The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung "For Social Justice and International Understanding" The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was established in 1925 as a poli

Shanghai Institute for International Studies Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Shanghai Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation Proceedings of the Fifth Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance January 23-24, 2007 For further information on, please contact: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin Hiroshimastr. 17 10785 Berlin Germany Tel.: ++49-30-26-935-939 Fax: ++49-30-26-935-959 Thomas.Manz@fes.de www.fes.de www.fes.de/globalization Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Shanghai 7A Da An Plaza East Tower Yan An Zhong Lu 829 Shanghai 200040 P.R. China Tel.: ++86-21-6247-2529 ++86-21-6247-2870 Fax: ++86-21-6279-1297 info@feschina.net www.feschina.net

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung "For Social Justice and International Understanding" The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was established in 1925 as a political legacy of Friedrich Ebert, Germany's first democratically elected president. As a private cultural non-profit institution, the foundation is committed to the ideas and basic values of social democracy. International cooperation connects the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung with partners in more than 100 countries all over the world. In most of these countries, the foundation has established offices and its representatives work to promote democracy, sustainable development, social justice, and international understanding. Head offices in Bonn and Berlin support the international network of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the German Federal Foreign Office grant the budget for activities on international cooperation and development. The FES has been working in China since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up policies. Today the foundation has two offices in Beijing and Shanghai, which develop and implement policy-orientated cooperation programs together with Chinese partner organizations. Main partner institution of the Shanghai office is the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), main partner of the Beijing office the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU). The FES offices in Beijing and Shanghai are part of the official German development cooperation in China and belong to the network of the foundation's fourteen representative offices in Asia. Through cooperation with its Chinese partner organizations, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hopes to contribute to the different stages of the reform process in China and further enhance Chinese-German/European understanding and friendship. Editors: Katharina Hofmann / Katja Meyer / Yan Yu Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung email: info@feschina.net 7 A Da An Plaza East Tower http://www.feschina.net 829 Yan An Zhong Lu Tel.: ++86-21-6247-2529 Shanghai 200040 ++86-21-6247-2870 PR China Fax: ++86-21-6279-1297 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Shanghai, June 2007. All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored or transmitted without the prior permission of the copyright holder. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily the ones of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.

Preface Improved European-Asian Dialogue: Challenges and Chances for a Partnership on Global Security Issues The Fifth Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance took place in January 2007 and was jointly organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Shanghai and its partner, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). European and Asian perspectives were given by 50 high-ranking stakeholders and experts from eleven countries (China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Korea, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy). The workshop series had been initiated in 2003 as a forum on foreign and security policy and has developed since as an institution which features open political dialogue on the non-governmental or track-two level and aims to contribute to inner- Asian and Euro-Asian exchange and cooperation. Against the background of the growing partnership between Germany and China on the bilateral level as well as on the partnership between the European Union (EU), China and other Asian countries on the multilateral level, some key questions for a future perspective of Euro-Asian security cooperation are: how much common ground do we have for an effective multilateralism, and what are future prospects for enhanced security cooperation between Asia and Europe? The FES Shanghai and the SIIS intended to provide a platform for an open debate on the Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation that would analyze the current state of Asia-Europe security cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral level; identify common ground between Asia and Europe s security strategies and areas for future inner-asian and Eurasian exchange and cooperation. The security situation in contemporary Asia has improved, but has also become more complex. Asia as a world-region has been experiencing a region-wide geo-political change. China s peaceful rise to one of the most powerful global players and India s attractive rise as well as Japan s enduring strength are positive developments to name. New developing forms of regional cooperation, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the East Asian Summit (EAS), reflect the new pattern of Asian architecture. The ASEAN-Plus-Processes as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have intensified the economic, but also political and cultural ties between the ASEAN members and China. Still, long-standing conflicts like the situation on the Korean Peninsula continue to feed new threats. New transnational security challenges such as the increased trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases as well as the scarcity of resources in certain areas have to be addressed jointly by politicians and think tanks in the area. The links between economic development, good governance and security are crucial for building peace and cooperation in the region. China as a rising player is increasingly interested in regional and multilateral solutions. The sheer size of China, its economic accomplishments and political strength make it indispensable to any meaningful process of cooperative or even collective security. As an important step in this direction the first East Asia Summit is a promising new mid-level-structure between the sub-regional ASEAN and the APEC. Other regional mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and closer China-US cooperation as well as improved Sino-Japanese relations are promising preventive I

