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1 好的社会科学研究怎么来? 以我 ( 们 ) 的三项研究为例唐世平 ( 复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院 ) 北京,

2 内容提要社会科学的目标和意义 : 社会科学旨在促进社会的进步生活质量的提高与人类的解放 ( 社会 ) 科学的大致分类为什么社会科学, 和自然科学一样, 也是科学? 什么是好的社会科学? 如何做好的社会科学? 我 / 我们的三项研究国际政治的社会演化族群冲突的广义理论重新审视现代化 : 时空下的全球视野结语

3 知识的目的 : 人民人类的福利是知识的唯一目的人类的福利是知识的唯

4 思考, 思考什么问题 Learning how to think really means learning how to exercise some control over how and what you think. It means being conscious and aware enough to choose what you pay attention to and to choose how you construct meaning from experience. Because if you cannot exercise this kind of choice in adult life, you will be totally hosed. The really important kind offreedomfreedom involves attention, and awareness, and discipline, and effort, and being able truly to care about other people p and to sacrifice for them, over and over, in myriad petty little unsexy ways, every day It is unimaginably hard to do this, to stay conscious and alive, day in and day out. [D id F t Wll ( ) 2005 K [David Foster Wallace ( ), 2005, Keynon, Commencement Speech.]

5 什么是科学? 科学的核心 : 讲究系统性的实际证据 ( 或者, 实证 ) 因此, 归根结底, 不讲究系统性的实际证据的学位都不是科学在 ( 社会 ) 科学中, 所有的道义 (normative) 问题或者训条都可以还原到一个实证问题比如己所不欲, 勿施于人

6 ( 社会 ) 科学的大致分类元科学 : 数学逻辑学语言学自然科学基础学科 : 物理化学生物学交叉学科应用学科社会科学基础学科 : 政治学社会学 ( 人类学 ) 经济学交叉学科 ( 比如, 社会心理学考古人类学 ) 应用学科 ( 管理学 ) 人文学科文学历史 ( 道义 ) 哲学 (ethics) h 美学 (aesthetics) h

7 比较是 ( 自然和社会 ) 科学的核心方法实验是自然科学的核心方法, 而实验的核心之一是基于对照 (control/ 空白 ) 的比较在社会科学中, 能够做实验的机会不多 ( 特别是重要的社会结果, 比如革命国家的形成战争民主化现代化等等 ) 因此, 在社会科学中, 许多时候 ( 甚至大多数时候 ), 我们用 controlled 的比较 ( 有控制的比较 ) 来接近实验这一方法论上的共同点使得社会科学和自然科学一样都是科学, 尽管他们有很大的不同 (Bhaskar 1975; 1979) ( 基于实证的 ) 比较不仅能够验证理论, 还能推广理论, 还能产生新的理论而没有 ( 基于实证的 ) 的理论化的观点和思想通常是靠不住的, 或者在实际社会体系中是行不通的, 甚至会造成巨大失误

8 社会科学的定义 I 社会科学遵循下面的一个基本特性社会科学的研究者在确立一个真实的社会事实后 (what), 问出一个为什么 (why) y 的问题? 对这个为什么 (why) 的问题, 社会科学的回答方式是 : 什么样的因素 (what htfactors, 包括 situations) 加上什么样的机制(what mechanisms?) 经历了大致的什么样的过程 (how,sequences q time) 导致了一个特定的 ( 发生了的或没有发生的 ) 社会事实这一点和自然科学也是一样的

9 社会科学的定义 II 方法论水平上的限定 I: 社会科学中最最核心的方法是比较, 而且是 controlled 的比较 ( 大致可以叫 structured & focused 的比较 ) 比较对于社会科学的作用好比是 (with control) 的实验室里的实验对于自然科学的作用正如没有实验就不会有严格意义上的自然科学 ( 即, 现代科学 ) 一样, 没有 (without control 的 ) 比较 ( 或者实验 ), 就不可能有严格意义上的 ( 实证 ) 社会科学这一方法论上的共同点使得社会科学和自然科学一样都是科学, 尽管他们有很大的不同 (Bhaskar k 1975; 1979) 这一点基本意味着, 除了利用一个案例来证伪某一个假说的尝试 (critical test), 任何单一案例的讨论都不是好的社会科学方法论水平上的限定 II: 将基于科学上的技术应用到实际世界里去, 是科学的另一更大尺度上的实验类似地, 将基于社会科学上的知识应用到实际社会中去, 是社会科学的另一更大尺度上的实验 (Popper;Bhaskar) 这意味着, 绝大部分情况下, 社会科学应该只支持渐进的社会变革 ( 作为实验 )

