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1 Modern Economic Science Jan Vol. 36 No Panel Data Panel Data A BZZ http / /jjkx. xjtu. edu. cn http / /www. ddjjkx. cn

2 % % / / Panel Data

3 Granger Granger Granger U FDI FDI FDI U 48

4 23 GDP GDP GDP Panel Data Y it = C i + α j f groeco jit + β k f prepol kit + j k γ l f devfin lit + λ m f inteco mit + δ n f elsfac nit l m n + ρ i + υ i + ε it 49

5 i i 31 t t = t α j β k γ l λ m δ n ρ i υ i ε it groeco prepol Culture devfin inteco Pubser elsfac j k l m n Agri 1. TL Culture Pubser Agri 3 Finsca GDP TL Fineff Finsca Fineff 17 TL it = 2 p ( ijt j = 1 p ) it ( ) p ijt z ijt p it z it j = 1 2 z ij GDP Fisexp i j = 1 j = 2 z i GDP i p ij i j = 1 j = 2 p i i TL it i Fisexp t 2. 1 GDP 4 PGDP / 24 Humcap Urb Trade H = n p i h i /p i = 1 H PGDP Urb Trade i p i i h i i 2 Assinv p 25 = 50

6 2 + Soeemp Humcap GDP GDP Terind Priind Terind Priind TL PGDP Urb Trade Assinv Culture Pubser Agri Finsca Fineff Fixexp Humcap Terind Priind Soeemp / - PGDP Fisexp sta- ta12. 0 Panel Data Trade 5% 1% 1 Hausman LLC 1 51

7 Pesaran Wooldridge Wald modified Wald statistic FGLS 3 3 Urb Trade Assinv Culture Pubser Agri Finsca Fineff Humcap Terind Priind Soeemp FGLS *** * * * *** *** *** * * *** * *** *** *** *** *** * *** ** *** *** * *** *** *** *** * *** * *** *** * R F *** *** Hausman *** *** Pesaran *** *** Wooldridge *** *** Wald *** *** *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 Hausman Urb Assinv Culture 1 Pesaran Wooldridge Pubser Humcap Wald 2 FGLS 3 FGLS 52

8 Assinv Agri Fineff 4 3 FGLS Terind Priind Soeemp 1% 3 4 1% Culture Pubser Assinv Agri Finsca 1% Fineff 53

9 Panel Data J J J Granger J J J J J J J J. J J J J J J. J J J J J. 9. J J M

10 Securities Issuance Control and Capital Allocation in China Perspective of Rent Seeking Theory FU Cheng International College Renmin University of China Suzhou China Abstract Governmental control has a huge impact on securities issuance in China's securities market. In our country's securities issuance market there exist a lot of improper phenomena such as fraud of corporate listing and lax supervision. Because of strong governmental control there may be rent-seeking behaviors in securities issuance market. Governmental officials gain additional income through bending the laws while securities issuers obtain additional rights by paying political rents and get information rent by controlling information disclosure. If rent seeking is possible inferior companies can get the same issuing qualification with high-quality companies by making more efforts and trading money for power. Rent seeking behaviors will result in inefficiency loss in the process of capital allocation which reduces the efficiency of capital allocation. Key words Rent Seeking Control over Securities Issuance Capital Rationing Game Model Empirical Analysis The Evolution of Chinese Regional Economic Growth Pattern and National Growth Pole System WANG Ye-qiang Research Institute of Urban Development and Environment CASS Beijing China 2. Research Centre for West Development CASS Beijing China Abstract In this paper China's regional economic growth is divided into four stages including brewing start fast advancing consolidation and intensification and the spatial diffusion of economic spatial concentration by statistically analyzing the spatial structure changes and changing trends of China's regional economic growth. Some characteristics of Chinese regional economic growth pattern are shown at these four stages there is a relatively balanced growth among the four areas the staggered growth of seven plates the east-led economic growth and westward industrial growth and so on. The paper believes that China's regional economy will form a multi-centered and network-like growth pattern in the acceleration period of industrialization and urbanization. From a national perspective we should actively promote the construction of the three-level national growth pole system. Key words Regional Economy Growth Pattern Multi-center Netuork-like National Growth Pole System The Factors that Affect the Income Gap between Urban and Rural Areas of China Based on the Provincial Panel Data from 2003 to 2012 WU Xiao-long LIU Zu-yun School of Public Administration Nanjing Agricultural University Nanjing China Abstract The income gap between urban and rural areas is one of the most prominent contradictions in the social and economic development of China. Based on the literature review researching the factors that affect the income gap between urban and rural areas is mainly through theoretical explanations and empirical a- nalysis. Theoretical analysis indicates that the reasons for the income gap between urban and rural areas include urban bias policy excessive pursuit of economic development and dual structure center - periphery. The results of Panel Data empirical model estimation show that the income gap between urban and rural areas is affected by economic development policy bias financial development economic intervention and other controlling factors. Some factors that can reduce the urban-rural income gap in general include urbanization economic openness human capital agricultural economic development and the development of tertiary industry. However other factors that can expand the income gap between urban and rural areas are spending on science and education public service spending financial development scale and the development of tertiary industry. Therefore the elimination of income gap should strengthen the development of rural vocational education pro- 125