strategies for a peaceful cooperation in this region and beyond. Asian leaders have widely recognized the need for building a regional community as a fundamental solution to an effective conflict management. As for the European side, there certainly is a long tradition in security cooperation within the NATO and OSCE framework. But the EU did not have a security or defense policy until the end of the 1990s. Security cooperation was a transatlantic project until the end of the cold war. Since the mid 1990s there is a growing trend towards an Europeanization of security cooperation. Despite the crisis of integration since the failed Constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands, security cooperation is now one of the few areas where significant progress is taking place. At the heart of the European approach lies the idea of combining hard and soft power. This approach goes beyond the political-military dimension of security, yet military instruments still play an important role. The third element of an emerging European security culture is effective multilateralism. The commitment to multilateralism, international law and cooperation is a traditional tenet of EU policy. EU-Asian relations have been gradually tightened and are today involving cooperation in an increasing number of sectors. Security cooperation is playing one prominent role on the dialogue agenda. Still, there certainly remain divergences in interests, perceptions, definitions and strategies on security policies on both sides. While Asian-European Security Cooperation is still quite an abstract undertaking, both sides are without doubt interested in a stronger cooperation on global and security issues. Although the participants perceived the actual state of cooperation very differently, all of them agreed that Asian-European dialogue is an essential element for an efficient management of the prospective environment of international security. The participants underlined the necessity to tackle environmental, energy and security issues from a more pragmatic stance and enhance cooperation especially in the fields of human security issues. The workshop papers cover a wide range of important issues in current international politics including reports on the current situation and future prospects of Asia-Europe security cooperation, regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European countries, regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European security organizations, Asia-Europe cooperation and Sino-European relations, as well as Asia-Europe security cooperation and global governance. In part one the state of the Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Countries is analyzed. Johannes Pflug, Member of the German Parliament, clearly names the challenge for the coming years which would be a comprehensive, explicit security agenda that involves the European and Asian states equally. Apart from the classic topics of limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation, this will involve action on issues that will be crucial in the future, such as global climate change and energy supply. Zhang Tiejun, Director of European Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) formulates the criteria for a strategic partnership: China and the EU need to define what it should be like and what criteria constitute it. The difference between stated and real strategic cooperation on security matters is also true for the South Asian region, claims Varun Sahni from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi arguing that there is no security cooperation in the South Asian region so far and that India as the regional power has not been able to pacify its region nor make it cohere. Besides India as a rising power in the region, Chinese- Japanese relations are not only important to the two countries but have regional and II

global significance as well. The Taiwan conflict, as well as the nuclear conflict with the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are security threats that require a common approach from China and Japan, emphasizes Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies from the National Defence University of Beijing. Regional security cooperation within Europe is a growing trend since the mid 1990s towards the Europeanization of security and security cooperation, explains Stefanie Flechtner from the Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Berlin in her paper. Global ambitions of the EU states are a key message of the European Security Strategy (2003) stating that the EU has to be ready to share in the responsibility for global security. At the heart of the European approach lies the idea of combining hard and soft power. This approach goes beyond the political-military dimension of security, yet military instruments still play an important role. A special case within the European enlargement and integration process of the new member states challenging the EU security cooperation, has been Poland s Atlanticism which can be explained by its exclusion from the decision-making process in European security matters, as Marcin Zaborowski from the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, argues in his article. Part two Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Security Organizations describes the possibilities of how regional actors address current security threats and what they could learn from each other by building regional security strategies. In comparing the regional security cooperation strategies of major Asian and European countries, one has to consider that although Asia can in part draw experiences from European states and consider the EU as an inspiration, it is also important to note that the East Asian states miss such an institutional framework that developed in Europe after the second world war. How do ASEAN and ARF fit into the concept of a security community? asks Bob S. Hadiwinata from the Department of International Relations at the University of Parahyangan, Indonesia in his outline on the roles of ASEAN and ARF in regional security architecture. Another regional security cooperation organization is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is an intergovernmental international organization founded in 2001. As Lu Gang, Director of the Department of Russian-Central Asian Studies of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies points out, to maintain regional stability and peace is now focusing on the border disputes between China and Russia plus Central Asia (bilaterally) and SCO holds an active role in supporting the war against terrorism. NATO has become an attractive framework and tool for supporting conflict resolution in Europe and beyond emphasizes Hans J. Giessmann, Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg. The successful transformation of the transatlantic alliance from a system of collective defense into a hybrid system that complements defense for all members with both institutionalized collective security building elements and multilateral military cooperation between members and interested partner countries has become the true secret of NATO ś survival. Part three deals with the current characteristics of Asian-European Cooperation and Sino-European Relations. Is ASEM a channel for Sino-European cooperation? It is an institution that generates and manages interdependencies in a globalizing world, states Sebastian Bersick from the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels. The ASEM process demonstrates the demand for governance on the inter- and intra-regional level. Special attention within the Asia-Europe Cooperation should be given to the field III

