3 :,,,, :,,,, :,, ( Putnam,1993 ; Fukuyama,1997 ; Knack and Keefer,1997) ;, (Barney and Hansen,1994 ; Sako and Helper,1998),, Coase (1937) Alchian (1965) Demsetz (1967) Cheung(1968) Williamson (1985) North (1990) ; ( ) (La Porta et al,1997,1998) Bertrand Mullainathan (2003),, ;Demirguc2Kunt Maksimovic (1999) Fan et al (2008) ; (2005) ; (2005) ( ), 3,, :201702, :liufengwei @snai. edu ;,;, ( :70672118) ( :04BJ Y013) ( :J51202) ( :09ZS190) Cheng Shijun, 2007,, 60
2009 8,,,, (North,1990 ; Greif,1994),, (Arrow,1975 ; Kreps and Wilson,1982 ; Fukuyama,1995), (2002),,,,,,,, (, 2001),,, (2002), (a social seal of approval),,,,,, (, ;, ) 1999 2003 A,, :,, ; ;,,, :,; ; ; ( ),,,,,,,,, 61
( ),,, (,2001) Kreps(1990),,, Kreps Wilson (1982),, (Williamson,1975) ( ),,,, ; (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995 ;Zaheer et al,1998) ;, ( Granovetter,1985),,, ; (Williamson,1975,1985) 1.,, (,2002) 31,,,(21819), (411) (217),, (,2005), Coase (1937), Zylbersztajn and Graca (2002) 9, 64, (Williamson,1975,1985),,,,, Cheung (1968),,, 2.,,,,,, 15000, 5000 31,, 60 %,, 511 % ; 13 ( ), 3812 %, 1918 %, 3411 %, ( )? 62
2009 8,,,,,, ( ) ;, ( ), ;,,,, ( ), ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,, 3.,, Fukuyama (1995),, Redding(1990),, (1948),,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,, (2001),,,,,, ;,,,,, (,2007) 63
2000,,,?,?,, ( ), ( ),,, (,2002),,, (,2002), (2002),,,,,,,,, :,,, ( ) 2000,, 1999 2003 A,, 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 784 824 837 1002 1001 ( 4448 ) CSMAR ; 2000,, (2002),,, 0 1 % 99 % 100 %,, IPO,,,,,,,,,,,,, 64
2009 8 : Creditmode = 0 + 1 3 Size + 2 3 Lev + 3 3 Cshr + 4 3 Shr1 + 5 3 Rpt + 6 3 Trust + j j Ind + k k Year +, Creditmode, Π( + ) Π,,,,,,,, ;,,,, :, Trust,,, Trust :,,,, ; (Size) (Lev) (Shr1),,,, ;,,,,,,,,,, 2002,,, Cshr, 1, 0, Cshr,,, Π Π( + + ),,,,,,,,, 2002,, : (5515 %) (5216 %) (5012 %) (2815 %) (2518 %) (916 %) 65
(Cash) (Market) ( Finance) (,2007) ;, ;,,,,,, 2001,, Tobinπs Q,,,,, 8, 3, 70 % ;,, Factor 1 1 Pjzk Yf Saleexpense Size Lev Cash Cshr Shr1 Π( + ), Π,,, Π Π,, 1 ; 0 Trust Rpt Finance Market Tobinπsq Factor, (2002) :,,,, 0 10, (2007) 2006, 0 10, Tobinπs Q = ( + + )Π, Ind Year,, ( ),, Π( + ) 01164, 01042, 66
2009 8 1Π5 ; 01035, 01021, ; 01061, 01038 ; Trust 711921, 3011,75 % 25 % 1414 11712, 701555,, Pearson,, ; Cshr (, ),( Trust = 1), ( Trust = 0), (T2test) (Wilcoxon2test) Π( + ) Π,,,, :,, 1 %,,,,31,,, 1 Π, 1,,, Π( + ), ( ) 2,, 1 2,,, - 01004-01007, 1 % ; 3, Trust - 01003,T - 4143, 1 % 4 6,,, 1 %,,, 4 5 6 Cshr,, 67
Rpt, 4, 5 6,,,, 2 1 Y= Pjzk 2 Y= Yf 3 Y= Saleexpense 4 Y= Pjzk 5 Y= Yf 6 Y= Saleexpense Intercept 01131 333-01052 333 01058 333-01398 333 01048 333 01133 333 (10193) ( - 5175) (13117) ( - 8147) (5174) (7127) Trust - 01004 333-01007 333-01003 333-01000 333-01001 333-01004 333 ( - 6102) ( - 6181) ( - 4143) ( - 6186) ( - 3195) ( - 4132) Size 01041 333-01002 - 01005 333 (7132) ( - 0150) ( - 3150) Lev 01120 333 01008 333 01017 333 (7117) (2177) (2117) Cshr 01029 333 01011 333 01029 333 (3166) (8111) (3133) Shr1-01001 33-01000 33-01002 333 ( - 2127) ( - 1199) ( - 5179) Cash 01019 333 (14116) RPT - 01003-01002 3-01031 333 Finance 01003 3 ( - 0185) ( - 1169) ( - 3103) (1173) Market - 01002 333-01003 333 ( - 3185) ( - 2168) F 18182 15102 37199 23106 21185 35187 Adj - R 2 ( %) 8117 6154 15159 11153 11176 17175 N 4448 4448 4448 4448 4448 4448 : 1(, ), 20 ;, 1 3 33 333 P < 0110 P < 0105 P < 0101,,, ( 4) ;,, ( 5) ;,, 1, 0 Pjzk Yf, ; 68
2009 8,, (Market),,, ( 5 6) 3, (2002),,,,, ( GDP),,,, (2002),, 1 Y= Pjzk 2 Y= Yf 3 Y= Saleexpense Intercept - 01365 333 01052 333 01117 333 ( - 7122) (6119) (6155) Residual2trust - 01003 333-01001 333-01000 33 ( - 2152) ( - 3106) ( - 2129) Size 01028 333-01002 33-01002 3 (8106) ( - 2135) ( - 1185) Lev 01211 333 01017 333 01016 3 (7132) (5110) (1184) Shr1-01002 33-01012 3-01001 33 ( - 2114) ( - 1193) ( - 2132) Cshr 01029 333 01015 333 01008 333 (2105) (5143) (2144) Cash 01019 333 (11115) Rpt - 01002-01013 33-01022 33 ( - 1114) ( - 2114) ( - 2131) F 22175 22101 44115 Adj - R 2 ( %) 11163 11139 21136 N 4448 4448 4448 : 1 3 33 333 P < 0110 P < 0105 P < 0101, Residual2trust, Residual2trust, 3, Williamson (1991), ( ),,, (Tobinπs Q) (Factor), 1 69
,, 21819, 217,, 1,,,,,, 1 %,,,,,,, ( 1 % ),, ( ), 5,,, : ( Trust) (Pjzk) ( Yf) (Saleexpense), Laporta et al (1997) Morck et al (2000),,,,, Pjzk Yf, Trust,,,,,,,,,, ; Vif, Vif 2, ; White,,,,,?,,,,,,,, 70
