202 2 * 5. 6 995 2008 0 2008 28% Meng 2003 2000 2009 9. 4% 47% 200 % 2% 20% 50% Gruber & Yelowitz 999 Engen & Gruber 200 Chou et al. 2003 200 200 200 Brown et al. 200 2003 2003 2006 2006 * 00084 wubzh@ sem. tsinghua. edu. cn 0zd&007 7025004 7200 70903042-4
5. 6 49 2003 30 2006 50 0. 44 2003 7 30 2005 67 2007 6 84. 9% 82. 8% 2 3 2003 0 20 2006 40 2 4 5 You & Kobayashi 2009 42 2 97% 2007 % 2008 80 20
202 2 54 25 4838 2006 50. 9% 4838 7489 2003 4% 2006 48% 48% 20% 75% Deaton 99 Carroll 992 2 Dynan 993 Starr-McCluer 996 Banks et al. 200 Carroll & Samwick 998 Engen & Gruber 200 Meng 2003 Jalan & Ravallion 200 2003 3 Kantor & Fishback 996 Gruber & Yelowitz 999 Engen & Gruber 200 Wagstaff & Pradhan 2005 Chou et al. 2003 2. 5 200 20 200 2007 200 8 2% 5% 2 3 2008 43
552 Brown et al. 200 2003 2006 2007 5 2006 23 43 5728 2003 2006 2003 6. 4% 2006 77. % 2 2003 9. 5% 2006 72. 3% 2003 2006 87. 2% 2003 63. 7% 2006 96. 2% 4. 4% 993 2002 2007 2003 2003 2003 2003 520 775 4 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 44 2 2003 2006 80% 50%
202 2 2004 2006 2003 26442 2460 25880 9773 2003 0873 0637 0847 8778 2003 0462 03 0424 8326 2003 60. 3 738. 3 625. 5 68. 9 2003 83. 3 63. 0 68. 6 246. 3 a 2003 3. 9% 3. 6% 3. 9% 3. 0% 2003 4. 2% 7. 2% 4. 5% 5. 2% 4. 0 4. 3 4. 02 4. 3 5. 82 50. 50 5. 68 5. 36 6. 72 6. 44 6. 69 6. 49 5. 2% 6. 7% 5. 4% 8. 2% 7. 8% 2. 2% 8. 3% 9. 4% 39% 4% 39% 32% 65 8. 8% 9. 7% 8. 9% 8. 4% 0 7. % 7. 5% 7. % 7. 5% 2003 5. 6% 3. % 5. 3% 7. 0% 7% 0% 6% 5% 9. 7% 7. % 0. 5% 5. 4% 0. 26% 0. 79% 0. 32% 0. 6% 2003 3396 324 3379 2554 5% 2% 5% 4% 2003. 28. 26. 28. 32 2003 97. 40 98. 54 97. 53 93. 85 2003 23% 23% 23% 25% 57% 55% 56% 54% 34% 32% 34% 3% 47% 53% 48% 57% 25% 2% 24% 23% 20% 20% 20% 27% 42% 4% 42% 52% 6 392 7 6 7 53 6 644 2003 2003 5 45
2 Y ijt = γ Family_insured it + τ t T t + β i D i + δ X ijt + ε ijt Y ijt j i t Family_insured it i t T t D i X ijt 65 0 3 γ γ 0 46 2 Wagstaff et al. 2009 3 2004 2006
202 2 2003 2 5. 5% % 2003 2660. 7 5. 5% 46. 3 2003 30 2006 60 2 0. 437 2 log 2 3 4 5 6 0. 055 *** 0. 055 *** 0. 056 *** 0. 058 *** 0. 066 *** 0. 067 *** 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 Log 0. 437 *** 0. 424 *** 0. 428 *** 0. 43 *** 0. 437 *** 0. 437 *** 0. 020 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 022 0. 022 0. 099 *** 0. 098 *** 0. 096 *** 0. 096 *** 0. 093 *** 0. 092 *** 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 0 Log - 0. 065-0. 077 * - 0. 085 ** - 0. 094 ** - 0. 090 ** - 0. 093 ** * log - 0. 005-0. 007 0. 04 0. 04 0. 043 0. 043 0. 043 0. 043 0. 005 0. 006 * log - 0. 07 ** - 0. 05 ** 0. 007 0. 007 * 2003 0. 00 0. 06 * 2003-0. 045 0. 030-0. 049-0. 403 * * - 0. 266 * 0. 064 0. 240 0. 57 9 730 9 730 9 068 9 068 9068 9068 R 2 0. 284 0. 286 0. 293 0. 297 0. 294 0. 294 *** ** * 0% 5% % log 65 0 log 47
2 2 3 2 3 3 5. 6% 49 4 2 5 6 3 2 3 6% 20 40 2 40 7 40 2 49 3 4 5 54 5 6 6 4 2 3 50% 50% 4 48 Wagsaff et al. 2009
202 2 2003 89% 3 Log Log Log 2 3 4 5 6 0. 072 * 0. 064 *** 0. 060 *** - 0. 90 ** - 0. 78 * - 0. 4 0. 039 0. 023 0. 02 0. 088 0. 094 0. 094 * - 0. 026 * 0. 05-0. 034 * - 0. 04 * 0. 09 0. 02 0. 844 ***. 007 *** 0. 28 0. 35 0. 020 0. 022 0. 037 0. 048 0. 323 * - 0. 27 0. 82 0. 268 3 97 8 400 9 068 2282 2299 2282 R 2 0. 37 0. 289 0. 302 0. 298 0. 285 0. 300 ** * 0% 5% % log 65 0 log 4 log 2 3 4 5 6 0. 652 *** 0. 055 ** 0. 02 0. 040 * 0. 087 ** 0. 04 0. 244 0. 025 0. 043 0. 023 0. 036 0. 025 * log - 0. 06 ** 0. 025 * 2003 0. 034 * 0. 08 9 068 4 598 4 470 9068 2 925 6 43 R 2 0. 295 0. 339 0. 95 0. 294 0. 325 0. 283 *** ** * 0% 5% % log 65 0 log 80 5 4. 49
5% 6. 7. 2% 2 3 5 Log 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0. 045 ** 0. 058 ** 0. 026-0. 04* - 0. 078-0. 085 0. 063 ** 0. 06 ** 0. 02 0. 028 0. 029 0. 053 0. 089 0. 092 0. 030 0. 030 0. 067 *** 0. 070 *** 0. 068 0. 069 *** 0. 06 0. 07 0. 094 0. 09 * 0. 002-0. 06 0. 09 0. 09-0. 55 *** 0. 056 * 0. 70 *** 0. 059 8 996 9068 8996 8 702 3 690 3 689 7 66 7 595 R 2 0. 294 0. 293 0. 294 0. 288 0. 248 0. 249 0. 307 0. 309 *** ** * 0% 5% % log 65 0 log 3 7 5 6 5 6 6. 3% 7 8 67% 36% 6 4 t t t + t t 6 50 2 3 4 2