of peace building, argues Toshiya Hoshino, Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. If the purpose of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation includes not just the promotion of peace and security but also the enhancement of mutual engagement in the strategic partnership to deal with the issues of global governance, the cooperation in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding should be given a high priority since most of today s conflicts are by character internal rather than inter-state wars. Analyzing the case of the EU arms embargo against China, Chen Zhimin from the Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that the EU was not yet a complete strategic actor. According to Zhimin, the EU still has to develop an operational strategy on hard security issues, to avail itself of the necessary resources and effective policy-making mechanisms. From a European perspective the strategic partnership between the EU and China is hampered by different interpretations of similar terminologies and rhetoric on the so-called new security concepts, and different views on the international system, the own desired role and the role of the US analyzes May-Britt Stumbaum from the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP) in Berlin. Three years after the declaration of the strategic partnership, the questions remaining are, if the EU and China do share the same paradigms, goals and priorities. Finally, part four examines Asian-European Security Cooperation and Global Governance on different and common perceptions of security issues as well chances and limitations for further cooperation. What can be done and has been done in fields such as in Development, Energy Security, African relationships and Peacekeeping? After a certain Sino-European euphoria in 2004/2005, the honeymoon is over, states Bernt Berger. The scholar from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) in Hamburg sees a more practical approach in the relationship developing. Jaewoo Choo from the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University in Korea identifies a strong need for energy security cooperation among European and Northeast Asian states. Only a common approach would allow the two major consumers of energy to maintain a stable energy market and delivery system. Ye Jiang, Director of the Department of International Relations at Jiaotong University, stresses the importance of Asia-Europe cooperation in the context of global governance. We hereby thank all participants and organizers of the 5 th Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance very warmly for their enriching contributions to this important debate! Katharina Hofmann / Katja Meyer Shanghai, June 2007 IV

Participants List of the Conference 1. Bernt Berger, Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany 2. Dr. Sebastian Bersick, Senior Research Fellow, European Institute for Asian Studies/EIAS 3. Dr. Wolfgang Bockhold, First Counselor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 4. Prof. Chen Zhimin, Director, Department of International Politics, Fudan University 5. Prof. Cheng Jian, Assistant Director, the School of Advanced International Area Studies, East China Normal University 6. Prof. Jaewoo Choo, Ph.D., Professor of Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy, Department of Chinese Studies, Kyung Hee University 7. Giovanni Cremonini, Political Counselor, Delegation of the European Commission to China 8. Prof. Feng Shaolei, Dean of the School of Advanced International Area Studies, East China Normal University 9. Stefanie Flechtner, Referat Internationale Politikanalyse- International Policy Analysis Unit, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin 10. Prof. Hajo Gießmann, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of Hamburg, Germany 11. Prof. Guo Shuyong, Deputy Head, Department of International Relations School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 12. Prof. Bob S. Hadiwinata, Head of International Relations Department, University of Parahyangan 13. Prof. Han Feng, Vice-Director of the Institute of Asia and Pacific, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 14. Dr. Albrecht v.d. Heyden, Consul General, Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany 15. Katharina Hofmann, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Shanghai Coordination Office for International Cooperation 16. Prof. Toshiya Hoshino, Minister-Counselor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, New York V

17. Prof. Kong Tianping, Director of East Europe Studies program, Institute of Russia- East Europe-Central Asia Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences 18. Jin Liangxiang, Researcher, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 19. Prof. Dr. Horst Loechel, Chairman of Board of Directors, Vice President, Shanghai International Banking and Finance Institute 20. Prof. Liu Mingli, European Studies Program, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 21. Prof. Lu Gang, Director, Department of Russian and Central Asian Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 22. Luo Songtao, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PR China 23. Prof. Ma Ying, Director, Department of Asian and Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 24. Katja Meyer, Resident Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Shanghai Coordination Office for International Cooperation 25. Dr. Ingo Ilja Michels, Sociologist, Expert for AIDS Prevention and Drug Addiction Treatment 26. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, Former Foreign Minister of Thailand 27. Johannes Pflug, Member of the German Bundestag, Head of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group, Berlin 28. Prof. Varun Sahni, Chairperson, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University 29. Dr. Leo Schulte Nordholt, Council of the European Union, Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, Relations with the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Relations with Russia 30. May-Britt Stumbaum, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin 31. Dr. Gudrun Wacker, German Institute for International and Security Affairs 32. Prof. Wang Xiaoshu, Vice President, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 33. Dr. Mikael Weissman, Research Fellow, Silkroad Studies Programme, Uppsala University 34. Prof. Wu Jinan, Director of Japanese Studies, Shanghai Institute for International VI

