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1,2, 2, 2 1, 350002; 2, 510275 ) A,, F830 A 1, investor relation management,irm. National Investor Relations Institute NIRI,,, [1].,IRM.,IRM [2]., IRM. 2004 3, IRM,98, 82, 75, 37% [3].,,., IRM,.1999 6, H,,, IRM., IPO., 2001,IRM,, IRM.,2002 000568, 0.77%, 99.23%,

. [4]., IRM, 2003 8 CEO,,,, [5]. [6], IRM.,,, IRM. IRM,.,, IRM.,, 2004 A, internet investor relation index,iiri., IIRI., IIRI ;,., IRM, IRM. 2 2.1 IRM, IRM,, IRM.,.,.,,.,,. 2002,.,, IRM.,, IRM,.,. 2.2 [6], IRM. (1)

,,,.,,,..,,, ;,.,,. (2),. Shleifer Vishny Pagano Roell,,,,,, [7,8].Johnson tunneling ) [9].,, 10,11.,., 6,11.,. (1).,,,.,,, 12.,.,;,. (2).,,.,,,,.,, [13]. (3)., ;,,..,.

(4).,,.,,.,,,. 2.3,..,,,..,,,. B.,, B.. IRM., ;, IRM,,., [14],... IT, ;,,, IRM. 3 3.1 2004 A,, 2004 10 1-2004 12 31. 3, 347, 1. Table 1 Sample Derivation 2004 A 484 2003 13 79 46 347,,. 3.2.[15],,.[15-18],,

3 48. 0-1, 1, 0., IIRI 1.,.. 3.3,,,,,,.,.,,,. (1) : IIRI, IIRI, 2004, IIRI,. IIRI = α + β1issue + β2growth + β3lev + β4growth Lev + β Lshrl + β Ushrl + β Dshr + β Gov + β Oshr + β Size + 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 β ID + β Fissue + β ROA + β IND + ε 11 12 13 13+ i i= 1,, 1-25,. 2., IIRI, 2004 IIRI. 2 IIRI 2004 17, 17, 2004 IIRI IIRI, 330., 43, 330, 2002 2003 6 A, B. 2002 2003 6,.,, IRM,A,. 1, 2004, Issue,. i 1

IIRI = α + βgrowth + β Lev + β Growth Lev + β Lshrl + β Ushrl + β Dshr + 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 β Gov + β Oshr + β Size + β ID + β Fissue + β ROA + β IND + ε 7 8 9 10 11 12 12+ i i= 1 2 1., 2 A B, IIRI. Table 2 Definition of Independent Variables i 2 Issue, 2004, 2004 1, 0 Growth Lev 2003 / Lshrl Ushrl r, r 50% Lshrl= Ushrl= 50%,, r r-50%,r>50% 0, Rshr () Gov, 1, 0 O sh r / S ize ln ( 2003 ) ID F issue ROA, B H 1, 0 2003 INDi i = 1, 2,, 12, 2001 12 ( ) Morck Shleifer Vishny [11,19].,, ;,,,.,,. 4

4.1 (1) 3,,,Issue IIRI 5%, (Growth Lev) IIRI 10.,(Oshr) IIRI, IIRI, 50,Ushrl IIRI., Size, [14,20],ROA IIRI.,,, IRM. 4.2, IIRI. A B,A 131,B 199. A, IIRI. A B IIRI 4.,A IIRI T Mann-Whitney U, B,. Table 3 Regressions of IIRI on Equity Financing Plan (Dependent Variable: IIRI) T? - 4.713*** - 2. 773 Issue + 3. 878** 2. 223 Growth? - 0. 718-0. 518 Lev? - 2. 095-0. 351 Growth Lev + 19. 682* 1. 871 Lshr1? 4. 158 0. 509 Ushr1? - 2. 683* - 1. 780 Rshr? 0. 126 0. 085 Gov? - 0. 242-0. 208 Oshr + 3. 293*** 2. 628 Size + 1. 145*** 2. 713 ID + 6. 731 1. 218 Fissue + - 0.221-0.135

ROA + 13. 637 1. 313 INDi N = 347 F = 2. 21*** AdjR2 = 0. 08 :* 10%,** 5%,*** 1%,. A B 2 5.,A F B., A B R2, A B, A IIRI B.,A Growth Lev IIRI 1,,,,,,,. A, IIRI., IIRI 10 50,,IIRI.,,,, IIRI.,,,.,,. Rshr,,,,.. (Oshr) IIRI,., Size IIRI. Table 4 Comparison s of IIRI in Group A and Group B : T-test and Mann-Whitney U-test N T ( T ) ( Z ) A B 131 199 15.67 12.25 16..00 14. 00 8.06 7.81 3. 277-2. 987 Table 5 Regression s of IIRI on Incentive of Equity Financing: Comparison of Group A and Group B