10 什么是好的社会科学研究? 最低要求 : 贡献了一些新的知识好的研究 : 贡献了一些重要的新知识这些新知识至少应该是 valid true( 在你的能力范围内 ) 的, 最好还是重要的新知识仅仅是陈述了一个事实, 不够好必须回答一个为什么 (why) 的问题, 且回答方式是 : 什么样的因素 (what factors, 包括 situations) 加上什么样的机制(what mechanisms?) 经历了大致的什么样的过程(how, sequences time) ) 导致了一个特定的 ( 发生了的或没有发生的 ) 社会事实有一定的政策涵义, 甚至是重要的政策涵义好的研究通常是可以生长的, 或者说是可以持续的 : 只是为了弄一篇文章而弄的研究通常都是一锤子买卖, 不是好的研究

11 什么是好的 ( 科学 ) 研究提出一个根本性的问题 ( 你是巨人的肩膀 ): 我们从哪里来? 为什么有白天和黑夜? 提出一个革命性的理论 / 范式 ( 日心说进化论相对论猜想与反驳福柯对权力的论述 ): 颠覆 / 如一道闪电划破夜空系统的合成整合 ( 大多是时候都是部分和不完整的 ): ( 毛泽东, 论持久战 ; 马克思, 历史唯物主义和资本主义 ; 韦伯, 对权力的理解 ) 为一个社会现实提供 ( 相对 ) 好的理解 / 解释 ( 制度学派相对于文化主义 ) 历史事实 : 修昔底德斯司马迁 ( 但严格意义上说, 社会科学不是历史 : 历史只是社会科学的基础 )

12 研究的基本进程找出一些你想研究的问题 ( 在你已经阅读了不少东西之后 ) 阅读 : 带着问题的 / 有目的的阅读提升你的问题 : 问一问你的问题是否是你能力之内问你的问题是否是你能力之内的, 在你从事的领域内, 最根本最有趣的问题这是一个重新选择提升问题的阶段形成一些想法 / 理解 / 解释更多的阅读 : 一定要超越你现有的阅读领域 ( 比如从社会学到政治学 ), 试图提炼你的想法 / 理解 / 解释整合你的答案预想到可能的攻击, 并给与反击 ( 这是一种迫使你自己的讨论更加缜密的办法 ) 找资料更多 / 更细的阅读真正的写作

13 好的社会科学研究怎么来? 好的研究怎么来? 关心真实世界中的根本性, 或至少是重要的问题整个 ( 实证 ) 社会科学, 只有两个根本问题 : 冲突与合作 ( 或, 战争与和平 ) 政治实体的兴衰( 或,: 国家的兴亡 ) 能够觉察到既有研究中的重要缺失错误更高的要求 : 提出一个新的研究议题个新的研究议题开辟开辟一个新的研究领域个新的研究领域 ( 作出好的研究的 ) 基本条件研究的是一个 ( 重要的 ) 真实问题了解既有的研究 ( 文献 ) 新的数据案例, 或, 用新的 ( 理论 ) 视角看待既有的数据或案例运用了适当的方法论工具, 对新的数据或案例, 进行了足够的处理, 获得了足够 solid 的结果和证据

14 研究一 : 国际政治的社会演化 Main References The Social Evolution of International Politics. Oxford University Press (June 2013). Winner, Annual Best Book Award, International Studies Association, On Social Evolution, book manuscript in progress. Additional References: Meso and Micro American Military Interventionism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation, (with Joey Long), European Journal of International Relations, 18/3 (2012). From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China s Security Strategy, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds., China s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (CornellUniversity Press, 2008), pp Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis, European Journal of International Relations, 16/1 (2010). A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Df Realism (Palgrave 2010) The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Survival: Fear, Trust, and Intergroup Cooperation, working paper (earlier version, ISA 2009).

