the model of foreign direct investment2led open growth and tests the ef2 fect of FDI on economic growth in a cross2country regression framework. The results of 65 countries show that the growth enhancing effects of FDI are more significant in high2income countries than those of middle and low income. In addition, FDI has positive ef2 fects on increasing total factor productivity and economic growth in China, which links scale of FDI inward and human capital. Key Words :Foreign Direct Investment ;Technology progress ;Open economy ; Endogenous growth JEL Classification :F210,F430,O330 Kno wledge Representation, Kno wledge Complementary and Game2theoretical Equilibria of Intellectual Property Rights Wang Dingding (CCER,Peking university) Knowledge complementarity is understood as the ultimate reason for strong increasing returns in knowledge economy, and comple2 mentarity can be hypothesized by super2modularity. With super2modularity and Tarski2Zhou fixed2point theorem, the conventional general equilibrium theorem can be replaced by equilibria2existence theorems of games on a concept - lattice. Pricing of intellectu2 al property rights is understood in this paper as a game on a complete concept lattice, therefore can be analyzed within the Tarski2 Zhou framework. There are many applications with this new approache, but mainly one can establish what Becker did for partial2 equilibrium analysis the Chicago producer2consumer choice model for the general equilibrium case. Key Words : Knowledge representation ; Knowledge complementarity ; Equilibria JEL Classification :C62,C70 96

227次双周：柯荣柱提要和全文.doc

227次双周：柯荣柱提要和全文.doc 1 * Trust in China: A Cross-regional Analysis * 1 1993 2 100 100 2 Putnam,1993 1998Knack & Keefer,1997 3 20 1998 4 Putnam,1993,1995; 1998; Colman,1988,1995 Social capital Kreps 1986 Fudenberg & Tirole1992