Studies 35. Prof. Xia Liping, Director of the Center of International Strategic Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 36. Prof. Xue Yanping, The Institute for European Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences 37. Prof. Yang Baoyun, Deputy Director of Asia-Pacific Security Studies, Beijing University, Beijing 38. Prof. Yang Yi, Director of the Institute of Strategy Studies, National Defense University 39. Prof. Ye Jiang, Director of Department of International Relations, School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 40. Prof. Yu Jianhua, Deputy Director, Institute of European and Asian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 41. Prof. Yu Xintian, President, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 42. Dr. Marcin Zaborowski, European Union Institute for Security Studies 43. Prof. Zhang Tiejun, Director, Department of European Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 44. Prof. Zhang Yinghong, Deputy Director, Department of European Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 45. Prof. Zhao Junjie, Deputy Director, Center for Asian European Studies, The Institute for European Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences 46. Zheng Dongli, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PR China VII

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Table of Contents Preface Participants Lists of the Conference I V Opening speeches: EU, China and Global Governance 1 Zhang Tiejun Crossing the Ocean by Feeling the Differences 7 Johannes Pflug Chapter 1 Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Countries Strategic approach needed to mend ties 11 Yang Yi Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of South Asian countries (Especially India) 13 Varun Sahni Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Western European countries (Germany, France and the U.K.) 25 Stefanie Flechtner The European Union as a Security Actor: The Polish Perspective 29 Marcin Zaborowski Chapter 2 Regional Security Cooperation Strategies of Major Asian and European Security Organizations ASEAN and the ARF: the Building Up of Security Community in Southeast Asia and Beyond 47 Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata The Role of the SCO in Regional Security Architecture 61 Lu Gang The Roles of EU and OSCE in Regional Security Architecture 69 Leo Schulte Nordholt The Role of NATO in the Regional Security Architecture 73 Hajo Gießmann IX

Chapter 3 Asia-Europe Cooperation and Sino-European Relations Retrospect, Prospects and Suggestions for Asia-Europe Cooperation: A Retrospect of the 2006 ASEM and Vision and Suggestions for the 2008 Asia-Europe Cooperation 81 Sebastian Bersick Shared responsibility for post-conflict peacebuilding one crucial aspect of the Asia-Europe cooperation with global relevance 91 Toshiya Hoshino The Limits of EU as a Strategic Actor: the Case of Ending EU s Arms Embargo on China 95 Chen Zhimin Sino-European Strategic Partnership: Retrospect, Vision and Suggestions from a European perspective 111 May-Britt Stumbaum Chapter 4 Asia-Europe Security Cooperation and Global Governance Major Areas and Goals of Asia-Europe Energy Security Cooperation 131 Jaewoo Choo Aspects and limitations of Sino-European Security Cooperation 149 Bernt Berger Asia-Europe Cooperation and Global Governance 155 Ye Jiang Comments 东盟地区安全合作战略的发展与演变 (Ma Ying) 165 全球治理 : 中欧合作建设和谐世界的重要领域 (Yang Baoyun) 171 亚欧合作评估及发展思考 (Yu Jianhua) 179 中国主导下的上合组织能源合作 (Cheng Jian) 183 上海合作组织与亚欧合作 (Xia Liping) 187 亚欧会议及中欧关系评估 (Liu Mingli) 195 X

Shanghai Institute for International Studies Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Shanghai Current Situation and Future Prospects of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation Proceedings of the Fifth Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance January 23-24, 2007 XI

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Opening Speeches EU, China and Global Governance Prof. Dr. Zhang Tiejun Department of European Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 1. EU Global Role and Inter-regionalism As a global player, the European Union has four different forms of foreign policy: enlargement in the core area of Europe; stabilization in the neighborhood area; bilateralism with great powers; and inter-regionalism with other organized regions. In the last decade, inter-regional cooperation has become an important component of EU foreign policy and external relations. The EU external policy has been characterized in sharply contrasting ways, from a distinctly European idealism to traditional national interest s policies hidden behind rhetoric. The type of power exercised by the EU is of the soft rather than the hard type, and is based on economic instruments; dialog and diplomacy, but even this kind of power can be used in different ways. According to Bjorn Hettne, a distinction is made between civilian power and soft imperialism : the former implies power without the hard option, the latter refers to soft power applied in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialog or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine dialog.1 Inter-regionalism is here understood as an idea or belief on constructing institutionalized and formal relations between two regions. 2 The degree of inter-regional cohesion is termed as inter-regionness, which, in turn, is judged by political, economic and socio-cultural connections between two given regions. The main characteristics of inter-regionalism are considered as inter-regional equality and the search of both two given regions for the institutionalization of inter-regional cooperation. In my mind, it needs also to be emphasized that analysis on inter-regional cooperation should be on three levels, i.e. the region-region level (like Asia and Europe), the region-country level (between one region like Europe and a country in the other region such as China), and country-country level (between a country in one region and another country in the other region); though the latter two levels cannot be viewed as inter-regional cooperation in the precise sense, they are nonetheless promoting inter-regional cooperation by and large. Both civilian power and soft imperialism are helpful in explaining EU inter-regional relations towards Africa, Latin America and Asia. The relevance of these two models is closely linked to the relative strength of the counterpart region. It is particularly interesting to note the various ways in which the EU promotes inter-regionalism towards different counterpart regions. In the case of ASEM, there is a pragmatic 1 M. Telo, Inter-regionalism as a Distinctive Feature of the Civilian Power of EU s Foreign Policy, a paper presented at SGIR Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9-11 September, 2004 2 Region is, in turn, defined as world region and not sub-national region. 1