15 Outline Why Social Evolution Paradigm (SEP) toward IR?: Background of my project The Puzzle: great debates of IR grand theories My Solution in one Paragraph Summary of Tang (2013), SEIP. Concluding Remarks Implications: theoretical and policy wise

16 The Great Debates as a Puzzle and My Solution The Great Debate: Realism, neoliberalism (or liberal institutionalism), and constructivism. (To a less extent, the pluralist/solidarist strain of the English School and the Copenhagen School). Realism: offensive realism vs. defensive realism Why have the debates remained un resolvable? Most IR theorists hold a non evolutionary approach toward IR (Thucydides, Morgenthau, Waltz, Gilpin, Mearsheimer etc.) A Social Evolutionary Approach toward IR: bring the transformation ti power of time back!

17 My solution in one paragraph The international system has always been an evolutionary system. As such, the international system can be transformed through htime even if anarchy remains a defining feature of the system. Consequently, no grand theories can cover the entire human history. Different grand theories of IR are for different historical epochs of international politics. More concretely: A paradise (~11000BC to ~6000/4000BC) An offensive realism world, An defensive realism world (post 1945) A more rule based world, still unfolding [somewhat similar to what liberal l institutionalism i i (e.g., Keohane, Ikenberry, has in mind]

18 Part I: The Origins of War and the Making of the Offensive Realism World: cases summarized Ancient Mesopotamia: +++ Ancient Egypt: +++ Ancient Anatolia: +++ Ancient China: +++ Ancient Northeast Coast of Peru: + Ancient Mesoamerica (Oaxaca, Mexico):+ Ancient Levant/Cannan (secondary): +++ Other secondary systems: Europe, India, and North America: +++ Amazon basin: /only raiding (lower end of warfare)

19 Part II: From Mearsheimer to Jervis: ~3/4000 BC to 1648/1945 AD The self transformation of the offensive realism world (or Mearsheimer s world): the offensive realism world is self destructive. As states tt expand and conquer (and some states tt do succeed in conquering others), two interconnected outcomes are inevitable: The number of states decreases, and the average size of states in terms of land, population, p and material wealth increases. These two interrelated outcomes dictate that all surviving states in the system will have accumulated more resources in terms of land, population, lti and wealth. What would these two outcomes mean for the whole system?

20 Pattern of State Death in Ancient China, 1045 BC to 1759 AD Historical Period Western Zhou /Spring-Autumn /Warring States to Qin Post-Eastern Han to Western (Xi) Jin Timeframe 1045 to 221 B. C. 190 to 280 A. D. Easter (Dong) Jin to Tang 316 to 668 A. D. Post-Tang to Yuan 907 to 1276 A. D. Number of states >800 > at the beginning Total territory controlled by all the states (million km 2 ) ~1 ~5 ~6.5 ~7.5 ~11 Years to eliminate all other states in the system Rate of state death (per century) >97 > Post-Yuan to Qing A. D. Average time (years) needed to eliminate a state ~1.03 ~3.79 ~12.6 ~18.5 ~25.3

21 Pattern of State Death in post- Holy Roman Empire Europe, A. D. Period No. of states at the beginning and the end Years of the period ~581 ~260 ~260 ~63 ~ No. of ~321 ~ states eliminated Rate of ~161 ~117 ~31 ~19 N. D. state death (per century) Average (years) needed to eliminate a state ~0.62 ~0.85 ~ N. D. These state deaths have actually led to an increase of the number of the state in the system. As such, it is not really meaningful to calculate rate of state death for this period.

22 From Mearsheimer to Jervis explained I The Fundamental Mechanism In an offensive realism world in which most, if not all, states are offensive realist states, a state can achieve its security only by reducing others security. Consequently, other than internal growth and armament, a state has to expand and conquer in order to achieve its security (Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 2). This logic of the offensive realism world to conquer or be conquered is the fundamental mechanism that will drive the transformation of an offensive realism world into a defensive df realism world. The whole transformation ti process is endogenously driven.

