* 46 1 * 07JZD0022 2009BCK001 EYH3548034 1 1996 2002 2003 Christiansen 1990 Cheng & Selden 1994 Mallee 1995 1996 Wang 1997 Solinger 1999 Chan & Zhang 1999 Wang 2005 58
2003 2001 Chan & Zhang 1999 Wang 2005 Cheng & Selden 1994 Chan & Zhang 1999 Chan & Buckingham 2008 Solinger 1999 Alexander & Chan 2004 2009 2002 Wu & Treiman 2004 2004 2005 2007 2008 2000 2001 2007 1 2001 2009 1 1958 59
2010. 6 1 Chan & Buckingham 2008 Davies & Ramia 2008 2010 46 2 1 2 30 2009 12 27 2009 12 28 60
50 61
2010. 6 1 2007 2008 2009 2008 Musgrave 1959 1986a 1986b Musgrave & Musgrave 1989 Buchanan & Musgrave 1999 1 Wong 1991 Oi 1992 Whiting 2000 2004 62
1 2 2005 2008 3 2010 1 2 3 GDP 1994 70% Whiting 2007 GDP 63
2010. 6 / 2007 64
Projection pursuit model 1. 2. 2009 100 46 4 27 15 18 39% 15 33% 13 28% 45 5 1 1 5 1998 24 65
2010. 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 1 66
2004 1. i j x ij i = 1 2 n j = 1 2 m n m 1 2 y ij = x ij - minx ij 1 maxx ij - minx ij y ij = maxx ij - x ij 2 maxx ij - minx ij 2. m y ij α = α 1 α 2 α m i z i Q z i = m j = 1 α j y ij Q = s α d α 3 4 s α 4 67
2010. 6 s α = 1 [ z i - 珋 z ] 2 n n i = 1 1 2 珋 z 5 d α r i1 i 2 = z i1 - z i2 d α = n n i 1 = 1 i 2 = 1 f R - r i1 i 2 I R - r i1 i 2 6 R [ ] R max r i1 i 2 + m 2 2 m R 6 = m f R - r i1 i 2 f R - r i1 i 2 = R - r i1 i 2 R > r i1 i 2 I R - r i1 i 2 = 1 0 3. 4 α maxq α { 7 α = 1 α = α 1 α 2 α n 4. α 3 z i z i 2 68
3 2004 1. 2. 3 2 1 2 1. i j x ij i = 1 2 n j = 1 2 m n m 2 22 1 2 Y = y ij n m N 0 1 8 y ij Z = z ij n m 69
2010. 6 z ij = y ij - y珋 j 8 s j z ij y珋 j j s j j 2. 9 45 22 g u j = a j1 f 1 + a j2 f 2 + + a jg f g + ε j j = 1 2 m 9 U = A F + ε 10 U = u 1 u 2 u m T u j j A = a jk m g a jk f k u j F = f 1 f 2 f g T ε ε = ε 1 ε 2 ε m T ε j u j z ij n m R = r ij n m R λ 1 > λ 2 > > λ m > 0 β 1 β 2 β m λ j β j z j g λ 1 > λ 2 > > λ g > 1 λ k δ k = k = 1 2 g g λ k k = 1 g k = 1 δ k 80% g 80% ± 1 0 1 3. F n g = f ik n g = Z n m B m g 11 f ik = m z ij b jk Z n m f ik j = 1 70
B m g 1 % % % % 9. 443 42. 921 42. 921 7. 745 35. 203 35. 203 3. 510 15. 956 58. 877 3. 985 18. 113 53. 317 2. 206 10. 027 68. 904 2. 375 10. 795 64. 112 1. 432 6. 507 75. 411 2. 254 10. 247 74. 359 1. 118 5. 399 80. 809 1. 419 6. 451 80. 809 1. KMO. 765 Bartlett χ 2. 000 1% 2. 1 80% 12 F i F i = g k = 1 δ k f ik 12 F i α k f ik F i 2 F i 45 5 1. g g 13 71
2010. 6 d 2 ij = g k = 1 f ik - f jk 2 13 13 d ij i j f ik f jk i j k 2. 14 n s G 1 G 2 G s G p G q G r G r G s D sr D 2 sr = n p + n s D 2 sp + n q + n s n D 2 s sq - D 2 pq 14 n r + n s n r + n s n r + n s 14 p q r s G p G q G r G s D sp D sq D pq G s G p G s G q G p G q 45 3 4 5 2 20 90 72
3 GDP GDP 73
2010. 6 4 5 74
2 F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F. 9554. 9799. 3448 1. 1663 2. 9370. 8600 2. 5515. 6355. 3700. 5786. 4713 1. 1993. 4788 2. 4116 -. 7825 3. 5216 1. 1069. 3888-1. 2696. 4398 1 3. 1762. 6144 -. 0146 -. 0377 1. 0501. 1276. 3254 2 1. 4160 -. 9276 2. 9789 -. 5374 1. 4576. 1622. 3148 1 2. 4563. 6240. 5209 -. 4928 -. 1862. 6437. 2833 3 1. 0010 -. 1338 1. 3195. 3248. 7290 -. 4855. 2703 1 1. 3316. 5597 -. 6363 1. 1693 -. 5160 1. 4933. 2515 2. 2158. 3333 -. 3028. 9056 -. 0569. 8808. 2112 2. 3229. 3807 -. 2288. 5127. 7619 -. 2447. 2102 2. 3718 -. 2982 1. 7896. 2696 -. 7028. 4013. 2022 1 2. 0549. 5310. 1342 -. 7120. 3052. 2382. 1810 3 1. 1956. 4205 -. 2734. 5753 -. 0539. 2697. 1725 2. 5349. 4026 -. 0850. 4474. 5733-1. 0071. 1684 2. 9545. 3983 -. 5742. 5228 1. 0043 -. 4900. 1639 2. 4749. 1243 -. 4948. 6949 -. 1191 2. 1028. 1526 2 1. 0084. 4312 -. 6715 -. 8734 1. 0395 1. 6945. 1517 2 1. 0414. 4379. 6288-1. 6686. 4400. 0029. 1332 3 1. 0646. 0539. 4617. 7195. 4802-1. 6021. 1261 2 1. 0006. 3257 -. 1789 -. 2464. 5536. 0300. 1143 2. 5517. 3920 -. 8437. 5802 1. 0660 -. 7226. 1104 2. 6822. 2318 -. 7645 1. 2919-1. 1477 2. 0632. 0981 2. 2045 -. 0054 1. 0576 -. 8945 -. 2843. 5078. 0967 3 1. 5427. 1207 -. 5384. 4804. 6737. 2738. 0835 2. 3317. 4883. 3550-1. 3501. 4345 -. 8356. 0811 3. 5801. 4151 -. 3817 -. 1773. 5686-1. 0874. 0460 2. 5374. 1441 -. 7212. 4998. 8721 -. 8013. 0117 2. 5352. 5582 -. 7288. 2512 -. 4107 -. 6904. 0050 3. 2771. 1626 -. 5177. 2786. 2407 -. 3440 -. 0040 2. 5773 75
