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: 38.5 3.6 : 6.4 1,426.5 54.54% A1 6:4 1,504 57.05% 34 A2 5 6:4 1,673 63.96% B1 6:4 1,264 48.3% 30 B2 5 6:4 1,413 54.05% C1 6:4 1,062.9 40.6% 25.6 C2 5 6:4 1,190.2 45.5% iii
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1. WTO Homeland Security - 1 -
2. APEC 3. 400 M - 2 -
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(Bernard Brodie) (The Strategy in Missile Age) 1 National Military Strategy Operation/Battle (Tactics/Combat) 1. Top-Down2. (Bottom-Up) 3. Scenario 4. Threat 5. Mission 6. Hedging 7. Technology 8. (Fiscal) 1 ( 81 12 ) 295 296-5 -
1. 3:1 2. 1 5 5 1. 2. 3. 2 2Board on Army Science and Technology of the Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems of the National Research Council ( 1996 1 ) 279 295-6 -
bitter to end 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. - 7 -
2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. (1) (2) (3) - 8 -
3 2-1 / 1 2 3 (4) 5 defense line 3 Richard L. Kugler, U.S. Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21st Century(Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), pp. 111-122. - 9 -
1991 without engagement in large-scale, land combat decisive attack decisive operations are full-dimension operation 4 1980 (Air-Land Battle) Follow On Forces Attack, FOFA anti-construction 5 6 4 Philip A. Dupont, in How to Fight Force XXI, CGSC Concept Development Program, 1997, p. 32. 5Jim Garamone, Joint Forces Command to Test Revolutionary Combat Concept, American Forces Press Service Washington May 8, 2000. 6-10 -
1998 (Kosovo) (linear operation) (maneuver warfare) (fluid) 7 1. 2. 1. 7Richard D. Hooker "Redefining maneuver warfare", Military Review, February 1992, pp. 50-58. - 11 -
2. 1. 2. 250 500 1. F-16 IDF 8 8 3 2000 9 5-12 -
2. / submunitions high-explosive 9 M-9 1 20-30 10 (Bekaa Valley) (October War) 11 71 9 John Stillion and David Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballastic-Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Response, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p. 13. 10 John Stillion and David Orletsky, op. cit., p. 25. 11Anthony H. Cordesman Abraham R. Wagner, The Lesson of Modern War Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, vol. 1 The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989, pp. 90-91. - 13 -
4 4 90 1. 2. 3. geographic strategy 1982-14 -
attribution war operational tempo - 15 -
force structure 1990 20 1989 213 144 5 18 10 10 5 3 19 7 17 4 12 20 216 150 1992 55 30 90 30 9 21 6 10-20% 18 15 13 14 21 12 ( 1997 5 ) 24 13 ( 1996 12 ) 30 ( 1994 11 ) 17 14 Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare: An Essay, AEI Annual Conference on the PLA(Maryland: Wye Conference Center, 1997), pp.2-3. - 16 -
5,000 7,000 15 90 5 38 5 3-1 / %) 51.75 199,237 14.61 56,284 14.33 55,170 3.89 15,015 1.57 6,545 10.17 39,155 3.68 14,168 385,574 89 348 4000 15 James R. Blaker, The American RMA Force: An Alternative to the QDR, Strategic Review, Summer 1997, p.22. - 17 -