23 研究二 : 族群冲突的广义理论 Shiping Tang, The security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict, Review of International Studies 51 (3) 王凯唐世平,2013. 安全困境与族群冲突 : 一个因素 + 机制的分析框架, 国际政治科学 2013 年第 3 期 Shiping Tang, The Onset of Ethnic War: A General Theory, Sociological Theory (forthcoming). Shiping Tang and Hui Li, Location, Location, and Location: The Ethnogeography of Oil and the Onset of Ethnic War, under review. 熊易寒唐世平, 石油的族群地理分布与族群冲突的升级,R&R Hui Li and Shiping Tang, Different Oil, Different Conflict, in progress. 王凯唐世平, 国际竞争和族群冲突, Ethnopolitics, : A New Dataset ( 全球族群政治的数据集构建 )(PI: 唐世平, 参与者 : 王凯等 )

24 三步曲和目前的工作 Tang 2011: 指出这一远大目标的可能性, 并且展现这一个远大目标的可行性 ( 非系统性证据支持 ) 王凯唐世平 (2013): 通过比较前捷克斯洛伐克的分裂和前南斯拉夫的分裂这两个典型案例 (pathway cases), 展现这一个远大目标的可行性 ( 系统性的证据支持, 非定量 ) Shiping Tang, The Onset of Ethnic War: A General Theory Theory, Sociological Theory (forthcoming). More specific empirical investigations: 构架一个全球性的油气资源和族群冲突的数据集 ( 基本完成 ) 在此基础上, 验证基于广义理论上的一个小理论 : 石油的族群地理分布才是真正决定石油是否导致族群战争的爆发以及导致族群战争的升级的关键构建一个全球性的族群政治指数这个指数可以用来作自变量, 也可以用来作因变量更重要的是, 这个指数有一定的预测能力 : 预测某个国家和地区爆发大规模族群冲突的可能性接下来 : 进一步探讨族群冲突的爆发和延续

26 Ethnic Conflict: State of the Field I Overall assessment: the field has become extremely fragmented, lacking an integrated theory or analytical framework. More specifically: Most quantitative studies are only marginally theoretical, or even atheoretical (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Most quantitative i studies are merely correlational:absence l of explanatory causal mechanisms Most quantitative studies assume explanatory factors to be independent from each other. Indeed, not only have existing studies of ethnic conflict often failed to integrate factors into a integrated theory, but also have tended to pit some factors or mechanisms against others (e.g., Gagnon ; vs. Arfi 1998) Most studies, especially quantitative ones, have failed to differentiate initialfactors and intervening regulatory factors from political processes that work together to drive ethnic conflict. Yet, processes such as manipulations of ethnic identity and hatred by elites have often been one of the crucial processes that drive ethnic conflict.

27 Ethnic Conflict: State of the Field II Ei Existing i studies, especially ill quantitative i ones, have tended dd to overemphasize tangible (i.e., material) factors, including tangible interests (e.g., oil, gas, diamond, territory, measureable ethnic power relationship), as the drivers of ethnic conflict. As such, they have implicitly adopted a largely materialistic instrumentalism approach toward ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Such an approach, however, is utterly misleading, as Connor (1984[1994]) pointed out long ago. Existing studies of ethnic conflict have failed to integrate factors into an integrated theory (Sambanis 2003; 2004; Horowitz 2008). Indeed, most studies tend to pit their favored factors or mechanisms against others. Qualitative studies, sometimes focusing on a single case or several cases, tend to make sweeping generalizations that cannot be supported.

28 Toward A More Integrated (General) Theory I conjecture that t a key cause behind this state t of the field has been that we simply have yet to find appropriate theoretical tools that can bring all the factors and processes under the same roof. I thus advance a possible solution to this challenge. Critically building upon earlier attempts of synthesizing (e.g., Horowitz 1985; 2001; Fearon and Latin 2000; Petersen 2002; Kaufman 2001; Lebow 2008), I seek to take several key steps toward a general theory of ethnic conflict, with two analytical innovations. First, I start with mechanisms rather thanfactors as almost all existing studies have done. More specifically, I deploy two meta mechanisms that drive intergroup conflict. I then go back to comb through the many factors that have been identifiedtoto contribute to ethnic conflict by asking this question: can a factor be reasonably linked with ethnic conflict through the two meta mechanisms? By so doing, I shall be able to link most of the relevant factors with ethnic conflict, both onset and duration. Second, I explicitly identify potential interactions of the various factors and mechanisms. The resulting framework is a more integrated theory of ethnic conflict.

