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1 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 儒敎文化硏究 Vol. 23 / February 2015 成均館大學校儒敎文化硏究所 Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Sungkyunkwan University

3 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 儒敎文化硏究 Vol. 23 / February 2015

4 Editorial Board Advisory Board Members Donald BAKER (University of British Columbia, Canada) Anne CHENG (College de France, France) KAWAHARA Hideki (University of Tokyo, Japan) LI Xueqin (Tsinghua University, China) SONG Young-Bae (Seoul National University, Korea) TU Weiming (Peking University, China) YOON Sa-Soon (Korea University, Korea) ZHANG Liwen (Renmin University of China, China) Director SHIN Jeong-Keun (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea) Editorial Board Members Roger T. AMES (University of Hawaii, U.S.A.) CHEN Lai (Tsinghua University, China) CHUNG Byung Suk (Youngnam University, Korea) CHENG Chung-yi (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, China) GUO Qiyong (Wuhan University, China) HUANG Chun-Chieh (Taiwan National University, Taiwan) HUH Nam-jin (Seoul National University, Korea) Nam-lin HUR (University of British Columbia, Canada) JANG Seung-Hee (Jeju National University, Korea) KATAOKA Ryu (Tohoku University, Japan) KIM Sea Jeong (Chungnam National University, Korea) LEE Junghwan (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea) LEE Kwang Ho (Yonsei University, Korea) LEE Sang Gon (Wonkwang University, Korea) LI Cunshan (Chinese Academy of Social Science, China) LIAO Mingchun (Tsinghua University, China) NGUYEN Tai Dong (Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam) PARK Jeoung Sim (Pusan National University, Korea) Frederic WANG (INALCO, France) YAN Binggang (Shandong University, China) YANG Guorong (East China Normal University, China) YOO Kwon Jong (Chungang University, Korea) YOO Weon-Ki (Keimyung University, Korea) ZHANG Xuezhi (Peking University, China) Managing Editors LEE Yong-Yun (English Articles) XING Liju (Chinese Articles)

Director SHIN Jeong-Keun (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea) Editorial Board Members Roger T. AM

5 儒敎文化硏究編輯委員會顧問尹絲淳 ( 韓國高麗大學 ) 宋榮培 ( 韓國首爾大學 ) 李學勤 ( 中國淸華大學 ) 張立文 ( 中國人民大學 ) 川原秀城 ( 日本東京大學 ) 杜維明 ( 中國北京大學 ) Donald BAKER( 加拿大 UBC) Anne CHENG( 法國 College de France) 主任辛正根 ( 韓國成均館大學 ) 委員片岡龍 ( 日本東北大學 ) 朴正心 ( 韓國釜山大學 ) 阮才東 ( 越南社會科學院 ) 李存山 ( 中國社會科學院 ) 李光虎 ( 韓國延世大學 ) 金世貞 ( 韓國忠南大學 ) 李相坤 ( 韓國圓光大學 ) 李定桓 ( 韓國成均館大學 ) 張承姬 ( 韓國濟州大學 ) 楊國榮 ( 中國華東師範大學 ) 兪原基 ( 韓國啓明大學 ) 郭齊勇 ( 中國武漢大學 ) 陳來 ( 中國淸華大學 ) 許南進 ( 韓國首爾大學 ) 張學智 ( 中國北京大學 ) 黃俊傑 ( 台灣台灣大學 ) 廖名春 ( 中國淸華大學 ) 劉權鍾 ( 韓國中央大學 ) 鄭宗義 ( 中國香港中文大學 ) 鄭炳碩 ( 韓國嶺南大學 ) 顔炳罡 ( 中國山東大學 ) Roger T. AMES( 美國 Hawaii 大學 ) Nam-lin HUR( 加拿大 UBC) Frederic WANG( 法國 INALCO) 編輯部主任李容潤 ( 英文 ) 邢麗菊 ( 中文 )

國圓光大學 ) 李定桓 ( 韓國成均館大學 ) 張承姬 ( 韓國濟州大學 ) 楊國榮 ( 中國華東師範大學 ) 兪原基 ( 韓國啓明大學 ) 郭齊勇 ( 中國武漢大學 ) 陳來 ( 中國淸華大學 ) 許南進 ( 韓國首爾大學 ) 張學智 ( 中國北京大學 ) 黃俊傑 (

6 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Contents ARTICLES SHIN Jeong-Keun 1 From Jingxue 經學 to Philosophy and from There, Whence? LEE Sang-ik 29 The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace MIN Byounghee 53 KIM Yon-jae 77 CHEN Yan MENG Qinglei 105 PENG Yaoguang 133 IM Ok-kyun 143 CHO KeongRan 161 LUO Ying 183 TEE Boon Chuan 199 The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage: Zhu Xi s 朱熹 Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks in the Neo-Confucian School of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學 From a Prohibition of Talk about Otherworldly Elements to Harangues about Heavenly Morality in Confucianism An Analysis of the Interaction between Heaven and Man in Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi s Neo-Confucianism Wang Fuzi s Understanding of the Great Learning: In Comparison to Zhu Xi s Understanding Confucianism, Intellectuals, and the State: Reconstructing Confucianism as a Critical Discourse A Masterpiece of Confucian Latin Translation in the 18th Century: François Noël S.I. and His Sinensis Imperii Libri Classici Sex A Study of Tjhie Tjay Ing s Views of Confucian Religion in Indonesia 213 APPENDIX

199 The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage: Zhu Xi s 朱熹 Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks in the

7 儒敎文化硏究第二十三輯 / 2015 年 2 月目錄學術論文辛正根 1 從經學到哲學, 然後是何處? 李相益 29 退溪學與和平閔丙禧 53 聖學的悖論朱熹是如何將聖人之治與現實的經世再結合的? 金演宰 77 程朱學的思維方式與社會網的可持續性的正當化之邏輯機制陳炎孟慶雷 105 從不語天神到奢談天德儒家思想的遷移彭耀光 133 二程理學天人感應論略析林玉均 143 趙京蘭 161 羅瑩 183 王夫之對大學的理解以與朱熹比較為中心國家儒學知識份子建議作為批判性論述的儒學十八世紀儒學西傳的代表作耶穌會士衛方濟及其中華帝國六經一書鄭文泉 199 論印尼孔教精神領袖徐再英的孔教觀 213 附錄

金演宰 77 程朱學的思維方式與社會網的可持續性的正當化之邏輯機制陳炎孟慶雷 105 從不語天神到奢談天德儒家思想的遷移彭耀光 133 二程理學

9 From Jingxue 經學 to Philosophy and from There, Whence? SHIN Jeong-Keun 1)2) Abstract Disciplinary classifications are subject to change because the purpose and method of pursuing knowledge change with the passage of time. Through the history of Western scholarship, philosophy has been regarded as the basis of all sciences, or as the Queen of Sciences. Before its import, jingxue 經學 (textual scholarship or the study of the Confucian classics) had been regarded as the most important type of scholarship in East Asia. Jingxue was one of the four traditional categories used in bibliographic classification in China. Since the initial encounter between the East and the West, jingxue has continued to exist, but has surrendered its privileged status to philosophy. Philosophers in Korea are confronted with the problematic condition of a lack of consensus on research subjects and methodology. This is different from Western situations in which philosophers have declared the demise of philosophy and cast doubts on the identity of philosophy. In Korea, intellectuals speak most frequently about the crisis of philosophical research or the crisis of philosophy education, not the crisis of philosophy itself. This paper intends to examine why the crisis of philosophical research has occurred and how to cope with it. The examination begins with revisiting the scholars who had a keen interest in the issue and explores some directions for philosophic inquiry in 21st century Korea. Keywords: jingxue (textual scholarship), philosophy, science, classification of sciences, modernity * SHIN Jeong-Keun: Professor, College of Confucian Studies, Director of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture, Sungkyunkwan University (xhinjg@hanmail.net) ** This paper is a revised version of an earlier one presented at the Spring 2014 Academic Forum organized by the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture, Sungkyunkwan University, under the title of From Text Scholarship to Philosophy: The Trends of Academic Research during the Early Modern Transitional Period in East Asia.

Through the history of Western scholarship, philosophy has been regarded as the basis of all sciences, or as the Queen of Sciences.

10 2 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February Introduction It has been over a century since the study of philosophy began in Korea. Yet, as academics begin to specialize in the philosophies of different countries and various subjects, many Korean researchers tend not to regard the academic achievements of others as philosophy. In other words, even though there is a large body of Korean academics all studying philosophy, there is no consensus among these scholars as to what constitutes philosophical study and how to study philosophy per se. This situation is, of course, different from what has transpired in the West (the United States and continental Europe, especially) where Wittgenstein and others have loudly and frequently proclaimed the death or demise of philosophy in the Western intellectual tradition and cast doubt on the very identity of philosophy. Korean philosophers appear to understand their current situation as a crisis of philosophical research or a crisis of philosophy education and do not speak about a crisis of philosophy per se. This paper attempts to examine why this crisis of philosophical research has occurred in Korea and provide some suggestions for overcoming it. Let us first examine the trajectory of scholars who have taken a profound interest in exploring this issue. In 1999, Lee Cheol-seung took issue with the methodology of philosophical research, as part of his efforts to address the initial question of How meaningful is Chinese traditional philosophy to contemporary Koreans? At the time, he attempted to probe some of the problems underlying the study of Chinese traditional philosophy in Korea and explore an alternative path to cope with them. He suggested that researchers were faced with two problematic conditions: the lack of problem awareness and methodological monotony. He stressed the importance of both a scientific approach and creative thinking in regards to finding alternative approaches to problem solving. In order to link the intellectual problems of the time with the system of thought, he called on scholars to develop a more accurate understanding of the real conditions in which philosophic inquiry is conducted and suggested the need for a dialectic union of both concretization and abstraction and specificity and universality. 1) 1) See Lee, Oneulnal jungguk jeontong cheolhak-eul yeunguhaneun hangukin-eui euimie

In other words, even though there is a large body of Korean academics all studying philosophy, there is no consensus among these scholars as to what constitutes philosophical study and how to study

11 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 3 In an interview with a newspaper more than a decade later, Lee described his view of unsatisfactory current research trends for Eastern philosophy in Korea and proposed a solution for the situation: Having deep concerns about the pervasive uncritical adoption of imported philosophy and blind overdependence on traditional philosophy, I am pondering on the possibility to establish uri philosophy. 2) For Lee, establishing uri philosophy entailed in-depth thinking about Korean problems in an era characterized by multi-faceted forms of conflict, such as those between nations, classes, religions, East and West, tradition and modernity, specificity and universality, etc. Two years later, in 2014, Lee commemorated the creation of the Institute of uri philosophy by organizing an academic forum on the theme of How Should We Study Uri Philosophy?: Beyond Imported Philosophy and Textual Scholarship. 3) In a nutshell, Lee s argument is that due to the lack of critical consciousness and methodological sophistication the study of Eastern philosophy in Korea has been, unfortunately, dominated by imported philosophy and text scholarship. As a response, Lee has urged other Korean academics to establish our own philosophy by seeking a dialectic linkage between reality and thought. From a glance at the forum s proceedings, one can identify subtly divergent standpoints regarding current research on Eastern philosophy in Korea among both presenters (Gweon In-ho and Hong Weon-sik, in particular) and discussants (Choi Yeong-jin and Lee Seung-hwan). According to Gweon In-ho, researches on Korean Confucianism show the habitual problem of tautology as exemplified in the discussions on the Four-Seven debate (originating from Yi Hwang and Yi Yi in the second half of the Joseon period), on the conception of whether humans and animals have the same nature, and Zhu Xi s Neo-Confucian thought (including the study of mind). It makes me wonder that even after seven to eight decades, we have not been able to go beyond Takahashi Tooru s 高橋亨 discussions on Korean Confucianism. Meanwhile, Choi Yeong-jin daehayeo, ) Uri in uri philosophy literally means our in Korean. Uri philosophy can be understood as a term that reflexes the effort to establish Korean own philosophical tradition. Interview with Gyosu sinmun, November 7, ) Held in commemoration of the establishment of the Institute for uri philosophy, the Forum was jointly sponsored by the Daedong Philosophical Association and Chosun University s Humanities Research Institute and held in the Mock Courtroom on the second floor of the College of Law Building at Chosun University, Gwangju, on May 24, 2014.

situation: Having deep concerns about the pervasive uncritical adoption of imported philosophy and blind overdependence on traditional philosophy, I am pondering on the possibility to establish uri

12 4 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 claims in his comments on Gweon s paper that the facts tell otherwise: Looking back, I remember that not a small number of research papers on the Four-Seven debate give a critical look at the logical fitness from an analytic philosophical perspective and excavate new issues. Also, as to the Horak Debate (discourse over where human nature is different from other creatures), some studies analyze its status in the politico-historical context and attempt an ecological reinterpretation. 4) In his remarks, Hong Weon-sik contended that Eastern philosophy in Korea is faced with the absence of three elements: communication, problem awareness, and proper perspectives and research methods. As a remedy, he urged scholars to acknowledge and then move beyond what he identified as the pervasion of self-contented, self-believing research. In his comments on Hong s paper, Lee Seung-hwan pointed out that Hong s formulation of the problem facing Korean philosophy was not very different from what Lee Cheol-seung had described in If he is right, it means that Eastern philosophy in Korea, despite some keen reflections made on its direction, has made no real progress during the past fifteen years. Borrowing the expression the lost 10 years, which is widely used in the Korean political sphere, Lee suggested that some might say, self-disparagingly, that Eastern philosophy in Korea has lost the past 15 years. Yet Lee Seung-hwan himself would not fully agree with the accuracy of a description of the lost 15 years. In his 2001 book, Noja-eseo Derrida-ggaji (From Laozi to Derrida), he contends that Taoist research in Korea has produced creative collective work by interpreting Taoist thought through the perspectives of the philosophy of language, Husserl phenomenology, and Heidegger s existential thought, which had never been attempted elsewhere in the world. He also argued that a series of novel researches anchored on the moral psychological viewpoint have been made on Neo-Confucianism, and semiotic and linguistic methods are applied to newly interpret the Confucian notions of li-qi and the Four-Seven. 5) To summarize, at least two competing views exist regarding the current condition of Eastern philosophical research in Korea. Some complain that without a keen sense of problem awareness and adequate methodology, it only imitates foreign research outcomes and pours most 4) Gweon, Hanguk cheolhak-ui hyeonhwang-gwa banseong mit hyanghu gwaje, 1-2; Choi, Discussion Remarks, 13. 5) Hong, Dongyang cheolhak yeongu bangbeomnon-ui gungpip-gwa munjejeom, geurigo mosaek, 31-40; Lee, Discussion Remarks,

look at the logical fitness from an analytic philosophical perspective and excavate new issues.

13 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 5 of its effort into little more than terminological (re)interpretations. Others believe that the application of diverse new methodologies over the past 15 years have indeed broadened the research horizon in significant and potentially dynamic ways. How should we understand the large gap between these two perspectives? First, we must admit that there is a lack of communication, in the sense that we do not check research outcomes produced in Korea as much as we do those made overseas. Second, we do not seem to agree as to the genuine value of employing philosophy of language-based approaches to Eastern philosophy. Third, despite some moves toward uri study in other disciplines that are comparable to that of uri philosophy, no compelling approach to interdisciplinary science or transdisciplinary science has yet been made in the Korean academy. 6) This paper aims to investigate how philosophy came into beigin with the classification of disciplines as well as some of the ramifications of the clash between premodern and early modern philosophical studies. Through this examination, it suggests that instead of being mere declarations, uri study and uri philosophy can in fact offer a consensus-based approach and direction for the future of academic inquiry in Korea. 2. Classification of Sciences and Philosophy In Taishigong zixu 太史公自序 (Autobiography of Sima Qian) in the Shiji 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), Sima Tan 司馬談 put forward his view that while each of the Six Schools (yin-yang, Confucianism, Mohism, the School of Names, Legalism, and Taoism) had its own characteristics, they had one thing in common, namely, that they upheld order. 7) He explained their core traits from this point of view. The fact that Sima compiled major summaries of the Six Schools lets us presume the existence of book classification methods and classified 6) Jo Dong-il explored the path to Our Intellectual Study early on, as demonstrated in his works, Inmun hangmun-ui samyeong and Uri hangmun-ui gil. Also, the Society for Studying in the Korean Language led by Lee Gi-sang and Choi Bong-yeong has tried to bridge the gap between Korean language and intellectual studies by producing a series of books, including Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui samuchim, Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui gomaum, Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui yongteurim, and Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui nalgaejit. 7) Sima, Taishigong zixu : 易大傳, 天下一致而百慮, 同歸而殊塗. 夫陰陽, 儒, 墨, 名, 法, 道德, 此務爲治者也. 直所從言之異路, 有省不省耳.

How should we understand the large gap between these two perspectives?

14 6 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 catalogs in premodern times, although it cannot be effectively confirmed. Liu Xiang 劉向 and Liu Xin s 劉歆 Qilüe 七略 (Seven Summaries) is generally regarded as China s earliest literature classification. While this is true in the sense of a classification which covers a wide range of subjects, as far as a single area is concerned, their work should not actually be considered the first effort at classifying literature, 8) especially as there are some interesting accounts in the military section in Yiwenzhi 藝文志 in the Hanshu 漢書. In the early Han period, Zhang Liang 張良 and Han Xin 韓信 made a summary of 182 Houses and grouped them into 35 categories. On the order of Emperor Wu 武帝, the military general Yang Fu 楊僕 collected scattered records of military tactics and compiled a classified catalog, although his was an incomplete list. Furthermore, Emperor Cheng 成帝 commanded Ren Hong 任宏 to classify military writings into four groups. 9) Demand for military strategies and military books rose sharply during Emperor Wu s reign due to increased military activities, both internal and external. 10) For those practical reasons, the earliest classified catalog dedicated to military books, named Binglu 兵錄, emerged. It is noteworthy that the first Chinese bibliographic classification targeted military books, not the Six Arts. As we all know, Liu Xiang and Liu Xin s Qilüe and its successor, Yiwenzhi 藝文志 in the Hanshu, were classificatory works that were not limited to military books but attempted to cover all available fields at that time. In particular, the Qilüe was divided into seven sections: General Summary, Summary on the Six Arts, Summary on Noncanonical Masters, Summary on Poetry and Rhapsody, Summary on Military Writings, Summary on Science and Numerics, and Summary on Practical Technology. The General Summary describes the main points of the book itself, meaning that there are actually six summaries. The six smmaries can be roughly divided into two larger clusters as the Six Arts, Noncanonical Masters, and Poetry and Rhapsody are grouped into arts and literature, while Military Writings, Science and Numerics, and Practical Technology concern governance and practical fields. The Lunyu 論語 is listed in the Six Arts, implying a special authority reserved for Confucius, though 8) Lee Seong-gyu views Yiwenzhi in the Hanshu, which inherited the tradition of Qilüe compiled by Liu Xiang and his son, Liu Xin, as China s earliest book classification, but this view needs to be corrected. See Lee Seong-gyu, Dongyang-ui hangmun chegye-wa geu inyeom, 12. 9) Ban, Yiwenzhi : 漢興, 張良, 韓信序次兵法, 凡百八十二家, 刪取要用, 定著三十五家. 諸呂用事而盜取之. 武帝時, 軍政楊僕捃摭遺逸, 紀奏兵錄, 猶未能備. 至于孝成, 命任宏論次兵書爲四種. 10) Lai, Jungguk-ui gojeon mongnokhak,

While this is true in the sense of a classification which covers a wide range of subjects, as far as a single area is concerned, their work should not actually be considered the first effort at

15 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 7 Confucianism itself is filed under Noncanonical Masters, indicating that its special authority was yet to be formed. Within this grouping scheme, writings of thought and ideology in modern-day classification were placed within either the Six Arts or Various Masters categories. The Seven Summaries classification framework employed by Yiwenzhi in the Hanshu did not last very long. Within a relatively short period, the four-section scheme (classics, histories, masters, and collections) in Jingjizhi 經籍志 in the Suishu 隋書, came to replace the old system of classification. Although there were slight inconsistencies in classification within sections depending on who was sorting the groups, the four-section system enjoyed dominance as the bibliographic classification framework until the release of Siku quanshu 四庫全書. 11) In fact, the shift from the seven summaries to the four sections did not represent a radical change in bibliographic classification. In both systems, the groupings were further divided into multi-level subsections, when necessary. Taking into account the whole features of each system, the change from seven summaries to four sections would be best described as a readjustment of classification units rather than a real change in the system of disciplines. In this context, it can be said that the classification of writings belonging to thought and ideology in the contemporary sense shifted from belonging to the Six Arts and Noncanonical Masters to belonging to the category described as Classics and Masters. Likewise, in terms of the study of each area, the study of the Six Arts and of Noncanonical Masters became known as the study of the Classics and of Masters. A far more radical change in disciplinary classification occurred with the publication of Minguo congshu 民國叢書. The Minguo congshu, a collection of 1,126 books selected from over 100,000 produced during the period of the Republic of China ( ), came out in five parts between 1989 and Part 1 was released in October 1989 with 100 writings in 258 categories; Part 2 released another 100 in 216 categories in October 1990; Part 3 printed in December 1991 included 100 books in 217 categories; Part 4 containing 100 of 232 categories was produced in December 1992; and Part 5 released in December 1996 had 100 in 203 categories. 12) 11) Lee, Dongyang-ui hangmun chegye-wa geu inyeom, 12-15; Shin, Sagojeonseo-neun siljero jeonseo- inga?, ) Zhou Gucheng 周谷城, the main editor of the publication, stated in the Preface (1989) that The compilation and printing of Minguo congshu is intended, in plain terms, to

The Seven Summaries classification framework employed by Yiwenzhi in the Hanshu did not last very long.

