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1 古吉拉特 (Gujarat)- 艾哈迈达巴德 (Ahmedabad) 一再重现的冲突困境都市研究与规划 - 麻省理工学院作业一 : 授课教师 :Diane Davis 教授麻省理工学院 年秋季课程作者 :Shahid Sadruddin Nanavati ( 草稿 - 请勿引述 ) 背景说明古吉拉特位于巴基斯坦 (Pakistani) 边境南方, 为印度西南海岸之一省, 人口约五千万 ( 印度人口普查,2001) 其中约 88% 人口为印度教徒,9% 为回教徒 ( 古吉拉特人口普查局,1991), 虽然地区人口统计数据与全国的统计数字相近, 但古吉拉特居民却经历了与人口不成比例的内部宗教暴力冲突 1947 年, 理当成为世俗国家的印度脱离大英帝国独立, 并分裂出一个新的回教国家巴基斯坦 领土分裂迫使数百万人民因印度教 回教分治而从家乡迁徙, 但仍有为数不少的回教徒仍留居印度 印度与巴基斯坦间之紧张关系及显见的威胁, 影响着印度教徒与回教徒间之互动, 尤其是边界的克什米尔 (Kashmir) 旁遮普(Punjab) 与古吉拉特省 1969 年, 领土分裂后第一个较大的地区冲突发生于古吉拉特省, 造成 2,500 人死亡 ( 英国广播公司新闻,2002 年 9 月 25 日 ), 而该地区冲突的状态一直持续至今 1980 年代后期, 估计约有 1,000 起地区性零星冲突的发生, 并造成约 1,300 人死亡 (Desai, 导致分裂之因,2002 年 3 月 3 日 ) 世界印度教徒会议 1 (Vishva Hindu Parishad;VHP)- 印度教徒的民族主义组织, 在阿逾陀 (Ayodhya) 北部城市重建罗摩神庙 (Ram temple), 而成为地区冲突之导火线, 此冲突并扩及整个印度, 特别是古吉拉特地区 巴布里 (Babri) 清真寺为十六世纪回教徒征服印度时所建, 该寺正好位于许多印度教徒认定其神圣的罗摩神 (Ram) 出生地的印度教神庙旧址上 ( 此说多所争议 ) 冲突爆发于 1992 年, 印度教激进团体将清真寺摧毁, 报载造成全国 2,000 名回教徒死亡 ( 英国广播公司新闻, 时间线 : 阿逾陀,2002 年 2 月 27 日 ) 2002 年初,VHP 宣称将于 2002 年 3 月 15 日在阿逾陀开始建庙, 数百名志愿者开始包围庙址, 恐吓并驱离回教徒, 随后还掠夺回教徒的家园与商店 ( 英国广播公司新闻, 时间线: 阿逾陀,2002 年 2 月 27 日 ) 当下困境 2002 年 2 月 27 日, 一列从阿逾陀到古吉拉特的火车, 满载着印度教徒民族主义自愿者, 途中不断与各车站的回教徒有所冲突 当火车抵达以回教徒为主要人口的小区高德拉 (Godhra) 时, 印度教徒仍对回教徒刁难与做出凶暴的手势 当印度教徒的乘客拒绝对回教徒小贩支付服务费时, 双方开始互相投掷石块, 冲突逐渐升高, 回教暴民还对火车投出火球加以攻击, 造成 58 名印度教徒死亡, 死者多为妇女与孩童 ( 人权观察, 我们未授权去救援,2002 年 4 月 ) 在古吉拉特事件之后, 印度教徒小区的反应强烈, 迅速造成数以百计的回教徒死亡, 以及更多的内地回教徒移居 ( 人权观察,2002 年 4 月 ) 国内与国际的人权组织开始对国家与政府在面对地区冲突时的怠惰 1 世界印度教徒会议于 1964 年成立, 以建立印度教国家为最终目的, 并致力于全世界弘扬印度教法, 主要有三项目标 :1. 增强并团结印度社会 ;2. 保护并宣扬印度生活 伦理与精神价值 ;3. 维系并组织所有印度教的海外教徒, 尽可能维持印度特性

2 展开严苛的调查 新德里 (New Deli) 的国家人权委员会 (National Human Rights Commission;NHRC) 在对古吉拉特发生的悲剧所提报告指出 : 古吉拉特惨剧发生于 2002 年 2 月 27 日, 而暴力冲突竟持续数周之久, 国家在保护古吉拉特人民在宪法上的权利彻底失败 ( 国家人权委员会, 古吉拉特的最后命令,2002 年 5 月 31 日 ) 行动者 组织与议题联合家庭 (Sangh Parivar): 联合家庭 是代表有权力的印度教国家主义组织家庭的集体总称 在联合家庭中最有影响力的团体, 包括 印度教复兴运动组织 (Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh,RSS) 世界印度教徒会议 (Vishwa Hindu Parishad, VHP) Bajrang Dal(VHP 的年轻组织 ) 印度人民党 (Bharatiya Janata Party,BJP) 这些组织是因其 印度教性 (Hinduness;Hindutva) 所结合的, 此意识型态强调印度教文明对印度文化的重要性, 与印度应成为一个印度教国家 在一个大多数人口是印度教徒的国家, 联合家庭要求印度教徒应牢记与尊敬他们的文化与历史 而反对党阵营与人权团体则声称, 印度教主义导致印度教徒与少数团体间的暴力冲突 联合家庭身在阿逾陀神庙冲突事件的最前线, 认为神庙的建筑是印度教徒的骄傲, 并有其必要性 由于长期执政的国会反对党普遍被认为是腐败贪污的, 联合家庭的崛起被视为国家主义在政治与意识型态的结合 (Haniffa Aziz,2003) 藉由忽视印度世袭制度为其意识型态的一部份, 它摒弃了长久以来分裂印度教徒的议题 ( 印度教复兴运动组织,2003 年 11 月 9 日 ) 当所有印度教徒的社会经济阶级统合后, 也造成其它少数宗教的信徒处于特别弱势的地位 印度教复兴运动组织 (Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh,RSS- 国家的服务性社团 ): 印度教复兴运动组织是印度最重要的社会服务组织, 全国约有 30 万个分会 (Tamminen, 印度教复兴主义,2003 年 11 月 3 日 ) 作为最大之一的印度教民族主义组织, 印度教复兴运动组织为联合家庭组织提供财务与选举方面的赞助服务 印度教复兴运动组织在 1925 年成立, 主要的宗旨为成立印度教徒国家, 并认为当初的独立运动并未建立起印度教文化的国家 世界印度教徒会议 (Vishwa Hindu Parishad,VHP): 世界印度教徒会议是一个民粹主义者的印度教徒组织, 其寻求全世界印度教徒的团结, 以保护印度教文化免于外界的影响与威胁 世界印度教徒会议成立于 1964 年, 与印度教复兴运动组织合作密切 世界印度教徒会议的主要宗旨在于团结与强化印度教徒的社会, 并藉由 国家主流 的人权保护, 驱离外部怀有敌意的力量, 最后会变得 所向无敌 ( 世界印度教徒会议, 议程与宗旨,2003 年 11 月 3 日 ) 世界印度教徒会议是印度教徒国家的强烈支持者, 反对今日世俗的印度国 当邻近国家受到外国侵略者压迫时, 世界印度教徒会议声称印度教徒是被压迫的国家, 为外国侵略者所包围, 特别是威胁到印度教文明的回教徒 世界印度教徒会议以引起宗教紧张和暴力知名,1992 年其支持者成功地领导摧毁在阿逾陀的巴布里清真寺 ( 英国广播公司新闻, 时间线 : 阿逾陀危机,2002 年 2 月 27 日 ) 在古吉拉特的一万八千个村落中, 世界印度教徒会议拥有五千个办公室 ( 世界印度教徒会议,2003 年 11 月 3 日 ) 根据报导, 许多参与 二月 - 三月大屠杀 激进份子领导人, 主要来自世界印度教徒会议与 Bajrang Dal( 世界印度教徒会议的一个年轻分支 ) 的活跃分子 警方的 首要信息报告 (FIR,First Information Reports) 谴责世界印度教徒会议在古吉拉特事件后, 领导反抗回教徒在阿穆达巴进行的冲突活动 ( 英国