29 Toward a General Theory: Two Building Blocks Kaufman (2001) and Petersen (2002) made important progresses toward a more integrated theory. Even these two works, however, suffer from serious shortcomings. We critically build upon them and other works. Security Dilemma/Spiral Model (SD/SM) The security dilemma (SD) is a key concept and dynamic theory of conflict in international/intergroup/interpersonal relations. SD/SM is a potent tool for integrating material and psychological factors that because SD/SM explicitly i l contends that physical and psychological factors can act as regulators of SD/SM and that final outcomes depend on the specific mixtures of these regulators. Inter Intra Group Interactions Intra group interaction between elite and mass is a key to the understanding of ethnic conflict and this intra group interaction is constantly under the influence of the dynamics of inter group interaction At the epistemological level, inter intragroup interaction can subsume the rational choice approach and a social constructionist /symbolic interaction approach.

30 Table I. From Underlying Factors to Master Drivers Master Drivers Specific Underlying Factors Emotion: fear, honor, hatred, and anger Tangible Interest/Greed Opportunity/feasibility (internal and external constrains) Fear (insecurity): Collapse of central authority; hijacking of the central authority by one group; withdrawal of colonial power leading to the fear of ethnic annihilation/subordination, especially with ethnic mixing and earlier episodes of violent il conflict; nationalizing i policies i by a dominant group; ifl influx of ethnic hi aliens; relative demographic decline. Honor (resentment/grievance): Ethnic solidarity; domination (subordination, exclusion, discrimination, repression); influx of ethnic aliens; economic inequality (real or perceived); redistribution ib i policy. Hatred: Earlier episodes of violent conflict, especially ethnic war and cleansing Anger, esp. Rage/Fury: Local brutality; natural disasters that stuck a group. Demand of equality and equal opportunity; demand of autonomy (cultural, economic, political); i l) demand d of secession/independence; d accesses to state bureaucracy and military rank-and-files; natural resources, esp. in the territory of the subordinate group; economic inequality & redistribution policy Collapse of central authority; political instability at the centre/regime transition; economic crises; a weakened state for whatever reason (e.g., by earlier episodes of violence, in-fighting within the ruling elite; defeat in an interstate war); contagion/diffusion of conflict; other political contexts (e.g., regime type, civil society; democratization/decentralization) Capability/Power Access to weaponry; military organizations i and combat experiences from earlier conflicts; absolute size of group & relative size of the group within the whole population; proportion of young men [within the subordinate group]; Support by external allies, either state or diasporas; distance between the rebelling region and the central government; terrain of fthe subordinate group; natural resources within the subordinate group; price of primary commodity goods; Total GDP (of the state, central government); overall state capacity weakened by earlier conflicts.

31 Table II. The Power of an Interactive Approach: An Illustration Majority domination/ minority in subordination: Minority domination/ majority in subordination Outcomes Can be stable or unstable, Highly unstable. The subordinated without other separatist/secessionist movement possible majority group will seek outright factors independence, if not outright taking over of the country. Discovery of oil Very likely to be a powder-keg. Extremely likely to be a powder-keg. and other One the one hand, the subordinate minority One the one hand, the subordinate substantial natural resource within the core territory of the group will seek some kind of re-distribution of resources. It may seek external support. On the other hand, the dominant majority majority group will seek outright independence, and it can easily draw outside support. subordinate group group will seek control of the resources. On the other hand, the dominating minority group will also seek control of the resources. Discovery of oil Implications for onset: Stabilizing, if not Implications for onset: extremely risky, and other actually strengthening the status quo because the dominant (minority) group now has substantial natural it provides more resources for the majority more resource for repression whereas resource within the group to dominate and fight, if necessary. the subordinate (majority) group has core territory of the dominant group Implications for duration: If war breaks out, war tends to be bloody but short (the majority group has more resources to fight). more reason to resent and rebel. Implications for duration: If war breaks out, war is likely to be bloody and long partly because the teminority otygoup group can gain external support by selling booty futures.

