: 1953 200433 Ariel Rubinstein 20 80 1982 1985 John Nash John Nash, John C. Harsanyi Reinhard Selten 1994 Robert J. Aumann, Ken Binmore, David Kreps Ariel Rubinstein 1
1951 1972 1975 1976 1979 1981 1984 1990 1990 1991 Lecturer in Rank of Professor 1995 JETRES 9 20 80 1990 M. Osborne 1994 M. Osborne 1998 2000 70 2000 1996 20 linguistic turn 1 20 2
19 20 Gottlob Freg Ludwig Wittgenstein Martin HeideggerJohn R. Austin 19 20 Johann G. HerderWilhelm von Humboldt Gilbert RyleJohn Searle Edmund HusserlHans-Georg Gadamer 20 meta-ethics Charles L. StevensenRichard M. Hare Claude Lévi-StraussClifford Geertz Don Cupitt 1997 Ferdinand de SaussureLeonard BloomfieldEdward SapirNoam ChomskyM. A. K. Halliday 3
Alfred Marshall John M. Keynes 1965 J. Marschak 1979 Theodore Schultz1980 234 1993 W. HendersonT. Dudley-EvansR. Backhouse development 20 20 21 4
Adam Smith Rubinstein2000p. 35 social normspractice, conventions custom 1996 221 genotypephenotype institutions established order by which everything is regulated Lebensformen institutions Austin, 1962Phonepheme (rheme)/ 2003a 5761 5
Lebenswelt 2 Noam Chomskyuniversal Grammarlanguage faculty 6
Saul Kripke involved in 0 Rubinstein2000, p. 4 regularity social institutions Wittgenstein, 1953: 201 This was our paradox: no course of action Handlungsweise could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule 7
semantics 1 Choosing the Semantic Property of Language Rubinstein2000, p. 9 linear ordering the grand set Rubinstein2000, p. 13 Rubinstein2000, pp. 2223 W. V. Quine, 1969, p. 126 John van Benthem Leibnizian Rubinstein, 2000, p. 95-96 8
evolutionary game theory Maynard SmithESS ESS payoff Rubinstein2000, pp. 25-28Be careful Be careful Rubinstein2000, p.28 utterance Paul Grice1989p.26 1 2 3 4 9
well-developed Rubinsteinp.39 conversational implicature Rubinsteinp.42 10
3 discourse Rubinstein, p. 72 strategy Martin Shubik playerjim Freedman John McMillan 11
Barton L. Lipmansorites paradox Rubinstein2000linear ordering Hilary Putnam,1970 12
Rubinstein, 2000, pp.118-122 Benacerraf & Putman1983 Rubinstein, 2000, p. 114 Ken Binmore Binmore1994 2003b 104105 13
4 14
Rubinstein2000, p.26 classical game theory IQRubinstein, 2000, p. 75 Rubinstein, 2000, p.79 the Nash Solution Rubinstein, 2000, p.82 Rubinstein, 2000, p.86 15
discount factorkalai-smorodingsky 2003c 5556 Rubinstein, 2000, p.82 2000 5 hyper-rational bounded rational Kalai-Smorodingsky Kalai-Smorodingsky Rubinstein, 2000, p.81 N (S, d) = arg max {(u 1 d 1 ) (u 2 d 2 )(u 1, u 2 ) S u i d i i} 16
H H. Peyton Young1998 tautology social institution Rubinstein2000, p.5 may may Ferdinand de Saussure, 1916/1949 social institution 17
tautology 2001formation of institutions Searle19951998 Searle19951998 institutional facts brute facts Searle, 1995p. 2 Searle, 1995:8788institution institutional facts codification institutions institutional facts customconventioninstitutions institutions institutional factsconventioninstitution Schotter, 1980 institution2003c 18
fact stated brute facts intentionality institution John L. Austin, 1962 Sachverhaltenfact state of affaires fact stated Sachverhalten 19
social institution consent pooling Rubinstein, 2000, p. 57 social institution social institutions Searle, 1995p. 13 matrix configuration law 20
6 Johan van Benthem Rubinstein, 2000, p.93 21
Rubinstein, 2000, p.95? 2003 12 15 Austin, J. L., 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benacerraf., P. & H. Putman, 1983, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2 nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003 Binmore, 1994, Game Theory and Social Contract, Vol. I, Playing Fair, Cambridge, MASS.: The MIT Press. 2003 Cupitt, D., 1997, After God: The Future of Religion, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Henderson, W., T. Dudley-Evans & R. Backhouse, 1993, Economics and Language, London: Routledge. Marschak, J. 1965, The Economics of Language, Behavioral Science, vol. 10, pp. 135-140. Putnam, H., 1970, Is Semantics Possible? in H. E. Kiefer and M. Munitz (eds.), Language, Belief and Metaphysics, NY: State University of New York University. A. P. 1998 590607 Rubinstein, A., 1982, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 97-109. Rubinstein, A., 1985, A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preference, Econometrica, 53:1151-1172. Rubinstein, A., 1998, Modeling Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press. Rubinstein, A., 2000, Economics and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004 Rubinstein, A. & M. Osborne, 1990, Bargaining and Market, New York: Academic Press. Rubinstein, A. & M. Osborne, 1994, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press. Saussure, F. de, 1916 / 1949, Cours de Linguistique Général, Payot Paris. 1980 Schotter, A, 1981, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003 Schultz, T., 1980, 2001 1996 2000 2002 4550 2001 2003a 2003b 22
2003c Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigation, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3 rd ed. (1967), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1996 23