3 国家广播新闻, 印度教激进教徒,2002 年 3 月 6 日 ) 在古吉拉特火车爆炸案之后, 世界印度教徒会议隔天展开 罢工 (bandh) 以抗议攻击事件 在这段期间, 世界印度教徒会议成员散发小册子, 呼吁印度教徒在社会与经济上对回教徒进行杯葛, 以逼迫古吉拉特的回教徒迁离 ( 2002 年古吉拉特大屠杀 : 全国报导,2002 年 4 月 10 日 ) 在古吉拉特的组织领导人也承认, 于二月廿八日早上收集选举人注册名单, 以提供滋事者有关回教徒的家庭与商业的详细资料 ( 2002 年古吉拉特大屠杀 : 全国报导,2002 年 4 月 10 日 ) 世界印度教徒会议的干部以使用三叉刺刀的武器知名, 许多目击者指出, 在致命的暴动中, 这也是他们所使用最显著的武器之一 ( 2002 年古吉拉特大屠杀 : 全国报导,2002 年 4 月 10 日 ) 世界印度教徒会议会长 Ashok Singhal 认为 高德拉之后的事件, 在提升全国印度教徒意识, 以及 清空 回教徒地区方面, 是个 成功的经验 ( 印度快报,2002 年 9 月 3 日 ) 这类声明显示其领导群明确的反回教徒政策 印度人民党 (Bharatiya Janata Party,BJP- 印度人民党 ): 印度人民党代表联合家庭的政治羽翼, 其政策跟随着联合家庭的印度教主义意识型态 目前, 印度人民党领导一个控制印度国会的国家民主联盟 (National Democratic Alliance) 的联合政府 1998 年, 印度人民党结束国会党的单一控制, 并得到政府的控制权 印度教复兴运动组织与世界印度教徒会议的成员, 共同替印度人民党建立一个必须依赖投票结果的庞大游说网络与投票基础, 而印度教复兴运动组织与世界印度教徒会议的权力亦由此而来 身为国家民主联盟联合政府的领导者, 印度人民党必须限制印度教主义的议题, 此举偶有造成世界印度教徒会议的挫折感 然而, 在古吉拉特的印度人民党却能藉由安插更多印度教复兴运动组织与世界印度教徒会议的成员, 或赞同联合家庭理想的人, 得以与印度教主义关系更加密切 一个绝佳的例子是行政首长 Narendra Modi, 他在二月暴动之后成为一个重要角色 Modi 宣称已尽力控制暴力活动, 其对于古吉拉特事件余波的处理方式, 却受世界印度教徒会议的赞美 ( 英国广播公司新闻, 印度教徒鹰派,2002 年 3 月 6 日 ) Narendra Modi 藉由印度教复兴运动组织与联合家庭的合作, 开启他的个人事业 在 1980 年代中期, 印度教复兴运动组织领导派遣 Modi 在古吉拉特加入印度人民党 当印度人民党在 1990 年后期逐渐形成势力时,Modi 也在古吉拉特政府获得重要职务 身为古吉拉特省的行政首长,Modi 在二 - 三月暴动的处理方式, 引发许多国内与国际的批评 他与印度人民党对于古吉拉特罢工事件的支持, 提供世界印度教徒会议有全国性活动的完全自由, 允许印度教暴徒大量地动员集结 ( 人权观察, 我们未授权去救援,2002 年 4 月 ) Modi 辩护已采取所有阻止暴力的必要行动, 而印度教徒对抗回教徒的强烈反应只是在 古吉拉特人民在激怒下, 所表现出不可思议地节制 反应 ( 人权观察, 我们未授权去救援,2002 年 4 月 ) 依据国家人权委员会所言, 印度人民党领导的国家政府, 在二 - 三月暴动中未对公民提供保护 在受到国内与国际上对古吉拉特事件的批评后, 印度人民党已经采取强制的行动去防止大规模的突发性暴动 身为政府的执政党, 他们有权力分配必要的资源, 以消除在各宗教小区间潜在的火花 古吉拉特的印度教徒与回教徒 : 与印度全国人口统计资料相似, 在古吉拉特省的印度教徒为多数人口, 回教徒占仅总人口的 10% 不到 在联合家庭所主导的政府中也占少数, 回教徒社团在政府中缺乏真正的代表性 虽然回教徒并非完全无罪, 但他们也遭到多数者的欺压 在古吉拉特事件之后几周, 回教徒遭受印度教徒对其家园 事业 信仰场所的有系统性的攻击 根据非官方统计, 至少有 2,000 人死于暴动后