Shanghai Institute for International Studies approach based on civilian power consisting of a reasonably symmetric dialog among equals in combination with a cautious stress on norms and good governance, at least to less significant states like Myanmar. This sharply contrasts with the EU-African relations that are more asymmetrical, dominated by the strong and built on conditionalities and imposition of norms for material self-interests. Thus, civilian power may have the most relevance in the case of ASEM and soft imperialism describes EU foreign policy relationships towards Africa, while EU-Latin American (such as Mercosur) relations lie in between. 2. Sino-European Strategic Partnership Both the European Union and China are facing an uncertain world as a result of major changes to the global environment since the end of the Cold War: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the US as the sole superpower; 9/11; greater terrorist threats, etc. The last decade has seen the EU and China grow in increasing importance in world affairs, with both undergoing processes of profound transformation such as EU enlargement and China s rapid economic development. This underpins the need for greater strategic cooperation between the EU and China. The EU s overriding challenge for the next decade is to find ways for promoting further regional integration rekindle economic growth and stabilize its neighborhood. China s overriding challenge for the next ten years is to main sustainable growth and creating harmony society domestically. The EU is now China s main trading partner and for the EU, China ranks second to the US. The EU is set to enlarge further while strengthening its institutional structures. China is set to maintain its extraordinary growth record and has its eyes firmly set on the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. It hopes to demonstrate its continuing peaceful rise through the successful holding of these two showcase events. 2.1. Criteria for a Strategic Partnership and the Chinese Practice China and the EU both claim that they have formed a strategic partnership, but neither defines what it should be like and what criteria constitute it. In order to analyze this so-called strategic partnership, it is important to at least make a brief outline about what are the criteria for such. The first thing comes to my mind is its distinctive features as compared with either alliance or normal inter-state relationships. From this understanding, we would be able to confine the range of this kind of special relationship. What makes it different from normal inter-state relations is that this kind of special relationship should contain critical implications, both for the constituent parties and for the wider world. The factor that makes it different from alliance is that it does not necessarily targeting at a third party, and if so, certainly not in alliance form. Secondly, being strategic, the partnership should be long-term oriented. 2

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Thirdly, a strategic partnership formed on the basis that the constituent parties share at least the basic values about how the domestic society and international community should be organized. Lastly, a true partnership should be built on the basis of mutual equality, and no political or other types of discrimination should be placed between the two parties. From the Chinese side, the term of strategic partnership is a creation by Jiang Zemin, former president of China. China first formed strategic cooperative partnership with Russia, with obvious orientation of creating a multipolar world, and that was in 1996, when Jiang visited Moscow and had Jiang-Yeltsin Summit. Soon after that, during Jiang s visit to Pakistan and India, China formed exactly the same term of Partnership with both countries, Constructive Partnership of Cooperation Oriented toward the 21st Century (and later after 9/11, upgraded with both to Strategic Partnership). In the next year (1997), China formed with the US, France and the ASEAN partnerships, only Sino-US one contained the word of strategic. China-US relations certainly include a lot of strategic matters. Later, Bush, however, thinking more of the negative or conflicting aspects of it, and refused to use the term. In 1998, China formed Long Term and Stable Mutual Trust Partnership with the EU (later upgraded to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership). In the same year, China also formed partnerships with the UK (Comprehensive Partnership), South Korea (Cooperative Partnership) and Japan (Friendly Cooperative Partnership). Since the beginning of this century, China has continued to form various types of Strategic Partnership, including with big countries like Brazil and small ones like Portugal. Among all these Partnerships/Strategic Partnerships, the most clearly defined was the Sino-Russian one, with the aims of creating a multipolar world, and more concrete cooperation in military affairs and tackling separatism and terrorism in Central Asia. In the first aspect, there is a true dimension of targeting at a third party (the US), though not in the alliance format. Sino-EU strategic partnership has not been defined clearly so far. This fact itself speaks for the inadequacy of it. 2.2. China-Europe: A Strategic Partnership yet to be realized Judged from the criteria listed earlier, China-Europe relations meet the first three ones. This relationship is critical for both parties, and the evolution of it has significant impacts on the current world (the first being critical), that is also why David Shambaugh termed the present China-Europe relations as an Axis, though not Axis of Evil. The important dimension of this relationship lies not only at present, but more on the potential. China is still not strong enough to be a full-fledged global player, and Europe is still not united sufficiently to be such either. Then it is only natural that both seek long-term partnership between each other (the second long term orientation). China and Europe do share some basic values concerning how the world should be organized, partly because China has become more and more confident in regional multilateral cooperation and appreciate 3

