中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 刘绍娓 1 2, 万大艳 ( 1. 湖南大学工商管理学院, 湖南长沙 410079; 2. 厦门大学经济学院, 福建厦门 361005) 高管薪酬与公司绩效一直都是学术界和实务界关注的热点本文选取 2003-2010 年沪深两市 296 家 国有和 176 家非国有 A 股上市公司为样本, 在控制了高管持股比例 公司规模 股权集中度和两职兼任等因素之 后, 实证分析了不同所有权结构的公司高管薪酬对公司绩效影响的差异研究结果表明, 高管薪酬水平与公司 绩效显著正相关, 且随着高管持股数量的增加, 非国有上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响程度更高, 但国有上 市公司则相反 ; 公司规模的扩大会降低高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响, 且只有当国有上市公司和非国有企业的股 权集中度在不同的区间范围内, 高管薪酬与公司绩效才表现出显著正相关 高管薪酬 ; 公司绩效 ; 国有上市公司 ; 非国有上市公司 F270 A 1002-9753 2013 02-0090 - 12 Executive ompensation Affects Firm Performance The Empirical omparative Study on State - owned and Non - State - owned Enterprises LIU Shao - wei 1 WAN Da - yan 2 1. Business School Hunan University hangsha 410079 hina 2. School of Economics Xiamen University Xiamen 361005 hina Abstract Executive compensation and company performance have always been the hot spots of the academic circles and business world. This research's samples select from 463 State - owned A - share listed companies and 176 non - State - owned A - share listed companies in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We take executives holding ratio company size ownership concentration and EO duality as control variables in order that we can analyze the difference of the company's ownership structure's different effect to the relationship of executives pay and company performance. This study arrive at the following conclusions by analyzing the significant relationship between executives pay level and company performance. Additionally when the holding numbers increase the effect of non - State - owned listed companies' executives compensation on company performance will increase. But State - owned listed company is contrast to that. The expanding of company size will reduce the incentive effect on performance. In addition only when the z index of state - owned and non - state - owned listed company are in a specific range can we observe the positive significant relationship between executive pay and company performance. Key words executive pay performance state - owned listed company non - State - owned listed companies 2012-10 - 10 2013-02 - 16 71103061 20110161120030 12ZDB32 11JJB004 2012ZK3037 90 1968 -
高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 2000 5 2000 2003 2007 2011 20 90 2006 1998 2007 2008 2010 2012 Nash 6 Jensen Murphy 1990 1974-1986 2213 EO EO 1 John Robert David 1999 Aggarwal 1999 Kaplan 1994 2 Mehran 1995 oughlan Schmidt 1985 Hall and Liebman 1998 1980-1994 100 3 Kevin 2011 2006-2009 280 Jensen meckling 1976 4 7 91
中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 onyon 1997 10 11 3 1 8 9 7 4 13 2 5 onyon 1997 ( 一 ) 变量说明 12-1 PEF 92