32 实证 1: 石油的族群地理区位与族群冲突石油的族群地理位置或者分布 (the ethno geography of oil, especially its location) 才是决定石油是否导致或者加剧族群冲突的关键要素具体地说, 在一个国家内部, 只要少数族群聚集区域有一定数量的石油资源, 那么这个少数族群就容易和中央政府发生矛盾而如果这个少数族群此前就和控制中央政府的多数族群有过流血冲突因而仇恨的话, 那么这个少数族群和多数族群之间就有可能发生族群冲突而如果在少数族群聚集区域中的石油是在冲突过程中被发现的话, 石油的发现将加剧既有的族群冲突而如果少数族群聚集区域没有石油 ( 这时候, 多数族群聚集区是否有石油也不重要 ), 或者少数族群和多数族群是混杂居住的, 则石油对一个国家内部的族群冲突没有影响

33 四个正面案例和一个负面案例四个正面案例 : 苏丹南苏丹印尼亚齐伊拉克库尔德尼日利亚尼日尔河三角洲之所以选择这四个案例, 不仅因为它们都盛产石油天然气, 而且长期以来饱受族群冲突之苦 ; 更重要的是, 它们分布在非洲中东和南亚, 国家规模族群结构人口规模和地理环境存在较大差别, 构成了最大差异案例 (most different cases) ) 如果在差异如此之大的案例中, 我们都可以发现上述机制的存在, 那么说明我们的理论是强有力的结论 : 油田区位假说得到上述案例的支持 : 假定一个国家业已存在族群冲突, 少数族群地区发现大型油田会加剧冲突的烈度 ; 假定一个国家不存在族群冲突, 但存在一定的仇恨, 少数族群地区发现大型油田可能促使冲突爆发推论 : 石油探明储量增长会延长冲突的持续时间 ( 南苏丹尼日尔河三角洲库尔德 ), 而石油资源的逐渐枯竭会使冲突趋于缓和 ( 亚齐 ) 负面案例 : 加蓬尽管族群林立, 石油丰富, 但是, 因为没有少数族群的聚集, 石油不容易和族群政治联系在一起, 因此, 迄今为止, 族群和平相处

34 The Ethno Geography of Oil and Ethnic Conflict: Some Quantitative Evidences: Key Theses: Discovery of oil and other substantial resources within a subordinate group is very likely to be a powder keg for ethnic conflict onset and may prolong existing conflict. The reason is that oil and other substantial resource within the subordinate group impact at least four of the five immediate drivers: fear (due to internal colonialization), anger/resentment, t tangible interest, t capability. In contrast, discovery of oil and other substantial resource within the dominating group has little impact on ethnic conflict onset. And if war does break out, war tends to be bloody but short (the majority group has more resources to fight).

35 Fig. 1: Oil/Gas and Ethnic Conflict: Descriptive

36 方法论的思考和贡献我们对族群冲突的研究充分体现了我们对方法论的理解首先, 我们的实证假说建立在好的理论之上其次, 我们定量假说包含因素 ( 含时空 ), 特别是因素之间的相互作用再者, 我们的定性研究的假说包含了三个部分 : 因素 ( 含时空 ) 因素相互作用机制而因为只有定性研究可以解决机制问题 ( 而这也是定性研究的核心优势之一 ), 我们的定性案例研究特别试图展现我们认定的机制的作用最后, 我们的结果, 无论是定量还是定性, 都非常明晰因此, 我们认为我们的这项研究充分体现了是定性定量以及其他方法的结合的方法论优势