Shanghai Institute for International Studies increasingly of multilateralism in international relations, and partly due to both parties want to play larger roles on the world stage. It is not multipolarity (how the world power structure is) but multilateralism (or how the globe should be governed) that partially puts them together. Concerning the convergence of value, there is a sharp distinction between Europe and China on how domestic society should be organized. The difference here is that Europe believes that both the international and domestic societies should be democratized, while China for the time being regards only the desirability of the former (here we are talking about the third criteria). Though claimed by leaders of both sides to build bilateral relations on the basis of mutual equality, there is still insufficiency here, notably regarding the arms embargo issue. And this issue has much to do with divergent views between China and Europe regarding human rights (Chinese domestic political situation) and sovereignty (the Taiwan issue). Judging from the four criteria, therefore, China-Europe relations are far short of the third, while also not satisfactory of the last. In contrast to its relations with the US, China acknowledges that its relationship with the EU is free of strategic competition and rivalry. As far as Beijing is concerned, EU-China relations are characterized by steadiness and pragmatism. From the Chinese perspective, cooperation in jointly developing the Galileo satellite navigation system falls under the strategic partnership. Many Chinese authors and the Chinese government maintain that the partnership should also serve to promote global multilateralism, the democratization of international relations and what is being referred to as global multipolarization. China appreciates Europe s achievements with regard to political and economic integration, and acknowledges that some elements of EU-style integration, policies and strategies could be applicable in the Chinese and Asian context. In fact, China compares its own peaceful rise with the peaceful rise of the European Union, maintaining that the EU and China will become global balancing forces pursuing similar international policy strategies. China is also keen to secure market-economy status from the EU, arguing that the rising number of anti-dumping charges and cases against Chinese companies stands in the way of implementing a strategic partnership. More significantly, China sees the arms embargo issue as both out-dated and politically discriminated. A true strategic partnership would certainly be awkward with the arms embargo in place, which is now targeted at only very few countries. 2.3. China and Europe: Constructing Strategic Partnership There are a lot need to be done before a true strategic partnership can be established between China and Europe. The first is regarding the mutual expectation. A strategic partnership does not have to be based on targeting at a third party, like in the case of Sino-Russian strategic partnership when it was formed in 1996 (changed to a certain extent after Putin came to power, who is more realistic, and also the simultaneous change of attitudes in China). China has had too high expectation of Europe, especially in (earlier) promoting multipolarity, and (presently) opposing unilateralism. 4

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Secondly, constructing the strategic partnership between China and Europe requires both parties to view the partnership more for their own term, the Chinese too high expectation on Europe with regard to the US, and Europe s too much consideration of the US the other way round, are both not conducive to the construction of the partnership. Lastly, regarding what concrete matter need to be done, the list of areas are as follows: mutually promoting global governance; enhancing economic and social sustainability; having dialogs on East Asian regional security and stability, and on the basis of all the above is promoting mutual understanding. 3. China and Europe in Africa Here we need to distinguish between good governance and effective governance. The former is a value-based approach, and sometimes idealized, more in the case of modeling the democratic governance of Western democracies into all other countries. The foreign aid policies of Europe to Africa, to a large extent, reflect such a trend. The latter (effective governance) is an end-oriented approach. The Chinese engagement in Africa is a case here. In foreign aid, China prefers much the language of mutually beneficial economic cooperation to that of aid or development assistance. Nevertheless, it does have a Department of Foreign Aid within the Ministry of Commerce, and each year the China Commerce Yearbook contains a very brief report from the Director General of this Department on China s Aid to Foreign Countries. By contrast, the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation is concerned both with inward investment to China and with the role of China s foreign direct investment overseas, especially engineering contracts, and with the role of China s labor cooperation. Overall, the almost 1000-page annual volume from the Ministry of Commerce has very little that is explicitly on aid or what in OECD countries would be termed officially official development aid (ODA). Thus, there are just two short paragraphs, which are specifically about Aid to African Countries, but those are, significantly, embedded in a report on Economic and Trade Relations between China and African countries. And this report is just one of a series of 14 reports on these same Economic and Trade Relations between China and different world regions or major countries. In other words, the language about aid is a very tiny element in a much more pervasive discourse about economic and trade cooperation and exchange. However, when China does pronounce about development cooperation, it avoids the language of donor and recipient. Instead, the discourse has a strong emphasis on solidarity, deriving from a claim about China and Africa s shared developing country status, and it is weathered by several decades of working together. The following, taken from the earlier Beijing declaration of 2000, produced by the first ministerial meeting of the forum on China-Africa Cooperation, typically affirms China s preference for the language of South-South cooperation and symmetry: We also emphasize that China and African countries are developing countries with common fundamental interests; and believe that close consultation between the two 5

