2014 6 CJS 34 曹正汉 : : ; : ; ( ) ( ) : PoliticalRisksand Decentralization:TheComparisonof ThreeModelsonChineseGovernance CAO Zhenghan Abstract:TherearethreemodelsonthestructureofChinesegovernanceal taking account ofthe centralgovernment s objectives about governance eficiencyandpoliticalstabilityatthesametime.theyarethe administrative subcontractsystem modelbyzhouli-anthemodelof centralizedpersonal controlsat the nationalleveland decentralized ruling over the people regionaly bycaozhenghanandthe empire sgovernancelogic modelby ZhouXueguang.Althree modelshavesignificantdivergencesintermsof whetherthetwoobjectivesofeficiencyandstabilityofthecentralgovernment * : (Author:CAOZhenghanColegeofEconomicsZhejiang University)E-mail:caozhenghan@aliyun.com 52
canbecompatibleornot.zhouli-anandcaozhenghanarguethatthetwo objectivesarecompatibleinspecificgovernancestructurewhichisnotshared byzhou Xueguang who arguesthatthe co-existence ofcentralization and decentralizationcannotleadtoastablestructureandthetwoprocessesare subjecttocyclicaladjustmentandcyclicfluctuation.andalsotheanalysesof thethree modelsfocusondiferentlevels.the administrativesubcontract system modelandthe empire sgovernancelogic modelmainlydiscussthe governancestructureand mechanism ofthediferentlevelsofgovernments withinthe bureaucraticsystemwhilethe modelof centralized personal controlsat the nationalleveland decentralized ruling over the people regionaly focusesonhowthe wayofcentralgovernmentdealing withthe publicshapesthe basicstructure ofdecentralization.the divergencesare causedbytworeasons.firstthesethree modelsholddiferentassumptions aboutwhethertheruleoverthe militaryandthepeoplecanbeseparated. Secondthereexiststhedisagreementaboutwhichoneisthecriticalsourceof politicalrisksbetweendecentralizationitself (e.g.thelocalgovernments behaviorsasdeviationoutofcontroletc.)andthepublic(e.g.thepublic s behaviorsasprotestoppositionconfrontationetc.). Keywords:authoritarianregimespoliticalrisksdecentralizationgovernance structure (winningcoalition) (Mesguitaetal.20032011;Northet al.2009) ( ) (Gandhi2009;Levitskyand Way2010;Svolik2012) 53
2014 6 : : ; ( 2011) (market-preserving federalismchinesestyle) (Weingast1995; MontinolaQianand Weingast1995;Qianand Weingast1996 1997;JinQianand Weingast2005;Xu2011) (Qianand Weingast1996) ( 2011; 2014) 54
(RoddenandRose-Akerman1997; 2008) : ( 20082014; 2012) ( 2011; 2013; 2013) (20112012 20132014a) 1 1. ( 2011; 2012; 2012) 55
2014 6 : ; ( ) ( ) : ( 一 ) 行政发包制 模型 ( 20082014; 2012) ( 2014) (2008) : (2014) : ; ; (2014) 56
(2014) : ( ) ( ) ( ) : ; ( 2014) ( ) ( 2012; 2014) 57
2014 6 ( 二 ) 中央治官 地方治民 模型 (2011) ( 2011;Cai2008) ; ( 2011; 2013) : ( ) ( )( 2011; 2013) ;2 ;3 ( 2003:29) (2011) 2. : 3. : 58
: ; ; ; ( ) ( 2014b) ( 2014b) 59
2014 6 : (20112013) (Huang1996; 2014) ( 2013) ( 三 ) 帝国的治理逻辑 (2011) ( ) (2011201220132014a) 60
: ; (20112013) ; ( 2011) ; ; ( 2013) (2013) ; ( ) ( ) (2013) ( ) 61
2014 6 (2011) : ( 2011; 2011) ( 2011) ( ) ( ) : ( ) ( ); ( ) ( 20082014) (2003:29) ( 2008:58-59) 62
( ) ( 一 ) 兵民能否分治? ( ) (Hintze1975) : 63
2014 6 ; ( 2005:250-253) (20112013) : (2014a:125) : 64
( 2005:250) 4 (20112013) 5 ( 二 ) 何种统治风险? (20112013) (2014) 4. ( ) ( 2005: 73) ; ( ) 5. ( 2005:168-177) 65
2014 6 (2011) ; ( 2013; 2014) (2014) (20112013) (2011) 66
; 6 7 : ( ) 21.62% (39.61%) (14.76%)( 2010:225-226) 1994 44.3% 30 ; 2012 52% ( ) 8 30 1984 2000 6. 7. (2014b) 8. 2012 ( ) 5128.04 ( ) ( ) 2012 56% : 2013 67
2014 6 (2005:251-252) : 60 ( 2011; 2013) (References).2011. [J]. (1):1-40..2013. [J]. (2):1-11..2014. [J]. (3):30-55..2013. [J]. (1):182-205..2010. [M]. :..2011. : [J]. (1):73-97..2013. [M]. :..2011. [M]. :..2012. : [J]. (5):113-130..2003. [M].. :..2008. [J]. (3):99-114..2011. [J]. (4):126-148..2012. : [J]. 32(1):1-37..2008. : [M]. :..2014. [J]. 34(6):1-38. 68
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