37 缅甸的族群冲突 ( 战争 ): 导因 I 去殖民地运动之后兴起的许多现代民族国家都试图把一个国家变成一个大族群 ( 优势族群 ) 据有的国家 ( nationalizing state ; Brubaker 1996) 而这样的国家通常容易族群冲突缅甸属于这一类国家的典型 ( 类似的马来西亚印尼越南等 ) 具体地说, 这些 nationalizing state 的主要做法是 : 在中央层面, 将国家机器转化成为优势族群的 ( 国家 ) 机器主要部门, 特别是强力部门 ( 军队警察内部安全 ) 在地方层面, 让国家机器最大程度地渗透到少数族群内部通过向少数族群地区的移民政策, 试图进一步挤压少数族群的生存领地 ( 内部殖民化 ), 同时达到控制少数族群地区的财政 ( 含自然 ) 资源等等从政治地理上, 将原本的少数族群领地分成几份, 制造促成少数族群内部分裂的地方小认同从政治上分化少数族群内部, 以更好的控制少数族群将优势族群的文化 ( 文字语言 ) 变成官方文化, 并且强迫少数族群接受 ( 胁迫下的同化 ) 不幸的是, 所有这些举措, 都非常容易激化少数族群对多数族群 ( 控制的中央政府 ) 的不满和仇恨, 因而非常容易导致族群冲突或者加剧已有的族群冲突

38 缅甸的族群冲突 ( 战争 ): 导因 II 按照我们关于族群冲突爆发 ( 及持续 ) 的广义理论, 缅甸族群冲突多发且不易解决非常容易理解缅甸的许多少数族群都有相当强烈的族群自我认同缅甸的许多少数族群都有明显的核心聚集区 ( 或者说是他们认定的家园 ), 且这些核心聚集区处于国家的边界地区许多靠近边境的少数族群核心聚集区都有丰富的自然资源 ( 如, 翡翠森林 ) 某些少数族群核心聚集区内有相对规模的毒品生产基地, 是的这些少数族群能够有实力进行战争这些靠近边境的少数族群核心聚集区很多都是丛林崇山峻岭的地形地貌这高度利于通过游击战和运动战防守, 而不利于政府军的围剿以及移民的留驻历史上, 这些少数族群和缅甸族都有过大规模的流血冲突, 双方积怨已深在这样的基础上, 缅甸中央政府的 nationalizing state 的政策只会进一步激化少数族群对多数族群 ( 中央政府 ) 的不满和仇恨, 因而非常容易烽烟再起缅甸内部的民主化有可能进一步激化族群矛盾和冲突

39 研究三 : 重新审视全球的现代化为什么要重新考察全球的现代化经历? 现实关怀 : 大部分国家 ( 包括中国 ) 都还未实现真正意义上的现代化可见的 ( 和潜在的 ) 理论创新认知论和方法论上的创新 : 现代化是在时空下展开已发表的作品李江春 : 制度之间的政治经济发展阿根廷和智利比较研究 ( ), 经济社会体制比较 2013 年第 5 期叶成城唐世平, 第一波现代化 : 一种因素 + 机制的解释, 开放时代,2015 年第 1 期

40 研究三 : 重新审视全球的现代化正在进行的工作 Shiping Tang, Modernization across Time and Space: A New Global Analytical Framework, Shiping Tang, The Institutional Foundational of Economic Growth, book manuscript. 叶成城唐世平, 第 1.5 波现代化之一 : 为什么法国和西班牙未能效仿英国, , 叶成城唐世平, 第 1.5 波现代化之二 : 西欧内部的大分流, , 王子夔唐世平, 帝国的挣扎 : 第二波现代化中的多族群帝国 ( 奥匈奥斯曼沙俄满清 )

<4D F736F F F696E74202D20D7E5C8BAD5BDD5F9B5C4B1ACB7A22DD2BBB8F6B9E3D2E5C0EDC2DB2D D30342D3239>

<4D F736F F F696E74202D20D7E5C8BAD5BDD5F9B5C4B1ACB7A22DD2BBB8F6B9E3D2E5C0EDC2DB2D D30342D3239> 族群战争的爆发 : 一个广义理论 (The Onset of Ethnic War: A General Theory) 唐世平 ( 复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院 ) 北京,2015 04 29 已经发表即将发表和正在进行的工作 Shiping Tang, 2011. The security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative