2019 3 2 ( 43 ) JournalofNortheastAsiaStudies :,,,,,, :,,, ;, : : : DOI:10.19498/j.cnki.dbyxk.2019.02.008 2017 1 20,,,, ;,, 66
2019 2,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,, 1, :,,, 2 (IMF),,, 67.8 3 1 2 KimberlyAnnEliot,CarrotsandSticks:TheRoleofEconomicIncentivesinAmer- icanforeign Policy.htps://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/ Eliot Carrots%26Sticks.pdf. US-Chinatradeprogressnotexpectedbeforeelection.htps://www.cnbc.com/2018/ 09/12/us-china-trade-progress-not-expected-before-election.html. 3 U.S.-ChinaTradeFacts.htps://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china- mongolia-tai- wan/peoples-republic-china. 67
,,,, :,, ; ; ; ; 1, (AIB),,, 2,,,, :,, 3,, 1 Douglas H.Paal,Sino- US Relationsinthe Trumpera,November16,2016. htps://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/16/sino-u.s.-relations-in-trump-era- pub-66168. 2 MireyaSolís,David Dolar,and JonathanStromseth,Rescuing U.S.economic strategyinasia,wednesday,october25,2017.htps://www.brookings.edu/blog/or- der-from-chaos/2017/10/25/rescuing-u-s-economic-strategy-in-asia/. 3 TimothyR.Heath,China sstrengtheningofcommunistpartyruleisnotjusta PowerGrab,April2,2018.htps://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24476/china -s-strengthening-of-communist-party-rule-is-not-just-a-power-grab. 68
2019 2,, 1,,,,,,, 2018,, 2018 3 22, 500 2 6 16, 500 25% 2025 9 24, 2000, 10%, 2019 1 1 25% 3 2018 3 16,,,,, 8 13, 2019, 7163, 2.6%, 4 9 1 XiJinping'spowergrabmakesChinavulnerabletothewhimsofoneman,Feb282018. htps://www.afr.com/news/world/xi-jinpings-power-grab-makes-china-vulner- 4 able-to-the- whims-of-one- man-20180227-h0wr3r. 2, ( )2018 4 30 3 2000,,2018 9 18 htp://inter- national.caixin.com/2018-09-18/101327201.html. 2019,,2018 8 15 htp://www. xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2018-08/15/c 137391623.htm. 69
21,,,, (SAIS), :,,, 1,,,,,, 2016,, :,, ; ;, ; 2 1 2, WangJisiand KennethG.Lieberthal,AddressingU.S.-ChinaStrategicDis- trust,friday,march30,2012.htps://www.brookings.edu/research/addressing-u-s -china-strategic-distrust/. 70
2019 2,,,, :, 1,,, :,,,,,,, 2,,, (1) :,,, 1 JefreyA.Bader,AframeworkforU.S.policytowardChina Monday,March21, 2016.htps://www.brookings.edu/research/a-framework-for-u-s-policy-toward -china/. 2 RichardC.BushThursday,You vegotafriendinme WhyU.S.aliancesmakeA- mericasaferseptember29,2016.htps://www.brookings.edu/research/in-support- of-u-s-aliances/. 71
,, 1 (2), :,,, 2, 3,,,,,,,,,,,, 2.5, 1 Benjamin Herscovitch,A BalancedThreatAssessmentofChina ssouthchinasea 2 3 Policy,August28,2017.htps://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/balanced -threat-assessment-chinas-south-china-sea-policy. ReginaldJ.McClam,BalancingonthePivotHow China sriseandoshorebalan- cingaectjapan sandindia srolesasbalancersinthetwenty-firstcentury.htps:// media.defense.gov/2017/nov/21/2001847265/-1/-1/0/dp 0022 MCCLAM BAL- ANCING PIVOT.PDF. GraceGu,EswarPrasad,RebalancingtheU.S.-ChinaRelationship,Monday,Jan- uary17,2011.htps://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rebalancing-the-u-s-china- relationship/. 72
2019 2 (3),,,, 1,, ;,,,,,,, 2016,, 2018 9 26,,, 1 David C.Gompert,AstridStuth Cevalos,Cristina L.Garafola,War with China Thinking Throughthe Unthinkable.htps://www.rand.org/pubs/research reports/ RR1140.html. 73
, 2018 10 4,,,,,,,,, 2018 9, :,,, :, ;,,,, 2018 9,,,,,, ;,, (1),, (2),, 74
2019 2,,,,,,,,,( ), 1,, 2017 10 2018 4, 2017 11,,,, 3 : 5050,,,, 2018 11,, 2500,,,,,,,, 2018,, 1 :, (2018 ),2018 9 29 75
,, :, ;, : ; ;, ;,,,,,,,, 40, 1,,,,,, 2 2018, 1 :, (2018 ),2018 9 29 2 :, (2018 ),2018 9 29 76
2019 2 2020, 1,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1 RobertZoelick,Tryto Look Beyond Today s Quarrels,27 September2018. htps://www.brunswickgroup.com/try-to-look-beyond-todays-quarrels-i8484/. 77
tions,china'soveralpolicytowardsthe Korean Peninsula has not changedsignificantly. Keywords:Sino-U.S.Relations;New Changes;KoreanPeninsula;Fu- turedevelopment;impact DonaldTrumpAdministration spolicytowardschinafromtheperspec- tiveofu.s.think-tanks WANGJunsheng Abstract:Theanalysisof Donald Trump government s Chinapolicy fromtheperspectiveofu.s.think-tankcontributestoourunderstand- ingonthecurrentsino-u.s.relations.thereweredisputesamongu. S.think-tanksoverU.S.policytowardsChinaimmediatelyafterDon- aldtrumptookoficeasu.s.president,however,therelativelyopti- mistictoneoftheargumentfrom U.S.think-tankshasbecomemore pessimismand morecriticaltowardchina.asforthereasons,u.s. policyexpertsprefertoperceivechina speacefuldevelopmentfromthe perspectiveofthehistoryofwesternpowerscompetingforhegemony, anddonaldtrumpprefertoconsulttheconservativethink-tanks.al- though Donald Trumpgovernment schinapolicyseemscontroversial sometimes,thebasicpolicydirectionofstrengtheningstrategiccompeti- tionwithchinahasbeenestablishedandimplemented.itisrecommen- dedthatchinashouldtakechanceofinternationalconferencestointro- duceitselftotheworld,and morethink-tanksexchangeswith U.S., inwhichchinesethink-tankstel thestoryofchina overseas,should encouraged. Keywords:U.S.Think-tank;Sino-U.S.Relations;DonaldTrump sadministration;chinapolicy;improvingexchanges 148