15 2,240 30 9 139 5 177 9 The International Institute for Strategic Studies,IISS The Military Balance2001 2002 37 24 6 2 6 8 64.9% 16.8% 18.3% 30 16 150 38 5 20 4 5 29 69% 15.5% 17 18 3-2 2 ( ) 3.6 2,200 38.5 20 5.6 5.5 2.07 634 16.35 12 0.65 3.7 37.7 1.27 23.98 14.87 4.42 4.54 24.4 5,893 21 11.39 4.35 5.39 12.1 2,450 108.2 95 4.6 8.6 9.9 4,729 68.3 56 6 6.3 16 The Military Balance2001 2002 Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001,pp.208~209 17 Annual Report on The Military Power of The People s Republic of China, http://www.dod.gov/news/jul2002/p07122002_p133-02.html 18-18 -
980.9 2.81 136.77 47.78 53.74 5.25 958.4 12.93 231 160 25 42 35.7 8,244 30.84 21.18 2.60 7.05 54.3 5,927 27.37 15 4.56 6.3 1,900 8,400 The Military Balance2001 2002 30 88 50% 26 1 6 24 1 5 14 8 7 4 4 2 4 5 4 62% 19% - 19 -
19 4 7 21 24 7 11 4 4 3 5 4 1 9 54% 20% 25% 0.9% 20 50% 3-3 / 5.55 / 200,000 1,566.3 35,980 127.7 / 148,700 15,800 377,835 0.39 / 9.41 / 114,000 12,429 244,110 0.46 / 9.17 / 120,000 1,279 20,770 5.77 / 93.82 / 560,000 2,751 98,480 5.68 / 203.56 / 0.5 9.5 5.5 127.7 10 19 The Military Balance2001 2002 Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001,pp.194~195 20Ibid., pp.75~79. - 20 -
22 3 % 12 14 31 7 25 300 1 8 2 40 600 1,000 2-21 -
21 41 3 2010 3-4 5 7 10 90-120 17 3:1 8 3 17 6 41 13.5 41 3-3 0.5 9.5 2 21 35 1999 p. 42-22 -
90 38 5 30 7 10 5 1 10 41 8.5 20 41 3-4 0.2 1.0 2.0 3.0 M-113 ( M-60 AH-1H ) Source: Course of Action Development, Defense. US Army Intelligence Center & School 8 6 2 41-23 -
3:1 13.5 1:5 8.5 7.5 17 17 1:5 3.6 3.6 1.8 3.6 2 2 5 4.5 2 2 1 1 7 7 5 1 4 5 2.5 1.5 7.75 1.5 9.25 5 19.25-24 -
74,883 385,574 25.1% 3-5 / %) 51.75 199,237 14.61 56,284 14.33 55,170 3.89 15,015 1.57 6,545 10.17 39,155 3.68 14,168 310,691 74,883 385,574 25,869 258,581 9.9% 10.17% 1.9 21.8:1 8,830 20.6 1 9,000 30 4,500-25 -
19.25 / 6 4 7.7 6 4 1 9 2 12,585 3,475 3-6 38 5 25 22-26 -
22 9 10 9 10 24 22 2 3 C4ISR 21 3:1 3-7 / 0.5 / 9.5 / 2 22-27 -
41 13.5 3:1 17 5.8 41 8.5 17 3.6 41 17 9.59 7.75 1.5 3,475 21 9.59 5 5 / 25.6 3-8 / 199,237 95,975 56,284 50,000 55,170 50,000 15,015 9,000 1.5 195,975 20.6 6,545 4,500 10:1 39,155 19,000 14,168 8,830 60,530 21.8:1 / 19,200 6:4 3-28 -
256,505-29 -
92 2,615 1,426 54.54% 512 19.59% 570 21.81% ( 4-1) 4-1 2001-2002 ($ billion ) ( billion) % % 23 87.7 26.29 8.8 37 133.9 40.14 5.0 21 105.2 31.54 9.8 41 70% 26% 62% 37% 50% 42% 23-30 -
1 8 70 70 78 79 32.8% 82 40% 88 50% 92 1,448 ( 1015 433 ) 92 4.05% 92 25.83% 24 68.15% ( 4-2) 92 1,015 38.81% 427 16.32% 474 18.12% ( ) 20 4-2 ( ) 24 92-31 -
( ) 25 751 94 170 1,015 52.61% 18.03% 29.83% 38.81% 219 99 109 427 13.97% 19% 19.29% 16.32% 203 138 133 474 13.53% 26.33% 23.44% 18.12% 54 83 4.8 141.8 3.85% 15.89% 0.85% 5.42% 24 9.0 4.2 37.2 1.69% 1.72% 0.74% 1.42% 56 5 3.3 64.3 3.91% 0.96% 0.58% 2.45% 150 94 87 331 10.44% 18.07% 15.28% 12.65% 1. 87 50% 4-3 87-92 (%) 87 12,253 2747.8 1325.5 48.24% 25 92 100-32 -
88 12,534 2844.9 1422.9 50.02% 88.5-89 22,558 4029.3 2177.1 54.03% 90 16,082 2697.5 1392.5 51.62% 91 15,993 2646.5 1430.4 54.04% 92 15,724 2615.5 1426.5 54.54% 100 50 93 2. 38 5 (92 36 7 ) 1.67% 86 5 91 5 2 93 1 5 95 34 30 30 3. 38 5 24 3 63.11% 14 36.36% 91 60% - 33 -
1. 4-4 87-92 (%) 82 2710.9 518.9 19.14 83 2584.8 515.3 19.94 84 2522.5 496.7 19.69 85 2583.3 509.7 19.73 86 2688.2 507.3 18.87 87 2747.8 532.1 19.37% 88 2844.9 550.3 19.34% 88.5-89 4029.3 835.9 20.75% 90 2697.5 568.6 21.08% 91 2646.5 547.9 20.71% 92 2615.5 512.5 19.59% 20%-40% 20% 80 F-16 2000 IDF AH-1W OH-58D M-60A3 F-16 ( 4-5) 20% 2. - 34 -
