2015 3 CJS 35 : : : DOI:1015992/jcnki31-1123/c201503004 The HierarchyofProfitDivisionand Grasroots Governance Involution: The Logic of Rural Governance under the BackgroundoftheResourceInput * : ; (Author:Chen FengColaborativeInnovation CenterofBeijingSociety-Building & Social Governance;Schoolof HumanitiesandSocialSciencesBeijing Universityof Technology) E-mail:chenfeng-0110@163com ** (13ZDA06) (14SHC025) (X5014021201301) [Thisresearchissupportedbythe SocialScienceFoundMajorProgramofBeijing(14SHC025)theSocialScienceFoundProgram ofbeijing(14shc025)thehumanitiesandsocialsciencefundprogramofbeijinguniversity oftechnology(x5014021201301)] ; ; 95
2015 3 CHEN Feng Abstract:Sincethelaunchofthereformoftaxesandfeesin2002thecentral governmenthasissuedaseriesoffavorablepoliciesforfarmersandtookalotof resourcestothecountrysideindustrystartedtosupportagricultureitbringsnew opportunityforruraldevelopmentandruralgovernancewhichgainssupportofthe broadmassesoffarmersinawayitalsohelpsconsolidatetherulingfoundationof Chinese Communist Partyand enhance the legitimacy ofthe state power Howeverthepoliticaleficiencyofthereformoftheagriculturaltaxesandfeeshas quicklyreducedandtheresourceinputtothecountrysidedidnotachievethe desiredefectontheonehandgrass-rootsorganizationscannotundertaketop- downinputedresourcesefectivelyandconnectscateredfarmersontheother handthenon-cooperationbetweenoficialsandthefarmersoftenendedupwith predicamentofgovernanceofthe nailhouse intheconstructionoftheproject Underthisbackgroundgrass-rootsorganizationsmainlypresenttwobasicformsof governancesomevilagecadreswereafraidof accident anddidthingspassively so much so that some even avoided theinput of resourcesfor the vilage constructionothervilagesmainlywereruledbytherichandthegreyblackforces Theyactivelyfightforresourcesandprojectsandtakeavarietyofmeanstosolve the nailhouseholds andgainsomebenefitsfromtheprojectorpoliticalcapitalfor thedevelopmentoftheirindividualeconomybothgovernanceformshaveeroded thenationalresourcesandlocalpublicresourcesandtheauthorityandlegitimacyof grassrootsorganizationsfurtherdeclineontheresourcesinputchainaprofit divisionhierarchyhasbeenformedamongpeopleinvolvedinpowerrent-seeking localsocialforcesoftherichandthegreyblackforcesopportunisticandinterest- oriented farmers and so on Ordinary people should have been the biggest beneficiariesoftheinputresourcesbutthehierarchalprofitdivisionimpairsthe interestsofthebroadmassesoffarmersbuttheyarereluctanttoprotestasthe resourcesaremainlyinputfromtheabovenotextractedfromthemgrassroots governanceissuferingfrominvolutionfundamentalyitisresultedfrom the tensionbetweentheoppressivesystem andefectivegovernanceandithappens duringthetransformationoftheruralsocietiesfromunderintegritygovernanceto undertechnologygovernancehoweverthecounterbalancerelationsofinterests andresponsibilityamongthestategrass-rootsorganizationsandfarmersproduce fractureanditisdificultfortheinputresourcestoproducemaximumefectiveness andimprovetheconditionoftheruralgovernanceonthecontrarytheinput 96
resourceshelpnourishaprofit-sharinggroupandthehierarchalprofitdivisionofthe grass-rootssocietyhasputruralgovernanceintoanewdilemma Keywords:resourcestheorderofprofitdivisioninvolutionruralgovernance powertechnologygovernance 2002 ( 2001; 2005) ( 2005) ( 2006) ( 2011) ( 2005) 1 1 (2010) 97
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