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菘英昌
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1 cyuan@fcu.edu.tw 59

3 policy network path dependence North, 1990 John, 1998 Kasper & Streit, new institutional economics public choice theory Yu & Kwan, 2003 perfect rationality bounded rationality 61

4 103 3 Kasper & Streit, 1998 Niskanen 1971, 1995 Weber rent-seeking behavior Buchanan & Tullock, 1982; Olson, 2000 Arrow, 1970 Pennington, 2000, micro level rational choice new institutionalism Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1984 Marsh & Stoker,

5 Langlois, 1992; Langlois & Foss, 1999; Rutherford, 1989 Yu, 2001 John 1998 North 1990 evolutionary economics increasing return path dependence David 1985 Arthur 1994 network externality QWERTY Arthur, 1994 lock in Mahoney & 63

6 103 3 Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002 Pierson, critical junctures

7 %-70%

8 increasing returns

9 % %-20%

12 103 3 assessment ratio % 4% 4% % 30% 20% % 100% 1400 / assessment ratio assessed value assessment ratio

13 % anchoring effects smoothing 2007 Quan Quigley

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85 88 2003 84 88 16% 87 94 90 2008 87 94 20% 35% 98 79 84 8-9 4 76

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20 Vickrey 1961 Cornes & Sandler,

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23 Arrow, K. (1970). The organisation of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choices of market versus non-market allocation. In R. Havenman, & J. Margolis (Eds.), Public expenditures and policy analysis (pp ). Chicago: Markham Book. Arthur, W. B. (1994). Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Buchanan, J. M., & G. Tullock (1982). Towards a theory of the rent-seeking society. Austin: Texas A & M Press. Cornes, R., & T. Sandler (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review, 75, Hall, P., & R. Taylor (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(4), John, P. (1998). Analysing public policy. New York: Continuum. Kasper, W., & E. S. Streit (1998). Institutional economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Langlois, R. N. (1992). Transaction-cost economics in real time. Industrial and Corporate Change, 1(1),

24 103 3 Langlois, R. N., & N. Foss (1999). Capability and governance: Rebirth of production in the theory of economic organization. Kyklos, 52(2), Mahoney, J., & D. Rueschemeyer (2003). Comparative historical analysis: Achievement and agendas. In J. Mahoney, & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), Comparative historical analysis in the social science (pp. 3-38). New York: Cambridge University Press. March, J., & J. Olsen (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. American Political Science Review, 78(3), Marsh, D., & G. Stoker (2002). Theory and methods in political science. New York: Palgrave. Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine Atherton. Niskanen, W. A. (1995). Bureaucrats and public economics. London: Edward Elgar. North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, M. (2000). Power and prosperity. New York: Basic Book. Pennington, M. (2000). Planning and the political market. London: The Athlone Press. Pennington, M. (2011). Robust political economy: Classical liberalism and the future of public policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), Pierson, P., & T. Skocpol (2002). Historical institutionalism in contemporary political science. In I. Katznelson, & H. Milner (Eds.), Political science: State of the discipline (pp ). New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Quan, D.C., & J. M. Quigley (1991). Price formations and the appraisal function in real estate markets. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 4, Rutherford, M. (1989). What is wrong with the new institutional economics (and what is still wrong with the old). Review of Political Economy, 1(3), Sevelka, T. (2003). Expropriation and condemnation: The large parcel. Appraisal Journal, 71(1), Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 16(1), Yu, T. F. L. (2001). An entrepreneurship perspective of institutional change. Constitutional Political Economy, 12(3), Yu, T. F. L., & D. S. M. Kwan (2003). Learning, catching up and international economic 82

25 order: Trilateral relationship between China, Britain and Hong Kong in the entrepreneurial perspective. Asian Profile: An International Journal, 31(6),

26 103 3 Institutional Change of Current Assessed Land Value and Its Impact upon the Price for Eminent Domain Simon Chien-Yuan Chen, Xiu-Zhen Li Abstract The eminent domain system in Taiwan has been transferred to market price basis since September This significant change means that the government-led Current Assessed Land Value (CALV) system, which has been implemented almost fifty years ago, was no longer the benchmark of compensation for eminent domain. However, during the transiting period of institution change, the new institution has to tackle all problems coming from new and old systems. Thus, the main purpose of this paper intends to explore what is the driving force behind the institutional change of CALV in the perspective of public choice theory, which will let us understand how the old problems were created and how correction might be made. Findings show that the main driving forces influencing the institution changes of CALV was from politicians and bureaucrats intervention as public choice suggests. Therefore, the CALV operated by political principle is incapable to keep pace with the fluctuation of marker price. The past institutional reforms of CALV trying to reduce the gap between market transaction prices not only never succeed but also created many unintended consequences. This consequence including the agriculture land and other counterparts were raised up their current assessed Simon Chien-Yuan Chen, Associate Professor, Department of Land Management, Feng Chia University. cyuan@fcu.edu.tw. Xiu-Zhen Li, Master, Department of Land Management, Feng Chia University. 84

27 land value much more than other types of lands because these lands do not need to pay associated land tax. However, other lands where are located in high density urban area and new developing districts were not adjusted to shorten the gap between the market price. Therefore, these problems are due to the very different nature between political organization and market institution. The corrections for these old problems and new challenges are obviously based on how Market-Price basis Eminent Domain policy can create a system with less political influence but with more impartialness by adding more market practitioners. Keywords: Current Assessed Land Value, Market-Price basis Eminent Domain, New Institutional Economics, Public choice school, Institutional change 85

fiscal decentralization local financial managerial capability 2

621 160 05-2428238 05-2721195 E- Mail polkjl@ccunix.ccu.edu.tw 1 fiscal decentralization local financial managerial capability 2 91 1 27 91 2 19 91 5 24 1990 3 fundamentalism 2000 fiscal decentralization