2010. 6 2 F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F. 2582 -. 8307 1. 0182 -. 3873 -. 6962 -. 0343 2. 5786 -. 1499. 0437. 3031 -. 2630 -. 2662 -. 0562 2 1. 0055 -. 1435. 8576. 0180-1. 7385. 1226 -. 0635 3 1. 4216. 3781 -. 1398. 7303-2. 5293 -. 4256 -. 1000 3. 0804 -. 2309 -. 5534. 5332. 2395 -. 5063 -. 1321 2. 3555 -. 1012 -. 4491. 1215. 3787-1. 0744 -. 1344 2. 5868 -. 1903 -. 7833 -. 0469. 8420 -. 3105 -. 1477 2. 3289. 3657 -. 4780 -. 6413-1. 0974 -. 3836 -. 1643 3 1. 2816 -. 2894 -. 2376 -. 2771. 0873 -. 2096 -. 1794 2. 4740. 7673 -. 7820-1. 1359-1. 1369-1. 6248 -. 2154 3. 4482. 2363. 6276-1. 5331-2. 0397 -. 8006 -. 2293 3 1. 6751. 0334-1. 4358 1. 2223 -. 4536-1. 0763 -. 2323 2. 3897 -. 7195. 8755. 4199-2. 7982. 0330 -. 3340 3 1. 2651 -. 7957-1. 2651-3. 5587 1. 1970. 0530 -. 7673 3 1. 5515-1. 2102 -. 4752-2. 6041-1. 5736 1. 3894 -. 8648 3 1. 4509-5. 8020-1. 1356. 8667. 4739. 3283-2. 0849 4 2. 5035 1. F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 2. N 0 1 0 76
3 35% 18% 3 % 35. 203 18. 113 10. 795 10. 247 6. 451 GDP 1. 0. 3 10% 0. 5 5 80. 809% 2. 77
2010. 6 3 1 1 2006 78
4 4 F i 4 F i 1 40 26 14 F i 5 3 2 1 14 79
2010. 6 4. 525 -. 410. 431. 439. 168. 925 -. 282. 155. 032. 073 GDP. 352 -. 062. 203. 029. 765. 091 -. 123. 863. 076. 136. 629 -. 153. 400. 168. 223 -. 934. 253 -. 104 -. 033 -. 099 -. 912. 319 -. 199 -. 002 -. 057 -. 188 -. 057 -. 922 -. 053. 076. 418 -. 295. 274 -. 193 -. 506 -. 004. 810 -. 017. 358. 176 -. 600. 354. 001. 046 -. 291 -. 471 -. 588. 127. 266. 193. 752 -. 157. 378. 231. 085. 902. 081. 191. 161 -. 117. 417 -. 766. 061. 211. 100. 062 -. 075. 107. 764. 308. 150. 193. 008. 742 -. 411. 938. 048 -. 032 -. 002 -. 056. 864 -. 061. 069. 151. 043 -. 474. 773 -. 197 -. 030 -. 029 -. 370. 848. 011. 227 -. 050. 148. 574. 118. 670. 048 1. 2. N 0 1 F i 2 5 80
5 F i 2 5 Path a- nalysis 2001 2002 2005 2009 81
2010. 6 2009 82
2000 4 2001 12 2007 6 2005 3 2010 30 2002 5 2004 1 2004 2003 2008 1 2009 2009 3 2006 57 2004 4 2009 5 4 2003 2005 4 2005 20 83
2010. 6 2009 1 2001 2010 1 2007 6 2006 5 2010 1996 2002 2007 2004 16 8 2008 2001 15 2008 2007 Alexander Peter & Anita Chan 2004 Does China Have an Apartheid Pass System Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30. Buchanan James M. & Richard A. Musgrave 1999 Public Finance and Public Choice Two Contrasting Visions of the State. Cambridge Mass MIT Press. Chan Kam Wing & Will Buckingham 2008 Is China Abolishing the Hukou System The China Quarterly 195. Chan Kam Wing & Li Zhang 1999 The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration Processes and Changes. The China Quarterly 160. Cheng Tiejun & Mark Selden 1994 The Origins and Social Consequences of China s Hukou System. The China Quarterly 139. Christiansen Flemming 1990 Social Division and Peasant Mobility in Mainland China The Implications of Hu-k ou System. Issues and Studies 26. Davies Gloria & Gaby Ramia 2008 Governance Reform towards Serving Migrant Workers The Local Implementation of Central Government Regulations. The China Quarterly 193. Mallee Hein 1995 China s Household Registration System under Reform. Development and Change 26. 1996 Reform of the Hukou System. Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 29. Musgrave Richard A. 1959 The Theory of Public Finance A Study in Public Economy. New York McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1986a Public Finance in A Democratic Society Vol. 1 Social Goods Taxation and Fiscal Policy. Sussex Harvester Press. 84