202 2 5 2007 6 6 log 2007 2 3 4 5 6 0. 024 0. 20 0. 023 0. 036 0. 05 ** 0. 03 * 0. 029 0. 330 0. 032 0. 038 0. 024 0. 07 * log - 0. 09 0. 034 * 2003 0. 004 0. 025-0. 097 * 0. 058 * - 0. 022 0. 070 Log log - 0. 007 ** 0. 003 5 064 5064 5064 4889 8 648 9065 R 2 0. 236 0. 236 0. 236 0. 237 0. 294 0. 305 *** ** * 0% 5% % log 65 0 log 2 2 5
Probit 00 bootstrap 5 caliper 0. 0 5. 2% 2 3 P / - P P 5. 6% 49 200 200 8 4 200 20 2003 5 2008 2 2007 Brown P. H. A. Brauw and 2009 Banks J. R. Blundell and A. Brugiavini 200 Risk Pooling Precautionary Saving and Consumption Growth Review of Economic Studies Vol. 68 757 779. 52
202 2 Carroll C. D. 992 The Buffer-stock Theory of Saving Some Macroeconomic Evidence Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Vol. 2 6 56. Carroll C. D. and A. Samwick 998 How Important is Precautionary Saving Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 80 40 49. Chou S. J. Liu and J. K. Hammitt 2003 National Health Insurance and Precautionary Saving Evidence from Taiwan Journal of Public Economics Vol. 87 9 0 873 894. Deaton A. 99 Saving and Liquidity Constraints Econometrica Vol. 59 22 248. Dynan K. E. 993 How Prudent are Consumers Journal of Political Economy Vol. 0 04 3. Engen E. M. and J. Gruber 200 Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 47 545 579. Gruber J. and A. Yelowitz 999 Public Health Insurance and Private Savings Journal of Political Economy Vol. 07 249 274. Jalan J. and M. Ravallion 200 Behavioral Responses to Risk in Rural China Journal of Development Economics Vol. 66 23 49. Kantor S. E. and P. V. Fishback 996 Precautionary Saving Insurance and the Origins of Workers Compensation Journal of Political Economy Vol. 04 49 442. Meng X. 2003 Unemployment Consumption Smoothing and Precautionary Saving in Urban China Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 3 3 465 485. Starr-McCluer M. 996 Health Insurance and Precautionary Saving American Economic Review Vol. 86 285 295. Wagstaff A. M. Lindelow Gao Jun X. Ling and J. Qian 2009 Extending Health Insurance to the Rural Population An Impact Evaluation of China s New Cooperative Medical Scheme Journal of Health Economics Vol. 28 9. Wagstaff A. and M. Pradhan 2005 Health Insurance Impacts on Health and Nonmedical Consumption in a Developing Country World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3563 April 2005. You X. and Y. Kobayashi 2009 The New Cooperative Medical Scheme in China Health Policy Vol. 9 9. Health Insurance and Consumption Evidence from China s New Cooperative Medical Scheme Bai Chongen Li Hongbin and Wu Binzhen Tsinghua University Abstract We exploit a quasi-natural experiment arising from the introduction of a health insurance program in rural China to examine how the insurance coverage affects household consumption. The results show that on average the insurance coverage increases non-healthcare consumption by more than 5 percent. This insurance effect exists even for households with medical spending. In addition the insurance effect is stronger for poorer households and households with worse selfreported health status. It also gets stronger when the insurance for households expenditure at the county-level hospitals gets more generous. These results are consistent with the precautionary savings argument. We also find that the insurance effect varies by household experience with the program. Particularly the effect is significant only in villages where some households in the village have actually obtained reimbursement from the insurance program. Within these villages the program stimulates less consumption among the new participants than among households that have participated in the program for more than one year. Key Words Precautionary Savings Health Insurance New Cooperative Medical Scheme Chinese Household Consumption and Savings JEL Classification D2 D9 E2 I8 53