16 8 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 The Minguo congshu classifies books into eleven subject fields, using an entirely different scheme than had been employed in the seven-summary and the four-section systems. The eleven subjects in the Minguo congshu are as follows: 1: Philosophy and Religion; 2: Social Sciences in General; 3: Politics, Law, and Military Affairs; 4: Economy; 5: Culture, Education, and Sports; 6: Language and Letters; 7: Literature; 8: Aesthetics and Arts; 9: History and Geography; 10: Science and Technology; and 11: Others. In fact, however, this grouping was not strictly adhered to. To provide one example, both Liang Shuming s 梁漱溟 Dongxiwenhua ji qi zhexue 西文化及其哲學 and Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi were classified under Philosophy and Religion, whereas Zhu Qianzhi s 朱謙之 Wenhua zhexue 文化哲學 was filed under Culture, Education, and Sports. Books having the same labels in their titles (like philosophy and/or culture, for example) were frequently listed under different domains. Despite this weakness, however, the collection adopted a classification scheme resembling our modern-day disciplinary classifications. For that reason, it can be claimed that China s early modern knowledge or intellectual study began with Minguo congshu. In comparing the bibliographic classification of Minguo congshu with those which had preceded it, we can see that the classification of works on topics which concerned thought and ideology has shifted over time: where they would have been considered first as belonging to the study of the Six Arts and Noncanonical Masters and later to that of Classics and Masters and then, finally to that of Philosophy and Religion, Culture and Literature, and Aesthetics and Arts. This shift in classification is one clear signal of the transition of the study of thought and ideology from text scholarship to philosophy. 3. The Early Modern Period and the Conditions of Studying Philosophy Philosophy as a discipline was not born from text scholarship through the course of an internal progression, rather it was a sort of culture adopted during China s engagement and clashes with Western forces. 13) Philosophy, preserve the historical materials, to protect the written records at the verge of extinction, and to play a role in the construction of a modernized nation by achieving a better understanding of the epoch. 13) Regarding the adoption and translation of the term philosophy and the emergence of

The eleven subjects in the Minguo congshu are as follows: 1: Philosophy and Religion; 2: Social Sciences in General; 3: Politics, Law, and Military Affairs; 4: Economy; 5: Culture, Education, and

17 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 9 broadly constituted, a set of intellectual activities of diverse characteristics, on which consensus was difficult to achieve within a linguistic community in a general sense, or within a research community in a more narrow sense. Let me give some specific examples of studies done under the name of philosophy. The Qingdai xueshu gailun 清代學術概論 compiled several streams of intellectual thought in the Qing Dynasty. Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang 中國哲學史大綱 examined Chinese philosophy using a scientific approach from the position of textual criticism. Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophical Thought compared Chinese and Western philosophical thought. Dazhong zhexue 大衆哲學 illustrated a layman s path to the study of Western philosophy. That was a notable feature of studying philosophy that arose in the spatio-temporal conjuncture of early modern China. One is also compelled to ask how philosophy acquired such complex characteristics during the early modern period of China. Four factors were crucial in this process: the first being translation; the second being instrumental thinking; the third, the sense of national identity and zealous comparisons of China and West (East and West); and the fourth, linkage between science and philosophy. (1) Translation Intellectuals in early modern China aspired to draw up a blueprint of the future, but found that it was unable to do so under the premodern intellectual framework. Under the circumstances, translation was undertaken as a part of desperate efforts of future planning, not just for the introduction of foreign books. For instance, Liang Qichao believed that translation was essential for building a strong nation in the world. He saw that Europe, Russia, and Japan had established themselves among the powerful nations of the world in part by strengthening themselves through their translations of Western learning. 14) Due to limited foreign language skills, Japanese translations of Western books received a great deal attention in China. Liang Qichao described the fervor of translation as follows: As soon as a new book was released in Japan, it was translated by several translators, introducing and spreading new ideas like a bushfire. However, as the history of Chinese philosophy in China, see Yang, Jungguk cheolhaksa-ui tansaeng: 20 segi junguk cheolhaksa tekseuteu seongnip-eul jungsim-euro. 14) Wang, Jungguk beonyeok sasangsa,

community in a more narrow sense. Let me give some specific examples of studies done under the name of philosophy.

18 10 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 the importing was done in Liang Qichao s style, it was grossly unsystematic, without exercising care in selecting texts for translation, and without discriminating what was important and what was not and which schools they belonged to. The basic attitude was the more, the better, which was welcomed by society. Just as people in a long-lasting calamity will eat anything they can find grassroots, tree bark, frozen magpies, rotten mice, and what not, they were drooling over and devouring whatever was available. They did not care if it was digestible, or if it would not make them sick. In fact, there was, simply, no alternative source of food better in hygiene and quality. 15) If Liang Qichao remarks are any guide, it is not going too far to say that the early modern period of China was an era of mostly undiscerning translation. As a part of ushering in an era of translation, guidelines for translation were proposed. In Lun fanyi 論飜譯, three essential factors were emphasized: careful selection of the text to be translated, accumulation of standard examples of expressions, and the training of excellent translators. He also claimed that the ideal translator should be someone who has both advanced intellectual knowledge and talent in linguistic articulation (tongxue tongwen 通學通文 ). 16) Unlike Liang Qichao, Yan Fu was well versed in the languages of the two worlds. Starting with his translation of Tianyanlun 天演論 (the Theory of Evolution of Heaven, a Chinese rendition of Thomas Huxley s Evolution and Ethics) in 1895 (at the age of 43) and finalizing with the last piece Zhongguo jiaoyu lunyi 中國教育論議 published in 1914 (when he was 61 years old), he translated 11 books over an approximately 20-year period. Among them, his eight masterpieces covered a broad array of fields, including philosophy, political sciences, economics, sociology, law, and ethics. 17) While translating Tianyanlun, Yan Fu specified three criteria of good translation: faithfulness, communicability, and elegance. Faithfulness referred to fidelity to the original text; communicability meant that the meaning of the original text should be well-transmitted and understandable; and elegance meant construction of the translated text according to grammatical rules. 18) Early modern China came to adopt the ideas of tianyan 天演 (evolution of Nature) or jinhua 進化 (evolution) largely through the translated works of Liang Qichao and Yan Fu. Their translations did not 15) Liang, Qingdai xueshu gailun, ch ) Liang, Lun fanyi, ) Wang, Jungguk beonyeok sasangsa, ) Yan, Yi li yan,

important and what was not and which schools they belonged to. The basic attitude was the more, the better, which was welcomed by society.

19 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 11 introduce new ideas from Western works alone; premodern Chinese texts were also translated into early modern Chinese, imparting new meanings. For example, the phrase self-strengthening (ziqiang 自强 ) was reinterpreted in the context that the sage emulates the operation of heaven and strengthens his character and moral spirit, and found support in passages like the following from the Yijing 易經 : the operation (movement) of heaven is steady and solid. The sage exerts himself on his own will and never ceases to. 19) At a time when social Darwinism grew influential, self-strengthening was reinterpreted as a rationale for a being (or a nation s) self-preservation efforts. 20) In early modern China, translation was regarded as a necessary, not optional, undertaking. Translation of foreign writings involved a process by which the self adopted an other and was transformed into a new self. In addition, translation of works from their own past gave the nation a chance to form an unfamiliar and perhaps more objective look at itself from across the distances of time and space. (2) Instrumental Thinking Premodern China recognized itself as both an empire and the center of the world. Because of this conception, premodern China did not represent itself as fang 方 (area), which signified a finite space, but as tianxia 天下 (all under heaven) or sihai 四海 (all within four oceans). In other words, without fixed external borders, an infinite expansion of this empire was within the realm of the possible. In contrast, early modern China had to see itself as a part of the larger world. This experience did not just mean attaining a new understanding of human geographic space; without proper adaption, China could have been driven to an extremely precarious condition which may have even resulted in the death of the nation and many of its people. China experienced an unprecedented crisis of existence in the early modern period. Existential crises typically involve multi-layered conditions. In many of these crises, the conventional self proves unable to respond to new developments and becomes powerless. Under such conditions, as the self becomes estranged from its subject, it often loses the power to reconstruct its own subjectivity, thereby becoming a powerless, meaningless 19) Yan, Qian gua, vol. 1: 天行健, 自强不息. 20) Yang, Yan Fu: Jungguk-ui geundaeseong-gwa seoyang sasang,

For example, the phrase self-strengthening (ziqiang 自强 ) was reinterpreted in the context that the sage emulates the operation of heaven and strengthens his character and moral spirit, and found

20 12 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 being. Though nominally alive, the self is for all intents and purposes lifeless, barely continuing to exist and struggling for breath. The preponderance of evidence suggests that early modern China regarded the crisis of its existence mainly as a struggle for survival. That could be a testimony to the gravity and perceived immanence of the risk of extermination of the nation and the people, that for many, there was little to no margin to think about and reflect on much of anything other than what was necessary for survival. Evading total destruction was a dire, but vital and very real task for early modern China and large numbers of Chinese people. At the national level, salvation of the state was often viewed as tightly connected with the development of a stronger military force. One way that this concern can be seen is through the government s active involvement in translation projects, of which roughly half were directly related to military affairs. Although books on arithmetic, electrical science, chemistry, and mathematics were also translated, they were usually regarded as serving the purpose of producing a strong military. Regarding thisimbalance, Liang Qichao protested that even though the Westerners strength lies in their military power, it is not the reason for their strength. 21) While the state was unable to grasp the essence of the West, ordinary Chinese people had no choice but to confront the changed circumstances and grope for survival. Finding itself incapable of fulfilling the public function of distributing proper rights to its citizens, and with its sustainability at stake, the state tried, perhaps perversely, to assign more duties and obligations to individuals. While the government was degenerating into a predatory institution, individuals were degraded into a condition in which they would do nearly anything, no matter how corrupt, simply for survival. Thus, existence in early modern China was, characteristically, reduced to an instrument in the sense that other beings were meaningful merely as the impacted the dimension of one s own survival. As Ling Qichao argued: There was a fundamental reason why the advocates of the new learning failed in the late Qing period. They did not regard intellectual knowledge as a goal, but as a tool School was just another name for the civil service examinations, and the new learning was an eight-legged essay of a mutated form. Eight or nine out of ten students had impure motivations in their studies. They studied for worldly success, and gave up after a while if 21) See Liang, Lun fanyi.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that early modern China regarded the crisis of its existence mainly as a struggle for survival.

21 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 13 it did not work out. Not just inferior students but excellent ones regarded utility as the key principle, thinking that what they learned should always be put to use. 22) Application is associated with essence, whether it is utility, functionality, operationality, or practicality. Yet, with the tie with essence severed, it became independent and moved around uncontrolled in early modern China. (3) Identity To portray the picture with broad strokes: the early modern period in China was both an era of translation and one in which the state underwent a crisis of existence. Under these conditions, many people found it difficult to define their identity within their internal tradition and language, as they had heretofore done. Devoid of a clear understanding of who they were, they felt themselves undefined, before settling upon a possible solution, namely, looking at themselves through the lens of the early modern West or Westerners. For many in early modern China, identity was deeply comparative; in other words, one s own identity was best revealed through the glance of the other. Consequently, after the Opium War and the Wusu Reform (wushu bianfa 戊戌變法 ), most attempts to examine Chinese identity took the form of comparing China and the West in various areas, including culture, civilization, intellectual thought, and philosophy. Writing in 1895, Yan Fu explicated on zhong xi shi li 中西事理 (situations in China and the West) by resorting to the usual format of comparing the two. In his view, China emphasized the past and overlooked the present, whereas the West stressed the present and tried to overcome the past. The former attached importance to sangang 三綱 (three bonds: emperor-official, father-son, and husband-wife), while the latter viewed equality as the foremost value. Chinese people, he continued, regarded kin (family) as the most important, but Westerners admired sagacious individuals. Governance was based on filial piety in China and on publicity in the West. His list goes on and on. 23) This type of list making was initially unique to Yan Fu, but was continued by Chen Duxiu during the New Culture period and is still repeated 22) Liang, Qingdai xueshu gailun, ch ) Yan, Lun shibian zhi ji, 1-5.

22 14 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 frequently today. Premodern Chinese people had a clear sense of identity without having to reflect on their existence through the mirror of the other. Entering the early modern period, however, the power to maintain and prolong their premodern identity was lost. Identity could be subject to post-examination, but could not be established as the norm for the future. Hence, early modern China was forced to ask, with some anxiety, as though in search of its identity, both Who am I? and What am I going to be? (4) Philosophy and Science The difference between textual scholarship and philosophy lay primarily in the method of verification. The former tried to prove the validity of an argument based on authentic precedents, analogies, and examples (i.e. by making appeals to tradition). The latter attempted to explain the legitimacy of a claim via conceptual analysis, logical validity, and scientific evidence (i.e. by making appeals to reason). For example, ren 仁 (benevolence) was a key virtue in defining humanity in premodern textual scholarship. Why did ren represent humanity and why should every human being have that virtue? Although Confucius made various attempts to define ren, he did not pay special attention to the question of why. Mencius clarified through a sort of experimental thinking that compassion is the natural psychological state of human minds. Later, drawing on the symptoms of paralysis as understood by Oriental medicine, he explained that ren means interconnection and life. Tan Sitong searched for traditional philosophical concepts suitable for the ideas of science and democracy and reinterpreted them. One traditional concepts he made particular note of was ren. 24) Hence, he wrote Renxue 仁學 in the effort to transform ren from a feudal to a public ethic. 25) Tan argued, among other things, that: The first and foremost meaning of ren is interconnectivity. Ether, electricity, and mental power all show how things are connected with one another. 26) 24) On Kang Yuwei s and Tan Sitong s conceptions of benevolence, see Shin, Saramdaum-iran mueot-inga?, ) Tan, Renxue jieshuo, ) Tan, Renxue jieshuo, 291: 一. 仁以通爲第一義. 以太也, 電也, 心力也, 皆指出所以通之具.

23 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 15 The essence of interconnectivity is that all existences are equal. 27) Unconstrained by the conventional discussion of ren as meaning love of family or life in an abstract sense, Tan placed the concept in a new context. He started by approaching ren within the relationship between two sides. Then, he noted that the relationship had a bilateral connection. He even used such elements as ether and electricity, which he learned about through his study of Western science, to verify it based on empirical concepts instead of abstract imagination. Thereby, he hoped, ren could be reestablished as the foundation of civic ethics beyond the feudal dimension. Speaking of interconnectivity, Tan wrote that it: has four meanings. The first one is the connectivity between China and foreign countries. My view on this is largely drawn from the Chunqiu 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals). After difficult times and relatively stable stages pass and a period of great peace arrives, both distant and neighboring countries and both large and small countries are regarded as one without distinction. The second is the interconnection between the superior and the inferior, and the third is that between men and women, or between the inside and the outside. My idea of this is based mostly on the Yijing... The fourth meaning is the interconnection between oneself and the other, which is largely derived from Buddhist scriptures. 28) There is a particularly interesting point in Tan Sitong s verification of his concept. After verifying ren = tong = pingdeng (benevolence = interconnection = equality), he derived from it a notion of equality between China-world, superior-inferior, men-women, and self-other. 29) To show ren = tong, Tan resorted to ether, a hypothesized material (since rejected) which was then thought to be akin to a connective substance or medium between two distant objects. He also used the example of electricity, by which he attempted to verify the existence of ren in a materialistic method, which no one before him had ever tried. What was most novel about Tan s approach was that he adopted the Western ideas of electricity and ether and used them as the basis of interpersonal linkage. This manner of thinking was an extension of evolutionary theories which were sweeping through early modern China. At that time, many Chinese people struggled desperately to understand the reasons for their 27) Tan, Renxue jieshuo, 291: 七. 通之象爲平等. 28) 通有四義. 中外通, 多取其義於春秋, 以太平世遠近大小若一故也. 上下通, 男女內外通, 多取其義於易.... 人我通, 多取其義於佛經. 29) On this point, see Lee M., Damsadong: Sotong-gwa pyeongdeung-eul sayuhan sasangga.

24 16 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 perceived inferiority and to locate the basis by which they might recover their superiority in the future. These feelings can help explain the vehement dominance of social Darwinism during that time. Social Darwinism argues that the rules governing society and history can be found among those used to explain natural phenomena. In some of its most excessive applications, natural scientific rules are applied indiscriminately to both nature and society (history). Considering how Western ideas like that of ether and Social Darwinism were employed in that era, it could be argued that early modern Chinese thought began to diverge from textual scholarship as Chinese thinkers first began to attempt to construct logical explanations for philosophy or to explain philosophical views based on scientific knowledge. 4. From Jingxue to Philosophy and From There, Whence? While the division of historical periods can be made in different fashions and given differing names, we can safely refer to the current era as that period of modernity which involves all the outcomes of the progression of modernization. What is the most appropriate approach to studying thought and ideology in modern times? If, in fact, all the tasks confronted by early modern China have been resolved, completely different ones should be taken up. In that case, modern Chinese thought and ideology will have to take on a drastically different form from the early modern counterpart. Conversely, if modern Chinese people still have unfinished agendas fromthe early modern period in addition to new ones for the modern period, some overlapping between the characteristics of modern and early modern thought and ideology is inevitable. (1) Li Zehou s work Let me first examine Li Zehou s work and then discuss the direction of modern thought and ideology. Instead of taking Lu Jiuyuan s phrases without alteration, Li Zehou distinguishes between the two approaches of I annotate the Six Classics and the Six Classics annotate me, and uses them as opposing frameworks forwriting. The former means that the researcher interprets the content, form, system, and structure of philosophical thought from a historical standpoint. In the latter, he/she relies on the past history of philosophy and philosophers thoughts to

25 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 17 explain his/her philosophical perspective. 30) Taking up the latter approach, Li Zehou has generated various new concepts such as xiti zhongyong 西體中用 (Western learning as foundation but adapted to Chinese use), lishi bentilun 歷史本體論 (historical ontology), and jidian 積澱 (sedimentation), and has freely moved between Eastern and Western texts. This corresponds to a modernization of Eastern philosophy. After the 1949 socialist revolution, China was reborn as a new country to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to evaluate it within the same dimensions as before. Amid vigorous efforts to forge out of economic backwardness a wonderful nation without exploitation of a class by another in the years following the establishment of the new China, the velocity of social and cultural change inevitably become a highly contentious issue. As Mao Zedong 毛澤東 and the Gang of Four (sirenbang 四人幇 ) asserted their will on the state and its people, modern China underwent a series of fast-paced political experiments including the creation of People s Commune (1958), the Great Leap Forward ( ) and the Cultural Revolution ( ). An excess of revolutionary fervor gripped the society and paralyzed rationality. One result of this upheaval was that many Chinese no longer behaved (or felt themselves to be) ordinary men and women with warm hearts and sympathetic feelings towards the suffering of their fellow human beings. Armed with full-fledged passion and extreme idealism, they acted like deities judging between good and evil. Li Zehou has contended that this period was characterized by a fanatical society dominated by something akin to religious morality and that these attitudes were the locus of tragedy in modern Chinese history. Li has argued that China in the late 20th century and the early 21st century must shake off the grip of religious fervor to achieve a society where individuals protect and speak up for their rights. To prevent the suppression of private interests in the name of the public good and the suffocation of individuals by order of the state, Li suggests that individuals, society (state), and the values of private and public interests must be rearranged based on the contract theory, instead of communalism. In a sense, Li Zehou is undertaking, based on the experiences of modern Chinese history, the intellectual adventure of overturning many of the prevailing values of Eastern philosophy. For this, some may well 30) See Li, Lun Kangde Heigeer zhexue; Li, Hakseol, 47.

26 18 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 wonder whether he can still be regarded as an Eastern philosophe, and from this alone, we can observe how different his interpretations of Eastern philosophy are from others who have preceded him. This is, definitely, a sure sign that he would coin many new terms while practicing the principle of the Six Classics annotate me in his writing. Let us take a quick look at what he has termed the fourth period of Confucian development and a culture of joy. Confucian scholars in Taiwan have traditionally divided Confucian history into three phases: the primitive Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius, the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, and the New Confucianism in the early modern and modern periods. This division reflects the position of placing the Confucian conception of human mind and nature at the center. By recognizing the inherent nature of moral perfection and reining in personal desires, one can be a moral being, i.e. one who attaches more importance to the moral way over one s greedy self-interest. In Li Zehou s view, such morality is a personal virtue which is attainable only by those who are capable of it; hence, it is not suitable for modern society. 31) Offering an alternative view of Confucian development, he treats Han Confucianism as a separate phase which emphasized a correspondence between heaven and man and explained it with the concepts of yin-yang, the five elements, and ki. Further, he tries to engender a new brand of modern Confucianism which would reject the precepts of both Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism. Li s formulation of the culture of joy refers to what he sees as the authentic Chinese cultural characteristic, as distinguished from the Western culture of sin and the Japanese culture of shame. According to this characterization, Chinese people pursue joy and pleasure in what they engage in, whereas Westerners and Japanese are sensitive to guilt (sin) and shame (humilation), respectively, and that these fundamental differences in outlook or orientation have led to the development of divergent cultural traits. One consequence has been that the Chinese tend to regard wrongdoing and mistakes not as manifestations of fundamental character flaws in the wrongdoer, but as examples of temporary carelessness or negligence. Further, he writes, while Westerners long for transcendence from reality and redemption in an other world, Chinese people are far less likely to have a notion of otherworldly salvation, preferring to seek fortune and happiness in this world. 31) Li, Hakseol, 9-46.

27 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 19 Li Zehou attempts to discover Chinese cultural characteristics through comparison with Japan and the West and Japan. In this, his approach resembles the distinctions made by Liang Shuming between human cultures based on how they deal with human desires. In his book, Dongxiwenhua ji qi zhexue 東西文化及其哲學, Li notes that Westerners emphasize the satisfaction of desires, whereas Chinese stress their regulation, and Indians, their suppression. Liang Shuming pays attention to the mental aspect of culture and reinterprets traditional philosophical works in the modern context. Meanwhile, Li Zehou s thought is primarily based on materialism, as he imparts importance to the material dimension of culture (such as eating) and the acquisition and employment of adequate technology needed for the production of materials. Where Liang Shuming retains old Chinese philosophical concepts and tries modern interpretations of them, Li Zehou borrows freely from Eastern and Western texts alike, inventing a number of new appellations as part of his aim to present a future direction for modern China. Liang Shuming believes that philosophical concepts of the past can be used both to explain Chinese culture in its entirety and to help build its future. By contrast, Li Zehou does not use old concepts as they are and prefers to alter them in substantial ways, claiming that modern society stands on entirely different socioeconomic conditions from the past. Needless to say, that he uses new labels does not mean that he entirely denies their connection with old ones. Li Zehou notes that although Western philosophy began with Plato s notion of noumenon, several highly significant modern thinkers (including Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger) have exhibited a profound interest in everyday life and language. Disillusioned with the belief that human beings cognize transcendental and unchangeable a priori principles and represent them in reality, much modern Western philosophy focuses on empirical rules that people can agree on and relate to. Holding that philosophy must encompass more than everyday life and language, Li calls for a philosophy of eating rice (chifan zhexue 吃飯哲學 ). For him, modern philosophy is bound to develop in the vein of political philosophy, intending to solve the problem of eating. On this point, his thought is fundamentally incompatible with the Confucian school of mind and nature which is currently gaining influence among New Confucians in Taiwan. How then can a philosophy of eating rice which begins with the reality of eating be constructed? Even if the problem of eating is most fundamental to human existence, it must not be approached solely based

28 20 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 on the so-called law of the jungle advocated by a now discredited Social Darwinism. 32) To find a solution, Li Zehou rejects ontological essence, reason, the absolute, god, and a priori values, and turns to history. He claims that the history of humankind is an evolutionary process of attempting to resolve the problem of eating in a better way. A particular historical period represents the accumulated body of intellectual wealth, experiences, and outcomes of addressing the problem of eating. Li believes that as the intellectual wealth, experiences, and outcomes are reflected in individual consciousness and transmitted to a future generations, this process both forms the collective memory of society and generates cultural characteristics. The cultural traits transmitted across generations are what he calls sedimentation. His notion of sedimentation is similar to British biologist Richard Dawkins s concept of memes as expressed in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene. For Dawkins, a meme is the unit of transmission of nongenetic culture which, like the gene in biology, is stored in an individual s memory and copied onto another s. Memes thus can be said to have an evolutionary characteristic, just as biological genes do. For Li Zehou, sedimentation and history are the last bastion he can resort to in order to secure, over his starting point of reality, the publically shared zone or a public goodness to which people can consent. But he is yet to explain his views of the consequence of sedimentation in history or the mechanism of its composition. Sedimentation and history are, apparently, never neutral to power and values, nor do they reflect simple, linear, evolutionary processes. In this respect, he exposes a limitation that while negating the a priori realm, he is overly optimistic about history. How can anyone overlook that history has too often been a bloody river? The misplaced optimism of his historical vision may be one reason why he no longer plays the leading role in Chinese intellectual life which he had occupied during the 1980s, and has recently done little more than simply repeating ideas he had already expressed by ) Korean novelist Jo Jung-rae portrays the jungle of modern China in Jungle malli.

