2010 1 * JEL H27 D72 F014. 31 A 1000-6249 2010 01-0003-012 1 * 100089 zhangshuguang@unirule. org. cn 2008 8 3 12 29 2008 1 3
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅱ Quasi rent 1 1949 2 1 Fetter Encyclopaedia of the Social Science ⅩⅢ 291 2 4
2010 1 2000 appropriable quasi rents hold-up Klein Crawford and Alchian 1978 Resource-based View Tullock 1967 Krueger 1974 Hotelling's rule d[ P( Q t ) - C ( Qt ) ] dt P( Q t ) - C ( Q t ) = r Q t t P( Q t ) C ( Q t ) 1 1 5
Q H Q * P H P * P H P * Hotelling rent 1 2 1 2 6
2010 1 1983-1986 1994 1993 2007 1. 6 2008 30 10% 5% 7
2 /3 2 2005 100 2006 2 50 100 2000 5. 88 0. 113 8-24 / 24-30 / 2006 40 20% - 40% 3 3 1 3796 1 2008 8
2010 1 2003 1994 1995 1 80 90 2 3 11980 1986 2008 5 6 2 2004 8 16 http / /finance. sina. com. cn /t /20040816 /1202951523. shtml 3 2007 5 18 http / /www. licaihome. com /html /yinxing /yinxingzixun /20070518 /33822. html 9
10 1 2002 1999 10
2010 1 2000 2001 2004 2002 12 2003 13. 5 2006 1997 2005 32. 4556 38. 6144 2006 39. 9368 26. 8064 2007 16. 5914 42. 3427 11 1 100. 6714 3. 5395 111. 2196 2006 3 1 9 30 10% 40% 2007 10 H 40% 50% 1 11
3 0 2006 21 2008 1 166 50% 1968 9 1980 50% 6 1982 40 1000 2000 1963. 86 284 2008 1996 4332 2000 1050 1000 1998-2007 549400 1 1130 101700 120 11300 24. 7% 391 70 3 2 1377 181901 182 181215 30. 8% 3 3075 236482. 27 44. 5% 13. 78 5000 500 1 12
2010 1 2007 3649. 9 Klein Benjamin Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian 1978 Vertical integration appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process Journal of Law and Economics 21 297-326. Krueger Anne 1974 The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society American Economic Review 64 291-303. Mises 1949 Humam Action New Haven Yale University Press. Tullock Gordon 1967 The Welfare Costs of Tariffs Monopolies and Theft Western Economic Journal 5 224-232. 2008 13
2006 3 0 2008 1972 1972 23 1986 2008 21 POLITICS & SOCIETY Vol. 32 No. 1 March 2004 7-39 2008 PPT 1972 2000 2008 13 2001 2003 ' ' Analysis on the Problem of the Factor Rent during the Reform of State-owned Enterprises Shuguang Zhang Abstract The paper reviews the theory of rent. I find that rent is materially a problem of the factor price. Its source and properties depend on the ownership of factors. During the reform of state-owned enterprises the rent is of central importance for many problems such as distribution between state and firms property transactions handling the problem about stimulating of enterpriser. Furthermore I discuss the setting up and operation of public trust fund. Keywords the Theory of Rent Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 14