4 的余波, 大多数为当地的回教徒, 而超过十万人以上的回教徒居住于非政府组织的 2 难民营中 (Kamal Mitra 对美国国际宗教自由委员会的证词,2002 年 6 月 10 日 ) 目前, 伐窦达拉 (Vadodara) 城中, 回教徒与印度教徒以悬挂旗帜来区隔邻里领地, 以防止暴力冲突的发生, 并且明确地建立小区的安全区 ( 印度快报,2002 年 10 月 2 日 ) 许多从阿穆达巴外围地区来的回教徒, 在二月下旬发生残酷的屠杀事件之后, 都十分害怕回到原来居住的家 而接二连三的社区暴力冲突, 已经造成回教徒小区贫民化的情况, 他们弃置原先与印度教徒比居的财产, 与其它回教徒大量群居以确保安全 ( 人权观察, 我们未授权去救援,2002 年 4 月 ) 安置与规模从安置来看,Ashutosh Varshney( 远东经济评论 - 香港 :2002 年 3 月 21 日,165 卷 11 项, 26 页 ) 认为, 印度教徒与回教徒发生暴动有两个原因 : 潜在的与近期发生的原因 潜在的原因部分与对历史的了解相关 从 1920 年代起, 印度教民族主义分子 这些相信印度是印度教徒的国家, 并主张回教徒基本上对印度并不忠诚 有些人也相信, 从第八世纪至第十八世纪所谓的回教时期的历史, 是印度教徒的蒙羞时期, 当时回教统治者粗暴地攻击印度教文化的栋梁, 尤其是宗教的信仰中心 有些印度教徒也认为, 回教徒天性好战, 而以优势强权的方式是改变他们行为的唯一方法 这种论点的代表性典型是印度教民族主义分子的意识型态, 许多统治着古吉拉特的人也持此等论点 印度与巴基斯坦间的复杂的关系, 也恶化印度的回教小区所需面对的多重困难 世界印度教徒会议与其它联合家庭的组织, 多半描绘回教徒对抗印度教徒的暴力来自巴基斯坦支持的恐怖活动, 因此印度教徒暴力抵抗回教徒是针对社群紧张的自然反应 这种反巴基斯坦的雄辩, 有效地造成印度教徒视回教徒为恐怖份子或颠覆分子的恐惧 印度教徒小区与回教徒小区互相恐惧对方, 并造成对立状态之两极化 从规模来看, 这些小区主义者的论点之一为 两国论, 即大型的回教徒政治组织组成一个独立于印度的国家, 可在同样的宗教信仰中加以认同 (Brandon Lindsey, 古吉拉特省, 印度 :2003 集体大屠杀的预兆幽灵 ) 这是从巴基斯坦分裂主义运动者开始, 并成为企图朝向基本教义发展的众多因素之一 当印度与巴基斯坦分裂时, 却发现到区域间的差异性极大, 例如 : 从印度教徒与回教徒在极端紧张与恐惧状态下, 到另一个极端 ( 远离边境的情况 ), 但印度教徒与回教徒的关系鲜少变化 Ashutosh Varshney 提到最近出现的两个重要的事实 ( 远东经济评论 - 香港 :2002 年 3 月 21 日,165 卷 11 章,28 页 ):(1) 个体的回教徒不会造成威胁 ;(2) 回教徒经济服务的贡献 就如其它地区一样, 地区的经济生活依赖的是固定且必须履行的责任 他们对印度的贡献, 不只是在经济上, 连在文学 科学 专业与教育生活上均十分卓著 目前, 问题在于这些关系要如何加以构想? 首要的背景因素, 是原先回教徒对于印度的侵略, 当时许多印度教徒自愿或非自愿地改变信仰而信奉回教, 与印度的大部分领土长期为回教徒统治者军队所统治有关 无论如何, 回教徒如外来者般在印度国土中生活, 就像是从前的英国人一样, 因语言与文化而与印度教徒分离 事实上, 回教徒的统治者从印度教徒的手中也学到并得到许多 2 美国国际宗教自由委员会 :USCURF;US Commission on International Religious Freedom

5 印度的新小区主义者是在政治上重建印度的抗争时崛起, 这原是集中关心于国家的合法性 国家资源的分配 社会的权力与正义 (David Ludden,1996), 并与意识型态 组织创新 大规模动员 国家遗产的再诠释 忠诚转移与政治利益与权力的竞争有关 他更进一步说明 : 事实上此等努力和许多在地区 宗教与政治不同的层面相关, 规模广大, 并具有其黑暗面 古吉拉特省暴力冲突之潮起潮落 一般的威胁与许多不同的骚动有关, 多半是因地区认同不是 固定的, 而是一种政治的建构, 因此集体的暴力行为不是一群有百年宿仇的疯狂群众的行为, 而是一种有计划的政治行为, 一种用来改变族群一般性认知的政治动员工具 (Patricia A. Gossman, 1999) 两大说明 : 第一 : 藉由故事的角色 国家主义者是基于对国家的爱, 也常是牺牲小我的爱, 如班纳迪克. 安德森 (Benedict Anderson) 3 (1983/1991,141) 所坚持的 但这种爱国者之爱有着一种深层的黑暗面, 其根植于对 他者 的恐惧与仇恨, 而常常以牺牲的方式表现 和安德森所言不同的是 Peter Van Deer Veer(1996) 的说法 - 若没有这种经常性压抑与表现黑暗面的 非正常性 (anomalies), 国家主义者是无法被了解的 如我们所知, 历史是现代国家的大叙述 在世界的殖民与被殖民区域, 主要是种从压迫中被解放的故事 这些黑暗的恐怖与血腥的故事, 通常解释为是为了朝向解放或 事件 的必要步骤而被纪录下来, 不然就可能会被遗忘 然而印度国家主义者的官方故事, 也是在教育中所教导的, 是人民从外国统治到解放的进程, 因此是爱国者之大爱的故事 但是其副线则是回教徒与印度教徒间分隔 仇恨与暴力冲突的故事 而这些所谓的 小区性 事件 插曲, 也不能干扰到常态的 解放国家自由的出现的主题 他们必须对解放国家的出现提供意义, 这并非由于他们被压迫的记忆已消失, 但他们记忆中有关团结的 合理的 解放国家的记忆却破碎不堪 (Amrita Basu 等,1995) 这些记忆最后以稍微引起政治与经济火花的方式出现 历史显示政治的动机通常经由此等暴力冲突之浪潮加以形成 而这些可憎的叙述也由特殊团体加以架构, 藉由植入这类反常事务至民众的心中, 并持续地更新提醒以造成紧张状态 3 班纳迪克. 安德森 (Benedict Richard O"Gorman Anderson) 安德森教授系康乃尔大学国际研究 Aaron L. Binenjorb 讲座教授, 为全球知名的东南亚研究学者 在其著作 想象的社群 (Imagined Community) 中有两个重要论述点 :1. 社群只能在想象之中产生 (imagined community), 即使是最微小的社群, 成员多半也漠不关心 ; 因此, 社群作为民族主义的支撑物, 也只可能是一种自身的创造 证据可见这种族群的想象往往把不平等的剥削状态掩盖, 以民族主义凌驾于社会民生困顿之上 国族或国家是历史叙事的建构物 2. 共同体的想象与国家政策结合 : 当殖民主义的政策, 如人口调查 地图和博物馆, 设法将遥远的殖民地纳入整齐划一的格式中, 不但是处置 管理殖民地的具体措施, 也成为后来当地民族主义想象自身的基础, 与民族主义者对共同体的遥想 这样的 殖民之眼, 从具体的政策到想象的共同体, 人是如何从独特的种族 部落 地域加以分化, 也成为可以观察 登记 计算的档案, 以致于殖民地能源源不绝成就欧洲霸权的想象, 而大英国协的太阳终年不坠