高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 Bartlett's 0. 0000 ROA ROE KMO EPS RSD 4 1 2. 900 1 PEF 72. 512% PEF i = 4 X ij * T ij j = 1 2 3 4 1 1 i = 1 2 PEF i i X ij i j T ij i ZZ 1 j = 0. 266 * 1 ZEPS1 + 0. 301 * ZROA 1 + 0. 315* ZROE 1 + 0. 290* ZRSD 1 4 SPSS17. 0 Z 2 PAY ZZ 1 = 0. 266 * 1 ZEPS1 + 0. 301 * ZROA 1 + 0. 315* ZROE 1 + 0. 290* ZRSD 1 2 ZZ 2 = 0. 344 * 1 ZEPS2 + 0. 362 * ZROA 2 + PAY 3 0. 322* ZROE 2 + 0. 215* ZRSD 2 3 PAY 1 KMO 1 2 PAY 2 KMO = 0. 773 1 % % % % 1 2. 9000 72. 512 72. 512 2. 9000 72. 512 72. 512 2 0. 546 13. 658 3 0. 387 9. 686 4 0. 166 4. 143 1 Kaiser KMO KMO > 0. 9 0. 7 < KMO < 0. 9 0. 8 < KMO < 0. 9 0. 7 < KMO < 0. 8 0. 6 < KMO < 0. 7 KMO < 0. 5 2 3 93
中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 2 1 4 EPS 1 0. 266 ROA 1 0. 301 ROE 1 0. 315 RSD 1 0. 290 5 1 SP 14 463 296 167 1 2 SIZE 3 ( 三 ) 描述性统计分析 3 Z 3 Z Z 4 BOTH 38. 87 1 0 ( 二 ) 样本选择及数据来源 2003-2010 A 2 SMAR 1 B H Z B H A 2 ST PT 3 1 2 2003 2003-2010 3 94
高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 3 PEF 1-0. 0004-0. 18 5. 60-5. 57 11. 17 1. 00 3168 PAY 1 38. 87 30. 43 348. 66 0. 50 348. 16 34. 75 3168 G 1 24. 04 0. 41 5306. 95 0. 00 5306. 95 203. 45 3168 SP 1 0. 00045 6. 87E - 6 0. 12 0. 00 0. 12 0. 0051 3168 XSE 1 59. 22 19. 98 2021. 49 0. 29 2021. 20 131. 52 3168 Z 1 32. 10 12. 16 1039. 33 1. 00 1038. 33 65. 43 3168 PEF 2 0. 0011-0. 13 7. 52-7. 30 14. 82 1. 00 1336 PAY 2 36. 15 24. 90 335. 91 0. 83 335. 08 36. 65 1336 G 2 301. 71 0. 03 18383 0. 00 18383 1310. 78 1336 SP 2 0. 0110 9. 08E - 7 0. 53 0. 00 0. 53 0. 05 1336 XSE 2 22. 53 10. 95 745. 59 0. 03 745. 56 42. 32 1336 Z 2 14. 80 3. 66 533. 33 1. 00 532. 33 36. 44 1336 1. PAY G XSE Z % 2. EVIEWS6. 0 ( 四 ) 面板数据的单位根检验 Z 3 1 ( 一 ) 全样本实证结果分析 4 5 EVIEWS6. 0 PEF 1 PEF 2 OLS 3 6 0. 0032 5 9 0. 0035 2 0. 0117 1 1 4 3 0. 0042 1 3 95
中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 ( 二 ) 依高管持股分组样本实证结果分析 3 5 6 2 2005 4 PEF 1 1-7 1 2 3 4 5 6-0. 0003-0. 0173-0. 0029-0. 1743-0. 0322 * - 1. 8937 0. 0360 * 1. 8070-0. 0012 0. 0682 0. 0026 0. 1266 D PAY 1 0. 0052 ** 6. 7600 0. 0052 ** 6. 7639 0. 0042 ** 5. 4266 0. 0052 ** 6. 7563 0. 0052 ** 6. 7679 0. 0042 *** 5. 4332 SP 1 6. 0753 1. 0079 D SIZE 1 0. 0032 *** 7. 2750 0. 0032 *** 7. 2144 Z 1-0. 0012 ** - 3. 2959-0. 0012 ** - 3. 1667 BOTH 1-0. 3857-0. 4879 R 2 0. 5524 0. 5526 0. 5653 0. 5551 0. 5524 0. 5677 Ad - R 2 0. 4778 0. 4778 0. 4925 0. 4806 0. 4774 0. 4952 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 F 7. 1171 7. 1206 7. 1869 7. 1255 7. 1074 7. 1747 13. 5733 0. 0002 14. 0248 0. 0009 11. 7656 0. 0028 12. 7187 0. 0017 14. 4528 0. 0007 13. 0892 0. 0003 96