29 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 21 (2) Early Modern Philosophy and What s Next? If we assess Li Zehou s work in view of the tasks faced by early modern China, it can be roughly characterized as a relentless quest for Chinese identity via translation work, instrumental thinking, and comparisons of Eastern and Western philosophy. We could probably even say that Li was baptized in an early modern philosophy. Li himself has admitted the limitations of his work on several occasions, saying that China would usher in an age of professionals where standard intellectual norms are respected. In the Preface to the Lishi bentilun 歷史本體論, he says: I wrote this book as I felt like, without giving too much thought to logical substantiation and citation. Some expressions even contain logical leaps. I just intend to give, borrowing Kant s term, subjective doxa, instead of seeking episteme, i.e., scientific truths universally accepted by people. In the book, I make statements which can only be regarded as personal points of view. 33) In a sense, Li Zehou has not succeeded in fully linking Chinese philosophy with science. This appears an undeniable limitation of his thought. He has played a leading role as a great enlightenment figure, but has not necessarily functioned as a systematic theorist. Nevertheless, by consistently putting forth the agenda of religious and social morality, he has raised the important modern questions of how to establish new relationships between individuals and the state and between rights and duties. It is in this where modern thought and ideology diverges most sharply from that of the early modern period. Furthermore, Li s work differs from the recent move in Korea to study uri philosophy, for the latter only insists upon the necessity of posing such questions. We must now go beyond the rhetoric and begin to develop a discourse around how to actually construct such a philosophy in and for our time. Let us go back to the current situation in Korea discussed in the introduction of this paper. Which of the two positions is the more valid? Have scholars of the past few decades simply reiterated the same arguments, or have they achieved something notable? Do the proponents of either position present a proper way forward for the study of modern thought and ideology in Korea? In my view, neither position appears to posit an adequate agenda for establishing uri philosophy and uri 33) Li, Yeoksa boncheron, 8-9. The quotations are from Gimyo oseol and Musa jeontong-eul malhada.

30 22 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 study. They have to clarify, first of all, what the agenda pursued by early modern thought and ideology was and second describe how its modern counterpart is to differ from what it seeks to replace. After all, linguistic analysis and semiotics are primarily concerned with the methods of how to carry out an agenda, not its aims or direction. In the philosophy and aesthetics of the East and Korea, nature is often regarded as the principle of establishing order, the legitimacy of moral behavior, and the standard of aesthetic appreciation and creativity. Premodern Koreans, grounded in little more than intuitive insight, held that nature is valid and desirable and reiterated their claims over and over. How shall we contemporary Koreans verify that nature is valid and desirable and that it is the value and virtue for us to seek? If we are to pick up where Li Zehou left off and attain a philosophical understanding based on scientific truth, we must be able to provide an answer to this pressing question. 5. Conclusion Among researchers studying philosophy in Korea, many of us who are pursuing uri philosophy or uri study have arrived at a similar conclusion. The study of Western philosophy in Korea must move beyond a purely imported philosophy, and the study of Eastern philosophy must move beyond mere textual scholarship. Both should be oriented toward uri philosophy. Unfortunately, just as the identity of philosophy itself is often unclear nowadays, so too is that of uri philosophy. As a consequence, too many scholars simply stop at reassuring their commitment and determination to study uri philosophy or reconfirm the vague direction which they believe it to be pointing. Considering the current situation, Kim Sang-hwan s proposition that modern Korean philosophy may be established on the basis of the modern condition has significant implications. As we all know, the ancient study of ethics was based on virtue ethics or the maximalism of Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle, whilst the early modern study of ethics was grounded in Kant s duty ethics. Kim s contention is that the modern study of ethics should not be simply a revival of one of the two or their mixture; we claimed that contemporary inquiry into ethics can be revitalized only through careful acknowledgment of the modern condition, namely, the fact that we are called to make a creative metamorphosis,

31 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 23 called to answer the critical questions: How should I change? and What can I be? 34) Modern ethics can create conditions of thought which directly correspond to the contemporary era as well as those cultural spaces where the premodern and the early modern intersect each other. By attending to the actual conditions of contemporary Korean life, we can suppose a community where virtue ethics enables emotional empathy and a space where duty ethics trades interests. A sharp bifurcation of the two conditions occurs between premodern and early modern times. Yet, in the modern period, the conditions reveal complex features of differentiation and intersection. A clear division is only possible in a textbook situation. Let us take an example from ordinary experiences. Goduri is a popular pastime in Korean festivities. One characteristic of the game is that people can set rules adapted to the given situation whenever they play it. In a festival period, family members and friends coming from different places sit around and play it. Because they are often used to different rules, they may disagree on certain things. When the disagreement is resolved, the previously conflicting rules and conditions add more fun and turn it into an even more exciting game. Likewise, I think, the modern study of ethics should attempt to find a code which both corresponds to the premodern and the early modern study of ethics and which produces meaningful insight into the modern condition. 35) In this paper, we have reemphasized the necessity of going beyond imported philosophy and textual scholarship in order to establish uri philosophy. Whether we should pursue the study of the Classics, or philosophy, or thought requires further discussion. Based on the discussion, we must formulate a new mode of study which embraces Eastern modern life on the horizon of enlightenment which has been sought by Li Zehou. This cannot be done by repeating the values of nature, mind, and human nature alone. Submitted: / Reviewed: / Confirmed for publication: ) Kim, Bulhaenghan uisik-ui yullihak-eul neomeoseogi, ) See Shin Jeong-Keun s comments on Kim Sang-hwan s paper (2014) cited in the previous footnote.

32 24 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 REFERENCES Primary Sources Hanshu 漢書 (History of the Former Han) Lunyu 論語 (Analects) Shiji 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian) Siku quanshu 四庫全書 (Complete Library in Four Sections) Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes) Secondary Sources Choi, Yeong-jin Discussion Remarks. At the Academic Forum jointly held on May 24, by Chosun University s Humanities Research Institute and the Daedong Philosophical Association on the theme of How to Study Uri Philosophy: Beyond Imported Philosophy and Textual Scholarship, Dawkins, Richard Igijeok yujeonja (The Selfish Gene). Translated by Hong Yeong-nam and Lee Sang-im. Seoul: Eulyu Munhwasa. Gweon, In-ho Hanguk cheolhak-ui hyeonhwang-gwa banseong mit hyanghu gwaje (Korean Philosophy: The Current Status, Reflections, and Future Agenda), Paper presented at the Academic Forum of the Humanities Research Institute of Chosun University and the Daedong Philosophical Association, May 24. Hong, Weon-sik Dongyang cheolhak yeongu bangbeomnon-ui gungpip-gwa munjejeom, geurigo mosaek (The Lack of Research Methodology in Eastern Philosophy and Other Problems, and Exploration for the Future). Proceedings of the Academic Forum jointly held on May 24, by Chosun University s Humanities Research Institute and the Daedong Philosophical Association on the theme of How to Study Uri Philosophy: Beyond Imported Philosophy and Textual Scholarship, pp Jo, Dong-il Inmun hangmun-ui samyeong (The Mandate of Humanities). Seoul: Seoul National University Press Uri hangmun-ui gil (The Path of Our Intellectual Pursuit). Seoul: Jisik Saneopsa. Jo, Jung-rae Jungle malli (The Great Jungle). 3 vols. Seoul: Haenaem. Kim, Sang-hwan Bulhaenghan uisik-ui yullihak-eul neomeoseogi (Beyond the Ethics of Miserable Conception). Proceedings of the Feel Alike Forum organized by the Ministry of Culture and Sports and Chosun Daily, entitled Books, the Door to the World: Secondary Happiness, the Meaning of Good Life, / Paper presented at the Feel Alike Forum of the Ministry of Culture and Sports and the Chosun Ilbo, July 28.

33 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 25 Korean Taoist Association Noja-eseo Derrida-kkaji: Doga cheolhak-gwa seoyang cheolhak-ui mannam (From Laozi to Derrida: The Encounter between Taoism and Western Philosophy). Seoul: Korean Taoist Association. Lai, Xinxia 來新夏 Jungguk-ui gojeon mongnokhak (Classical Bibliography in China). Translated by Bak Jeong-suk. Seoul: Hanguk Haksul Jeongbo. Lee, Cheol-seung Oneulnal jungguk jeontong cheolhak-eul yeonguhaneun hangugin -ui uimi-e daehayeo (The Significance of Koreans Studying Chinese Traditional Philosophy Today). Sidae-wa cheolhak (Epoch and Philosophy) 1.1: Lee, Myeong-su Damsadong: Sotong-gwa pyeongdeung-eul sayuhan sasangga (Tan Sitong: A Philosopher who Expounded on Communication and Equality). Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press. Lee, Seong-gyu Dongyang-ui hangmun chegye-wa geu inyeom (Eastern System of Disciplines and Its Ideology). In So Gwang-hee, ed., Hyeondae-ui hangmun chegye (Modern System of Disciplines). Seoul: Mineumsa. Lee, Seung-hwan Discussion Remarks. At the Academic Forum jointly held on May 24. Li, Zehou 李泽厚 Lun Kangde Heigeer zhexue (Discussion on the Philosophies of Kant and Heidegger). Shanghai: Shanhai Renmin Chubanshe Yeoksa boncheron (Historical Ontology). Translated by Hwang Hee-gyeong. Seoul: Deullyeok Hakseol (Treatises). Translated by No Seung-hyeon. Seoul: Deullyeok. Liang, Shuming 梁漱溟 Dongseo munhwa-wa cheolhak (The Cultures of East and West and Their Philosophies). Translated by Gang Jung-ki. Seoul: Sol. Liang, Qichao 梁啓超 Qingdai xueshu gailun (Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period). Shanghai: Shangwu inshuguan Cheongdae haksul gaeron (Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period). Translated by Lee Gi-dong and Choi Beom-il. Seoul: Yeogang Bianfa tonglun (General Discourse on Reform). In Shen Penghung, ed., Liang Qichao quanji (Complete Works of Liang Qichao), vol. 1. Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe. Shin, Jeong-geun. 2011a. Sagojeonseo-neun siljero jeonseo -inga? (Is the Complete Library in Four Sections Really a Collection of Complete Works?). Dongyang cheolhak (Journal of Eastern Philosophy) 35: Saramdaum-iran mueot-inga? (What Is Humanness?). Seoul: Geulhangari. Society for Studying in the Korean Language. 2008a. Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui samuchim (Yearning to Study in Korean). Seoul: Prunsasang b. Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui nalgaejit (Flapping the Wings to Study in Korean). Seoul: Chaeryun Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui gomaum (The Blessing of Studying in Korean). Seoul: Chaeryun Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui yongteurim (Bracing up to Study in Korean). Seoul: Chaeryun. Tan, Sitong 譚嗣同 Renxue (An Exposition on Benevolence). In Cai

34 26 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Shangxi 蔡尙思 and Fang Xing 方行, eds., Tan Sitong quanji (Collected Works of Tan Sitong), vol. 2. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Wang, Bingqin Jungguk beonyeok sasangsa (History of Translation Thoughts in China). Translated by Kim Hye-rim et al. Seoul: Ewha Womans University Press. Yan, Fu 嚴復 Tianyanlun (Theory of Evolution). In Wang Shi, ed., Yan Fu ji (Collected Works of Yan Fu), vol. 5. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Yang, Il-mo Yan Fu: Jungguk-ui geundaeseong-gwa seoyang sasang (Yan Fu: Chinese Modernity and Western Philosophy). Seoul: Taehaksa Jungguk cheolhaksa-ui tansaeng: 20 segi jungguk cheolhaksa tekseuteu seongnip-eul jungsim-euro (The Birth of the History of Chinese Philosophy: Focus on the Formation of the Text of Chinese Philosophical History). Dongyang cheolhak (Journal of Eastern Philosophy) 39:

35 SHIN Jeong-Keun / From Jingxue to Philosophy and from There, Whence? 27 從經學到哲學, 然後是何處? 辛正根中文摘要每個時代學問的分類有別因爲每個時代追求知識的方向與方法有所不同起源於西方的哲學原本被看作是最根本的學問在哲學傳入之前, 東方曾按照經史子集的學問分類方式, 把經學當作最好的學問近代因東西方交流, 經學雖存續著, 卻把從前的地位交給了哲學然而, 目前韓國哲學面臨著一個問題, 即關於研究什麼怎樣研究, 研究者群體並沒有達成共識這跟一面呼喊哲學的終結一面質疑哲學的本性並不同因爲韓國雖然處於哲學研究的危機或哲學教育的危機, 卻不談哲學本身的危機本論文試圖探究關於哲學研究的危機是如何產生的該怎樣克服等問題的線索首先看看爲了克服哲學研究的危機, 曾深入關注這個問題的研究者的經曆進而探討在現代環境下, 哲學應該向哪個方向前進關鍵詞 : 經學, 哲學, 科學, 學文分類, 近代性

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37 The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace LEE Sang-ik 1) Abstract This study begans with a comparison between two approaches to peace: one suggested by Plato and the other by Thomas Hobbes. Believing that humans are animals of reason, Plato suggested a moral approach of using reason to control animal nature. In his view, peace would come as a natural consequence of our overcoming animal nature through the instrumental use of reason. In fact, however, there have not been very many people of character capable of overcoming their animal nature. Consequently, the world remained as chaotic as ever. Hobbes argued that to have no desire is to be dead. He therefore rejected the idea of a life led by controlling animal nature with reason. Hobbes appointed desire as sovereign and described reason as the capacity to calculate self-interest. Because he saw reason s self-interested calculation as essentially a series of calculated choices between the costs of war and the price of peace, Hobbes believed that people will gladly surrender some of their personal rights and enter into a social contract (i.e. a contract of peace) based on the calculation that peace brought greater benefits than war. Here, though, we find a trap: Self-interested calculation is based on the premise that anything can be done as long as it brings benefits to the perpetrator. It follows that any person or country accustomed to such reasoning will unhesitatingly start a war if victory can definitely be achieved at a low cost. This is why wars still erupt across the world today. It is here that we discover the significance of jigyeong 持敬 (piety) and gyeomyang 謙讓 (humility). Yi Hwang 李滉 (a.k.a., Toegye 退溪 ) * LEE Sang-ik: Associate Professor, Department of Ethics Education, Busan National University of Education (dltkddlr200@hanmail.net)

38 30 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 emphasized piety based on suppressing human desire and cherishing natural order; in the same way, piety rejects self-interest as a way of thinking, whether it be precise calculation or narcissistic miscalculation. Peace based on self-interested calculation is temporary and can be shattered at any time. Therefore, if we take the view that self-interested thinking must be overcome in order to attain genuine peace, the potential for this can be found in piety. Humility, meanwhile, means considering the benefits of others before one s own, based on satisfaction with one s own lot; in the same vein, it overcomes the will to compete with hostility against others, even if precise calculations lead to the conclusion that war would be a more profitable choice. If we take the view that the will for hostile competition itself must ultimately be overcome in order to attain real peace, the virtue of humility offers one way of achieving this. Keywords: Yi Hwang 李滉 (a.k.a., Toegye 退溪 ), peace, war, i-gi hobar ron 理氣互發論 (Theory of I-Gi Mutual Dynamism), jigyeong 持敬 (piety), gyeomyang 謙讓 (humility)

39 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace Two Approaches to Peace While some philosophers have praised war, the majority have yearned for peace. The paths to peace that they have suggested can be broadly divided into two categories. The first, proposed by classical political philosophers such as Socrates and Plato, is one of promoting correct or moral behavior in order to nullify even the possibility of war. The second, suggested by modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, involves inducing the choice of peace over war through rational calculation of the respective advantages and disadvantages of each. Let us begin by looking at Plato s method. According to the Athenian, the essence of politics is healing the soul 1) and among our chief political tasks as political actors is examin[ing] how we, as citizens, can be as brilliant as possible. 2) Politics, then, is essentially about making each citizen into an upright man of character. Plato s ideal man of character is closely connected to his theory that the soul is tripartite, being a mixture of reason, spirit and desire. Firstly, reason is the wise, calculating part that provides foresight for the soul as a whole, and which contains knowledge of what is advantageous not just for each of the three parts but for the community they constitute as a whole. Reason therefore plays the role of a master, controlling the other two parts of the soul. The virtue of reason is wisdom. 3) Secondly, the spirited part of the soul plays the role of supplementing reason. Someone whose spirit does not yield to pain or pleasure and who obeys the commands of the logical part of the soul to fight bravely is a courageous man. 4) Thirdly, desire is the largest part of the soul and is characterized by its insatiable hunger for wealth. In order to stop desire from wreaking general chaos in life, Plato argued that it must be monitored and subdued by reason and spirit. Someone whose desire is well governed by her or his reason and spirit is someone capable of moderation. 5) 1) Plato, Gorgias, 464b. 2) Plato, Gorgias, 515c. 3) Plato, The Republic, 442c. 4) Plato, The Republic, 442b-c. 5) Plato, The Republic, 442a-d.

40 32 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 As outlined above, Plato believed that reason must control spirit and desire, that spirit had to help reason in its domination of desire, and that desire had to be monitored by reason or spirit. Only then, in Plato s view, could joy of the truest kind be experienced. 6) Plato also applied his ideal ordering of the soul directly to the ideal ordering of the state. He argued that if the military class and the productive class follow wise orders from the ruling class, the private interests of each member of society and the common good could be achieved simultaneously. For some early modern thinkers, however, Plato s assertion that reason must govern desire was met with serious objections. Among the first and most powerful objections was that of the Dutch humanist Erasmus, who asserted that the loins were the true source of life and a sacred place and questioned how life can ever be called life if pleasure is removed from it. 7) These objections found perhaps their clearest and most divergent expression in Hume s statement that reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions. 8) It was on these foundations that the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes built his own political philosophy. One of Hobbes s key tenets was that nature permits everything of us. In short, we, as humans, can do whatever we want to. Hobbes called this our natural rights. 9) His idea of natural rights overturned the traditional master-servant relationship between reason and passion (desire). Most classical political philosophers, such as Aristotle, defined reason as the master of the soul and dictated that desire must submit to the control of reason. But Hobbes made desire the master, branding it the origin of all life force, and regarded reason as no more than a calculating capacity to effectively satisfy our desires. 10) He commented as follows: A man who has no great Passion for any of these things (Power, Riches, Knowledge, Honour); but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desire, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all 6) Plato, The Republic, 586e. 7) Erasmus, Moriae encomium, ) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ) Hobbes, Leviathan, ) Anthony Arblaster maintains that defining desire as sovereignty is the general theory of liberalism; he identifies Hobbes as a leading proponent of this idea (Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 28).

41 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 33 quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse. 11) As the above quote illustrates, Hobbes took a positive view of human desire and passion. Once these have been affirmed, they are followed by reason and thoughts, which play roles of scouts and spies. Scouts and spies do not generally set goals of their own, but are entities that merely seek the means of achieving aims dictated to them by their military commander, which in Hobbes s analogy is desire. The above quote neatly summarizes Hobbes s view that desire is the supreme ruler and reason is merely its tool. As is widely known, Hobbes defined the natural state as a state of war, claiming that human life was a process of competing for power, wealth, and honor. He also argued that the natural state was therefore inevitably bound to bring about chaos. In a situation of all-out war, the fear and danger of possible death made it a certainty that people would seek peace. Hobbes claimed that the role of reason at such times was to search for convenient Articles of peace. 12) In Hobbes s conception of reason, there were two especially significant aspects: on the one hand, it increased desire in consideration of future uncertainties and possible poverty; but on the other it also induced people to yield (or transfer) their own rights in order to defend themselves and peacefully coexist with others. Reason, for Hobbes, both increases an individual s desire for the sake of greater satisfaction, and urges that same individual to give up some of their rights in order to gain the satisfaction of guaranteed safety through peace. In this respect, Hobbes s assertion that reason designs the rules of peace was not a claim that reason regulates desire but that it effectively sates it. We have thus witnessed two prominent routes to peace found in Western philosophy. In the following section we will examine how these views compare with the route to peace proposed by the Korean Confucian scholar Toegye Yi Hwang? 2. Confucian Tradition Let us begin with an overview of Confucianism as an ideology of peace. While Confucianism as a whole can be described as just such an ideology, 11) Hobbes, Leviathan, ) Hobbes, Leviathan, 188.