2009 8,,,,,,,,,,,,2007 : 2006,,1948 :,,1985,2007 :, 3,2005 :, 5,2005 : :, 6,2005 :, 5,2001 :,,2002 : :, 10 Alchian, A. A., 1965, Some Economics of Property Rights, IL Politico, 30, pp. 816 829. Arrow, K. J. 1975, Gifts and Exchanges, In Phelps. E. S. Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, New York : Russel Sage Foundation. Barney, J. B., Hansen, M. H.,1994, Trustworthiness as a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage, Strategic Management Journal, 15, 175 190. Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan,2003, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Managerial Behavior Following Antitakeover Legislation, Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1043 1075. Bromiley P, Cummings L,1995, Transaction Costs in Organizations with Trust : A Theoretical Perspective, Research in Negotiations. Cheung, S.,1968, Private Property Rights and Sharecropping, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 76. Coase, R.,1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16, pp. 386 405. Demsetz, H.,1967, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review, 57. Demirguc2Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V., 1999, Institutions, Financial Markets, and Firm Debt Maturity, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 295 336. Fan, Joseph P. H., Titman S. and Twite G., 2008, An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices, working paper from www. ssrn. com. Fukuyama, F., 1995, Trust : The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York : The Free Press. Fukuyama, F.,1997, Social Capital and the Modem Capitalist Economy : Creating a High Trust Workplace, Stem Business Magazine. Granovetter, M.,1985, Economic Action and Social Structure : the Problem of Embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology. Greif, A.,1994, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society :a Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, Journal of Political Economy, 102 :912 50. Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff a Cross2country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of,,,,,, ( ) 71
Economics, Vol. 112,No. 4,pp. 1251 1288. Kreps. D. and Wilson. R.,1982, Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253 279. Kreps. D, 1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press. La Porta, R., Lopez2de2Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52, 1131 1150. La Porta, R., Lopez2de2Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113 1155. Morck R., Yeung B., Yu W.,2000, The Information Content of Stock Markets : Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? Journal of Financial Economics,58 : 215 260. North, D. C.,1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Putnam, 1993, Robert, Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press. Redding, G., 1990, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, Walter de Gruyter, 122 136. Sako, M., Helper, S., 1998, Determinants of Trust in Supplier Relations : Evidence From the Automotive Industry in Japan and the United States, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 387 417. Williamson, O. E.,1975, Markets and Hierarchies, New York : Free Press. Williamson, O. E., 1985, The Economic Institution of Capitalism, New York : The Free Press. Williamson, O. E.,1991, Comparative Economic Organization : the Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2) :269 296. Zaheer, A., McEvily B., Perrone V., 1998, Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Inter2Organizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance, Organization Science, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 141 159. Zylbersztajn, D., Graca, C. T., 2003, Costs of Business Formalization : Measuring Transaction Costs in Brazil, Revista de Econom a Institucional, Vol. 5, No. 9. Trust, Transaction Cost and Mode of Trade Credit Liu Fengwei, Li Lin and Xue Yunkui (Shanghai National Accounting Institute ; Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade ; Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business) Abstract :This paper investigates how trust, as an informal institution, affects corporate transaction cost and financial structure. Using trust index of different provinces in China, we find that differences of trust level in different regions of China cause different contract forms in different regions. The lower the regional trust level, the higher transaction costs of firms in that region. We prove this relationship between trust level and transaction costs because we find that firms in regions with a lower trust level use trade credit mode with higher transaction costs such as prepayments or notes payable and have more selling expenses and discounts per sales revenue. The conclusion of this paper supports that the local trust environment influences transaction behaviors and contract structure of firms and also indicates that trust has the same vital economic significance to firms as formal institutions. This paper also verifies the transmission characteristics of trust between groups and individual, which is practically significant for us to understand the interest relationship between the groups and individual. Key Words : Trust ;Transaction Cost ;Mode of Trade Credit JEL Classification :D23, G32, L14 ( : ) ( : ) 72