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1 CJS 34 曹正汉 : : ; : ; ( ) ( ) : PoliticalRisksand Decentralization:TheComparisonof ThreeModelsonChineseGovernance CAO Zhenghan Abstract:TherearethreemodelsonthestructureofChinesegovernanceal taking account ofthe centralgovernment s objectives about governance eficiencyandpoliticalstabilityatthesametime.theyarethe administrative subcontractsystem modelbyzhouli-anthemodelof centralizedpersonal controlsat the nationalleveland decentralized ruling over the people regionaly bycaozhenghanandthe empire sgovernancelogic modelby ZhouXueguang.Althree modelshavesignificantdivergencesintermsof whetherthetwoobjectivesofeficiencyandstabilityofthecentralgovernment * : (Author:CAOZhenghanColegeofEconomicsZhejiang University) caozhenghan@aliyun.com 52

2 canbecompatibleornot.zhouli-anandcaozhenghanarguethatthetwo objectivesarecompatibleinspecificgovernancestructurewhichisnotshared byzhou Xueguang who arguesthatthe co-existence ofcentralization and decentralizationcannotleadtoastablestructureandthetwoprocessesare subjecttocyclicaladjustmentandcyclicfluctuation.andalsotheanalysesof thethree modelsfocusondiferentlevels.the administrativesubcontract system modelandthe empire sgovernancelogic modelmainlydiscussthe governancestructureand mechanism ofthediferentlevelsofgovernments withinthe bureaucraticsystemwhilethe modelof centralized personal controlsat the nationalleveland decentralized ruling over the people regionaly focusesonhowthe wayofcentralgovernmentdealing withthe publicshapesthe basicstructure ofdecentralization.the divergencesare causedbytworeasons.firstthesethree modelsholddiferentassumptions aboutwhethertheruleoverthe militaryandthepeoplecanbeseparated. Secondthereexiststhedisagreementaboutwhichoneisthecriticalsourceof politicalrisksbetweendecentralizationitself (e.g.thelocalgovernments behaviorsasdeviationoutofcontroletc.)andthepublic(e.g.thepublic s behaviorsasprotestoppositionconfrontationetc.). Keywords:authoritarianregimespoliticalrisksdecentralizationgovernance structure (winningcoalition) (Mesguitaetal ;Northet al.2009) ( ) (Gandhi2009;Levitskyand Way2010;Svolik2012) 53

3 : : ; ( 2011) (market-preserving federalismchinesestyle) (Weingast1995; MontinolaQianand Weingast1995;Qianand Weingast ;JinQianand Weingast2005;Xu2011) (Qianand Weingast1996) ( 2011; 2014) 54

4 (RoddenandRose-Akerman1997; 2008) : ( ; 2012) ( 2011; 2013; 2013) ( a) 1 1. ( 2011; 2012; 2012) 55

5 : ; ( ) ( ) : ( 一 ) 行政发包制模型 ( ; 2012) ( 2014) (2008) : (2014) : ; ; (2014) 56

6 (2014) : ( ) ( ) ( ) : ; ( 2014) ( ) ( 2012; 2014) 57

7 ( 二 ) 中央治官地方治民模型 (2011) ( 2011;Cai2008) ; ( 2011; 2013) : ( ) ( )( 2011; 2013) ;2 ;3 ( 2003:29) (2011) 2. : 3. : 58

8 : ; ; ; ( ) ( 2014b) ( 2014b) 59

9 : ( ) (Huang1996; 2014) ( 2013) ( 三 ) 帝国的治理逻辑 (2011) ( ) ( a) 60

10 : ; ( ) ; ( 2011) ; ; ( 2013) (2013) ; ( ) ( ) (2013) ( ) 61

11 (2011) : ( 2011; 2011) ( 2011) ( ) ( ) : ( ) ( ); ( ) ( ) (2003:29) ( 2008:58-59) 62

12 ( ) ( 一 ) 兵民能否分治? ( ) (Hintze1975) : 63

13 ; ( 2005: ) ( ) : (2014a:125) : 64

14 ( 2005:250) 4 ( ) 5 ( 二 ) 何种统治风险? ( ) (2014) 4. ( ) ( 2005: 73) ; ( ) 5. ( 2005: ) 65

15 (2011) ; ( 2013; 2014) (2014) ( ) (2011) 66

16 ; 6 7 : ( ) 21.62% (39.61%) (14.76%)( 2010: ) % 30 ; % ( ) (2014b) ( ) ( ) ( ) % :

17 (2005: ) : 60 ( 2011; 2013) (References) [J]. (1): [J]. (2): [J]. (3): [J]. (1): [M]. : : [J]. (1): [M]. : [M]. : : [J]. (5): [M].. : [J]. (3): [J]. (4): : [J]. 32(1): : [M]. : [J]. 34(6):

18 : [G]//.. : : : [J]. (10): : [J]. (9): : [J]. (3): a. : [J]. (4): b. : [M].. CaiYongshun PowerStructureandRegimeResilience:ContentiousPoliticsin China. BritishJournalofPoliticalScience38(3): GandhiJennifer Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. HintzeOto The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. New York: Oxford UniversityPress. HuangYasheng.1996.Inflation andinvestmentcontrolsin China:ThePolitical Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress. JinHehuiYingyiQianand Barry Weingast RegionalDecentralizationand FiscalIncentives:FederalismChineseStyle. JournalofPublicEconomics 89 (9-10): LevitskySteven and Lucan Way.2010.Competitive Authoritarianism : Hybrid RegimesaftertheCold War.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. MesquitaBruce Bueno dealastair SmithRandolph M.Siversonand James D. Morrow.2003.TheLogicofPoliticalSurvival.Massachusets:TheMITPress. MesquitaBruceBuenodeandAlastairSmith.2011.The Dictator s Handbook.New York:PublicAfairs. MontinolaGabrielaYingyiQianandBery Weingast FederalismChineseStyle: ThePoliticalBasisforEconomicSuccesinChina. World Politics48(1): NorthDouglassC.JohnJoseph WalisandBarryR.Weingast.2009.Violenceand SocialOrders.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. QianYingyiand Barry Weingast China s Transitionto Markets: Market- PreservingFederalismChineseStyle. JournalofPolicy Reform 1(2): QianYingyiandBarry Weingast Federalism asacommitmenttopreserving MarketIncentives. JournalofEconomicPerspectives11(4): RoddenJonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman Does Federalism Preserve Markets Virginia Law Review 83(7): SvolikMilan W.2012.ThePoliticsof Authoritarian Rule.New York:Cambridge UniversityPress. WeingastBarry TheEconomicRoleofPoliticalInstitutions:Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Performance. Journal of Law Economics and Organization1(1):1-31. XuChenggang The Fundamental Institutions of China s Reforms and Development. JournalofEconomicLiterature49(4): : 69

Abstract:In Chinesehistory thepowerrelationshipbetweenthecentraland localgovernmenthasundergoneperennialandcriticalchanges.thesechanges havegiv

Abstract:In Chinesehistory thepowerrelationshipbetweenthecentraland localgovernmenthasundergoneperennialandcriticalchanges.thesechanges havegiv : 2017 3 CJS 37 : : : DOI:10.15992/j.cnki.31-1123/c.2017.03.001 CentralizationandDecentralizationofPowerStructure:A Theory of Ruling Risks and Empirical Evidence from ChineseHistory CAO Zhenghan * : (Author:CAO