A ( n = 131) (2002 2003 ROE 6% ) B ( n = 199) (2002 2003 ROE < 6% ) T T - 5. 226* * * - 2. 82-4. 706* * * - 2. 51 Growth - 1. 323-0. 80-1. 420-0. 92 Lev - 7. 725-0. 83-6. 514-1. 13 Growth Lev 32. 49* * * 2. 90 7.104 1. 00 Lshlr 2. 14* 1. 79 6. 214 1. 12 Ushr1-4. 570* - 1. 87-8. 880* - 1. 70 Rshr 0. 205 0. 06 0. 821 0.43 Gov - 1. 114* * - 2. 12-1. 026-0.70 Oshr 3.389* * * 2. 79 3. 621* * 1. 96 S ize 1. 862* * * 2.49 1. 009* 1.77 ID 9. 164 0. 88 6.210 0. 88 Fissue - 1. 033-0. 38 0. 844 0. 40 ROA 40. 680 1. 45 2. 272 0. 18 INDi F 2. 37* * * 1.729* * A d jr2 0.09 0. 06 B, Growth Lev Lshr IIRI. A,, IRM, A B IIRI.,Oshr Size IIRI,Ushrl 10 IIRI, IRM. 5,,.2001., IRM. IRM,, IIRI, A 347,.,.,.,

.,., IRM,.,,. 1 CRC NCRC 192 205 179 194 172 181 200 182 66 25 64 75 93 22 77 125 55 37 342 281 98 153 80 135 55.33% 59.08% 51.59% 55.91% 49.57% 52.16% 57.64% 52.45% 19.02% 7.20% 18.44% 21.61% 26.80% 6.34% 22.19% 36.02% 15.85% 10.66% 98.56% 80.98% 28.24% 44.09% 23.05% 38.90%

IS a CSRC Excel 69 1 11 7 214 237 194 199 28 45 19 13 99 9 46 42 67 163 0 25 11 12 39 3 19.88% 0.28% 3.17% 2.02% 61.67% 63.80% 55.91% 57.35% 8.07% 12.97% 5.48% 3.75% 28.53% 2.59% 13.26% 12.10% 19.31% 46.97% 0.00 7.20% 3.17% 3.46 % 11.24% 0.86% [1] NIRI Board of Directors. Definition of Investor Rela2tions [EB /OL]. (2003-03 - 20) [2005-05 -10].Http: / /www. Niri. Org /. [2] MARSTON C. The Organization of the Investor Relations Function by Large UK Quoted Companies [J].Omega,1996,(24): 477 488.

[3]. [ N ]., 2004-3 - 15 (7). [4]. [ N ].,2002-12 - 9 (6). [5]. [ N ]., 2003-10 - 18 (3). [6],.?[J]., 2003, (6): 128 138. [7] SHLEIFER ANDREI,VISHNY ROBERT W. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. The Journal of Finance, 1997, (52): 737 783. [8] PAGANO MARCO, ROELL AILSA. The Choice of Stock Ow2nership Structure: Agency, Monitor, and the Decision to Go Public [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Econom2ics, 2000, (113): 187 225. [9] JOHNSON S R, LA PORTA F, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES,A SHLEIFER.Tunneling [ J ]. American Economic Review, 2000,(90) : 22 27. [10],. [ J ]., 2004, ( 2 ) : 56-64. [11],,. [ J ]., 2004, (12) : 3 12. [12] CLAESSENS S, S DJANKOV, J FAN, L LANG. Disentang2ling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding [J]. The Journal of Finance, 2002, (57): 2741 2771. [13],. [ J ]., 2003, (3) : 59 69. [14] ETTREDGE M, RICHARDSON V J, SCHOLZ S. Determinants of Voluntary Dissemination of Financial Data at Cor2porate Web Sites [ R ]. University of Kansas, 2002. [15]. [ D ]. :, 2002. [16] GEERLINGS J, L BOLLEN, HASSINK H. Investor Relations on the Internet: A Survey of the Euronext Zone [ J ].The European Accounting Review, 2003, (12) : 567-579. [17] PIRCHEGGER B, WAGENHOFER A. Financial Information on the Internet: A Survey of the Homepages of Austrian Companies [J]. The European Accounting Review, 1999, (8): 383 395. [18] XIAO J Z, HE Y, CHOW C W. The Determinants and Characteristics of Voluntary Internet2based Disclo2sures by Listed Chinese Companies [ J ]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 2004. (23): 191-225. [19] MORCK R, A SHLEIFER,R W VISHNY. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Ana lysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,(20) : 293 315. [20] ASHBAUGH H. K M JOHNSTONE. WARFIELD T. Corporate Reporting on the Internet [ J ]. Accounting Horizons. 1999, 13 (3): 241 257. Incentive of Equity Financing and Investor Relation Management: Evidence from Investor Relation on Corporate Websites

XIN Qing-quan 1, 2 YANG De-ming 2 CHEN Nian 2 (1.School of Business, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350002, China; 2 School of Business, Sun Yat2sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China) Abstract: In order to verify the effects of incentive of equity financing on investor relation management, the paper constructs the internet investor relation index ( IIRI). From a sample comprising the listed corporations that have A shares on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the paper finds that the IIR I is affected by p resent financing plans and future refinancing incentive. If the possibility of achieving the financing qualification is greater in the coming year, the investing motivation and enclosing money motivation will make IIR I increase. Otherwise, the corporations motivation to undertake investor relation on their websites will be weakened. The conclusion indicates that investor protection is not the true purpose of investor relation management. Actually, investor relation management is a self interest behavior of Chinese listed companies. Key words: investor relation management; corporate websites; incentive of equity financing; investment motivation; enclosing money motivation. : 2006-01-26 01BJY017 ) 70372024 ) 1975-