42 34 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 here we will note four particular aspects of it. The first of these aspects is Confucius s zhengminglun 正名論 (theory of rectification of names). 13) As one of the central ideas of the Lunyu 論語 (Analects), this theory holds that all names have their own unique accompanying duty, and that each name must be brought into conformity with its duty. This, of course, is based on the theory of yin 陰 and yang 陽 as found in the Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes), but ideal human relationships in Confucianism are referred to as ganying 感應 (In other words, things will go well when there is mutual influence between yin and yang). In this respect, right name theory calls for each individual to fulfill her or his particular duty, thereby creating harmonious relationships, which in turn allow people to mutually influence each other, improving the lives of all. Confucius s right name theory is symbolized by the phrase, The prince is prince, and the minister is minister; the father is father, and the son is son. 14) Here, being denotes faithfully fulfilling the unique roles bestowed upon us by our names. The Daxue 大學 (Great Learning) contains the following passage: King Wen 文王, as a sovereign, rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence. As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith. 15) Here, benevolence on the part of a sovereign, reverence on the part of a minister, kindness on the part of a father, filial piety on the part of a son and good faith when interacting with others are all examples of unique duties, corresponding to the various relational roles performed by Emperor Wen. According to the Great Learning, those who properly fulfill their unique duties rest in the highest excellence (chi yu zhi shan 止於至善 ). The Great Learning equates resting in the highest excellence with making the whole kingdom peaceful and happy (ping tianxia 平天下 ). From this point of view, Confucius s Right Name Theory is an ideology of peace, in the sense that the world will attain peace if all people fulfill their unique duties. The second notable aspect of Confucianism is Mencius s doctrine of the Kingly Way (wangdao 王道 ). Mencius defines the Kingly Way as 13) Of course, the word ming 名 (name) here denotes not proper nouns but common nouns in the sense of social roles, such as parent, child, employer or worker. 14) Lunyu 12.11: 君君臣臣父父子子. 15) Daxue, ch. 3: 詩云穆穆文王於緝熙敬止爲人君止於仁爲人臣止於敬爲人子止於孝爲人父止於慈與國人交止於信.

43 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 35 practicing benevolent rule through virtue (yi de xing ren 以德行仁 ) and opposes it with hegemony (badao 覇道 ), which he defines as feigning benevolent rule while using force (yi li jia ren 以力假仁 ). 16) The Kingly Way, in other words, involves first ensuring that the people are able to make a living, then enabling them to live in comfort and righteousness by teaching them about human relationships (renlun 人倫 ). Hegemony, by contrast, is aimed at achieving rule by force and involves using any means available to build a prosperous nation and powerful army in order to subjugate neighboring states and eventually extend a rule of tyranny across the world. Mencius defends his advocacy of the Kingly Way by claiming that The benevolent have no enemy (renzhe wu di 仁者無敵 ), 17) while deriding hegemony as climbing a tree to catch a fish (yuan mu qiu yu 緣木求魚 ). 18) His basis for defending the Kingly Way with this claim is twofold: firstly, a king that rules benevolently will come to be regarded as a father not only by his own people but also by those of neighboring states; secondly, such benevolent rule will engender love for the state among its people, so that they will give everything they have to defend it, even against better-armed invaders. Mencius s criticism of hegemony, meanwhile, is also based on two points: firstly, he maintains that seeking power through force will create enemies among neighboring states, making it impossible for one country to subjugate all others; secondly, that seeking to create a prosperous nation and powerful army through tyranny will lead, ultimately, to domestic resistance or collapse. In other words, the politics of hegemony involves excessive exploitation of the people to create national wealth and military power, leading in turn to popular resistance, while revering fame and private gain for the sake of creating a prosperous nation and powerful army produces clashes of interest among the people, leading to the internal collapse of the state. Mencius branded hegemony a vicious cycle of violence and sought to create a peaceful world via the Kingly Way. The third aspect of Confucianism to be noted with regard to peace is the theory of the zhonghe 中和 (equilibrium and harmony) in the 16) Mengzi 2A3: 孟子曰以力假仁者覇覇必有大國以德行仁者王王不待大湯以七十里文王以百里. 17) Mengzi 1A5: 孟子對曰地方百里而可以王王如施仁政於民省刑罰薄稅斂深耕易耨壯者以暇日修其孝悌忠信入以事其父兄出以事其長上可使制梃以撻秦楚之堅甲利兵矣彼奪其民時使不得耕耨以養其父母父母凍餓兄弟妻子離散彼陷溺其民王往而征之夫誰與王敵故曰仁者無敵王請勿疑. 18) Mengzi 1A7: 然則王之所大欲可知已欲辟土地朝秦楚莅中國而撫四夷也以若所爲求若所欲猶緣木而求魚也.

44 36 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean). According to this text, While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony. 19) The Doctrine of the Mean also comments, Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. 20) A happy order prevailing throughout heaven and earth, and the nourishing and flourishing of all things denotes the same thing as resting in the highest excellence as mentioned in the Great Learning: both signify states of utter peace. The Doctrine of the Mean, however, takes the view that this utter peace begins with equilibrium and harmony in the heart of each individual. The Great Learning describes the relationship between self-cultivation and ruling the people as being akin to the relationship between roots and branches, with self-cultivation as the roots and ruling the people as the tips of the branches. In the same vein, the Doctrine of the Mean regards external peace, which is present when a happy order prevails throughout heaven and earth and all things are nourished and flourish, as beginning with the attainment of personal equilibrium namely, harmony in one s own mind. This is indicated by the passage that reads, This Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actions in the world, and this Harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue. 21) The implication here is that internal states of mind are closely related to the external outcome of peace. The fourth notable aspect is Zhu Xi s doctrine of renxin 人心 (human mind) and daoxin 道心 (moral mind). According to the Shujing 書經 (Book of Documents), Shun 舜, upon handing power to Yu 禹 said, The human mind is solely dangerous, while the moral mind is solely obscure. Therefore, always observe things closely, remain consistent and grasp the mean. Zhu Xi 朱熹 explained this passage as follows: The mind s miraculous perception is one, but the difference between the human mind and the moral mind is that the former originates in the body s personal feelings, while the latter is based on the rightness of nature and heavenly order. This is because they perceive in different ways. The human mind is dangerous and unstable, while the moral mind is subtle and does 19) Zhongyong, ch. 1: 喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中發而皆中節謂之和. 20) Zhongyong, ch. 1: 致中和天地位焉萬物育焉. 21) Zhongyong, ch. 1: 中也者天下之大本也和也者天下之達道也.

45 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 37 not easily manifest itself. If one takes the moral mind as one s personal master and ensures that the human mind always obeys its commands, the dangerous human mind will lose its risky edge and the subtle moral mind will manifest itself, so that all excess and inadequacy will automatically disappear from one s behavior. Yao, Shun and Yu were among the great sages of the world; their successive appointments by each other as king were highly important events for the world. When these greatest of sages performed these most important of deeds, these were the only words of caution with which they admonished each other. How, then, could there be any other principle as important as this? 22) The term human mind, is conceived of as something that originates in the body and refers to such phenomena as wanting to eat when hungry, wanting to put on clothes when cold, and longing for the opposite sex when filled with desire. Zhu Xi explained the human mind by linking it to xingqi zhi si 形氣之私 (physical disposition of the self) or to renyu zhi si 人欲之私 (human desire of the self). Since the character si 私 here indicates privacy, the human mind involves each person pursuing her or his private desires. The moral mind arises from the natural laws of ren yi li zhi 仁義禮智 (benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom) and refers to feelings such as commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval. Zhu Xi explained the moral mind by linking it to the tianli zhi gong 天理之公 (fairness of Heavenly Principle) or the xingming zhi zheng 性命之正 (rightness of nature and heavenly mandate). In other words, the moral mind is that which pursues rightness (zheng 正 ) in order to ensure fairness (gong 公 ) among the members of society. Zhu Xi explained the meaning of the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind in the Book of Documents by saying, Dominate the human mind with the moral mind and make sure your behavior is neither excessive nor inadequate. If we avoid excess and inadequacy in everything we say and do, he argued, peace will naturally follow; in this sense, the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind is itself oriented toward peace. Zhu Xi also asserted that the domination of the human mind by its moral counterpart was the most important principle behind the actions of the world s greatest sages. What he meant by this is that the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind is the true core of political 22) Zhongyong, 中庸章句序 : 心之虛靈知覺一而已矣而以爲有人心道心之異者則以其或生於形氣之私或原於性命之正而所以爲知覺者不同是以或危殆而不安或微妙而難見耳... 必使道心常爲一身之主而人心每聽命焉則危者安微者著而動靜云爲自無過不及之差矣夫堯舜禹天下之大聖也以天下相傳天下之大事也以天下之大聖行天下之大事而其授受之際丁寧告戒不過如此則天下之理豈有以加於此哉.

46 38 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 philosophy. Toegye s Neo-Confucianism is a continuation of this doctrine: this is why we are able to portray it as an ideology of peace. 3. I-gi sangbar ron 理氣互發論 (Theory of I-Gi Mutual Dynamism) As is well known, Toegye s Theory of I-Gi Mutual Dynamism refers to the Four Sprouts (sadan 四端, siduan in Chinese) as i dynamism (ibar 理發, lifa in Chinese) and the Seven Feelings (chiljeong 七情, qiqing in Chinese) as gi dynamism (chibar 氣發, qifa in Chinese). While traditional Confucianism referred to human emotions sometimes as the Four Sprouts and sometimes as the Seven Feelings Toegye believed that the Four Srouts and Seven Feelings were essentially different. His fellow scholar Gi Dae-seung 奇大升 (a.k.a. Gobong 高峰 ) argued against Toegye s interpretation by asserting that the Four Sprouts and Seven Feelings were originally the same emotions, and the two men s correspondence began the now-famous sa chil nonjaeng 四七論爭 Four-Seven Debate). Toegye explained his Theory of I-Gi Mutual Dynamism to Gi Dae-seung as follows: The distinction between the Four Sprouts (sadan 四端 ) and the Seven Feelings (chiljeong 七情 ) seems to lie in the difference between original nature and physical nature. We have already divided nature into two parts: i 理 and gi 氣. Can this division really be impossible only when it comes to emotion? What is the source of emotions such as commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval? They originate in the nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge. What is the source of happiness, anger, sadness, enjoyment, love, hate and greed? The mind is moved by contact between the body and external objects; it is these objects that generate such sentiments.... The ancients called avoiding analysis and attempting to lump issues together swallowing a jujube without chewing. This is highly problematic. If you continue in this way despite everything I have said above, you will confuse gi with nature before you know it; this will lead you into the damaging trap of mistaking human desire for natural order. 23) Toegye described the Four Sprouts as originating in original nature, which he then further described as stemming from the nature of 23) Toegyejip, vol. 16, 20-23, 答奇明彦論四端七情第二書 : 情之有四端七情之分猶性之有本性氣稟之異也然則其於性也旣可以理氣分言之至於情獨不可以理氣分言之乎惻隱羞惡辭讓是非何從而發乎發於仁義禮智之性焉爾喜怒哀懼愛惡欲何從而發乎外物觸其形而動於中緣境而出焉爾 ( ) 夫講學而惡分析務合爲一說古人謂之鶻圇呑棗其病不少而如此不已不知不覺之間駸駸然入於以氣論性之蔽而墮於認人欲作天理之患矣.

47 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 39 benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge. This means that the Four Sprouts have their source in the innate moral character of humans, and have nothing to do with physical desires. He also described the Seven Feelings as originating in physical nature, claiming that this meant they arose when the mind was stimulated by contact between the body and external objects, and that such objects were therefore the cause of the sentiments. For Toegye, it is human instinct that gives rise to desire or aversion when we come into contact with external objects; these desires are what he referred to collectively as the Seven Feelings. In the quote above, Toegye contrasts original nature, i 理 (li in Chinese, the Four Sprouts and natural order) with physical nature, gi 氣 (qi in Chinese, the Seven Feelings and human desire) and it is upon this contrast that he founds his doctrine of mutual dynamism. 24) Toegye further believed that human mind and moral mind correspond with the Seven Feelings and Four Sprouts, respectively, commenting as follows: You said the human mind is the Seven Feelings and the moral mind the Four Sprouts, but if you look at Zhu Xi s and Xu Dongyang s explanations in Zhu Xi s preface to the Doctrine of the Mean, you ll see that it can only be the case that the human and moral minds are the Seven Feelings and Four Sprouts, respectively. 25) In his preface to the Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu Xi held that the human mind and the moral mind are distinguished in the same way as the personal feelings of the body (xingqi zhi si 形氣之私 ) are distinct from the rightness of nature and heavenly order (xingming zhi zheng 性命之正 ), while Xu Dongyang held that the human mind originates in gi: for example, the desires of the ears, eyes, mouth and nose and the four limbs.... The moral mind originates in i: for example, the Four Sprouts: commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval. As his reference to these two explanations make clear, Toegye believed that the Four-Seven Debate and the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind were two versions of the same thing. Let us now look again at Zhu Xi s doctrine of the human mind and the moral 24) In Neo-Confucianism, original nature (benrean zhi xing 本然之性 ) and physical nature (qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性 ) are originally concepts that explain the universality and particularity, or the completeness and incompleteness of humans or creation. But Toegye understood original nature and physical nature to mean moral nature and physical instinct. This is a characteristic of Toegye s scholarship. 25) Toegyejip, vol. 37, 27, 答李平叔 : 人心爲七情道心爲四端以中庸序朱子說及許東陽說之類觀之二者之爲七情四端固無不可

48 40 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 mind in this light. In the Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu Xi writes: The human mind and the moral mind exist in a disorderly mixture in every one of us. Therefore, if we do not know how to control them, the human mind becomes more dangerous and the moral mind more subtle, so that the fairness of natural order is eventually unable to defeat personal feelings of human desire. Observing things closely means watching the gap between the human and moral minds and ensuring that they do not mix, while remaining consistent means faithfully maintaining the correctness of one s true mind. If we remain devoted to this, without the slightest lapse, making the moral mind our master at all times and ensuring that the human mind follows its commands, the dangerous human mind becomes less threatening and the subtle moral mind appears, leaving our behavior free from all excesses and inadequacies. 26) The above quote first explains the conflicting aspects of the human and moral minds, before explaining why effort is needed to observe things closely and remain consistent. It then describes the effect of these actions: the elimination of excessive and inadequate behavior. If we replace the human mind and the moral mind in Zhu Xi s explanation with i 理 and gi 氣, respectively, and observing closely and remaining consistent with piety (gyeong 敬 ), we have something which closely resembles Toegye s theory of mutual dynamism and thoughts on piety. Toegye made the following comment: I 理 is lofty to the extent where it has no match. It only commands objects and takes no commands from them. Gi 氣, therefore, ought not to defeat i. But once gi takes form, it becomes the material and the instrument of i; frequently, then, it influences manifestation and reception. When gi easily follows i, i is naturally manifested. Therefore, gi is not weak but submissive. If gi defies i, i is obscured. Therefore, i is not weak but the victim of inevitable circumstances. This can be illustrated with the following metaphor: a king may be higher than all others, but if an unruly subject takes office in the royal court, he will come into competition with the king. This is a crime on the part of the subject; there is nothing the king can do about it. Therefore, a gentleman must study hard in order not to get carried away by his feelings, blocking material greed, enhancing virtue and returning to the path of the great mean and extreme righteousness. 27) 26) Zhongyong, 中庸章句序 : 二者雜於方寸之間而不知所以治之則危者愈危微者愈微而天理之公卒無以勝夫人欲之私矣精則察夫二者之間而不雜也一則守其本心之正而不離也從事於斯無少間斷必使道心常爲一身之主而人心每聽命焉則危者安微者著而動靜云爲自無過不及之差矣. 27) Toegyejip, vol. 13, 17-18, 答李達李天機 : 理本其尊無對命物而不命於物非氣所當勝也但氣以成形之後却是氣爲之田地材具故凡發用應接率多氣爲用事氣能順理時理自顯非氣之弱乃順也氣若反理時理反隱非理之弱乃勢也比如王者本尊無對及强臣跋扈反與之或爲勝負乃臣之罪王者無如之何故君子爲學矯氣質之偏禦物欲而尊德性以歸於大中至正之道.

49 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 41 After discussing i and gi, Toegye draws the conclusion that material greed must be blocked and moral virtue enhanced. When Toegye speaks of a battle between i and gi, he means the conflict between the natural order and human greed, or between the moral mind and the human mind. From this perspective, when our minds are aroused, it is important to observe these signs to better ensure that natural order or the moral mind is victorious. We will discuss this further in the next section of this essay. To summarize what we have discussed so far: Toegye tried to divide the Four Sprouts and Seven Feelings into the respective dynamisms of i and gi. In his system, i dynamism arises from pure moral nature and is therefore desirable, while gi dynamism arises from instinctive physical desire and is therefore dangerous. This is why Toegye believed it necessary to keep gi dynamism under the control of i dynamism, it is equivalent to eliminating all excess and inadequacy from one s behavior by mastering the human mind with the moral mind, or to blocking human greed and preserving natural order. Ultimately, all of these concepts are aimed at achieving peace. In this sense, Toegye s theory of mutual dynamism is an ideology of peace, which aims to ensure that a happy order prevails throughout heaven and earth, and that all things are nourished and flourish. 4. Jigyeong 持敬 (Piety) and Gyeomyang 謙讓 (Humility) If Toegye s mind-nature theory can be integrated with the theory of i-gi mutual dynamism, his theory of practice can be integrated with jigyeong 持敬 (piety) and gyeomyang 謙讓 (humility). We will now discuss the meaning of Toegye s theory of practice, focusing on piety and humility. As we have seen above, Toegye s writings on mutual dynamism discuss the tussle for supremacy between i and gi. Here, piety is the practical method used to ensure that i always wins over gi. Toegye often called for the domination of the mind through piety. In other words, the mind, which dominates the body, should in turn be dominated by piety. Dominating the mind with piety means distinguishing (and choosing) properly between natural order and human desire when the mind is aroused, thereby attaining peace. Toegye made the following comment:

50 42 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 The moment when human nature becomes emotion is the indication of a unified mind and the core of all creation; this is the juncture at which good and evil divide. A scholar must consistently remain pious and aware of natural order and human desire. 28) For Toegye the moment when nature becomes emotion is the moment when the outcome of the battle between i and gi is decided; the outcome of this decision determines whether one is a gentleman (jungzi 君子 ) or a petty individual (xiaoren 小人 ). Toegye accorded piety its significance in relation to this moment. It is piety that ensures victory for i in the battle with gi by defending natural order and impeding human desire. But this is not to say that piety is only demanded at the moment when nature becomes emotion. Only if piety is habitually cultivated will it be capable of naturally ensuring victory for i at the decisive moment. In this respect, effort to cultivate piety is always needed, whether the mind is aroused or not, and in times of both emergency and non-emergency. Toegye wrote: In general, when it comes to study, piety must remain one s main priority regardless of whether anything is happening or not and whether one is conscious or not. If one maintains piety whether in motion or still, the mind itself will be clear, one s true character will achieve deep purity when thoughts have not yet arisen; and loyalty will shine brightly and drive out material desire when thoughts have already arisen. If several events occur at once, or if we try to respond in two directions at the same time, how can we think amid all this complexity and respond in accordance with our thoughts? But if control of the mind is established and becomes the general principle behind everything, all indications reveal themselves. The body quietly becomes aware of this and there is no omission of detail. 29) The above quote can be summarized as follows. First, effort is required to maintain piety at all times. This enables the true character of the mind to become clear and pure before arousal has taken place, and allows loyalty to drive out material desire when arousal has occurred. Second, working to maintain piety is a way of establishing domination of the mind. Third, establishing domination of the mind allows one to respond without undue complication even when several events occur at once. This is known as dealing with all events precisely (beom eung 28) Toegyejip, vol. 7, 24, 聖學十圖, 第六心統性情圖說 : 性發爲情之際乃一心之幾微萬化之樞要善惡之所由分也學者誠能一於持敬不昧理欲. 29) Toegyejip, vol. 28, 17-18, 答金惇敍 : 大抵人之爲學勿論有事無事有意無意惟當敬以爲主而動靜不失則當其思慮未萌也心體虛明本領深純及其思慮已發也義理昭著物欲退聽若遇衆事交至之時或左或右一彼一此豈可雜然而思旋思旋應只是心之主宰卓然在此爲衆事之綱則當下所應之事幾微畢見四體黙喩曲折無漏矣.

51 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 43 gok dang 泛應曲當 ) and means achieving peace or having no excess or inadequacy in one s behavior. The effort to maintain piety is therefore concentrated on the mind. Since the mind dominates the body in Toegye s worldview, establishing dominance over the mind will enable the body to deal with all events precisely in practice. In which case, why is piety essential in establishing dominance over the mind? Toegye makes the following case: The reason of the mind is so vast that it cannot be imitated and so wide that its boundaries lie out of sight. How, then, could it preserve nature and establish substance in the absence of true and consistent piety? Arousal of the mind is so insignificant that observing it is as difficult as examining the end of a strand of hair and as dangerous as stepping into a hole. How, then, could signs be made proper and master function in the absence of true and consistent piety? In his learning, a gentleman should study for self-cultivation by making piety the master of his mind when arousal has not yet occurred, and conduct introspective study by making piety the master of his mind when arousal has taken place. This is why piety is all-important and penetrates substance and function when it comes to study. 30) For Toegye, the mind is so unfathomably wide and its use is so subtle and dangerous that it cannot properly mastered without piety. Indeed, our minds touch on all matters in the world, and are subtle and dangerous, capable of suddenly becoming nasty over the most trivial things, even in the moments after feeling the most profound compassion. In Neo-Confucianism, piety is often described by phrases such as zhuyi wu di 主一無適 (concentrating on one thing), zhengqi yansu 整齊嚴肅 (achieving symmetry and maintaining gravity), chang xingxing 常惺惺 (being awakened at all times) and shoulian 收斂 (convergence). This takes issue not with the dispersion of the mind but with the center around which it converges. If we were attempt to address the dispersed fields of the mind, there would be so many as to make examining them one by one impossible. The aim is therefore that piety make the mind converge into one place; it endeavors to reach even its outer extremities by gaining control of this hub of convergence. This is why Toegye commented that piety is all-important and penetrates substance and function when it comes to study. 30) Toegye sokjip, vol. 8, 20, 天命圖說 : 此心之理浩浩然不可模捉渾渾然不可涯涘苟非敬以一之安能保其性而立其體哉此心之發微而爲毫釐之難察危而爲坑塹之難蹈苟非敬以一之又安能正其幾而達其用哉是以君子之學當此心未發之時必主於敬而加存養工夫當此心已發之際亦必主於敬而加省察工夫此敬學之所以成始成終而通貫體用者也.