1997 2001 113 20% 1. 4-5 87-92 (%) 87 2747.8 890.1 32.39% 88 2844.9 871.6 30.64% 88.5-89 4029.3 916.2 22.74% 90 2697.5 627.6 23.27% 91 2646.5 568.9 21.50% 92 2615.5 570.5 21.81% 4-5 79 88 30%-45% 20% 2. 1997 2001 113 10 60 150 F-16 49% 92 570.5-35 -
21.81% 106 72 70% 30% 1 5,000 2 / 6 43 34 30 25 34 95 30 25.6 ( ) 26 34 95 1 3 1 2 2 2% 20% 60% 1 26 92.89% 27-36 -
26,193 11 3,889,660.5 6 4 64,173 104,773 52,386 A1 5 1 9 28 40,000 30,000 1382.7 4-6 A1 ( ) 14.5 104,773 40 60,768,340 12,834 90 16,748,370 51,339 51 37,965,190.5 52,386 30 22,787,910 138,269,810.5 1,310 26,193 78,580 16,000 11,000 6,000 105 4-7 A1 ( ) 13.5 1,310 16 282,960 78,580 6 6,364,980 10,537,600.5 4-8 A1 ( ) 14.5 9,236 10K 1,339,220 3,349 6.5k 315,643.2 28 20% 9 80% 5 1-37 -
104,773 45 68,364,382.5 1,654,863.2 34 1 2 1,504 92 57.5% 34 38 60% 36.36% A2 5,000 A1 5,000 4-9 A2 ( ) 14.5 12,834 95 17,678,835 51,339 56 41,687,268 52,386 35 26,585,895 154,316,380.5 4-10 A2 ( ) 14.5 9,236 15K 2,008,830 3,349 11.5k 558,445.75 2,567,275.75 34 5,000 105 1,543.1 25.6 1,673 92 63.96% - 38 -
75,636 40 43,868,880 B 30 29 11 30 12,585 287,415 1 2.5 2.2 50,424 126,060 110,933 6 4 50,424 75,636 66,560 50,424 44,373 11 B-1 5 1 9 30 40,000 30,000 1,158 4-11 B1 ( ) 14.5 10,085 90 13,160,925 40,339 51 29,830,690.5 66,560 30 28,953,600 115,814,095.5 50,424 44,373 11,000 6,000 11 90.2 4-12 B1 ( ) 11 29 30? 30 29-39 -
11 6,101,304 75,636 45 49,352,490 6 2,928,618 9,029,922 16.5 4-13 B1 ( ) 14.5 9,236 10K 1,339,220 3,349 6.5k 315,643.2 1,654,863.2 30 11 1,264 92 48.30% 162 B2 5,000 5 90.2 4-13 B2 ( ) 14.5 10,085 95 13,892,087.5 40,339 56 32,755,268 66,560 35 33,779,200 129,779,045.5 4-14 B1 ( ) 14.5-40 -
9,236 15K 2,008,830 3,349 11.5k 558,445.75 2,567,275.75 30 5 1413.8 92 54.05% 13 C 25.6 9 4-15 / 199,237 95,975 56,284 50,000 55,170 50,000 15,015 9,000 1.5 195,975 20.6 6,545 4,500 10:1 39,155 19,000 14,168 8,830 60,530 21.8:1 / 19,200 6:4 3 256,505 12,585 243,920-41 -
64,189 40 37,229,620 C1 5 1 9 4-16 C1 ( ) 14.5 8,558 90 11,168,190 34,234 51 25,316,043 56,485 30 24,570,975 98,284,828 4-17 C1 ( ) 9 42,793 11 4,236,507 37,657 6 2,128,572 6,365,079 4-18 C1 ( ) 14.5 9,236 10K 1,339,220 3,349 6.5k 315,643.2 31 29-42 -
64,189 45 41,883,322.5 1,654,863.2 4-14 4-15 25.6 9 982.8 63.6 16.5 1,062.9 92 40.6% 363.1 C2 5,000 5,000 1,101 4-19 C2 ( ) 14.5 8,558 95 11,788,645 34,234 56 27,798,008 56,485 35 28,666,137.5 110,136,113 25.67 4-20 C2 ( ) 14.5 9,236 15K 2,008,830 3,349 11.5k 558,445.75 2,567,275.75 25.6 5 1,101 63.6 25.67 1,190.27 92 45.5% 236.23-43 -
4-21 92 : 38.5 3.6 : 6.4 1,426.5 54.54% 91 A1 6:4 1,504 57.05% 34 6:4 A2 5 1,673 63.96% B1 6:4 1,264 48.3% 30 B2 5 6:4 1,413 54.05% 95 60% 36.36% C1 6:4 1,062.9 40.6% 25.6 C2 5 6:4 1,190.2 45.5% 1 34 92 2.51% 5,000 9.42%2 30 48% 54% 3 25.6 40%-45% 60 2% 4% 91 38 5 1426.5 54.54% 92 95 1 5-44 -
34 30 30 30 75%-80% 70%-75% 70% 25% 10 7 91 49% 20%-25% 98/99 (Military Balance 98/99) 22,074 27,692 176,065 ( 9 ) 145,095 ( 7 ) 57,931 ( 3 ) 3 4 5,618-45 -
- 46-30% 10 2,500 54% 19% 25% 2% 59.6% 16.9% 21.6 32 32 1.
2. 3. 1 2 4. - 47 -
25.6 2 1 1 26 24 30 3 48 100 25.6 36% 60% 92 1,062.9 40.6% 363.1-48 -
2 3 1 2 25.6 9-49 -
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