6 第二 : 经由历史 为何国家在分隔前后会出现小区暴力冲突? 英国政府方面清楚声明其理由 : 分离与统治 马拉达巴(Moradabad) 的地区指挥官 Lt. Colonel Coke 在 1822 年写道 : 我们应全力支持现存不同宗教与种族的分离状态, 而不是去混合他们 (Sucheta Mahajan,2000) 分离治理应是印度政府的根本原则 他更进一步说明 : 我不能闭上眼睛说这个种族 ( 回教徒 ) 基本上对我们有敌意, 因此我们的真实政策是去调解印度教徒 Lord Canning 也提出相同的观点 : 当我们要以极少数的英国人来统治 1.5 亿人口时, 最好是让其分治 ( 在宗教与国家情感已是如此时 ), 并鼓励他们尽可能尊重我们的权力, 并对我们的动机毫不怀疑 Sir Henry Cotton( 印 4 度的问题,1905) 在有关 1905 年孟加拉国分裂写道 : 在历史上, 这是第一次藉由行政省分的分离, 而在回教徒与印度教徒间建立宗教宿仇 此等原则也是首次在官方圈中被宣布 : 分离与统治 回教徒在各种情况下受到官方的善待 Lord Minto 对 Morley 写道 : 我认为印度的阶级制度与宗教差异, 特别是在回教徒与印度教徒的两大族群上, 已显示出弱点, 在下一个世代中, 在政治目标不同的情况下, 阶级制度与宗教分离消失的可能性大增 现今的印度建国于 1858 年, 小区的暴力冲突是其国家构成的一部份 (Sir Henry Cotton, 1905) 英国利用这个政策以系统和形式化的方式, 制度化社群的暴力冲突, 其内容包括结合机构和法律中的小区代表 1909 年 Morley Minto 改革 小区投票权, 与在所有国家组织与行政单位的小区代表, 激起宗教上的野蛮仇恨 他们让小区与阶级制度基础投票表决银行 印度政府在 1935 年的行为, 针对分离活动更进一步鼓动小区的暴力冲突 (J. Nehru,1946) 这类殖民者的分离与统治的政策, 除了弱化反殖民势力的团结外, 还有其它的目标, 即声东击西 分离弱化了他们的团结与反对英国的活动, 而小区暴力活动所分散的注意力, 也成为此等政策的构成部分 由英国人所组织的小区暴力冲突, 也提供他们更进一步镇压人民的借口, 并声称造成印度人民问题的是宗教问题而非殖民统治, 还谴责殖民统治下所造成的牺牲者和其宗教, 并说英国的政策是公平的, 是以达到 所有宗教小区正义 的世俗政策为主 这种由国家制度化的小区暴力冲, 往往弱化人民的团结与反对势力, 也用来当做进一步攻击并转向其注意力的借口 英国殖民者已在苏格兰 爱尔兰与韦尔斯完美化这个作法 他们使用宗教作为分离人民与建立其管辖的工具 此等小区的组织与国家结构的本质, 并未因 1947 年的权力移转而有所改变, 而权力移转本身也造成小区间的大屠杀 新的统治圈继续着同样的国家与政策, 而这也适用于边境两侧 印度与巴基斯坦继续着同样的组织法律与政策, 造成更多人民间在宗教 语言 阶级制度 国籍上等的分离与暴力冲突 1947 至 2002 年, 在 世俗与社会主义的印度 (Secular and Socialist India) 中, 无数的小区暴力冲突情节相继上演着, 也屠杀了数千条人命 在 回教的巴基斯坦共和国 (Islamic Republic of Pakistan) 也有数千的孟加拉国人 辛宜斯人 (Sindhis) 巴拉奇斯人(Balochis) 阿曼迪亚人 (Ahmadiyas) 辛亚人(Shias) 等被屠杀 殖民权力所创造的仇恨浪潮, 4 孟加拉国昔为印度东北部的一省, 现分为东 西孟加拉国, 东孟加拉国原属巴基斯坦, 现已独立, 称 孟加拉国共和国, 首都达卡 ; 西孟加拉国属印度

7 也为政治利益所利用维持 系统化与合理化 此浪潮多在选举期间引起, 并于政治里程被取代时退潮 为何今日小区的暴力冲突由统治圈与国家所组织? 今日谁从分离与统治政策中得利? 谁想继续分离政策? 目的为何? 今日的转向政策为何? 这些问题将会在下一篇文章中叙述, 也能帮助我们了解暴力冲突的潮起潮落, 以及阿穆达巴的都市面向与其它古吉拉特省的城市 注 : 本文中之批注为译者注 参考书目 : 1.Ambedkar, B. R., 国会议员与甘地, 对不可碰触的孟买做了什么?:Thacker & Co Amnesty International, 印度 : 中止古吉拉特省的暴力冲突,2002 年 10 月 16 日 3.Anderson, Benedict, 想象的共同体 : 民族主义的起源与散布, 修正版, 伦敦与纽约 :Verso, Banu, Zenab., 小区主义者的政治 : 后印度独立小区暴动的政治与历史分析, 以古吉拉特省为例 - 若加斯坦 (Rajasthan) 暴动, 孟买, 印度 : 民众的波卡山 (Prakashan), Basu Amrita 与 Kohli Atul 编著 : 小区冲突与印度媒体在麻省 Amherst 学院研讨会的报导 英国广播公司, 评析 : 为何古吉拉特省如此暴力?,2002 年 9 月 25 日 年 10 月 30 日参访 7. 英国广播公司, 古吉拉特省的回教徒处于恐怖中,2002 年 5 月 9 日 年 10 月 30 日参访 8. 英国广播公司, 印度教激进教徒领导古吉拉特省暴动,2002 年 3 月 6 日 年 11 月 5 日参访 9. 英国广播公司, 印度军队阻止古吉拉特省暴动,2002 年 9 月 26 日 年 10 月 25 日参访 10. 英国广播公司, 时间线 : 阿逾陀危机,2002 年 2 月 27 日 年 10 月 30 日参访 11. 英国广播公司, 英国对古吉拉特省统治者的责难,2002 年 4 月 25 日 年 11 月 3 日参访 年印度人口普查, 临时人口统计 : 古吉拉特省 年 11 月 5 日参访 13.Chenoy, Dr. Kamal Mitra, Shukla, S.P., Subramanian, K.S. 与 Vanaik, Achin, 2002 年古吉拉特省大屠杀 : 对国民的报导,2002 年 4 月 10 日 年 10 月 30 日参访 14.Cotton, Sir Henry, 印度问题演讲 伦敦, 国家自由政策委员会, 第一版, David Ludden, 国家竞争 : 印度的宗教 小区与民主政治, 企鹅书屋, Desai, Darshan, 印度快报, 导致分裂之因, 人权观点,2002 年 3 月 3 日 我