52 44 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 If piety generally takes issue with the internal mind, humility concerns external actions. Humility means always lowering oneself and showing greater consideration to others when it comes to relationships. Toegye lived a life consistent with humility and modest retreat and advised his friends and students to show humility. The poem Seokhae 石蟹 (Crayfish), composed by Toegye at the age of 15, reads as follows: You make your home by digging into the sand under a stone. You move forwards; you move backwards. How many legs you have! You spend your whole life in one palm-sized patch of stream, Never even asking how big the river is. 31) This poem describes how a crayfish spends its whole life in a palm-sized area of a stream without wanting for anything or feeling a lack of freedom. The final line, Never even asking how big the river is, is a particularly direct reference to the idea of being content with one s lot. The poem shows how Toegye, from a young age, sought a secluded life of modesty and containment. Though he spent a considerable part of his middle age working in official positions, this was not Toegye s ideal life. Eventually, at the age of fifty, he returned to his hometown, found a place to live, and built a home that he named Hanseoam 寒棲庵. In the poem, Toegye described his feelings at the time as follows: Having retired, I feel comfortable in my foolish station. But my study has regressed, making me anxious in my old age. Since my new home lies next to a stream, I ll spend each day gazing at the flowing water and reflecting. 32) This poem clearly shows a new resolve in Toegye s old age to live in humble satisfaction with his own lot while absorbing himself in study. The philosopher regarded humility as his own proper duty. Toegye also advised humility on the part of his friends and students. To Jeong Yu-il, for example, he said, Dealing with life means always taking one step further back than others and bowing your head once more than others as your primary consideration. 33) Most important in embodying humility is foregoing undue concern with worldly honor and riches. To Nam Eon-gyeong, he said, Be sure to begin by disregarding 31) Toegye sokjip, vol. 1, 1, 石蟹 : 負石穿沙自有家前行卻走足偏多生涯一掬山泉裏不問江湖水幾何. 32) Toegyejip, vol. 1, 47, 退溪 : 身退安愚分學退憂暮境溪上始定居臨流日有省. 33) Toegyejip, vol. 24, 26, 答鄭子中 : 所以行於世者則每以退人一步低人一頭爲第一義.

53 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 45 obsession with profit and loss or glory and shame, in order to avoid sullying the mind. 34) To Gi Dae-seung, Toegye described his feelings as he lived a life of modesty as follows: When I think about it, I had no talent that could have been of use to the world. I soon fell ill and experienced many hardships before I had reached middle age. Only in my old age did I at last try to find satisfaction by gathering myself, addressing my inadequacies, reducing my flaws and fulfilling my long-held wish. If I did every single thing according to the old way in deciding my advance or retreat, without looking in front or behind and without gauging my own ability, it would be as if one of my legs was shorter than the other; in which case, how could I escape the fear of stumbling and falling flat on my face? That s why, even though I know there is work to be done in the world by great men, I find myself hesitating instead of ambitiously launching myself into new responsibilities. 35) Work to be done by great men refers to the possibility of taking a government post at the royal court and attempting to do good in the world through public service. The use of the term old way, meanwhile, refers to the perceived duty incumbent upon Confucian scholars to seek a civil service position and play a part in governing the world properly. But Toegye resigned from government and returned to his hometown. He gave two reasons for his avoidance of official life. Firstly, he had no original talent and therefore had to be mindful of his limits. Toegye claimed that he lacked ability and tried to make up for his inadequacies through study. Secondly, the political situation at the time was particularly unfavorable and Toegye keenly felt the need for circumspection. In other words, the royal court was such a hotbed of treachery that just being part of it brought the risk of falling victim to an unjust purge and offered no possibility of implementing policies in accordance with one s convictions. Adverse circumstances thus also played a part in Toegye s choice of a modest life outside politics. More fundamentally, however, this choice was the product of humility. Toegye sought to forsake egotism and devote himself to study because he genuinely believed he was inadequate. To summarize: Toegye s theory of practice can be reduced to cultivation of the virtues of piety and humility, where piety equates to 34) Toegyejip, vol. 14, 2, 答南時甫 : 第一須先將世間窮通得失榮辱利害一切置之度外不以累於靈臺. 35) Toegyejip, vol. 17, 10, 答奇明彦 : 顧滉自念本乏世用早嬰身痾中歲以前七顚八倒迨至桑楡之景方欲收拾補塡庶幾寡過以畢素願足矣若不顧前後不揆力量獨於出處一事必欲節節而反古之道是所謂一脚短一脚長豈能免於顚仆之患乎是以雖知世有大丈夫事而尙趑趄不敢奮發直前而承當也.

54 46 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 suppressing human greed and cherishing natural order (e renyu cun tianli 遏人欲存天理 ) and humility equates to being content with one s lot (an fen zhi zu 安分知足 ). Because Toegye held that conflict generally has its origins in greed and egotism he sought to establish peace by impeding greed through piety and forsake egotism through the cultivation of humility. 5. The Significance of Toegye s Work as an Ideology of Peace In To Have or To Be?, the twentieth-century German philosopher Erich Fromm defines competition and greed as products of the having mode and cooperation and sharing as products of the being mode. He describes each of these phenomena as follows: The fundamental elements in the relation between individuals in the having mode of existence are competition, antagonism, and fear. The antagonistic element in the having relationship stems from its nature. If having is the basis of my sense of identity because I am what I have, the wish to have must lead to the desire to have much, to have more, to have most. In other words, greed is the natural outcome of the having orientation. 36) In the being mode, private having (private property) has little affective importance, because I do not need to own something in order to enjoy it, or even in order to use it. In the being mode, more than one person in fact millions of people can share in the enjoyment of the same object, since none need or want to have it, as a condition of enjoying it. This not only avoids strife; it creates one of the deepest forms of human happiness: shared enjoyment. The experience of sharing makes and keeps the relation between two individuals alive; it is the basis of all great religious, political, and philosophical movements. 37) According to Fromm, those dominated by the having mode equate their egos with what they have, which gives rise to competition and greed, eventually leading to bloody conflict. By contrast, the mode of being allows us to realize the joy of sharing, leading us on a path of cooperation and coexistence. According to Fromm, the having mode and the being mode both lie dormant within human nature. He writes that: The truth is that both the having and the being modes of existence are 36) Fromm, To Have or To Be?, ) Fromm, To Have or To Be?,

55 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 47 potentialities of human nature, that our biological urge for survival tends to further the having mode, but that selfishness and laziness are not the only potentialities inherent in human beings. We human beings have an inherent and deeply rooted desire to be; to express our faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of selfishness. 38) Fromm explains the having mode by linking it to a biological urge, which can be taken to mean physical instinct. He also described the desire to be; to express our faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of selfishness as the will to give, to share, to sacrifice. This will, he claims, stems from the moral nature of humans. Fromm s view, then, is that the having mode comes from physical instinct and the being mode from moral nature. His intention in developing this analysis, of course, was to break free from greed-based competition and to enjoy the pleasure of sharing. Perceptive readers will have already noticed the remarkable similarity between Fromm s having and being modes and Toegye s gi and i dynamisms, respectively. Fromm asserts that a life dominated by the having mode is a life of greed, and that greed for possessions eventually leads to brutal war. The being mode, on the other hand, lets us realize the pleasure of sharing and leads along a path of cooperation and coexistence. In this respect, Fromm said, peace as a state of lasting harmonious relations between nations is only possible when the having structure is replaced by the being structure. 39) A similar line of reasoning can be directly applied to Toegye s theory of i and gi dynamism. Zhu Xi claimed that the human mind originated in the personal feelings of the body and the moral mind originated in the rightness of nature and heavenly order, while Toegye called the former dynamism of gi and the latter dynamism of i. For Toegye, the human mind of gi dynamism pursues personal physical desire, which eventually leads to conflict, while the moral mind of i dynamism, on the other hand, pursues fairness that allows coexistence among human beings, leading to harmony and peace. This is why Zhu Xi and Toegye were wary of the human mind of gi dynamism and supportive of the moral mind of i dynamism. This study began with a comparison between two approaches to peace: that of Plato and that of Hobbes. The approaches of Fromm and Toegye can be likened to that of Plato. Hobbes, however, believed all 38) Fromm, To Have or To Be?, ) Fromm, To Have or To Be?, 114.

56 48 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 the approaches of classical philosophers such as Plato had failed in their search for the truth and their pursuit of peace. Classical philosophers had aimed to create a society full of virtue based on man s highest aspirations; Hobbes believed that this was the reason for their failure. Hobbes took a more pragmatic approach, pursuing lower goals that abandoned the idea of the perfectibility of man and took passion, rather than reason, as his starting point. 40) According to Hobbes, living without desire was to be Dead. He therefore rejected the classical ideal of a life led by controlling animal nature with reason. Hobbes appointed desire as sovereign and branded reason as the capacity for calculated self-interest. Hobbes explained that people would gladly surrender some of their personal rights and enter into a social contract (i.e. a contract of peace) based on the calculation that peace brought greater benefits than war. Indeed, most peace today is maintained in this way. Here, though, we find a trap: Self-interested calculation is based on the premise that anything can be done as long as it brings benefits to the perpetrator. It follows that any person or country accustomed to such reasoning will unhesitatingly start a war if victory can definitely be achieved at a low cost. Moreover, those with inadequate capacities for calculation or deluded by narcissism will choose war as a result of miscalculation. This is, perhaps, one of the fundamental reasons why wars still erupt across the world today. It is here that we discover the significance of piety and humility. Toegye emphasized piety based on suppressing human desire and cherishing natural order; in the same way, piety rejects self-interest as a way of thinking, whether it be precise calculation or narcissistic miscalculation. Peace based on self-interested calculation is temporary and can be shattered at any time. Therefore, if we take the view that self-interested thinking must be overcome in order to attain genuine peace, the potential for this can be found in piety. Humility, meanwhile, means considering the benefits of others before one s own and is based on satisfaction with one s own lot; in the same vein, it seeks to overcome the will to compete with hostility against others, even if precise calculations lead to the conclusion that war would be a more profitable choice. If we take the view that the will for hostile competition itself must ultimately be overcome in order to attain real peace, we find that cultivating humility offers one possible way of 40) Strauss and Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy,

57 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 49 achieving this aim. The Han Dynasty Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu left us with the immortal line, Ensure that justice is upheld, do not scheme in your own interest, illuminate the true way and do not quibble over merit. Zhu Xi adopted this line for his Regulations of the White Deer Grotto Academy, while Toegye in turn adopted the Regulations of the White Deer Grotto Academy for his Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning. In sum, Toegye rejected utilitarianism and chose a path of attaining peace through the illumination of moral virtues. This was the same path followed by Confucius with his Right Name Theory and Mencius with his doctrine of the Kingly Way. Submitted: / Reviewed: / Confirmed for publication:

58 50 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 REFERENCES Primary Sources Daxue 大學 (Great Learning) Lunyu 論語 (Analects) Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) Shujing 書經 (Book of Documents) Toegyejip 退溪集 (Collected Works of Toegye Yi Hwang) Toegye sokjip 退溪續集 (Subsequent Works of Toegye Yi Hwang) Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes) Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean) Secondary Sources Arblaster, Anthony The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Erasmus, Desiderius Moriae Encomium. Translated by Kim Nam-woo. Seoul: Openbooks. Fromm, Erich To Have or To Be? New York: Harper & Row. Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. Edited with an introduction by C. B. Macpherson. London: Penguin Books. Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. London: Oxford University Press. Plato The Republic. Translated by Pak Jong-hyoun. Seoul: Seokwangsa. Plato Gorgias. Translated by Kim In-kon. Seoul: EJB. Strauss, Leo, and Joseph Cropsey, ed History of Political Philosophy. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

59 LEE Sang-ik / The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace 51 退溪學與和平李相益中文摘要本文開頭以人們接近和平的兩個方法展開柏拉圖 (Plato) 與霍布斯 (Thomas Hobbes) 對和平的論述差異比較如果說人類是理性動物的話, 那麼柏拉圖用理性來控制動物性 (sensible soul) 是接近道德性的方法其就由理性的統治 ( 控制 ) 來克服動物性的話, 那結果自然達到和平的構成然而事實上能克服動物性的人格者並不多, 因此世上仍然處於混亂的狀態霍布斯認為沒有慾望就如同死亡, 若以此觀點來看便是拒絕以理性來控制動物性的人生霍布斯認為人性是惡的, 是自私自利的盤算者, 為了求安全的欲望, 經過盤算, 甘願放棄了原來享有的自然權利, 彼此訂立了一種社會契約, 於是建立了國家實際上現實生活中的和平也是經過人們對自我利益的盤算下, 所做出來的協調性和平然而若陷於自我的迷戀 ( 對權力慾望的我執 ) 盤算失誤, 便會造成戰爭現今世界便是如此, 因誤以為戰爭帶來的利益大過於人民的利益而紛爭不停因此吾人可由此找到持敬謙讓的價值與意義, 退溪以持敬的方法來強調遏人欲存天理順理看來持敬便是正確的計算, 從根本克服並抵制自我陶醉的誤算盤算式思考方式等從盤算的角度算計來的和平, 總有因彼此利益失去平衡而崩毀之時, 是假性暫時性的和平, 為了真正的和平必須克服盤算性的思考方式, 而持敬正具有此功能另一方面, 謙讓是藉由安分知足來使人們面對自我的利益的同時能優先顧慮到對方的利益, 論理看來謙讓即是正確性的計算, 克服爭辯的意志我們於謙讓中看到能積極且正面克服好爭辯的可能性, 也找到能帶來真正和平之法關鍵詞 : 退溪學, 和平, 戰爭, 理氣互發論, 持敬, 謙讓

60 52 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015

61 The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage: Zhu Xi s 朱熹 Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World 41) MIN Byounghee Abstract This article explains how Zhu Xi attempted to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world, one of the most serious political questions in the Confucian tradition. Facing the gap between moral authority and actual political power, Zhu Xi presented a new alternative for integrating sagehood and ideal governance. This article explores his idea of sagehood in connection to his new approach to governance. I pay particular attention to the paradox of learning to become a sage, since Zhu Xi s teaching included a seemingly self-contradictory promise. For Zhu Xi, every human being has the universal potential to become a sage and anyone can be a sage through learning. However, Zhu Xi also held that in physical and historical reality it is impossible for humans to become a sage through learning. This contradiction shifts the focus of learning from the result of learning to the process of learning. Zhu Xi emphasized learning as a lifelong project and argued that individuals seeking sagehood should engage in the processes of right learning throughout their lives without interruption. According to him, the importance of learning to become a sage lies in following a path of moral learning rather than the possibility of realizing its ultimate goal. The most crucial notions of Zhu Xi s philosophical system are also described through the metaphor of process. The investigation of things, the most fundamental basis of his learning, has the same contradiction as learning to become a * MIN Byounghee: Assistant Professor, Department of History Education, Hongik University (bhmin2004@naver.com)

62 54 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 sage. With such a philosophical system, Zhu Xi also claimed that the sagely governance prepared by Confucius was his learning per se. As a result, he attempted to reintegrate sagehood and statecraft by presenting the learning process as analogous to or identical with the governing process. One consequence of this, I argue, is that Zhu Xi s learning process can also be seen as the process of governing the world in which it is a group of people with a shared purpose, rather than a single sage, who participate by committing to the lifelong project of learning to become a sage. Keywords: Zhu Xi, sagehood, governing the world, process, paradox of learning to become a sage, reintegration of sagehood and governing the world

63 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage Sagehood as a Political Question Tension between the ideal world ruled by sage-rulers and the real world ruled by secular political power has always cast a long shadow on the considerable history of the Confucian tradition. 1) In the ideal world order the Confucian Classics envision, the rulers of all under heaven were also sages. The Three Dynasties (sandai 三代 ) are often regarded as the Golden Age in this tradition because of the perception that sagehood and real political power were in unity at that time. 2) However, since the desirable unity of sagehood and political power quickly vanished from the actual world and became entrenched in legend, Confucian scholars have faced serious questions about the practical relationship between Confucian sagehood and governing the world, namely: In the real world, how can we reintegrate these two realms which were initially indivisible? Should we redefine the relationship between sagehood and the secular political power? If so, how? To answer these politically sensitive questions, we must begin with the question of how to define sagehood. Zhu Xi s 朱熹 ( ) learning is often referred to as learning to become a sage (shengxue 聖學 ), largely because his learning is based on the assumption that every human being is born with the full potential to become a sage through learning. Because Zhi Xi posits a universal human potential for achieving sagehood, the tension between sagehood and the real political power of governing the world became more complicated in his learning: If everyone can become a sage through learning, should those who pursue sagehood also be entitled to govern the world? In other words, if someone were to achieve sagehood through learning, should they by virtue of this fact become a political ruler too? It should not be surprising that questions such as these would have been very uncomfortable questions for a monarchical system where rulers were decided by hereditary blood line rather than by claims of sagehood. The idea of abdication to the worthiest (shanrang 禪讓 ) rooted in the 1) Concerning the tension in the history of Confucian tradition, see Ching, Neo-Confucian Utopian Theories and Political Ethics ; and Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History. 2) Regardless of the historical reality of the three dynasties, Xia 夏, Shang 商, and Zhou 周, Confucian tradition believed in and supported the idealized image of the Three Dynasties in which the most desirable human state, one which integrated both morality and power, was realized.

64 56 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Confucian Classics could lead to doubts about political legitimacy in the real world where a ruling family monopolized political power and the ruler was not necessarily a sage (and thus the worthiest to rule). 3) Zhu Xi s task, in part, was to tackle these sensitive questions by redefining sagehood and governance without abandoning the ideal that sages should have actual political power to govern the real world. It is not a simple enterprise to resolve such contradictions between the ideal and reality by proposing a compelling and practical alternative. However, Zhu Xi provided both a novel and persuasive solution to this potentially thorny problem. I would argue that his approach has exerted a significant impact not only on Chinese history but also on human history in general. 4) Recent studies on Zhu Xi s views on political governance have shown that his ideas regarding governing were quite novel. 5) Zhu Xi tried to build up a larger community and networks of literati as the basis of social and political reform instead of relying only on the emperor or government. 6) He also believed that the improvement of society should have its ground in moral cultivation rather than institutional reform. However, the moral self-cultivation proposed in Zhu Xi s learning is not cast simply as a private and personal enterprise of an isolated self. For Zhu Xi, self-cultivation should be pursued through participating in the right learning process, which is also a social and political process. This article attempts to explain Zhu Xi s idea of sagehood in connection with his new approach to governing the world. Zhu Xi s idea of sagehood is much more complicated and paradoxical than expected. I 3) With regard to the idea of the abdication to the worthiest and the tension between the ideal and reality in Chinese history, see Allan, The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early China. 4) Accounts of Zhu Xi s significance in the history of Chinese philosophy that emphasizes his role as an architect of Neo-Confucianism often attenuates his important role in presenting a new alternative to the way of governing the world. However, East Asian societies since Zhu Xi have been seriously influenced by his novel approach to governance, which is one significant reason why his philosophical system had been so appealing to many literati. In fact, his philosophical system cannot be separated from his idea of governance, and this article tries to explain the relationship between two realms. 5) Refer to Hymes and Schirokauer, Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China; and Bol, Neo-Confucianism and Local Society, Twelfth to Sixteenth Century: A Case Study, The Localist Turn and Local Identity in Later Imperial China, and Neo-Confucianism in History; and Min, The Republic of the Mind: Zhu Xi s Learning (Xue) as a Sociopolitical Agenda and the Construction of Literati Society. 6) The studies of Tsuyuhiko Ichiiki, Min Byounghee, and Peter Bol (2010) present the structure of the approach and offer several concrete examples.

65 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 57 pay particular attention to the paradox of learning to become a sage, a notion which has recently received detailed attention from several scholars writing about Zhu Xi s learning. 7) Although learning to become a sage is claimed as the primary purpose of Zhu Xi s learning, a close examination of Zhu Xi s texts reveals that he asserted both that in human history no one has ever become a sage through learning and that no one will do so in the future either. How can we explain this paradox of sagehood and learning? If it is impossible for anybody to become a sage through learning, why should we make an effort to become a sage through his learning? What does learning to become a sage really mean? What can learning do for us? Why do we still have to learn? As we shall see, the questions surrounding the paradox of learning to become a sage are, in fact, closely related to Zhu Xi s concern with how to govern the world. 2. Zhu Xi s Paradoxical Position on Learning to become a sage The ultimate purpose of Zhu Xi s learning is becoming a sage. If one pursues learning to its ultimate, he writes, then one can become a sage. If one does not learn, then one cannot avoid remaining a simple villager. Can one afford not to make an effort? 8) Daoxue 道學 is premised on the idea that all human beings can become a sage through learning because they are endowed with li 理 as their nature. However, to our surprise, Zhu Xi also implies that thus far in human history, no one has yet become a sage through learning. Furthermore, his logic suggests that becoming a sage through learning will never happen either. Zhu Xi s commentary on the Analects separated Confucius learning into two categories: Learning of li 理 and learning of concrete affairs like the names of the objects used in ceremonial and music and the details of historical change. 9) Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius did not need to learn in order to understand li and that he simply needed to use unity to connect all things (yi yi guan zhi 一以貫之 ). 10) The 7) See Kakiuchi, Shu Ki no keisho no shushakubunken no kenkyu josetsu ; Fujii, Sodai Dogaku ni okeru seijingkan ; and Makeham, Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects. 8) This paragraph is Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyu jizhu 5:28, Zhuzi quanshu 6, 108: 學之至則可以爲聖人不學則不免爲鄕人而已. 9) Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyu jizhu 7:20 reveals the idea. Zhuzi quanshu 6, 126: 蓋生而可知者義理爾, 若夫禮樂名物古今事變, 亦必待學而後有以驗其實也.

66 58 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 implication of this position is that Confucius must have been born with a preexistent apprehension of li and applied it to concrete affairs. Since the final goal of learning in daoxue is to apprehend li and those who realize li are sages, within this view it follows that although Confucius would have needed to learn practical knowledge such as details of rituals and institutions, the sagehood he achieved was not through learning but by virtue of inborn capability. In his commentary on the famous account in the Analects of Confucius six life stages, Zhu Xi describes a sage as one who has an innate knowledge and being at ease in realizing them in practice (sheng zhi an xing 生知安行 ) and argues that no one can become a sage merely through efforts: I maintained that the sage [Confucius] had an innate knowledge and was at ease in realizing them in practice and everything came without gradual or cumulative advancement. Despite this he never believed that he had already reached this stage. In daily life Confucius alone was able to realize his own advancement which other people could not reach. Accordingly it appeared that he was gradually accumulating learning so that he described himself that way. It was because he wanted students to follow his example as their model for self-motivation and make efforts for learning. It was not the case that he regarded himself as a sage but temporarily showed modesty. All subsequent examples of modesty on Confucius part are motivated by the same intention. 11) In the above passage, Zhu Xi claims that Confucius modestly described himself as one who made progress through learning because he wished to inspire others learning with his example, not because he felt that it was accurate to explain his own experience of sagehood. Zhu Xi s claim that Confucius was born as a sage and he did not need to attain sagehood through learning follows a view advanced previously by Cheng Yi 程頤 ( ). Cheng Yi also described Confucius as one who was born with innate knowledge and explained Confucius claim to have reached his stage through learning as designed to encourage later generations to advance their own learning. 12) According to both Cheng 10) See the context of the idea, see Zhuzi yulei 45, Zhuzi quanshu 15, 1548: 問子貢一貫章. 曰聖人也不是不理會博學多識. 只是聖人之所以聖, 卻不在博學多識而在一以貫之. 今人有博學多識而不能至於聖者, 只是無一以貫之. 然只是一以貫之, 而不博學多識則又無物可貫. 11) Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyu jizhu 2:4, Zhuzi quanshu 6, 76: 愚謂聖人生知安行固無積累之漸, 然其心未嘗自謂已至此也. 是其日用之間, 必有獨覺其進而人不及知者. 故因其近似以自名, 欲學者以是為則而自勉, 非心實自聖而姑為是退託也. 後凡言謙辭之後凡言謙辭之屬, 意皆放此. 12) Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyu jizhu 2:4, Zhuzi quanshu 6, Zhu Xi quoted Cheng Yi s explanation of why Confucius pretended to learn.

