44 3 2007 5 ( ) Journal of Peking University( Philo sophy and Social Science s) Vol. 44, No. 3 May. 2007 1 2, (11, 100871 ; 21, ) :,,, :11,, ;21, ;31,, ; : ; ; ; :F121 :A :100025919 (2007) 0320120212,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :??,?,?,,,, :2007202206 :,,, (02JAZJD810001),
3 : 121,, [1 ] (Stage Theory),,,,,,, 1 :, ;,,,,, 1 :11, 6,116 ; 21 2003, 2003 ; 31 = Π ; 2, 1996 ;1996,,2000, Walt Rostow (1960, 1971), A. F. K. Organski (1965), C. E. Black (1966).
122 ( ) 2007 2 ( 1978-2004) : 1983 2002 :,2005 (3), 20 (2) :,2005 3 GDP ( 1978-2004), 3 2,,1986 1990 1996,,??,? [2 ], [3,4 ( ) ], GDP, [3,5 ],, [6, ] [7 Putnam, ],,,, ( ) [8, ],,
3 : 123 [9,10, ], ;, (Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR) [11,12 ],,,,,, (RCCC) 2003 31, 18 65, 7,714,, 6,116 ( ) 6,116 31 102 102, 211,? 51,6,065 6 %,11 % (5,700 ),,75 %, 1Π4 ( ), 1Π4,,,, 212,, :,, 10,,,?,?
124 ( ) 2007 (4) 4, 16 %,,, 26 %, 9116 %,,,,, ;,,, :, ;,, ;, ;,, 8, 5 : 5 :
3 : 125, 5, 80 %,,, 10 %,, 11 % (37 %), 213, (6),,, 6,,,,, (7),, : Π
126 ( ) 2007 7,,,,, (logistic regression), () () (), 20,1983 2003,,, (365Π6616),, 311, 6,,,, 1 0, ( dummy variable),4713 %, 312 : 31211,,,
3 : 127 :11 ; 21 ; 31 ;41 ;51 1,, 0 (1 ), (0 ),,1, 0 ( ),,, ( GDP ) ( GDP) (, ),, ( ) 31212, (information diffusion),,,, ;, 15 12,, 31213, 011 015, 313 1,,,, ;, ( 01018 01009), 01012 GDP 95 %,,GDP,, GDP,,? : = (B 3 S. E. )Π118138
128 ( ) 2007 1 : : - 2 Log - 2 Log - 2 Log :5700 likelihood 3766163 likelihood 3754126 likelihood 3720183 P < 0101 P < 0101 P < 0101 B S. E. B S. E. B S. E. 0110 0101 333 0107 0101 333 0107 0101 333-26113 2189 333-26120 2189 333-26125 2189 333 0100 0100 0100 0100 0129 0111 3 0122 0111 0119 0108 3 0117 0108 3 0126 0108 3 0119 0109 3 GDP log 0125 0117 0122 0117 loggdp 3 dummygdp - 0106 0102 33-0106 0102 33 GDP 2121 0181 33 2101 0182 33 0107 0102 0106 0102 33 0111 0102 333 0110 0102 333 3111 1109 33 3185 0160 333 2157 1111 3 3 p < 0105 ;33 p < 0101 ;333 p < 01001 : ;GDP log= log GDP(2003) ;dummygdp 1, 0 ; loggdp 3 dummygdp= GDP log dummygdp ; GDP (2003) GDP,,,, GDP,, ;,GDP ( 102 GDP 4,745,730,000),,,,,
3 : 129,,,,,,,,,, :,, [13 ],,, [13, ],,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,, : ;, :1, ;2,, ;3, ;4, ;5 :, ;,,,,,
130 ( ) 2007 [ ] [ 1 ] Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies[M]. New Haven and London : Yale University Press., 1968. [ 2 ] Huntington, Samuel, and Jorge Dominguez.Political Development. Macropolitical Theory[M]. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Addison2Wesley Publishing Co., 1975. [ 3 ] Lipset, Seymour Martin. Some Social Requisites of Democracy : Economic Development and Political Legitimacy [ J ]. American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1959. [ 4 ] Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy : Participation and Opposition[M]. New Haven and London : Yale University Press. 1971 [ 5 ] Cutright, Phillips. National Political Development : Measurement and Analysis[J ]. American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1963. [ 6 ] Putnam, Robert D, et. al. Explaining Institutional Success : The Case of Italian Regional Government[J ]. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 1, 1983. [ 7 ] Putnam, Robert.. Making Democracy Work[M]. Princeton University Press. 1993. [ 8 ]. [M]. :, 1998. [ 9 ].. [J ]. 1995(3). [10 ]. [J ].. 1996(9). [11 ]. [M]. :, 1996. [12 ]. [J ].. 2001(3). [13 ] Giles, Micheal W. and Lancaster, Thomas D. Political Transition, Social Development, and Legal Mobilization in Spain[J ]. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, 1989. The Preference of the Dispute Resolution in the Chinese Countryside SHENG Ming2ming 1, WANG Yu2hua 2 (1 School of Government Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871 ; 2 Department of Politics, Michigan University, U. S. A ) Abstract : Development theory hypothesizes that the higher level of economic development a region is, the more likely the individuals prefer the formal legal institutions in resolving their disputes. Drawn from a national survey conducted by the Research Center of Contemporary China at Peking University, this paper sets forth to test this hypothesis in the context of China s countryside. The analysis shows first that cost concern, legal knowledge, and traditions are main obstacles for people using the formal legal institutions. Examining the rural people s institutional preferences when they have economic disputes, statistical analysis reveals : 1) economic growth rate, rather than level of economic development, is conducive to the consolidation of formal legal institutions ; 2) the marginal effect of economic development turns negative after crossing a certain threshold ; 3) one who gets more involved in market activities, is more likely to use court to solve his disputes ; however, this relationship disappears after controlling for amount of legal information he has. Key words : development theory ; formal legal institution ; dispute resolution ; institutional preference ( )