8 们未授权去救援 : 古吉拉特省小区暴力冲突的国家参与及共谋,14 卷,2002 年 4 月 年 10 月 30 日参访 17.Engineer, Asghar Ali, 印度的小区主义者与小区暴力 : 印度教徒与回教徒冲突的分析研究, 德里, 印度 :Ajanta 出版 Ajanta 国际出版社, 年古吉拉特省人口普查当局 年 11 月 5 日参访 19.Haniffa, Aziz, 印度广播, 普林斯顿大学出版,2003 年 20. 人权观点, 印度 : 古吉拉特省的和平维持,2003 年 11 月 3 日 印度快报, Jafri 谴责他的谋杀行为,2002 年 6 月 4 日 年 11 月 1 日参访 22. 印度快报, 最后一圈 :C 在印度人民党活动中, 对小区采开放态度,2002 年 12 月 1 日 年 11 月 3 日参访 23. 印度法律之鹰 : 最终的法律大门, 印度刑法典 : 公共宁静的捍卫, 24.Jain, Sharda, 印度的恐怖主义政治 : 旁遮普个案, 新德里, 印度 : 深度与深度出版, Jawharlal Nehru, 发现印度, 牛津印度平装书, Karan Vijay, 秘密行动的战争 : 印度的恐怖主义, 新德里, 印度, 维京出版, 修辞 - 叙述学院, 英国国家广播观察 : 亚洲太平洋地区, 印度 : 古吉拉特省的宵禁箝制带来小区冲突, 二死,2002 年 7 月 20 日 28.Sucheta Mahajan: 独立与分治 : 印度殖民权力的腐蚀, 新德里报导, Micchel Chossudovsky, 战争与全球化,911 背后的真相, 全球瞭望, 国家人权委员会, 古吉拉特省的最后命令,2002 年 5 月 31 日 年 10 月 30 日参访 31. 为人民自由而进行的人民团结组织, 国家人权委员会的过渡时期报告,2002 年 3 月 21 日 ion.htm,2003 年 11 月 3 日参访 32. 为人民自由而进行的人民团结组织, 古吉拉特省大屠杀的媒体角色 : 简要分析报告,2002 年 4 月 5 日 年 11 月 3 日参访 33. 专业询问 :( 麻省理工学院 - 电子期刊 ) 民族新闻观点,Bhatt, Sheela 仇恨与绝望 : 早该做的, 早该做的, 印度广播,2002 年 5 月 17 日,32 卷,33 期,M2 页 34. 专业询问 :( 麻省理工学院 - 电子期刊 ) 民族新闻观点,Bhatt, Sheela 信仰的代价, 印度广播,2002 年 3 月 15 日,32 卷,24 期,3 页 35. 印度教复兴运动组织网站, 组织, 年

9 11 月 9 日参访 36.Rediff 网站, 古吉拉特省的暴动, 年 11 月 3 日参访 37.Tapio Tamminen, 印度教徒复活主义与印度教徒活动, 年 11 月 3 日参访 38. 印度时代, 费南德兹对古吉拉特省的报告摘要,2002 年 3 月 3 日 pe=1, 月 3 日参访 39. 国际宗教自由之美国委员会, Kamal Mitra Chenoy 的证词,2002 年 6 月 10 日 年 11 月 3 日参访 40.Van Deer Veer Peter, 暴力写实, 国际平装书, 世界印度教徒主义, 世界印度教徒的宗旨与目标, 年 11 月 3 日 Gujarat Ahmedabad: a quagmire of recurring conflict Department of Urban Studies and Planning - MIT Paper One: Presented to: Prof. Diane Davis MIT Fall 2003 By: Shahid Sadruddin Nanavati (Paper in draft format please do not quote) Background Information Situated on the southern Pakistani border, Gujarat is a state located on India s north-west coast with a population of around fifty million (Census India, 2001). Of this population, roughly 88% of the population is Hindu while nine % are Muslims (Gujarat Directorate of Census Operations, 1991). Though these population demographics are similar to the national figures, Gujarat has experienced a disproportionate amount of inter-religious community violence. With the British Empire overseeing the partition of India in 1947 and the newly created state of Pakistan, India was to be a secular state while Pakistan would be an Islamic one. Partition forced millions of people to migrate from their homeland in an attempt to separate Hindu and Muslim populations, but a large number of Muslims remained in India. India s tense relations with Pakistan and its perceived threat, affect interaction between Hindus and Muslims, especially in border areas of Kashmir, Punjab and Gujarat. In 1969, the first major post-partition communal violence occurred in Gujarat leaving 2,500 dead (BBC News, 25 September 2002). The pattern of communal violence has continued into the present day. During the latter half of the 1980s an estimated 1000 communal incidents occurred taking the life of nearly 1300 (Desai, Driving the Wedge, 3 March 2002). The emergence of a coordinated movement by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindu nationalist organization, to re-erect the Ram temple in the northern Indian town of Ayodhya has been flashpoint for communal violence throughout India and especially 功能變數代碼變更 Gujarat. The Babri mosque, built by Islamic conquerors during the sixteenth century, stood on the site of what many Hindus consider to be the sacred birthplace of the god Ram (legally contested). Riots erupted in 1992, after Hindu extremist groups razed the mosque leaving a reported 2000 Muslims dead nationwide (BBC News, Timeline: Ayodhya, 27 Feb 2002). In the beginning of 2002, the VHP declared that it would begin building a temple in Ayodhya on March 15, 2002 and hundreds of volunteers had begun to converge on the site and scared the Muslim population away from the region, later looted their homes and shops (BBC News, Timeline: Ayodhya, 27 Feb 2002). Current Predicament

10 On February 27, 2002, Hindu nationalist volunteers en route to Ahmedabad, Gujarat from Ayodhya were involved in a series of altercations at successive train stops with Muslims communities. When the train arrived in the Muslim majority community of Godhra, the pattern of Hindu heckling and violent gesturing directed at Muslims continued. When Hindu train passengers refused to pay Muslim vendors for their services, stone throwing ensued between groups, and escalated into the eventual fire bombing of two train cars by a Muslim mob, killing 58 Hindus, most of whom were women and children (Human Rights Watch, We Have No Orders to Save You, April 2002). After the Godhra incident, a huge communal backlash by Hindus occurred, immediately leaving hundreds of Muslims dead and thousands more internally displaced (Human Rights Watch, April 2002). The state and national government came under extreme scrutiny from domestic and international human rights organizations for their inaction in the face of communal violence. The National Human Rights Commission sent by New Delhi to report on the Gujarat tragedy noted that, there was a comprehensive failure of the State to protect the Constitutional rights of the people of Gujarat, starting with the tragedy in Godhra on 27 February 2002 and continuing with the violence that ensued in the weeks that followed (NHRC, Final Order on Gujarat, 31 May 2002).