67 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 59 and Zhu, although learning was effortless for Confucius, he never stopped exhibiting the incremental and cumulative learning process, since he wished to provide a role model for his students and encourage them to make ceaseless efforts. 13) When scholars posed the question of why Confucius would pursue learning if he was born with innate knowledge, Zhu Xi consistently explained that Confucius pretended to learn for other people. Zhu Xi thought that sages have an inborn qi 氣 component which is undefiled and inherently different from that of an ordinary human. 14) In his conversation on the Analects with students, Zhu Xi made a clear distinction between sages and those who engage in learning (xuezhe 學者 ). Question: Exhausting one s own utmost sincerity (zhong 忠 ), this is the utmost sincerity of those who engage in learning. Then do sages also always make commitment to such utmost sincerity? Answer: Those who engage in learning (xuezhe) are those who emulate sages but have not reached sagehood yet. Sages are those whose learning reaches the utmost stage. Whereas sages are only [the product of] their nature, those who engage in learning (xuezhe) are [through] making efforts. If something is in ones nature, it lasts long and does not change. If it is achieved through making efforts, sometimes it could be lost and missed. And he continues quoting Master Cheng s words: Mencius was doing what Confucius did, and exhaustively did that. But yet he had not been able to do just like the sage was doing. Yang Shi 楊時 ( ) said, Confucius is similar to a Prefect, and Mencius is similar to an Inspector (tongpan quanzhou 通判權州 ). This analogy is really good. One can conduct affairs as an Inspector, but it is not as long-lasting as a Prefect. 15) Zhu Xi believed that even though Mencius was the crucial link in the transmission of dao 道, he did not reach the stage of Confucius. Master Cheng, Yang Shi, and Zhu Xi all maintained that Mencius cannot be considered as a sage. Therefore, judging from the gap between ordinary scholars who were far behind Mencius in their learning and born with more defiled qi, sagehood should be impossible to achieve. To use John Makeham s term, Zhu Xi took an exclusivist position concerning sagehood. 16) 13) Makeham, Transmitters and Creators, ) Makeham, Transmitters and Creators, ) Zhuzi quanshu 14, 724 (Zhuzi yulei 21): 問盡己之忠, 此是學者之忠, 聖人莫便是此忠否. 曰固是學者是學聖人而未至者, 聖人是為學而極至者. 只是一箇自然, 一箇勉強爾. 惟自然, 故久而不變. 惟勉強, 故有時而放失. 因舉程子說孟子若做孔子事, 儘做得, 只是未能如聖人. 龜山言孔子似知州, 孟子似通判權州, 此喻甚好. 通判權州, 也做得, 只是不久長. 16) Makeham, Transmitters and Creators,

68 60 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Recently Kakiuchi Keiko 垣内景子 17) and John Makeham 18) analyzed Zhu Xi s view on learning, an issue which plays a very important role in Zhu s commentaries on the Analects. Both scholars concluded that Zhu Xi did not believe that sagehood can be achieved through learning. For example, Zhu Xi implied that even the best student of Confucius, Yan Yuan 顔淵, could not achieve sagehood even through diligent study. 19) Although Zhu Xi thought highly of Yan Yuan, he felt that there was still a huge gap between Confucius and Yan Yuan. In his commentaries on the text which states that Yan Yuan did not turn his back on benevolence (ren 仁 ) for three months, Zhu Xi quotes Yin Tun s 尹焞 ( ) remarks that there was a gap that separated Yan Yuan from the sage. As for the sage, he completely abided by benevolence (ren) without any momentary lapse. 20) In writings other than the commentaries on the Analects, Zhu Xi constantly maintained the same view on sagehood. Fujii Michiaki s 藤井倫明 study on the daoxue 道學 ideas of sagehood among Song 宋 ( ) thinkers also confirmed that daoxue scholars such as Zhang Zai 張載 ( ), Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi all revealed paradoxical views on sagehood. 21) They all placed sagehood in the realm of nothing (wu 無 ), no intention (wuyi 無意 ), and non-doing (wuwei 無爲 ). This seems contradictory, since daoxue always emphasized real existence (you 有 ) and doing (youwei 有爲 ) in contrast to the Buddhist and Daoist positions. Fujii interprets this contradiction by arguing that among daoxue thinkers wu of sages, in fact, presented a strong longing for something constant, unchanging, timeless, and eternal. However, he explains that putting sages in the realms of the eternal and timeless also creates an insurmountable gap between sages and ordinary people. Daoxue thinkers placed sagehood in the unreachable realm and at the same time expected all of their students to set sagehood as their final goal for learning. In the long run, this contradictory demand required students to exert unceasing efforts for 17) Kakiuchi, Shu Ki monjin shūdan keisei no kenkyū, ) See Makeham, Transmitters and Creators. 19) See Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyujizhu 6:7. Zhuzi quanshu 6, ) Zhu Xi s commentary on Lunyujizhu 6:7. Zhuzi quanshu 6, 111: 尹氏曰此胃顔子於聖人未達一間者也若聖人則渾然無間斷矣. Makeham quotes the similar passage: Although Confucius was completely selfless (wuwo 無我 ), Yan Yuan merely stopped using self to suppress other ; indeed he still entertained the relative distinction of self and other. Confucius, however, was completely without either self or other (Makeham, Transmitters and Creators, 246). 21) Fujii, Sodai Dogaku ni okeru seijingkan,

69 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 61 learning throughout their lifetime even though such efforts were bound to fail in accomplishing their purported goal. Zhu Xi clearly claimed that the purpose of learning is to become a sage. However, he simultaneously denied the possibility of being a sage through learning with references to physical and historical realities. For pedagogic and heuristic reasons, Confucius pretended to learn but he did not become a sage through learning. What does this paradox of learning to become a sage mean in the system of the daoxue philosophy and what kind of political implication does it have in regard to the relationship between sagehood and governing the world in the daoxue agenda? Makeham argues that what legitimated Zhu Xi s project of learning to become a sage was the pragmatic import of following a path of moral learning rather than the possibility of realizing its ultimate goal. 22) Zhu Xi himself explained this as follows: These days the important thing in learning is to see how the sages taught people to make an effort. 23) In daoxue, encouraging people make a constant effort is the goal of learning. In reality, the closest a person can arrive to sagehood is being always in process of learning. This means that the goal of learning to become a sage is not to enable people to actually become sages but to teach people to emulate sagehood. If the goal of learning is to make people learn, this sounds redundant and tautological. However, it shifts the focus of learning and sagehood into a very different direction as it relates to the accomplishment of sagehood. If the significance of learning does not lie in its result but in its process, the meaning of sagehood in the world has also changed. Sagehood, then, is no longer a goal which one can realistically achieve, but an eternal and changeless standard which everyone should make a ceaseless effort to emulate for the duration of their life. Learning thus becomes an all-encompassing and extensive enterprise. If nobody can actually acquire sagehood in the world, the only way to transform the world into one which possesses sagely governance is to make the learning process similar to sagely governance. The shift of the focus of learning onto the importance of its process is thus crucial to understanding Zhu Xi s philosophical system. 22) Makeham, Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects, ) I re-quote from Makeham, ibid. which is originally the paragraph in Zhuzi yulei.

70 62 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February Learning to become a sage as an Ongoing Process For Zhu Xi, the importance of learning lies in the process instead of the result. Zhu Xi emphasized learning as an ongoing lifelong project. As long as one is alive, one should be always engaged in the learning process. Thus, what really matters is not whether one achieves sagehood or not but whether one is in the process of learning or not. In other words, what matters is whether or not they are engaged in the right processes. Zhu Xi s learning to become a sage is actually learning to be in the process of becoming a sage. He argued that only his learning could provide the right process for those who aspired to become a sage. Zhu Xi consistently adopted images of process or processing in order to describe the most crucial concepts in his philosophical system. Furthermore, he resolved many conflicts and contradictions in his philosophical system through defining something as a process in practice instead of a fixed entity. Because human consciousness can be described as something more akin to a flowing stream than to a fixed structure and human cognition is generally treated as a collection of cognitive processes rather than a set of components, it seems that thinking everything in terms of process is a natural derivative of the idea system which deals most seriously with human mind, perception, and cognition. Adopting the image of process as a major metaphor is closely related to another major idea in Zhu Xi learning system: the dynamism of life. Zhu Xi s system is full of images and notions of being alive, living, generating, regenerating and producing. Such images and notions are used for explanations of the core concepts in his philosophical system such as the mind (xin 心 ), li, the Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極 ), and benevolence (ren 仁 ). In Zhu Xi s thought, the mind is incessantly generating and regenerating (shengsheng bu qiong 生生不窮 ). 24) The Supreme Ultimate (taiji) is also generating and regenerating (shengsheng 生生 ), 25) and the Supreme Ultimate (taiji) is li. 26) Ren is the Principle of generating and regenerating (shengsheng zhi li 生生之理 ). 27) For Zhu Xi, the world never stops generating, producing, and nurturing life. 24) Zhu Xi ji 3, 1375: Wen Zhang Jingfu 問張敬夫. 心具衆理變化感通生生不窮故胃之易. 25) Zhuzi quanshu 13: Taiji tushu jie 太極圖說解. 26) Zhuzi yulei 1: 太極只是一箇理字. 27) Zhu Xi ji 6, : Renshuo 仁說. When Zhu Xi explained Renshuo in the part in which he accounted for his own works (Lun zizhushu 論自注書 ) in Zhuzi yulei, he also expressed the same idea. 仁者天地生物之心.

71 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 63 Everything is always in process. It is no wonder that many students were puzzled by Zhu Xi s remark that things which are withered and dead (kugao 枯槁 ) also have li. 28) The predominant image of li in Zhu Xi is alive, living and generating in a dynamic process. Therefore, many questions were raised when Zhu Xi stated that the dead tree also has the same li. The major concepts of Zhu Xi s philosophy can be defined as a processes and he emphasized that the process should not be interrupted for one moment. It is very plausible that Zhu Xi s idea of learning to become a sage can also be defined as a process of becoming a sage. One function of this is that the learning process itself must be regarded as meaningful and the process of learning ought not to be ceased for one moment either. It is also fair to say that for Zhu Xi, learning means employing the correct processes which lead to becoming a sage, even though nobody ever becomes a sage in their lifetime through these processes. However, it follows from this that what can be shared by a society is not the result of a sage s moral decisions but things which emerge from the process of being moral. The result of moral decisions could be expressed in the form of institutions or moral judgments. Once good judgments or decisions have been made, they can be observed by others in a more concrete form. In Zhu Xi s system, however, judgments and decisions cannot be imposed from outside oneself. In this case, the way in which sharable norms can be provided for society is by sharing the process of becoming a sage rather than through sharing the result of the embodiment of sagehood. The process of becoming a sage is learning. Now the crucial question for how to provide sharable norms for society leads to the question of how we can share the process of learning and produce some common ground in the learning process. The answer to this question determines whether or not Zhu Xi s system can be sustained. In Zhu Xi s learning process, the investigation of things (gewu 格物 ) provides the common ground upon which people can share objective norms. The notion of the investigation of things can be viewed as underpinning the whole system of Zhu Xi s learning. Zhu Xi held that if people cannot find any way to share the processes of their mind, society 28) Zhuzi yulei 4 (Zhuzi quanshu 14) shows many examples: 問曾見答余方叔書, 以為枯槁有理. 不知枯槁瓦礫, 如何有理. 曰且如大黃附子, 亦是枯槁. 然大黃不可為附子, 附子不可為大黃. 問枯槁之物亦有性, 是如何. 曰是他合下有此理, 故云天下無性外之物. 因行街, 云階磚便有磚之理. 因坐, 云竹椅便有竹椅之理. 枯槁之物, 謂之無生意, 則可謂之無生理, 則不可. 如朽木無所用, 止可付之釁灶, 是無生意矣. 然燒甚麼木, 則是甚麼氣, 亦各不同, 這是理元如此. 問枯槁有理否. 曰才有物, 便有理. 天不曾生箇筆, 人把兔毫來做筆. 才有筆, 便有理.

72 64 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 tends toward anarchy. In order to avoid total anarchy, Zhu Xi suggested that we recognize that the li in our minds and the li in things in the world are one and the same. The unity, however, cannot be reached at one moment and endure for long because we continuously come into contact with new things as long as we are alive. That is why the investigation of things is more like the method of learning rather than the theoretical explanation of the unity. It serves as the foundation for all the steps in the Great Learning (Daxue 大學 ) and eventually leads to bringing peace to all under heaven. The thorough penetration (huoran guantong 豁然貫通 ) which the investigation of things pursues has a paradoxical problem congruent with that of sagehood. The ultimate goal of the investigation of things, furthermore, of the entire enterprise of Zhu Xi s learning, is to reach the state of thorough penetration (huoran guantong). 29) When one encounters a situation, one takes up the situation and examines its li to the very end. After while there are many [such li that one has examined thus], and spontaneously, one can penetrate thoroughly. 30) This idea of thorough penetration is, admittedly, a confusing notion, particularly since it seems to resemble the notion of sudden enlightenment (dunwu 頓悟 ) in Chan Buddhism, which is precisely what Zhu Xi argued against. However, Zhu Xi s thorough penetration can be achieved only after gradual accumulation (jixi 積習 ). 31) That makes the idea of thorough penetration much more puzzling. Today this one item is understood thoroughly and tomorrow that one item is also understood thoroughly. When many [such items] have been accumulated, then one can penetrate thoroughly. 32) To reach the ultimate state of penetration, one continuously investigates the li of many particular things. However, the li that is pursued as the ultimate goal of the thorough penetration is the one universal li which all the things in the universe share. 33) 29) Concerning the discussion on the investigation of things and thorough penetration, see Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi; Kim, Analogical Extension (leitui) in Zhu Xi s Methodology of Investigation of Things (gewu) and Extension of Knowledge (zhizhi), I refer to them for the translation in this chapter. 30) Zhuzi quanshu 14, 603 (Zhuzi yulei 18): 只是才遇一事, 即就一事究竟其理, 少間多了, 自然會貫通. 31) Zhuzi quanshu 14, 599 (Zhuzi yulei 18): 積習多後, 自然貫通. 32) Zhuzi quanshu 14, 598 (Zhuzi yulei 18): 今日格一件, 明日又格一件, 積習既多, 然後脫然有貫通處.

73 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 65 Although the myriad li are simply one li, scholars still need to proceed to understand all the thousand ends and hundred beginnings inside the myriad lis. 34) It is true that for Zhu Xi, thorough penetration requires a moment in which our understanding undergoes a sudden leap, a process which bears at least a superficial similarity to the notion of sudden enlightenment in Chan Buddhism. However, what Zhu Xi advocated was enhancing the achievement of learning through cumulative, incremental effort, a gradual process made up of many smaller realizations. In fact, Zhu Xi explained the investigation of things with reference to probabilities many times: Now let us talk about it with ten cases. If one can understand seven or eight cases then those two or three cases can be penetrated by means of [their being of the same] kind. 35) [Suppose] Dao and li of one thing has ten portions. If one only sees two or three portions, then one has not seen exhaustively. One must keep extending and must try to see [all] ten portions exhaustively. Only then can it be the investigation of the thing. If one has seen [all] ten portions exhaustively, only then on knows [that one can] stop. 36) This view of thorough penetration, the ultimate goal of the investigation of things, reminds us of the paradox connected with learning to become a sage examined earlier. Both the promise of being able to become a sage and also reaching the state of thorough penetration empower those who engage in the learning and legitimize the process of learning. Furthermore, for Zhu Xi, the goal of the investigation of things in practice is gradual accumulation (jixi). Therefore, our ability to find a way to share norms is tied to the process rather than the result of learning. For Zhu Xi, thorough penetration refers to the moment of the leap from understanding particular principles of things to one universal principle, but is also predicated on the accomplishment of perfect unity between the li in things and the li in our mind. In Zhu Xi s idea of the relationship between external world and self, there does not exist a 33) Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi, ) Zhuzi quanshu 18, 3691 (Zhuzi yulei 117): 萬理雖只是一理, 學者且要去萬理中千頭百緒都理會. 35) Zhuzi quanshu 14, 604 (Zhuzi yulei 18): 今以十事言之, 若理會得七八件, 則那兩三件觸類可通. 36) Zhuzi quanshu 18, 475 (Zhuzi yulei 15): 一物有十分道理, 若只見三二分, 便是見不盡須是推來推去, 要見盡十分, 方是格. 既見盡十分, 便是知止.

74 66 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 moment that human beings do not come into contact with the external world. Since human beings cannot be separated from the external world, we must begin anew the process of investigating and understanding a particular thing whenever encountering a new thing, even after one has already experienced the moment of thorough penetration in relation to other particular things. Therefore, an instance of thorough penetration cannot be the end of all the endeavors of apprehending li. One should start the process anew every time a new object is encountered. Thus the learning based on the investigation of things becomes a never-ending process and lifelong project, as the number of new things to investigate or encounter always exceeds our prior experience. The paradox of learning to become a sage leads to an emphasis on the process of learning. As I have explained, Zhu Xi s philosophical system also supports the same conclusion. The crucial notions like the mind, li, the Supreme Ultimate, and benevolence in his system are all explicated by images of processes. The investigation of things, the most important theory of learning in his system, has at its core a paradox similar to the one present in learning to become a sage. For Zhu Xi, thorough penetration, the ultimate goal of the investigation of things, cannot be achieved once and for all things as a consequence of learning and must be renewed incessantly. Therefore the learning which is fundamentally based on the investigation of things should be, like the process of becoming a sage, a lifelong process without any moment in which the task has been fully completed. Since the notion of sagehood and learning are both closely related to governing the world in the daoxue system, the idea that learning to become a sage is a lifelong process which can never be wholly completed should change the way of governing the world too. In the next section, I will explain how Zhu Xi reintegrated sagehood and statecraft and how sagely governance was presented within this paradoxical learning system. 4. Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World Prepared by Confucius Zhu Xi depicted the antiquity as an ideal world where sages were also rulers, presenting his version of the lineage of dao 道 (the Way) in the Preface to the Doctrine of the Mean as below: Yao 堯, Shun 舜, and Yu 禹 were great sages among all under heaven, and for them to pass on succession to [rulership of] the world was a major

75 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 67 matter for all under heaven. As great sages performing a major undertaking for all under heaven, on such momentous occasions their repeated admonitions still consisted only of these few words. How then could anything more to be added to this from among all the principles under heaven? Subsequently sages upon sages succeeded one another: King Tang 湯, King Wen 文 and King Wu 武 as rulers, Gao Yao 皋陶, Yi Yin 伊尹, Fu Yue 傅說, the Duke of Zhou 周, and Duke Shao 召 as ministers, received and passed on the succession to dao. As for our master Confucius, though he did not attain a position of authority, nevertheless his resuming the learning of the past sages and imparting it to later scholars was a contribution even more worthy than that of Yao and Shun. Still, in his own time those who recognized him were only Yan Hui 顏回 and Zeng Shen 曾參, who grasped and passed on his essential meaning. 37) With the exception of Confucius, Zhu Xi s list of sages who passed dao includes only rulers and ministers. In antiquity, they received and passed rulership and dao simultaneously. Sages governed the world and learning and governance were integrated. Because the world was ruled by sage-rulers and they implemented a perfect system, the institutions that the government employed guaranteed good governance in antiquity. A reason why the world deteriorated into an undesirable situation is difficult to discern in Zhu Xi s texts, but his narrative asserts that the perfect order maintained by the unity of sagehood and political power eventually disappeared. In a world where rulers were no longer sages, a new type of sage appeared. Zhu Xi pointed out that Confucius was different from the other ancient rulers and ministers in that he did not hold an influential governing position during his lifetime. However, Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius contribution was even more worthy than that of Yao and Shun because Confucius provided an alternative for future scholars. Confucius did not hold the deserved position so that he took the way of the former kings, recited and passed them on to his disciples, to proclaim them to later generations. As Confucius was often regarded as an uncrowned king (suwang 素王 ), Zhu Xi believed that he should have attained the position of a ruler in the world as well. Zhu Xi argued that Confucius should be regarded as a sage not only because he had moral superiority but also because he prepared (or more properly, preserved) knowledge about the proper way to govern the world for later scholars. In the Personal Proposals for Schools and Official Recruitment (xuexiao gongju siyi 學校貢擧私議 ), his famous discussion on the reform 37) Zhuzi quanshu 6, 29-30: Zhongong Zhangju xu 中庸章句序. 夫堯舜禹天下之大聖也. 以天下相傳, 天下之大事也. 以天下之大聖, 行天下之大事而其授受之際, 丁寧告戒, 不過如此. 則天下之理, 豈有以加於此哉. 自是以來, 聖聖相承若成湯文武之為君皋陶伊傅周召之為臣, 既皆以此而接夫道統之傳, 若吾夫子, 則雖不得其位, 而所以繼往聖開來學, 其功反有賢於堯舜者. 然當是時, 見而知之者惟顏氏, 曾氏之傳得其宗.