1986b Public Finance in A Democratic Society Vol. 2 Fiscal Doctrine Growth and Institutions. New York New York University Press. Musgrave Richard A. & Peggy B. Musgrave 1989 Public Finance in Theory and Practice Fifth Edition. New York McGraw-Hill Book Company. Oi Jean C. 1992 Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China. World Politics 45. Solinger Dorothy J. 1999 Contesting Citizenship in Urban China Peasant Migrants The State and the Logic of the Market. Berkeley CA University of California Press. Wang Feiling 2005 Organizing through Division and Exclusion China s Hukou System. Stanford Stanford University Press. Wang Feng 1997 The Breakdown of A Great Wall Recent Changes in the Household Registration System of China. In Scharping Thomas ed. Floating Population and Migration in China The Impact of Economic Reform No. 284. Hamburg Mitteilungen Des Instituts Für Asienkunde. Whiting Susan H. 2000 Power and Wealth in Rural China The Political Economy of Institutional Change. New York Cambridge University Press. 2007 Central-local Fiscal Relations in China A Report Based on the Proceedings of the International Conference on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. China Policy Series No. 22 National Committee on United States-China Relations and Remin University of China. Wong Christine P. W. 1991 Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao Era. The China Quarterly 128. Wu Xiaogang & Donald J. Treiman 2004 The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China 1955-1996. Demography 41. 85
The Problem on Structural Dislocation of Social Status Zhang Jing 41 Abstract This article discusses about the causes of group discontent during the social transitional period. In addition to the theory of income gap the author attempts to reveal the impact of structural dislocation upon highly educated young groups. After reviewing the tradition of diploma-oriented education this article exhibits the following trends graduates' job will their anticipations about future social status the scale of highly educated outputs and unemployed graduates' actual positions in the society and the classifications of their employers and locations. Based on comparative analysis the author points out that as graduates enter the society the difficulty of structural advance will be met which shakes the order of gaining anticipated social status for new generations and influences the behaviors and attitudes of them. Meanwhile the role of education as a social distribution stabilizer is weakening. Developmentalist Government and Urban Hukou Threshold Rethinking hukou system reform Wu Kaiya & Zhang Li 58 Abstract After years of transition from the central planning system to the marketoriented one the actual progress of hukou system reform has not met the expectations of the public which is removing every restriction on accessing a formal registration in the city. The purpose of this study is to seek for a better understanding of the barrier of hukou system reform. Taking the perspective of developmentalist government the paper tries to explain the rationale for the existence of hukou barrier. Applying the projection pursuit model as well as the techniques of factor analysis and cluster analysis to analyze the data of 46 cities our empirical findings show that the hukou barrier at the city level can be largely explained by many social and economic factors including economic output the level of consumption the provision ability of urban infrastructure the degree of outside dependence and economic structure. Market or Non-Market An Empirical Analysis of the Main Causes of Income Inequalities in China Today Chen Guangjin 86 Abstract In existent researches on mechanisms of the making of income inequalities in China since 1978 there are two kinds of causal-attributing patterns. The first pattern ascribes income inequalities mainly or completely to the process of economic marketization while the second one ascribes them mainly or completely to various non-market mechanisms. Based on eight nation-wide surveys of rural and urban households from 1989 to 2008 this paper firstly applies methodologies of inequality 243