高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 5 PEF 2 8-14 7 8 9 10 11 12-0. 0260-1. 0664 0. 0055 0. 1747-0. 0685 * - 2. 7062-0. 0297-1. 0249-0. 0246-1. 0066-0. 0743 ** - 2. 4993 d PAY 2 0. 0044* 4. 0330 0. 0044 ** 4. 0460 0. 0035 ** 3. 2215 0. 0044 ** 4. 0247 0. 0042 ** 4. 0274 0. 0035 ** 3. 2091 SP 2-3. 0330-1. 5793 d SIZE 2 0. 0117 ** 5. 3675 0. 0117 *** 5. 3729 Z 2 0. 0003 0. 2360 0. 0004 0. 3746 BOTH 2-0. 5339-0. 8651 R 2 0. 4530 0. 4543 0. 4683 0. 4530 0. 4534 0. 4684 Ad - R 2 0. 3617 0. 3627 0. 3790 0. 3611 0. 3615 0. 3784 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 F 4. 7308 4. 7442 4. 5299 4. 6825 4. 6979 4. 4760 15. 8257 0. 0001 18. 5484 0. 0001 11. 9490 0. 0025 18. 3535 0. 0001 16. 5045 0. 0003 15. 2188 0. 0013 1. * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 2. t F hi - Sq P 3. 4. d 5. 6 PEF 1 PEF 2 13-16 13 14 15 16 0. 0691 * 1. 8949-0. 1070 ** - 4. 4137-0. 1633 ** - 5. 0778 0. 1146 * 2. 2430 d PAY 1 0. 0073 * 3. 5509 0. 0019 * 2. 0383 0. 0036 * 1. 9541 0. 0039 * 2. 6119 d SIZE 1 0. 0073 ** 6. 3467 0. 0023 ** 3. 3164 0. 0053* 2. 5816 0. 0202* 2. 6015 Z 1-0. 0020 ** - 3. 0646 Ad - R 2 0. 5269 0. 4844 0. 0947 0. 1151 101* 7 123* 7 61* 7 57* 7 12 2006 12 97
中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 1% 15 0. 1% ~ 10% 10% 16 Z 6 16 3 7 17 0. 0039 0. 0247 0. 0019 0. 0061 0. 0045 0. 0030 1% 0. 29% 0. 19% 3 0. 045% 1. 1% 17 Jensen and Murphy 1990 - ( 三 ) 依公司规模分组样本实证结果分析 1 Z 4 98 1 stata11. 2
高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 7 PEF 1 17-20 17 18 19 20 < 8. 2377 8. 2377-43. 0574 43. 0574-54. 8782 1 > 54. 8782-0. 4535 ** - 4. 0119-0. 0984-1. 3092-0. 3306-1. 4034-0. 0366-0. 2078 d PAY 1 0. 0247 ** 4. 4678 0. 0061 ** 2. 9442 0. 0045 * 1. 8989 0. 0030 * 2. 1195 d SIZE 1 0. 0089 ** 3. 1706 0. 0425 ** 6. 2234 0. 0028 ** 4. 9194 Ad - R 2 0. 0787 0. 0269 0. 3884 0. 0969 32* 7 94* 7 12* 7 49* 7 8 PEF 2 21-23 21 22 23 < 15. 5479 15. 5479-22. 0480 > 22. 0480-0. 2257 ** - 3. 3784 0. 1518 0. 6907-0. 0198-0. 2236 d PAY 2 0. 0043* 2. 3907 0. 0037 0. 3449 0. 0029* 1. 7331 d SIZE 2 0. 0499 ** 4. 8947 0. 0079* 2. 0243 Z 2 0. 0077 ** 2. 9437 Ad - R 2 0. 0560 0. 0331 0. 3326 88* 7 15* 7 32* 7 9 PEF 1 24-25 24 25 26 27 < 10. 1378 10. 1378-22. 3795 22. 3795-35. 4296 > 35. 4296-0. 0857 ** - 3. 3291-0. 0879-0. 577 0. 8605 * 3. 4815-0. 0170-0. 1494 d PAY 1 0. 0017 1. 4014 0. 0035 * 2. 7225 0. 0058 1. 2788 0. 0033 1. 5969 d SIZE 1 0. 0065 ** 6. 2091 0. 0071 ** 3. 1420 0. 0476 ** 3. 5855 Z 1-0. 0205* - 2. 4420-0. 0010* - 2. 0661 Ad - R 2 0. 5165 0. 0555 0. 6925 0. 0160 100* 7 41* 7 17* 7 52* 7 99
中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 10 PEF 2 28-29 28 29 30 < 3. 3787 3. 3787-34. 4307 > 34. 4307-0. 0313-0. 7467-0. 0060-0. 0787-0. 2864-1. 6126 d PAY 1 0. 0014 1. 0217 0. 0065 ** 3. 6546 0. 0062 0. 9372 d SIZE 2 0. 01535 ** 3. 0734 0. 0059 * 2. 3774 0. 0157 ** 3. 0911 Ad - R 2 0. 3529 0. 0630 0. 0970 73* 7 57* 7 16* 7 Z 10. 14 ~ 22. 38 Z 3. 4 ~ 34. 4 17 - ( 一 ) 研究结论 Z 10. 14 ~ 22. 38 Z 3. 4 ~ 34. 4 - ( 二 ) 政策建议 18 100
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