Shanghai Institute for International Studies sides on international affairs is of great importance to consolidating the solidarity among developing countries and facilitating the establishment of a new international order. From the perspectives of the African aid-recipient countries, this framing of language is felt comfort, since it probably gives an alternative to African countries, than the mere Western donation. The Chinese re-engagement with Africa is a result of growing national interests need and the pragmatic diplomacy. On how China is approaching Africa, current global economic power structure explains a lot. One of the greatest concerns for China in Africa is China s increasing energy need. The existing global energy regime is largely designed by industrialized world and oil exporting countries. As a late-comer, China does not have sufficient sources of energy supply if it does not go to those so-called rogue states. While taking care of its legitimate national interests needs, China does care about world peace and stability, and how unstable regions and countries could cause harm to them. At issue here is that while we all agree that poor performance in both economic and governmental aspects lead to the problems in Africa. The Chinese approach to Africa shows that China believes that the problem of Africa is more the lack of development than lack of better governance. Contrary to European approach is that Sino-African relations are not based on conditionalities, except for the Taiwan issue. Chinese workers build infrastructure for many African countries, and help African countries to develop their own manufacturing capacity. China believes that with development more effective governance might follow, and when people are starving, it is too luxury to talk about good governance. 6

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Crossing the Ocean by Feeling the Differences Johannes Pflug Member of German Parliament, Head of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group Bomb attacks on Bali, in the Philippines, in Madrid, in London have left hundreds dead and many more injured. The painful experiences of the Asian states and the European Union have taught them that no country can afford the illusion it is safe from international terrorism. It has become clear that we are facing an apparently faceless enemy who operates in small, but networked groups to achieve what he regards as exalted aims. It will be difficult to defeat this enemy with armies and symmetrically conceived military strategies: the terror cells are too widely scattered, they operate too independently. A look at Afghanistan confirms the complexity of the situation. But we must not give into the misapprehension that there is nothing we can do about all this. What we need is a comprehensive, explicit security agenda that involves the European and Asian states equally. Certainly, we have recognised this imperative. For some years now, there have been more parallels between Asia and the EU in the field of security policy, such as the ongoing efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the struggle against terrorism. Over time, the EU and the Asian states have established a range of cooperative arrangements that have markedly improved communication in the security field. At this point, I would like to particularly highlight the ASIA-EUROPE MEETING (or ASEM), which was set up in 1996 by Singapore with French support and now brings together 45 partners from Europe and Asia. At the expert level, there is lively dialogue on the fight against terrorism and action to combat cross-border crime. One positive example of this comprehensive sharing of knowledge in the field of security cooperation was the anti-terrorism conference held in Berlin in 2004. The ASEAN Regional Forum (or ARF), which was established in 1994 as a result of a decision taken by the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Bangkok, is the only permanent security forum for the Asia-Pacific region and also offers far-reaching opportunities in the security field, with strong involvement on the part of the EU. Personally, I regard the ARF as a significant form of cooperation, if one that requires further consolidation. Until now, as a result of its heterogeneous composition, it has not been in a position to act as a decision-making body responsible for security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, but it does offer the EU, in particular, a framework within which to canvass support for security policy concepts among its Asian partners. From the development of preventive diplomatic approaches and traditional confidence building measures to events that allow the ARF to learn from the OSCE s experience the Forum offers the EU a wealth of opportunities. This is one of the reasons why the German Federal Government has been so actively committed to its activities with the Forum over the years. We can put it on the record: the forms of cooperation initiated by the Asian and European sides have proved their worth over the years. Bilateral relations have been deepened, partnerships strengthened, trust created. The fundamental thinking behind 7