76 68 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 of the educational and examination system, Zhu Xi portrayed literati (shi 士 ) of the Golden Ages as follows: In antiquity the method of selecting officials from the schools began with [school] in the villages and communities and reached up to [the Imperial College] at the capital. Students were taught moral conduct and the [six] arts, and those who were worthy and capable were promoted [to become officials.] There was just one place where students were educated, just one means by which they were made officials, and just one method by which they were selected. Therefore, literati (shi) had a fixed purpose and suffered no distractions. They made diligent efforts from morning to night and were only concerned about failing in moral cultivation rather than possible failure in attaining office or emoluments As a systematic process this could help people to cultivate their minds and nourish their qi. Consequently people were able to make progress toward the goal of virtuous conduct. It was for this reason that the ancient system could develop human talents, enrich culture, regulate society s affairs, and bring about great peace. This is not so, however, of the present system. 38) According to Zhu Xi s view of the ideal system of antiquity, education, selection of officials, and bureaucracy in the system should all be selected from one source. He states that there was just one place where students were educated, just one means by which they were made officials, and just one method by which they were selected. There was no other way to attain official positions. Everything was integrated into one perfect system. Through their employment of systematic processes, the ancient institutions could help people to cultivate their minds and nourish their qi. Therefore, literati in antiquity would naturally participate in governance; in fact, their participation was guaranteed in part by the government s very system and institutions. Zhu Xi claimed that governance and learning had ceased to be properly integrated during the dynasties between Confucius and the Cheng brothers. Although government and learning had been united in antiquity, he felt that government failed to provide learning in later times, and claimed that no subsequent periods could equal the Three Dynasties, which he saw as exceptional. 39) The exceptional standing of the Three 38) Zhu Xi ji, 6, 3632: 古者學校選舉之法, 始於鄉黨而達於國都, 教之以德行道藝, 而興其賢者能者蓋其所以居之者無異處, 所以官之者無異術, 所以取之者無異路, 是以士有定志而無外慕, 蚤夜孜孜, 唯懼德業之不脩, 而不憂爵祿之未至. 其爲法制之密又足以爲治心養氣之助, 而進於道德之歸此古之爲法所以能人材而厚風俗, 濟世務而興太平也. 今之爲法不然. 39) Concerning the topic, Zhu Xi s position is well expressed in the debate between Zhu Xi and Chen Liang 陳亮 ( ) with regard to the unique status of the Three Dynasties and its difference from the later dynasties, see Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi,

77 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 69 Dynasties did not, however, prompt him to propose simply attempting to recover its political institutions and structures. Unlike many daoxue thinkers in the Song periods, Zhu Xi believed that such a recovery would be impossible, stating that we cannot achieve good governance simply by recovering the institutional formats of the Three Dynasties and implementing them in the contemporary world. Even as he expressed his admiration and showed great respect for ancient institutions and idealized them, Zhu Xi basically disagreed with proposals made by other of his daoxue contemporaries to recover them. He was not a part of the institutional returning to the antiquity (fugu 復古 ) movement in the Song period, for example. Instead, what Zhu Xi idealized in his portrayal of the Three Dynasties was the way in which the society of the Three Dynasties operated as an organic whole. He felt that the utopian mechanism which antiquity exercised could not be explained simply by the sum of its institutions. By bracketing the Three Dynasties as an inimitable exception to the historical pattern, Zhu Xi liberated Confucian tradition from history and created a new beginning. Furthermore, he foreclosed the possibility of reintegrating sagehood and governing the world as part of a method to recover ancient ideal institutions. Although Zhu Xi never denied the institutional features and functions of governments, he thought that the state was merely a part of the bigger system. He did not believe that institutional approaches alone could successfully reintegrate sagehood and governance. Zhu Xi insisted that governance (zheng 政 ) and learning (xue) should be unified. While he held that no institution can guarantee good governance by itself, he did not oppose the idea that sages should govern the world, however. He believed that if Confucius had lived in the right time, he should have been able to enact governance and teaching together. Although Confucius did not achieve the way in his own life time, Zhu Xi thought that later generations would be able to resume the way through his teachings. Therefore, the way to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world is the learning per se prepared by Confucius. Since learning to become a sage is a lifelong process, governing the world is achieved not through the implementation of institutions or emergence of sage-rulers but through a process actively and voluntarily participated in by those who commit to learning to become a sage as their lifelong project. 5. Concluding Remarks: Governance in/as the Learning Process and Paths Untaken

78 70 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 The problem of how sagehood and governing the world could be reintegrated in a real society where political power was clearly separated from sagehood remained a fundamental question for Zhu Xi. There were some easy ways to evade this troublesome question: declaring the present ruler to be a sage-king, enabling those who pursue sagehood to become government officials and exercise power as a minister, or simply by redefining governing the world as the practice of moral self-cultivation. Although many have argued that Zhu Xi realized his political vision through governance by a sagely emperor who cultivates his mind, 40) I would argue that in fact Zhu Xi does not recommend any of the aforementioned ways to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world. While it is true that Zhu Xi emphasized that rulers should participate in the only right learning (meaning the daoxue learning), and the self-cultivation of rulers did have enormous implications in governing the world for him, he never relied exclusively on sagely emperors for the enacting of sagely governance. 41) Although a minister-centered governance (zaixiang zhengzhi 宰相政治 ) in which a minister who attempts to embody the daoxue vision in real politics and has power to check and control the absolute power of the monarch is also often referred to as the way to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world, 42) Zhu Xi s vision encompasses more than just minister-centered governance. Though Zhu Xi argued that governing the world should be based on moral self-cultivation, this does not mean that he advocated a naive moralist vision which failed to present any actual means to govern the world in the real society. 43) This is, in fact, one of the many paths that Zhu Xi did not take. Rather, Zhu Xi adopted a brand new approach, one which sought to integrate learning and governing the world into a unified process. In so doing, those who participate in his learning could also participate in governance. He designed his learning program as the way in which those who pursue his learning channel their aspiration for political participation into the public realm. Zhu Xi promoted an institutional basis for his 40) For the representative study of this type of perspective, see Yu, Zhu Xi de lishi shijie: Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu. 41) See Bol, On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas for a refutation of perspectives like those put forward by Yu Yingshi. 42) For an example of this perspective, see Wang, Sōdai no kōtei kenryoku to shitaifu seiji. 43) Min argued against this view.

79 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 71 learning via such organizations as academies, community granaries, and community compacts through which the learning process could be closely related to both public social activity and the political realm. 44) However, the single most important feature of Zhu Xi s learning process as the way of governing the world was his effort to build powerful networks of literati and to influence public opinion (gonglun 公論 ) through the learning process. This article examines Zhu Xi s idea of sagehood by focusing on the paradox of learning to become a sage. Zhu Xi s teaching contained a self-contradictory promise: on the one hand, he insisted that every human being has the universal potential to become a sage through learning. On the other, he admitted that in physical and historical reality it is impossible for human being to become a sage through learning, since sages have innate knowledge and their sagehood is an inborn trait (Confucius, for example, was born as a sage). Although the sagehood of Confucius was not achieved through learning, Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius pretended to learn so that other people might emulate his model. The effect of Zhu Xi s resolution of this seeming contradiction is a shift of the emphasis of learning from result to process. In other words, Zhu Xi emphasized learning to be a sage as a lifelong project that should be pursued even though it was impossible to achieve, since the importance of learning to become a sage lies in following a path of moral learning rather than the realizing its ultimate goal. Because learning to become a sage is, in fact, learning to be always in the process of being sage, the functional impact of having sagehood as the goal of his learning is to bind its followers to remaining continually in its process. Other crucial notions within Zhu Xi s philosophical system (such as li and the Supreme Ultimate) are also described using the metaphor of process. The investigation of things, the most fundamental basis of his learning, embodied many of the same contradiction as learning to become a sage. The ultimate goal of the investigation of things is perfect penetration, which can never be achieved once and for all, but must be renewed every moment and continually in relation to different things. As with sagehood, what is emphasized most heavily is the learning process. Zhu Xi also claimed that the sagely governance prepared by Confucius is 44) Concerning community compacts, see Übelhör, The Community Compact (Hsiang-yüeh) of the Sung and Its Educational Significance. In regard to academies, see Walton, The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, Schools, and Shu-yüan in Sung-Yuan China ; Walton, Academies and Society in Southern Sung China.

80 72 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 his learning per se. As a consequence, reintegrating sagehood and governing the world is nothing other than making the learning process coterminous with the governing process. Because it is functionally impossible for any person to actually achieve sagehood through learning, sagehood cannot be practiced as a result of the learning to become a sage. For Zhu Xi, then, there is no other way to reveal sageliness than by performing it in the process of making efforts to become a sage. Because no single person, no matter he is an emperor or minister, can be expected to govern the world as a sage, the world must be governed not by a single individual who has already become a sage but a group of people who have committed to the lifelong project of learning to become a sage. In this way, the paradox of learning to become a sage underpins Zhu Xi s significant new idea for how the world ought to be governed. Submitted: / Reviewed: / Confirmed for publication:

81 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 73 REFERENCES Allan, Sarah The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early China. San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center. Bol, Peter K. 2003a. Neo-Confucianism and Local Society, Twelfth to Sixteenth Century: A Case Study. in Paul Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn eds.: The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center b. The Localist Turn and Local Identity in Later Imperial China. Late Imperial China 24. 2: On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas: Reflections on Yu Yingshi s Approach to the study of Song Daoxue. Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 34: Neo-Confucianism in History. Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monograph. Ching, Julia Neo-Confucian Utopian Theories and Political Ethics. Monumenta Sinica 30:1-56. Fujii, Michiaki 藤井倫明 Sodai Dogaku ni okeru seijingkan 宋代道学における聖人観の本質道学的無の意味するもの, Toho gakuho 東方學報 104: Hymes, Robert P. and Conrad Schirokauer eds Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ichiki, Tsuyuhiko 市来津由彦 Shu Ki monjin shūdan keisei no kenkyū 朱熹門人集團形成の研究. Tokyo: Shobunha. Kakiuchi, Keiko 垣内景子 Shu Ki no keisho no shushakubunken no kenkyu josetsu 朱熹の経書注釈文献の研究序説論語為政篇吾十有五而志于学章をめぐって. Toyo no sisho to shukyo 東洋の思想と宗敎 18: Kim, Yung Sik The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi. Philadelphia: Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society Analogical Extension (leitui) in Zhu Xi s Methodology of Investigation of Things (gewu) and Extension of Knowledge (zhizhi). Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 34: Makeham, John Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center. Min, Byounghee The Republic of the Mind: Zhu Xi s Learning (Xue) as a Sociopolitical Agenda and the Construction of Literati Society. (Doctoral Dissertation) Harvard University. Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi. Cambridge: Harvard University, Council on East Asian Studies. Übelhör, Monika The Community Compact (Hsiang-yüeh) of the Sung and Its Educational Significance. : in de Bary, Wm. T. and John Chaffee eds.

82 74 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage. Berkeley: University of California Press. Walton, Linda The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, Schools. and Shu-yüan in Sung-Yuan China. In de Bary, Wm. T. and John Chaffee eds. Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage. Berkeley: University of California Press Academies and Society in Southern Sung China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Wang, Ruilai 王瑞来 Sōdai no kōtei kenryoku to shitaifu seiji 宋代の皇帝権力と士大夫政治. Tokyo: Kyūko sōsho. Yu, Yingshi 余英時 Zhu Xi de lishi shijie : Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu. 朱熹的歷史世界宋代士大夫政治文化的研究. Vol Taibei: Yunchen wenhua shiye. Zhu, Xi 朱熹 ( ). Lunyujizhu 論語集注, Zhuziyulei 朱子語類. Zhu, Xi 朱熹 Guo Ji 郭齊. Yin Bo 尹波 eds. Zhu Xi ji 朱熹集. Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe. Zhu, Xi 朱熹 Zhu Jieren, Yan Zuozhi, Liu Yongxiang 朱傑人, 嚴佐之, 劉永翔 eds., Zhuzi quanshu 朱子全書. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe; Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe.

83 MIN Byounghee / The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage 75 聖學的悖論朱熹是如何將聖人之治與現實的經世再結合的? 閔丙禧中文摘要本文討論說明的是朱熹針對儒家政治思想中最重要的內容之一的如何將聖人之治與現實的經世再結合這一問題所提出的解決方法針對現實中道德權威與政治權力乖離的問題, 朱熹提出了將聖人之治與現實經世相結合的新的對策本論文將朱熹新的經世觀點及其對聖人的思考結合起來進行了說明, 並特別注意到朱熹所提出的聖學中所包含的悖論朱熹一方面認爲所有人都具備成聖的普遍潛力, 通過學都能成聖但同時另一方面他又指出在現實中與曆史上, 從來都沒有人通過學而到達過聖人的境界, 而且那也是不可能實現的可見朱熹對於學其實持著自相矛盾的觀點盡管如此, 朱熹事實上是通過這一矛盾來啟發人們不要執著於學的結果而應該關注學的過程朱熹強調說學是一個人應該一生不斷追求的, 哪怕是一瞬間也不應該脫離正確的學的過程爲了成聖而堅持學之所以重要, 並不是因爲學就真的有可能實現成聖這一最終目的, 而是因爲參與到遵循倫理的正確的學的過程本身才是最重要的朱熹哲學體系的主要概念和理論中也有很多可以用表現過程的比喻來予以說明的而且他關於學的理論體系中處於最根本地位的格物也存在與聖學悖論類似的矛盾在這樣的哲學體系基礎上, 朱熹對他關於經世構想的說明繼承了孔子的思想, 指的是准備好了的聖王的經世事實上就是學本身朱熹對於如何才能重新像三代理想時期一樣由聖人來治理天下這一問題提出了將學的過程與經世的過程同一化的方法他認爲, 不是由一個完美無缺的聖人來治理天下, 而是通過讓更多的人參與到爲了成聖而終身獻身於學的過程中來這一辦法才能夠真正參與到經世的過程中關鍵詞 : 朱熹, 聖人, 經世, 過程, 聖學的悖論, 聖人之治與經世的再結合

84 76 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015

85 A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks in the Neo-Confucian School of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學 KIM Yon-jae 1) Abstract This paper examines how a system of justice can be established in the Neo-Confucian School of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學 from the perspective of social networks. The keyword is the principle of sustainability, which stems from the ecological concept of sustainable development. For Neo-Confucianists, the world, which is represented as myriad things under heaven and on earth, is a coherent whole with a certain origin and unitary processes. This world-view is reflected in the sustainable operations of its social structure. The process of justifying the sustainability within this worldview can be approached from three categories: tianli 天理 (Heavenly Principle), tiyong yiyuan 體用一源 (one source of substance and function), and liyi fenshu 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations). One source of legitimacy in this system is expressed under the concept of the Heavenly Principle. In Neo-Confucian thought, it provides the basis for justice in human relations. Its mode of changeability is expressed as one source of substance and function, which provides an organic quality of appropriateness to the human social relationships. As a result, the structure in which relationships are sustained is sometimes expressed as one Principle and its multiple manifestations. It provides a holistic unity to the orientation of social networks. These three categories reciprocally support one another, but the first two are integrated into the * KIM Yon-jae: Associate Professor, Department of Oriental Studies, Kongju National University (yonjae333@hanmail.net)

86 78 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 third (liyi fenshu). In particular, the third works implicitly as the basis for positing a unified total system, in the sense that the same principle is seen as being comprehensively maintained in several complex individual relationships. Here, the ecological concept of sustainability provides several useful suggestions for explicating a logical mechanism of justification within a Neo-Confucian system. The structure of sustainability can be symbolized as a web of social networks, according to which members in a community are suited to play their roles in each field and, on this basis, bring forth their maximal productive activity. Such a model preserves an open horizon of coexistence and cooperation for newly emergent order within a series of integral relationships between person and community, knowledge and practice, ideal and reality, etc. The Neo-Confucian system, therefore, concentrates upon a principle of reality rather than upon one of entity. Neo-Confucianists, while diverse in their thought, tended to share a common way of thinking within a social network. In a reality characterized by incessantly changing processes, they constructed a sound system for a moral canon of justice oriented toward self-realization (ziwo shixian 自我實現 ). As a consequence, the Neo-Confucian world-view has a logical, sustainable mechanism for both moralizing justice and justicizing morality. Keywords: sustainability, Heavenly Principle, one source of substance and function, one Principle and its multiple manifestations, justice, modes of change, structure of social networks

87 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks An Awareness of the Neo-Confucian Issues and Its Arguing Point One of the main concerns for our shared human future is how well the global village can be integrated with natural environments. Our ability to do so is closely associated with the existence of life, continuous growth, balanced prosperity, a stable way of life, etc. In recent years, many branches relating to this topic have converged under a single rubric, namely, the idea of sustainable development. 1) Although sustainable development is closely associated with the issue of how economic development can occur within the bounded constraints of ecological environments or made compatible with natural conservation, its implications touch upon all areas of human activities like natural science, economics, sociology, philosophy, and so on. The essay focuses upon exploring how a system of justice can be established from the perspective of social networks in the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學. 2) The key is the principle of sustainability which stems from the ecological concept of sustainable development. Sustainability, whether it is that of economic development or that of an ecosystem s opeartions, is an important key to setting up lasting relationships. Our ecological environments themselves have self-control systems, in which the input of elements cannot exceed the capacity of the whole to accommodate these elements. These self-control systems continually adjust (and are adjusted by) the conditions within which various organisms interact, generally seeking to establish both balance in change and change in balance. A similar understanding can be applied to human activities. Human activities are basically constituted into a web of relations, a social network composed of individuals and their surroundings, both natural and social. 3) In seeking to 1) The term sustainable development has a particular history. In 1970s, a slogan of Only One Earth was proposed in the UN Conference on the Human Environment. Early in 1980s, the term of eco-development was suggested in the Environmental Plan of UN. The term sustainable development derived from the 1987 UN report Our Common Future. It seeks to explore the delicate relationship between the natural environment and economic and social growth, and is specifically concerned with whether the community pursues social growth which also seeks to protect and preserve the natural environment. In 1992, the term was expanded to environmentally sound and sustainable development in the Rio Conference on the Human Environment in Brazil, though I will use the shorter formulation throughout this essay. 2) This topic provides a new way of thinking about the modernization of Neo-Confucianism. There has been no established study on this topic to date.

88 80 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 explain those social networks within which we conduct our lives within the global village, therefore, such social variations can be expanded into a sustainable regularity, and a mechanism of balance and change can be converted into the principle of sustainability. The principle of sustainability, though stemming from an ecological field, can be understood as analogous to the organic structure of social networks since it relates both to how individuals live their lives within a social network and conversely how a social network continually supports individuals and their lives. 4) Therefore, the principle of sustainability can be explored in two dimensions: what it means to seek the value of a human life and how to actualize that value. The two are neither mutually exclusive nor independent but exist in the same line of continuity. As cultural beings with beliefs and values, human beings live their lives in a complicated web of populations, economics, energy, information, structures, etc., a fact which, when considered, greatly widens the belt of consensus. A conceptual application of sustainability to human lives, thus, is particularly significant because it orients us toward an open horizon of globalization, 5) which can be expressed as a structural way of coexistence and cooperation in the world. Throughout history, the solidity of human relationships have primarily been based upon such a series of social, economic, political, and cultural interactions. A community, as a specific crystallization of particular human relationships, can be characterized as an integrated system in which parts functionally adjust to the whole, and vice versa. The Neo-Confucian community is not exceptional in this regard. For Neo-Confucianists, how such an integrated system could be maintained in a community was a kind of barometer for its efficiency and soundness. This view is basically inspired by an emphasis on achieving the self-realization that a variety of human activities are secured in other lives and an awareness that all members of the community can cultivate their own unique selves, each capable of orienting itself toward the utopian community called datong 大同 (great harmony). During the Song 宋 dynasty, especially in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Neo-Confucianists experienced one of the greatest transformations in history. It was a kind of turn within Post-Confucianism (or what is called Neo-Confucianism) and was driven by their laudable 3) De Bary, Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought, ) Yang, Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior, ) The term is referred to as an expression of a harmonious unity of globalization and locality, which reflects an ideal oriented toward a larger and higher community.

89 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 81 desire to restore classical Confucianism. These thinkers shared a belief in the possibility of developing an integrated system which would be capable of filling up the large disjunction that had been made between social, political and economical practices on the one hand and cultural identities on the other. 6) Their system entailed maintaining a hierarchical class structure consisting of the ruling and the ruled, and they consequently emphasized those moral commitments which they believed to be necessary for the functioning of a traditionally hierarchical social network. In doing so, they incessantly sought to institutionalize the moral canon of classical Confucianism on the highest level of universal ultimacy (gongji 窮極 ), which is characteristic of identity, coherence, consistency, interconnectedness, continuity, harmony, wholeness, etc. 7) With regard to the establishment of Neo-Confucianism, we can raise a few questions: Why should Neo-Confucianists seek new values for their lives? Are there any values which might make their lives happier, and if so, how do they define them for the purpose of reconstructing Confucianism? How might these values enable them to achieve a higher quality of living? How might they constitute a Neo-Confucian system of orthodoxy? These questions are closely associated with thoughtful approaches towards comprehending a Neo-Confucian ideal of social networks and justifying their sustainability. Against the grave challenge of Buddhism and Taoism, Neo-Confucianists faced the challenging of developing a new world-view capable of overcoming the discrepancy between the ideal and the real. They constructed a foundation upon which was laid the axiological scheme of daoxue 道學 (Learning of the Way). 8) From a cosmological perspective, they posited the existence of virtues shared in common between tiandao 天道 (heavenly way) and rendao 人道 (humane way), and claimed that these virtues also dwell in the inner essence of human existence, that is, that they are fundamental to human nature. According to their view, human value is legitimated through a holistic integration of the heavenly and the humane way. This integration is a universal ideal referred to by the expression tianren heyi 天人合一 (unity of heaven and man) and is posited as the final stage of self-realization, namely, the ultimate goal of neisheng waiwang 內聖外王 (inner sagehood and outer kingship). In concretizing daoxue 道學, thus, there is no sharp distinction 6) Smith, et al., Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching, ) Kim, The Yijing Theories and Moralistic Metaphysics of Neo-Confucian Schools of Lixue and Xinxue in Song-Ming Dynasties, ) De Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart, 1-17.

