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was willing to undertake tasks assigned by the party and government which reduced the difference between the Federation and the latter. On the other hand as the policy emphasized on the transition into a social organization the Federation enhanced its functions as a social organization. It however resisted turning into a complete social organization but only resembling it. Thus the pendulum in the past reform was the result of the coupling effect of both the institution and actors. That is it was caused not merely by institutional arrangements and periodical change of orders from above but also by the collective actions of the cadre group in the Federation. Thus the future reform of the Federation should proceed from both the institution and actions. Active Inertia A Study on the Mechanism of the Restructuring of the Agricultural Industries by the Local Government Liu Junqiang Lu Yu & Li Zhen 140 Abstract Why has the restructuring of agriculture been high on government agenda for decades but yielded little results during the cycles of new projects - inefficient projects - new projects Based on fieldwork for one year in a county in southern China and interviews with over 100 people we find that the frequent restructuring of agribusiness is an adaptive action to strong incentives and weak punishment mechanisms. Competition for performance and time pressure propel local cadres to chase new projects. Weak punishment reduces the cost of project failure because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility intervention through informal ties and the multi-task balance. This study investigates the institutional origins of active inertia in government casts doubt on the government capacity in building local agribusiness and hence improves our understanding of government s limitation in economic development. How Does the Local Government Avoid Risks An Analysis of the Reform of Community Property Management in City A Sheng Zhiming 166 Abstract Government departments at different levels face various potential risks that need to be avoided in the process of social governance. This paper conducts case study of the community property management reform initiated by the Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in City A and illustrates how this local government department avoids potential risks through a series of institutional 245