Shanghai Institute for International Studies these cooperative arrangements has been confirmed. But the global political situation has changed dramatically since the early days of these cooperative efforts. We might think of the attacks in New York and Washington, which filled the world s television screens with images of international terror. We might think of the attacks on Bali, in the Philippines, in Madrid and London, which showed us that terror had reached Asia and Europe as well and that it was not something that could be rooted out easily or quickly. The policy concerns and core themes addressed by these bodies must be adapted more effectively to the global situation and current security issues and concerns in Asia and Europe. Apart from the classic topics of arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation, this will involve action on issues that will be crucial in future, such as global climate change and energy supply. Only forward-looking planning and cooperation will enable us to avoid predatory and destructive international competition, economic catastrophes, global crises and political tensions that could even result in warfare. Should the participating states prove incapable of dealing with these challenges, or unwilling to address them, the cooperative European-Asian security arrangements will become futile and insignificant. We are on the right path, a path that is worth pursuing further. But at a time when no country is immune from international terrorism and its attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, security policy considerations must play an even more prominent role in parallel to our economic activities. Trade agreements and a focus on shared economic interests are of immense importance. However, terrorist attacks and secretive nuclear weapons tests make it essential for us not to lose sight of our shared security objectives, but develop them further. What are the EU s concrete goals in this respect? In the autumn of last year, I had the honour to accompany the German Federal Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on a tour of the Central Asian republics. It became clear to me on this trip that Central Asia is growing into a region of immense strategic significance. Due particularly to their direct proximity to Afghanistan, the Central Asian states have become transit countries for opium and other drugs and found themselves being turned into consumer countries as well. The smuggling of contraband goods, human trafficking and organised crime all have to be dealt with. Not only that, the Central Asian states are being targeted with Islamist ideas from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other countries. Nonetheless, they also represent a link between Europe and East Asia. Above all, this region possesses the greatest energy reserves in the world. However, there is as good as no cooperation between these countries; the conflicts between the oil and gas-producing states, on the one hand, and the states that control water resources, on the other, are increasing in severity. A stable Central Asia would have a massive impact throughout Asia. The stan countries could also take on a central role in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately the Central Asian states are still fundamentally unstable, and their understanding of basic democratic values is in its infancy. Despite all the difficulties there, this trip strengthened the Federal Foreign Minister in his determination to carry on pressing for the EU to make a greater commitment in the region. In the months to come, the discussion process that has begun about a deepening of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia will be pushed ahead under the German EU Presidency. We must exploit this opportunity to support the 8

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Central Asian countries on their way to democracy. In doing so, we must place them in a position to have a stabilising effect on a region that has been rocked by a series of crises. In this respect, we undoubtedly need the assistance of our Asian partners, China and India in particular. As the chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Friendship Group, I naturally have a particular interest in China s role in the field of security policy. The good diplomatic relations between the EU and China that have now lasted for 30 years were underlined once more in December of last year: The conclusions of the Council of Ministers on the European Commission s strategy paper Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities were published on 11 December 2006. The open tone of the communication, which gives an account of our successes, failings and common challenges, reflects the intensity of European-Chinese relations. China s extraordinary significance for Asian security policy is shown by the active, constructive role that Peking is playing in the talks set up to resolve the North Korean crisis. China s mediating role in the six-party negotiations on North Korea will be of crucial significance for the region in future as well. It is not just the neighbouring Asian countries, but the whole world that is relying on China as a go-between in the nuclear dispute. Just like the EU, China has been stressing that Pyongyang should completely and verifiably renounce its nuclear programme. Without China s influence, the problem would have the potential to escalate out of control. China is on the way to becoming a world power, politically and economically. Its key role in the North Korean crisis and increasing willingness to shoulder international responsibility, as in the negotiations with its partners about the Security Council resolutions on Iran and Lebanon, show the country s growing status. The EU appreciates the significance of European-Chinese relations. Nevertheless, the situation seems to be bogged down in some respects. To begin with, European-Asian relations were mainly economic in nature, shaped as they were by a wide variety of trade agreements, which established a basis of trust. However, this appeared to stagnate as soon as the political level was touched upon. With the elaboration of its Security Strategy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has grown into an important pillar of the EU, Europe has shown that, at the global level, it aspires to be perceived not just as an economic power, but above all as a political actor. This has enormous significance as far as its relations with China are concerned. Many questions that influence the security policy agenda there, such as non-proliferation and terrorism, affect us as well. But the EU must demonstrate its expertise in the field of security cooperation more clearly. It has to show the Chinese leadership that it can represent and defend European positions outside the economic domain as well. The European Council and the Commission must draw up a coherent policy towards China that does justice to the transatlantic context. We Germans will have to work on this over the next six months. For its part, China should signal to the Europeans that they are respected as security policy partners, and also allow European points of view to be incorporated into any decision-making processes that may take place. There will be plenty of opportunities for concerted action to reduce tension in Asia. The crisis in North Korea is certainly not over. New tests are to be feared and the nuclear muscle flexing is continuing. It is doubtful whether Pyongyang would ever use the bomb against another country, and also whether it actually has the technology that would be needed to carry out such an operation. 9