90 82 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 between human existence and its value, between subject and object, between human beings and their environmental conditions, or even between transcendence and immanence, which, until now, has usually been regarded as one of the chief characteristics of East Asian thought and culture. Neo-Confucianists also attached great importance to the world s ecological unity. They recognized the world as participating in the biological processes of production and transformation, and inquire into the original source of all things and the constitution of nature in an ever-changing world. The world of all creation, which is representative of myriad things under heaven and on earth, is a coherent whole with a certain origin and unitary processes. An unfolding process of production and transformation is reflected in the operation of a hierarchical structure to make the Confucian orthodoxy of daotong 道統 (succession of the Way), and is applied to a just and great cause for social networks. And furthermore it is comprehensively categorized into an ideal of unity within which mutually sustaining relationships between the self and the others and the self and the government are maintained and extended in a certain way. 9) The world-view of the Cheng-Zhu school exhibits a particularly strong tendency towards the idealization and quest for such an identical unity. Crucial to an understanding of this worldview is tianli 天理 (the Heavenly Principle) or li 理 (Principle). For adherents of this school, the Heavenly Principle represented a moral cause of justice which is primarily oriented toward an ideal of sagehood as it was manifest in antiquity. Neo-Confucianists thought that the principle was fully manifest in the antiquity of the Zhou 周 dynasty but was no longer recognizable in their contemporary community. Since their goals was to realize a perfect community of integrated order which resembled the one they identified in the Rituals of the Zhou (zhouli 周禮 ), they placed new ideological weight on certain aspects of the thought of Confucius, Mencius, and the sages, and advanced a particular method for transforming the self through learning, and furthermore for transforming government into an effective instrument for serving the common interest. This capacity for transformation can be expressed through the notion of tiyong yiyuan 體用一源 (one source of substance and function). As a result, Neo-Confucianists sought to establish a common, sustainable structure for all networks, social and otherwise, namely that liyi fenshu 理一分殊 (the Principle is one and its manifestations are many). For these 9) De Bary, Learning for One s Self: Essays on the Individual in Neo-Confucian Thought,

91 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 83 thinkers, all things, including human beings, have the same unity of principle, even while enjoying particular (and differing) roles in individual relationships. Such a unity is conceptualized as the Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極 ) and was believed to employ incessant processes of balancing between yin 陰 and yang 陽, movement (dong 動 ) and stillness (jing 靜 ), etc., which are recognized as the sources of heaven and earth and the fundamentals of the myriad things. It is comprehensively elevated to an organic cosmos ultimately to provide the full endowment of innate coherence for the world. 10) From the perspective of such a universal unity, human community can support social value and its realization, especially as it relates to moral obligations, like one s rights and duties. In this respect, it is possible to say that the concept of sustainability has all manner of implications when one considers a logical mechanism for justifying systems of Neo-Confucianist thought. 2. Tianli 天理 as an Ideal of Justice One of the most crucial concepts for an understanding of the Neo-Confucian system of integrity is that of the Heavenly Principle. This idea, first presented by Cheng Hao 程顥, is used to prescribe a kind of original and creative order in the heavenly body and thereby to probe into the natures and grounds of myriad things in the world. The notion is not only representative of a turn from cosmology to ontology, as scholars like John Henderson have pointed out, 11) it also provides an ideal of justice for a social network which comprises a whole and healthy community. To begin with, Cheng Hao draws attention to the word sheng 生 (generation), which has a clear biological flavor. Sheng is the natural law which creates and transforms all things under heaven and on earth. Cheng writes: To generate over and over again, which is called Changes. This is the ground that heaven is the Way. Heaven simply regards generation as the Way. What succeeds to the principle of generation is goodness. Goodness has the implication of origin. Origin is the head of goodness. Myriad things have all the significance of spring, which is that what succeeds to it is goodness. 12) 10) In general, a belief in unity was pervaded over the Neo-Confucian society. Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, ) Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology,

92 84 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 For Cheng Hao, all changes in the world can be characterized as the Heaven Way. In the world, the processes of generation are referred to as a natural course (ziran 自然 ), which can be envisioned as functioning like a circle of life. It has the quality character of producing itself in the sense of having a primordial beginning or source, from which things start to grow up. In the sense of the succession or continuity of organismic process that all things spontaneously unify one another in self-generating lives, 13) therefore, it is characterized by a virtue of goodness and is conceptualized into the law of Nature without any intention or consciousness, 14) Cheng Hao refers to this as shengli 生理 (principle of generation) or chunyi 春意 (generating function of spring). Cheng Hao asserts that there must exist a creative way of naturally producing all things, and prescribes it as the ecological law which justifies the existence of all things and especially supports the legitimacy of human beings. His position provides a basis for conceptualizing the Heavenly Principle. Where can we find the deductive ground of the Heavenly Principle? Cheng Yi 程頤 answers the question by precisely analyzing the Heavenly Principle into an abstract stratum. He combines a term of the Way with an attribute of heaven, one which has the characteristic of the being strong and vigorous, in maintaining a process of its own creation. The Heavenly Way implies that all things proceed strongly and ceaselessly in their own way. Cheng Yi writes: Now, there is a series of processes of creating in spring and growing in summer. These all are what results from the generation of the Way, and then there is a process of creation and growth. It is not true that the Way is such that the vital force, firstly, already generated and then there is a process of creation and growth. The Way generates myriad things again and again as naturally as it is in itself and is ceaseless. 15) The paragraph can best be understood within the context of Cheng Hao s 12) Er xiansheng yu shang 二先生語二上, ErCheng yishu 2:a: 生生之謂易, 是天之所以為道也. 天只是以生為道, 繼此生理者即是善也. 善便有一箇元底意思, 元者善之長, 萬物皆有春意, 便是繼之者善也. 13) Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, ) In this sense, he says, I deal with things by themselves, not by myself, and so it is non-myself. The Heavenly Way is like this. How can we go against it? ( Mingdao xiansheng yuyi 明道先生語一, ErCheng yishu 11: 以物待物, 不以己待物, 則無我也. 天理如此, 豈可逆哉? ) 15) Yichuan xiansheng yuyi 伊川先生語一, ErCheng yishu 15: 今夫春生夏長了一番. 皆是道之生, 後來生長, 不可道卻將旣生之氣, 後來卻要生長. 道則自然生生不息.

93 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 85 notion of generation. He regards the Way as a universal network which contains the regularity of creation and transformation, according to which all things undergo a process of birth and growth in and by itself, a process that they undertake in themselves in a fashion which is as natural to itself as the Way is to itself. Most importantly, it can be understood as a process of completion that myriad things have their own respective ways, and that each of this different ways are provided for within the larger law of Nature. For example, in Cheng Yi s view, the Way works as a law of networks by which all things maintain or continue their existences via continual processes of creation and transformation. In explaining the circular process of fugua 復卦 (Restoration hexagram), 16) he applies a law of shengsheng zhi li 生生之理 (the principle of generating over and over again) to the heavenly rule of creating and transforming all things. From this, he proposes the deductive inference that a thing attains at the extremity of changing and then necessarily returns to the beginning. The principle is necessary to be like this. 17) The principle reflects interchangable, ongoing processes, like flourishing and decline or the going out and coming in of yin and yang. It entails things generating as naturally as it [the Way] is, and is compared to the phenomenal progress of the year, that is, a just and naturally ordained cycle of birth, growth, exhaustion, and rebirth under heaven and on earth. Therefore, the Heavenly Principle provides an ideal of justice for the observed reality that all things create and transform themselves in their own ways. Furthermore, Zhu Xi is of the opinion that, in the more advanced level of generation, there is a constitutive way of the original substance and its liuxing 流行 (stream). He uses the relationship of taiji 太極 (Supreme Ultimate) and yin-yang to explain one mode of the Heavenly Way: 18) 16) In the Fu hexagram, yang returns below five yin lines, which it will gradually supplant. According to the Commentary of Xugua 序卦傳, when yang is stripped to the extreme above, it returns to be born below. This is how Fu hexagram follows Bo Gua 剝卦 (Deterioration hexagram). It is a process of deceasing yin and increasing yang according to a balancing principle of yin and yang, from gugua 姤卦 (Temptation hexagram) through dungua 遯卦 (Retreatment hexagram), fougua 否卦 (Stagnation hexagram), guangua 觀卦 (Contemplation hexagram), bogua 剝卦 (Deterioration hexagram), kungua 坤卦 (Reception hexagram), to fugua (Restoration hexagram). 17) Yichuan xiansheng yuyi, ErCheng yishu 15: 物極必返, 其理須如此. 18) Yu, The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi s Philosophy,

94 86 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 The original substance of the Way cannot be seen. To observe it, one can see the substance of non-substance. For example, yin-yang and wuxing 五行 (Five Elements) are the substances of Supreme Ultimate. 19) Substance, as a quality of the Way, has two aspects. One of these aspects is original like the Supreme Ultimate, while the other aspect is unfolded like yin-yang and the Five Elements. The former, as the original substance, makes its individual way through the manifestation of the latter as the secondary substance. In particular, the relationship between the invisible original substance and its individual way constitutes the principle of generation that gives existence to all things. Zhu Xi describes the relationship as follows: Therefore, the ultimacy of the substance of the Way is called the Supreme Ultimate, and the stream of the Supreme Ultimate is called the Way. Although they have two names, their origin does not have two substances. 20) The Heavenly Way is described as a stream of yin and yang or movement and stillness. The most ultimate substance of the Heavenly Way is called the Supreme Ultimate and its individual manifestations are expressed as a stream. Zhu Xi writes, That the Supreme Ultimate has movement and stillness is the stream of the heavenly mandate and is so-called one yin and one yang are called the Way. 21) The Supreme Ultimate, as the original substance, is also a creative principle, naturally producing all things, and its stream, which has the quality of the heavenly mandate, is the law of justifying the existence of all things. And so the Supreme Ultimate is the principle of yin and yang, and its stream is revealed in the heavenly mandate. 22) For Zhu Xi, all things under the heaven and on earth should be considered to be expressions of the Supreme Ultimate in the sense of their ultimate origin, and as yin-yang and the Five Elements in the sense of their unfolding type. While the Supreme Ultimate, yin-yang, and the Five Elements are all different aspects of the original substance, Zhi Xi 19) Zhuzi yulei 36: 道之本然之體不可見, 觀此則可見無體之體, 如陰陽五行爲太極之體. 20) Da luzijing 答陸子靜, Zhu Xi ji 36: 故語道體之至極則謂之太極, 語太極之流行則謂之道, 雖有二名初無二體. 21) Zhu, Taiji tushuo jie: 太極之有動靜, 是天命之流行也, 所謂一陰一陽之謂道. 22) Concerning the philosophical methodology of Cheng-zhu school, refer to Kim, The Yijing Theories and Moralistic Metaphysics of Neo-Confucian Schools of Lixue and Xinxue in Song-Ming Dynasties,

95 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 87 claims that they do not just share the simple genetic relationship of production or creation like physically timely order. He emphasizes a reality of originality, creativity and transformation, and conceptualized it into a metaphysical rule through his notion of the original substance and its unfolding stream. For the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu, thus, the Heavenly Principle is the law by which all existing things in the real world operate. We can even say that it provides the foundational idea of justice necessary to make a sustainable ruling system in the Neo-Confucian world-view. 3. Tiyong yiyuan 體用一源 as a Holistic Mode of Change Cheng Yi generalizes the idea of the Heavenly Principle into a mode of change. The mode of change is none other than the famous proposition that tiyong yiyuan xianwei wujian 體用一源, 顯微無間 (substance and function are of one source, and there is no difference between the manifest and the hidden). The proposition that one source of substance and function are of one source is a kind of deductive rule drawn from a holistic understanding of the world, and thus provides a ground for prescribing the unitary nature of all existences in a network of reality. Cheng Yi concretizes this proposition into more applied relationships, as when he writes: The most manifest is no other than the affair, and the most hidden is no other than the Principle. Therefore, the Principle and the affair are identical, and the manifest and the hidden are of one source. 23) According to Cheng s deductive logic, all things possess the doubled aspect of both li 理 (Principle) and shi 事 (affair). The Principle is the ground of all existence, while the affair is their specific type, that is, the exterior form assumed by the general principle. It is the relationship between the two, between the general and the specific, which constitutes the living reality of existence. Cheng Yi further writes: They are calm and unmoved, and respond and finally penetrate as a whole. This implies that one already differentiates the affair from the 23) Yichuan xiansheng yushiyi, ErCheng yishu 25: 伊川先生語十一, 至顯者莫如事, 至微者莫如理, 而事理一致, 微顯一源.

96 88 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 Principle. If one mentions the Way, myriad Principles are already equipped in it, and so one does not discuss the distinction of the responded (gan 感 ) and the unresponded (weigan 未感 ) anymore. 24) A single affair is characteristic of the creation and transformation of all things, and as the general principle takes its operation within it, there is no distinction or separation as there is in the dichotomy of the responded and the unresponded. The principle and the affair, therefore, have such a unitary relationship that they are distinct but inseparable, like a pairing of ben 本 (the main) and mo 末 (the subsidiary). From such a relationship, he draws a significant conclusion: It doesn t need to be necessary that Changes are the affair. If one, in doing an affair, does the Heavenly Principle to the fullest, it is none other than Changes. 25) Here, the affair, which is characterized as the content of human activities, participates in the larger general category of human nature. The specific activity can be thought as an ontological type of which exists in accordance with the Heavenly Principle, in that the Heavenly Principle is concretized or manifest in all things, including human nature. Thus, since it is the case that the Heavenly Principle is prevalent in the existences of all things in the world, the unity of the Principle and the affair necessarily exist in human activities. This is the key foundation necessary for establishing libenlun 理本論 (Doctrine of Principle as the substance), which the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu advocates as the great Golden Rule. How then does Zhu Xi explain the deductive relationship of the Principle and the affair? Commencing with Cheng Yi s standpoint of yiyuan 一源 (one source) and wujian 無間 (no difference), Zhu Xi analyzes how and on what ground the Supreme Ultimate reveals itself. He contends that while the Supreme Ultimate reveals itself as the Principle prevalent in the unfolding course such that one yin and one yang or one movement and one stillness wholly correspond to each other, it itself is not yin and yang or movement and stillness. This has a purpose of mentioning a relationship of the substance and its stream through the paired terms substance-function or xingershang zhi dao 形 24) Yichuan xiansheng yuyi, Ercheng yishu 15: 寂然不動, 感而遂通, 此已言人分上事, 若論道, 則萬理皆具, 更不說感與未感. 25) Er xiansheng yu shang, ErCheng yishu 2:a: 不要將易又是一個事, 卽事盡天理, 便是易也.

97 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 89 而上之道 (the way above the physical realm) and xingerxia zhi qi 形而下之器 (things with physical shapes). From the standpoint of tiyong 體用 (substance and function), the Supreme Ultimate is the ultimate principle of making no distinction between movement and stillness, whereas, from the standpoint of xianwei 顯微 (the manifest and the hidden), it is the unfolded affair of making a distinction between movement and stillness. 26) Therefore, the relationship between the general principle and the specific affair has a kind of organic type in the relationship of one source or no difference. Furthermore, he explains the character of such a type comprehensively: It is right that the Supreme Ultimate includes movement and stillness (according to the comment, it is called the original substance). It is right that the Supreme Ultimate has movement and stillness (according to the comment, it is called stream). However, if the Supreme Ultimate is said to be movement and stillness, then, it makes no distinction of what is above shapes and what is within shapes. In that case, the phrase that there is the Supreme Ultimate in Changes is not necessary. 27) The Supreme Ultimate itself is characteristic of the principle of movement and stillness, not the specific instance of movement and stillness, and the specific instance wholly rests on the principle. The Supreme Ultimate itself cannot be moving or still, but encompasses the Principle which makes its own way of being wholly moving and still. Zhu Xi refers to a stream of the Heavenly Way as the characteristic method by which the Supreme Ultimate reveals its own substance. The Supreme Ultimate, as the original substance, can make its own revelation of stream. Thus, the view of the original substance of Supreme Ultimate and its stream are conceptualized into the organic mode of the one source of substance and function and no difference of the manifest and the hidden. Furthermore, Zhu Xi explains the significance of such a unity by exploring the relationship between the Principle and the vital force. The Principle and the vital force are different, in that one is xingershang 形而上 (metaphysical) and the other xingerxia 形而下 (physical); but, Zhu Xi claims they are not temporally ordered in terms of their production: 26) Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies, ) Da Yangzizhi 答楊子直, Zhu Xi ji 45: 蓋謂太極含動靜則可 ( 自注 : 以本體而言也 ), 謂太極有動靜則可 ( 自注 : 以流行而言也 ), 若謂太極便是動靜, 則是形而上下者不分, 而易有太極之言亦贅矣.

98 90 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 It is possible to say that the Principle and the vital force originally have no distinction of before and after. But, from an inference, it seems that the Principle is before and the vital force is after. 28) While simple inference seems to suggest that the Principle is prior to the vital force, Zhu Xi insists that from the standpoint of a unity of original substance, no simple distinction in terms of production time can be made between them. He says in a metaphorical way: The Supreme Ultimate is the Principle, and movement and stillness are the vital forces. The vital force is on going, and so is the Principle, too. Both of them are dependent on each other and are never divided respectively. The Supreme Ultimate is like a man, and movement and stillness are like a horse. 29) This paragraph means that, for Zhu Xi, the Principle and the vital force have a relationship of undividable necessity. The Principle and the vital force are necessarily mentioned together and exist in a relationship of reciprocity, with the Principle, as the original substance of Supreme Ultimate, revealing itself in an unfolding way through the manifestations of the vital force. In their relationship, it is important to note Zhu Xi s insistence that the vital force manifests itself only according to the Principle. For this reason, Zhu says, It is possible to say that this originally has no distinction of before and after. However, if we infer from their belonging, it should be said that there is this Principle firstly. Nevertheless, the Principle is not something different, but something which exists in this vital force. If this vital force did not existent, then this Principle would not have a dependent place. 30) While it is possible to say that the Principle is prior to the vital force, they both are wholly necessary to each other and depend on each other for their existence, or as Zhu Xi claims, In the world, there is no vital force without the Principle, and there also is no Principle without the vital force. 31) This is because the relationship of the two is based upon an organic relationship of the original substance of Supreme Ultimate and its unfolding way. Both have their origin in each other: the Principle 28) Zhuzi yulei 1: 理與氣本無先後之可言. 但推上去時, 如理在先, 氣在後相似. 29) Zhuzi yulei 94: 太極, 理也. 動靜, 氣也. 氣行則理亦行, 二者常相依而未嘗相離也. 太極猶人, 動靜猶馬. 30) Zhuzi yulei 1: 此本無先後之可言. 然必欲推其所從, 則須說先有是理. 然理又非別爲一物, 卽存乎是氣之中. 無是氣, 則是理亦無掛搭處. 31) Zhuzi yulei 1: 天下未有無理之氣, 亦未有無氣之理.

99 KIM Yon-jae / A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks 91 serves as the ground of the vital force, and, as for the unfolding way, the vital force serves as the revelation of the Principle. As the original substance of Supreme Ultimate, the Principle must serve as the prior ground of the vital force, meaning that in one sense the vital force falls into a subsidiary function subordinate to the Principle. But Zhu s main interest is showing how their mutual dependence establishes fundamental principles, as he concludes: If there is this principle, there should be this vital force. But the Principle is fundamental. 32) From this we see that his larger aim is applying the view of the original substance of the Supreme Ultimate and its unfolding way to the essential and unitary relationship of the principle and the vital force. 33) Consequently, the Neo-Confucian idea of one source of substance and function has all kinds of implications which flow from the way it understands the reality of the world: implications which touch on the unification of community as well as the particularity of its members and the ideal shape of their relationships. The Cheng-Zhu School positively accepts holistic modes of changeability in order to justify the necessity of an absolute canon in the organized unity of the Neo-Confucian system. 4. Liyi fenshu 理一分殊 as a Sustainable Structure of Network Using the doctrine of liyi fenshu 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations) to construct a theory of unity of identity and difference, Cheng Yi gives an explanation for self-evident facts about the world. For him, everything is composed of the two vital forces of yin and yang and the existence of things requires a continual balancing of the forces. In Cheng s worldview, opposite phenomena, like male and female, are naturally drawn together into one unity. Therefore, all the things of the world naturally form types with each other according to their apportionment of yin and yang. Such types are not merely a means for classifying things by groups. More fundamentally, they manifest the orderliness that naturally occurs within the network of heaven and earth. For Cheng, this orderliness is characteristic of the harmonious unity of differences. In their concrete manifestations, things may have multiple distinctions and perform many different roles, but the Principle remains 32) Zhuzi yulei 1: 有是理便是氣, 但理是本. 33) Lokuang, Chu Hsi s Theory of Metaphysical Structure,

92 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 unitary in that their differences are subtle and related within a unifying system.

100 92 Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Vol. 23 / February 2015 unitary in that their differences are subtle and related within a unifying system. This unified system constitutes a kind of network under heaven and on earth, in human relations, and among all living things. Cheng Yi argues that the true functioning of society is similar to the functioning of yin and yang. Indeed, he viewed the sage s actions as identical to such physical processes as natural cycles of growth and decline. He felt that human beings should have imperatives to act according to the Principle that the physical world is structured in a natural hierarchy. For him, this principle also explains the basis of social solidity and the efficiency of its organic system. For Cheng Yi, how human relationships are going on for a community of higher class implicitly includes a way to accomplish the harmonious unification and distinctive difference of all things in a universal network. Concerning the understanding of Tuan-zhuan 彖傳 34) of kuigua 睽卦 (Opposition hexagram), he says: Extend the sameness in the Principle of things to illuminate the timely use of Kui. This is the way the sage unites differences. It is commonly known how sameness is the same. A sage, however, illuminates the fundamental sameness in the Principle of things. Thereby he can take the world as being the same, and harmonize and unite the myriad types. 35) This shows how to understand the world from the implied meaning of Kui Gua. The world is a dynamic system in which we can observe great diversity in unity and great unity in diversity. Therefore, he says: Living things have myriad differences that set them apart. But in attaining the harmony of heaven and earth and in receiving the vital forces of yin and yang, they form corresponding types. Therefore, though the vast of the world and groups of things are differently set apart, a sage can unite them. 36) Here Cheng Yi claims that while things appear to be disparate and unconnected by virtue of their differences, these differences are actually fundamentally connected and united by type. Distinctions between things are both real and fundamentally ordered by type; in other words, the 34) Heaven and earth are set apart but their affairs are the same. Male and female are set apart, but their aspirations comprehend each other s. The myriad things are set apart, but their affairs are ordered by types. The timely uses of Kui are great indeed! 35) Zhouyi chengzhi zhuan 2: 推物理之同, 以明睽之時用, 乃聖人合睽之道也. 見同之爲同者, 世俗之知也. 聖人則明物理之本同, 所以能同天下而和合萬類也. 36) Zhouyi chengzhi zhuan 2: 生物萬殊, 睽也, 然而得天地之和, 稟陰陽之氣, 則相類也. 物雖異而理本同, 故天下之大, 群生之衆, 睽散萬殊, 而聖人爲能同之.

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<4D6963726F736F667420576F7264202D2031322D312DC2B2B4C2AB47A16DC5AAAED1B0F3B5AAB0DDA144A7B5B867A16EB2A4B1B4A277A548AED1A4A4BEC7A5CDB0DDC344ACB0A8D2> 弘光人文社會學報第 12 期簡朝亮讀書堂答問. 孝經略探以書中學生問題為例趙詠寬彰化師範大學國文學系博士班研究生摘要孝經是十三經中字數最少的經典, 然實踐性高, 受歷來帝王重視但在清末民初, 傳統思維受到挑戰, 被視為維護