11 2 Actors, Institutions and Issues Sangh Parivar: Sangh Parivar is the collective name used to represent a family of powerful Hindu nationalist organizations. The most influential groups in the Parivar are the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal (a youth branch of the VHP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). What binds these organizations is Hindutva ( Hinduness ), an ideology that stresses the cultural importance of Hindu civilization to India and the need for India to be a Hindu state. In a nation where the overwhelming majority of the population is Hindu, the Sangh Parivar urges Hindus to remember and revere their culture and history. Opposition political parties and human rights groups claim that Hindutva exacerbates communal violence among Hindus and minority groups. The Sangh Parivar has been at the forefront of the Ayodhya temple issue deeming its construction a matter of Hindu pride and necessity. Rising as an opposition to the long dominant Congress party, which was widely viewed as corrupt, Sangh Parivar has emerged as a leading national political and ideological coalition (Haniffa Aziz, 2003). By not recognizing the caste system as part of its ideology, it discards an issue that has always divided Hindus (RSS.org, Organization, 9 November 2003). With Hindus of all socio-economic levels unified, it leaves members of other religious minorities in a particularly weak position. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS - National Service Society ): The RSS is one of India s most important social service organizations with an estimated 300,000 branches nationwide (Tamminen, Hindu Revivalism, 3 November 2003). As the one of the first major Hindu nationalist organizations, the RSS served as a patron for financial and electoral support base for the rest of the Sangh Parivar organizations. Formed in 1925, the main objective of the RSS is the formation of a Hindu state. The RSS felt that the independence movement failed to frame the nation around Hindu culture. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP World Hindu Council ): The VHP is a populist Hindu organization that seeks to unite Hindus all over the world in order to protect the Hindu culture from outside influence and threats. Founded in 1964, The VHP works closely with the RSS. The main objectives of the VHP are to consolidate, strengthen, and make Hindu society invincible by protecting the human rights of the national mainstream from hostile outside forces. (VHP.org, Agenda and

12 3 Objectives, 3 November 2003) The VHP is a strong proponent of a Hindu state, as opposed to the current secular Indian state. The VHP speaks of Hindus as the oppressed nation surrounded by foreign invaders, particularly Muslim, who threaten Hindu civilization. The VHP is known for provoking religious tensions and violence, and in 1992, its supporters led the successful campaign to destroy the Babri mosque in Ayodhya (BBC News, Timeline: Ayodhya Crisis, 27 February 2002). Of Gujarat s 18,000 villages, the VHP is known to have offices in 5000 (VHP.org 3 November 2003). Many mob leaders involved in the February-March massacres were reported to be activists from the VHP and Bajrang Dal (VHP s youth wing). First Information Reports (FIR) taken by the police condemned VHP officials of leading the riots against Muslims in Ahmedabad in post-godhra backlash (BBC News, Hindu hardliners, 6 March 2002). After the Godhra train bombing the VHP called a bandh (a strike) the following day in order to protest the attack. During the strikes, VHP members disseminated pamphlets, wherein they called on Hindus to boycott Muslims socially and economically in order to drive Muslims from Gujarat (Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation, 10 April 2002). Organization leaders in Gujarat have admitted to compiling voter registration lists the morning of February 28 to provide rioters with detailed information on the whereabouts of Muslim homes and businesses (Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation, 10 April 2002). The VHP has also been known to arm its cadres with trishuls (3 knived septars/bayonets), which many witnesses report as one of the most prominent weapons during the deadly rioting (Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation, 10 April 2002). VHP president Ashok Singhal has called the post-godhra events a successful experiment in raising the consciousness of Hindus nationwide and of emptying a whole area of Islam. (Indian Express, 3 September 2002) Statements like this illustrate a clearly anti-muslim policy in VHP leadership. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP- Indian People s Party ): The BJP represents the political wing of the Sangh Parivar. Its policy follows the Hindutva ideology of the Sangh Parivar. Currently, the BJP leads the coalition National Democratic Alliance that controls the Indian Parliament. In 1998, the BJP gained control of the National government ending the single party dominance of the Congress Party. Members of the RSS and VHP form a large lobbying network and voting base for the BJP, which must rely on the ballot, and therefore the RSS and VHP for its power. As the leader of the National Democratic

13 4 Alliance coalition government, the BJP has had to restrain the Hindutva agenda, which at times frustrates the VHP. In Gujarat, however, the BJP has been able to stick more closely to Hindutva by filling positions with VHP and RSS members or those sympathetic to the Sangh Parivar cause. An excellent example of this is Chief Minister Narendra Modi who became a prominent figure after the February riots. Modi claimed to have done his best to keep the violence under control, and was lauded by the VHP for the way he handled the Godhra aftermath (BBC News, Hindu hardliners, 6 March 2002). Narendra Modi began his career with the Sangh Parivar as a member of the RSS. In the mid-1980s RSS leadership dispatched Modi to join the BJP in Gujarat. When the BJP came to power in the late 1990s, Modi gained a prominent status within the Gujarati government. As the current Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi has received much national and international criticism for his handling of the February-March riots. His and the BJP s support of the post Godhra bandh gave the VHP total freedom of action throughout the state, which allowed mass mobilization of Hindu mobs (HRW, We Have No Orders to Save You, April 2002). He defended that all steps necessary to prevent violence were taken and that the Hindu backlash against Muslims was a reaction, in which the people of Gujarat showed in incredible restraint under grave provocation (HRW, We Have No Orders to Save You, April 2002). According to the NHRC, the BJP-led State government failed to protect its citizens during the February-March violence. After receiving such criticism at home and abroad for the post-godhra violence, the National BJP has acted forcefully to prevent a large-scale flare-up of violence. As the ruling party in the national government, they have the power to allocate the resources necessary to diffuse potential sparks among religious communities. Gujarati Hindus and Muslims: Similar to the population demographics of India as a whole, in Gujarat, Hindus comprise a majority, with Muslims accounting for less the ten % of the total population. As minority in a state where the Sangh Parivar dominates the government, the Muslim community lacks true representation in state apparatus. Although Muslims are not completely innocent of wrongdoing, they have suffered the majority of the abuse. Muslims suffered systematic attacks on their homes, businesses, and places of worship in the weeks following the Godhra incident. Unofficial estimates assert that at least 2,000 perished in the aftermath, most of whom where Muslim, and