11 mote the urbanization and construct inclusive development policies and effectively achieve the integration of urban and rural development. Key words Income Gap between Urban and Rural Areas Policy bias Economic Development Financial Development Conjunction of Politics and Enterprises Research & Development and Innovation Performance Based on the Data of 426 Innovative Enterprises PANG Rui- zhi 1 SHI Wen-wen 1 DING Ming-lei 2 1. Academe of Economic and Social Development Nankai University Tianjin China 2. Chinese Academe for the Strategic Development of Science and Technology Beijing China Abstract Based on the data of 426 innovative enterprises in 2009 this paper attempts to study the relationship among the conjunction of politics and enterprises R&D and innovation performance. The study finds that politically connective enterprises have an obvious advantage in getting governmental funding support but this advantage is not effectively transformed into innovative development advantage. Moreover the conjunction of politics and enterprises has an overall negative impact on the performance of the innovative enterprises. This is related to the systematic dysfunction led by system deficiency in the course of enterprises' innovation. In addition research and development is the lifeline of innovative enterprises which have notable effects on innovation performance ownership structure diversification and enterprises' size all affect the innovation performance of enterprises. Key words Conjunction of Politics and Enterprises R&D Innovation Performance Innovative Enterprise The Relative Importance and Interactions among Competition Property Right and Control Evidence from Chinese Power Industry Gong Ru-kai Glorious Sun School of Business and Management Donghua University Shanghai China Abstract Using the provincial panel data of China from 1999 to 2010 this paper tests the effects of economic reform system on the output efficiency of power industry from three dimensions competition property right reform and control policy and then analyses the relative importance of reform policy for industrial growth in the viewpoints of single factor effect multi-factor effect and interactions. The empirical research based on tool variable method indicates that 1 In single factor model property right and control policy have significant positive effects but the effect of competition is not significant 2 In the joint model of reform policies the role of property right and control policy is relatively important and the significance of competition's positive effect is raised 3 The interaction among reform policies has a negative effect on the output performance which shows that the supportive effect of reform policies has not realized the expected results. The above results are stable in different indicator design and model enactment. The conclusion has obvious policy implications decision-makers should continue to implement the separation of plant and grid and primary and auxiliary services respectively in deep stage of electricity reforms establish market mechanism as the decisive role in allocation of resource need to take into account the relative importance of reform policy and the interactions of theirs in reform design in order to have assessment of effects of reform measares comprehensively. Key words Competition Property Right Reform Control Policy Performance Interaction The Elasticity of Factor Substitution Deflection of Technical Progress and Industrial Economic Growth of Chinese Industry ZHONG Shi-chuan School of Economics Jinan University Guangzhou China Abstract This paper discusses the relationship between the elasticity of factor substitution and economic growth in the CES production function estimates the substitution elasticity of China's industrial industry from 126

CHIPS Oaxaca - Blinder % Sicular et al CASS Becker & Chiswick ~ 2000 Becker & Chiswick 196

CHIPS Oaxaca - Blinder % Sicular et al CASS Becker & Chiswick ~ 2000 Becker & Chiswick 196 2015 3 179 2015 5 Comparative Economic & Social Systems No. 3 2015 May 2015 2001 ~ 2011 F812 A 1003-3947 2015 03-0020-14 Wu & Perloff 2004 Benjamin et al. 2004 Sicular et al. 2007 1998 2003 40% 1985 2.