14 5 that upwards of 100,000 Muslims were living in NGO-administered refugee camps (Testimony of Kamal Mitra Chenoy to USCIRF, 10 June 2002). Currently, in the town of Vadodara, Muslims and Hindus have marked their separate territories by flying flags above their neighbourhoods hoping to prevent violence and also to clearly establish safe-zones for their communities (Indian Express, 2 October 2002). Many Muslims from districts outside of Ahmedabad have feared returning to their homes after the brutal massacre that occurred in late February. Successive incidences of communal violence has led to a ghettoization of Muslim communities, who have left property alongside Hindus to seek safety in numbers (HRW, We Have No Orders to Save You, April 2002). Nested-ness and Scale Looking at the nested-ness, according to Ashutosh Varshney (Far Eastern Economic Review - Hong Kong: Mar 21, Vol. 165, Iss. 11; pg. 26) Hindu-Muslim riots in India are understood to have two causes: the underlying and the proximate. The underlying causes are linked partly to perceptions of history. Since the 1920s, Hindu nationalists-those who believe that India is a Hindu nation have argued that Muslims are fundamentally disloyal to India. Some also believe that the so-called Muslim period of Indian history, stretching from the 8th century to the 18th century, was a period of Hindu humiliation, when Muslim rulers ruthlessly attacked the pillars of Hindu culture, especially its temples of worship. Finally, some Hindus also think that Muslims are essentially aggressive by nature, and a demonstration of superior brute strength is the only way to alter their behaviour. The biggest exponents of such views are the Hindu-nationalist ideologues, many of whom rule Gujarat. India s relationship with Pakistan presents a complicating factor by exacerbating the difficulties the Indian Islamic community faces. The VHP and the rest of the Parivar often portray the Muslim violence against Hindus as Pakistani sponsored or terrorist while the Hindu violence against Muslims is portrayed as natural reaction to communal tensions. The anti-pakistan rhetoric effectively causes Hindus to fear Muslims as terrorists or subversives. Both communities have been left to fear each other, helping to polarize the situation.

15 6 Looking at the Scale, one aspect of this communalism was the "two-nation theory," the conception that wherever large blocs of Muslims could be identified within the same region they constituted a national group independent of the Indian nation (Brandon Lindsey, Gujarat, India: Foreboding Specter of Genocide 2003). This was one of many factors tending towards the ultimate development of the atmosphere from which the Pakistan separation movement began. When finally the separation of India and Pakistan occurred, one finds regions varying all the way from one extreme to the other, i.e., from those in which every Hindu and every Muslim is in a state of extreme tension and fear with respect to the other group, to those at the other extreme (and far from the borders) where little change in Hindu-Muslim relations occurred. Important in the latter situation were two facts says Ashutosh Varshney (Far Eastern Economic Review - Hong Kong: Mar 21, Vol. 165, Iss. 11; pg. 28) : (1) the Muslims were personally known and offered no threat; and (2) their economic services were needed. The economic life of the region depended upon the fact that the Muslims, like the rest, had fixed and necessary duties to perform. They contribute notably not only to the economic, but also to the literary, scientific, professional, and educational life of India. Now just how are these relations to be conceived? The first background factor is the original invasion of India by the Muslims, the voluntary or involuntary conversion of many Hindus to the Islamic faith, and the long military domination of large parts of India by Muslim rulers. At no time, however, did the Muslims live as aliens in the land, as the British did, separating themselves in language and culture from the Hindus. In fact, Muslim rulers learned a great deal and borrowed a great deal from the Hindus. Thus India's new communalism has arisen during a struggle to reconstruct India politically. The struggle is centrally concerned with the legitimacy of the state, the distribution of state resources, power in society, and justice (David Ludden, 1996). It involves ideological and organizational innovation, mass mobilization, reinterpretations of the national heritage, shifting loyalties, and competition for political gains and control. He furthers says: The struggle is thus actually many different kinds of struggles in localities, regions, and national politics; and it has a very dark side and is of a very large scale.

16 7 Ebbs and Tides of Violence in Gujarat The common thread linking various disturbances lies in the perception that communal identity is not "fixed" but is a political construction, and that collective violence is not the behaviour of a frenzied crowd acting out of centuries-old animosities, but a planned political act, a tool of political mobilization used to change popular perceptions of group identification (Patricia A. Gossman, 1999). Presenting it in two parts: ONE: With the role of narratives. Nationalism is about love of the nation, and this is often a self-sacrificing love, as Benedict Anderson (1983/ 1991, 141) insists. However, the dark underside of patriotic love is rooted in fear and hatred of the other, and this is often also expressed in sacrificial terms. Contrary to what Anderson seems to claim, Peter Van Deer Veer (1996) says nationalism cannot be understood without these dark undercurrents, which are constantly repressed and represented as "anomalies." As we know, history is the grand narrative of any modern nation-state. Both in the colonizing and colonized regions of the world, it is a story of liberation from oppression. The dark stories of terror and bloodshed are only memorized to be interpreted as either necessary steps toward liberation or "incidents" that might as well be forgotten. Whereas the official history of Indian nationalism, as told in Indian education, is the progressive story of the liberation of the people from foreign domination, thus the narration of patriotic love. But there is also a subtext that tells the story of partition, of hatred and violence between Hindus and Muslims. The subtext is that of events, of incidents that are called "communal" in order not to let them disturb the text of the emergence of freedom, of a normal, liberated nation-state. They have to be given meaning by the narrative frame of the emergence of a liberal nation-state. It is not so much that their memory is totally obliterated, that they are repressed, but that they are memorized as fragments of a story of which the unitary, rational subject is the liberal nation-state (Amrita Basu, et.al. 1995). These memories come back with slight ignition of political and economic sparks. History shows that political motives are achieved through such tides of violence. Abhorrent narratives are formed by special groups who then implant such anomalies into the psyche of the masses and time and again refresh them to generate tension.

17 8 TWO: Through History Why was communal violence needed by the state before partition and after partition? The British officials clearly state the reason why they needed it: Divide and Rule : Lt. Colonel Coke, Commandant of Moradabad wrote in 1822: "Our endeavour should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavor to amalgamate them (Sucheta Mahajan 2000). Divide et Impera should be the principle of Indian government." He further said, "I can not close my eyes to the belief that this race (Mussalmans) is fundamentally hostile to us and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindus." Lord Canning expressed the same view: " As we must rule 150 million of people by a handful (more or less small) of Englishmen, let us do it in the manner best calculated to leave them divided (as in religion and national feeling they already are) and to inspire them with the greatest possible awe of our power and with the least possible suspicion of our motives." Sir Henry Cotton wrote (Problem of India, 1905) referring to the Partition of Bengal in 1905: "For the first time in history, religious feud was established between them (Hindus and Muslims) by the partition of province. For the first time, the principle was enunciated in official circles: Divide and rule. The Mohammedans were officially favoured in every possible way." Lord Minto wrote to Morley: "I think that caste and religious differences, certainly in respect to the two great groups of Mohammedans and Hindus, are showing signs of weakening, and that in the next generation there is a great prospect of the disappearance of the separation of castes and religions in deference to the calls of political aims." The present Indian State was established in 1858 and communal violence was an integral component of it (Sir Henry Cotton, 1905). Following this policy, the British institutionalized communal violence in a systematic and methodical manner by communal representations in institutions, education, 1909 Morley Minto Reform, Communal Suffrage and Communal representation in all organs of the state and administration to incite bestial hatred based on religion. They laid the foundation of communal and caste vote banks. Government of India act of 1935 and Partition were to further incite communal violence (J. Nehru, 1946). This divide and rule policy of the colonialists besides weakening the unity of anti colonial forces, also had another aim, that was diversion. While division of the people weakened their unity and movement against the British, diversion from their struggles to something

18 9 else by communal violence was also an integral part of this policy. Communal violence was organised by the British because it provided them a pretext to further suppress the people and declare that it was not the colonial rule that was the cause of the problems of the Indian people, but that religion was the problem, and blamed the victims and their religions for the situation created by the colonial rule, and said that it is the policy of the British to be fair and pursue a Secular policy to " do justice to all religious communities." Thus communal violence was institutionalized in the state structures, used to weaken the unity and resistance of the people and used as a pretext to further attack them and cause diversions. The British colonialists had already perfected this in Scotland, Ireland and Wales. They had used religion as an instrument to divide the people there and establish their domination. This communal nature of the institutions and state structure did not change with the transfer of power in 1947 and this transfer of power itself was done in the midst of a communal carnage. The ruling circles continued the same state and same policy, as it also suited them on both sides of the border. The Indian state as well as the Pakistani state continued the same institutions and policies, causing more divisions and violence amongst people on the basis of religion, language, caste, national background etc. In "Secular and Socialist India" from , innumerable episodes of communal violence have been staged, killing thousands of people. In the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" too thousands of Bengalis, Sindhis, Balochis, Ahmadiyas, Shias and others have been slaughtered. The tide of hatred that was created by the colonial powers is maintained and used systematically and seasonally for political gains. The tide rises around election times and ebbs after the political mileage is taken from it. Why is communal violence being organized today by the ruling circles and their state? Whose interest does Divide and Rule policy serve today? Who are they trying to divide and what for? What is this diversion today for? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in the second paper. They will help us in understanding the ebbs and tides of violence with respect to the urban dimension of the city of Ahmedabad and other cities of Gujarat.

19 10 Bibliography: Ambedkar, B. R. What Congress & Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables Bombay: Thacker & Co Amnesty International, India: Hate Speeches on the violence in Gujarat must be stopped October 16, 2002, Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso, Banu, Zenab. Politics of Communalism: A Politico-Historical Analysis of Communal Riots in Post Independence India with Special Reference to the Gujarat Rajasthan Riots. Bombay, India: Popular Prakashan, Basu Amrita, and Kohli Atul (Editors): Community Conflicts and the State in India Papers presented at a conference at Amherst College, Massachusetts in BBC News. Analysis: Why is Gujarat so violent? September 25, October 30, BBC News. Gujarat s Muslims live in terror. May 9, October 30, BBC News. Hindu hardliners led Gujarat attacks. March 6, November 5, BBC News. Indian Troops head off Gujarat Violence. September 26, October 25, BBC News. Timeline: Ayodhya Crisis. February 27, October 30, BBC News. UK censures Gujarat rulers. April 25, November 3, Census of India Provisional Population Totals: Gujarat. November 5, Chenoy, Dr. Kamal Mitra, Shukla, S.P., Subramanian, K.S., and Vanaik, Achin. Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation. April 10, October 30, Cotton, Sir Henry, An Address on the Problem of India. London, Political Committee of the National Liberal Club. 1905, First Edition. David Ludden, Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, Penguin Book House,1996 Desai, Darshan. Indian Express. Driving the Wedge. March 3, Human Rights Watch. We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat. April Vol October 30, Engineer, Asghar Ali. Communalism and communal violence in India: an analytical approach to Hindu-Muslim conflict. Delhi, India: Ajanta Publications; Ajanta Books International,1989. Gujarat Directorate of Census Operation November 5, Haniffa, Aziz, India Abroad (Princeton Uni. Press) 2003

20 11 Human Rights Watch, India: Keep Peace in Gujarat, November 3, Indian Express. Jafri blamed for his murder. June 4, Nov 1,2003. Indian Express. Last lap: C in BJP campaign stands openly for communal. December 10, November 3, Indian Legal Eagle: The Ultimate Law Portal, Indian Penal Code: Offences Against Public Tranquility, Jain, Sharda. Politics of terrorism in India: the case of Punjab. N.Delhi, India: Deep & Deep Pub Jawharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Oxford India Paper-back, 1946, Karan Vijay. War by stealth: terrorism in India. New Delhi, India: Viking, 1997 Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. BBC Monitoring: Asia Pacific. India: Curfew clamped in Gujarat following communal clashes; two dead. July 20, Sucheta Mahajan: Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India. N Delhi Press, 2000 Michel Chossudovsky, War and Globalisation, The Truth behind September 11, Global Outlook, 2002 National Human Rights Commission. Final Order on Gujarat. May 31, October 30, People s Union for Civil Liberties. An Interim Report to the National Human Rights Comm. March 21, Nov. 3, 2003 People s Union for Civil Liberties. Role of Newspapers in Gujarat Carnage: A brief Analysis. April 5, November 3, 2003 Pro Quest: (MIT e-journal) Ethnic News Watch. Bhatt, Sheela. Hate and Despair: It had to be done, it had to be done. India Abroad. May 17, Vol. XXXII. No. 33. pg. M2. Pro Quest: (MIT e-journal) Ethnic News Watch. Bhatt, Sheela. The Wages of Faith. India Abroad. March 15, Vol. 32. No. 24. pg. 3. RSS.org. Organization. November 9, Rediff.com. The Gujarat Riots. November 3, 2003 Tapio Tamminen, "Hindu Revivalism and the Hindutva Movement," Novembr 3, 2003 Times of India. Fernandes briefs PM on Gujarat. March 3, Nov. 3, 2003 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Testimony of Kamal Mitra Chenoy. June 10, November 3, 2003 Van Deer Veer Peter, Writing Violence, International Paperback, 1996 Vishva Hindu Parishad. Aims and Objects of Vishva Hindu Parishad. November 3, 2003 格式化 : 德文 ( 德國 )

21 12 刪除 : G:\MIT\Gujarat- Ahmedabad(Shahid)0913.doc I:\D\OcwWeb\twocw\mit\NR\rdonlyres\Urban-Studies-and-Planning\11-949Cities-in-Conflict--Theory-and-PracticeFall2003\C9C35F82-FE EC-4FF5-AD3F-43F5F5A1A17E\0\shaids_paper_cn.doc