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峥闲华江
5 years ago
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26 Lant T. K Aspiration Level Updating An Empirical Exploration. Management Science Levinthal D. A. & J. G. March 2010 The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management Journal 14 S2. Liu Mingxing J. Wang R. Tao & R. Murphy 2009 The Political Economy of Earmarked Transfers in a State - Designated Poor County in Western China Central Policies and Local Responses. The China Quarterly 200. Neustadt R Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York Free Press. O Brien K. J. & L. J. Li 1999 Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China. Comparative Politics OECD 2013 Perspectives on Global Development 2013 Industrial Policies in a Changing World. Paris OECD Development Centre. Sull D The Dynamics of Standing Still Firestone Tire and Rubber and the Radial Revolution. Business History Review Thompson G Industrial Policy USA and UK Debate. London Routledge. Zhang Qian Forrest 2013 Comparing Local Models of Agrarian Transition in China. Rural China Zhou Xueguang 2011 The Autumn Harvest Peasants and Markets in Post Collective Rural China. The China Quarterly

27 was willing to undertake tasks assigned by the party and government which reduced the difference between the Federation and the latter. On the other hand as the policy emphasized on the transition into a social organization the Federation enhanced its functions as a social organization. It however resisted turning into a complete social organization but only resembling it. Thus the pendulum in the past reform was the result of the coupling effect of both the institution and actors. That is it was caused not merely by institutional arrangements and periodical change of orders from above but also by the collective actions of the cadre group in the Federation. Thus the future reform of the Federation should proceed from both the institution and actions. Active Inertia A Study on the Mechanism of the Restructuring of the Agricultural Industries by the Local Government Liu Junqiang Lu Yu & Li Zhen 140 Abstract Why has the restructuring of agriculture been high on government agenda for decades but yielded little results during the cycles of new projects - inefficient projects - new projects Based on fieldwork for one year in a county in southern China and interviews with over 100 people we find that the frequent restructuring of agribusiness is an adaptive action to strong incentives and weak punishment mechanisms. Competition for performance and time pressure propel local cadres to chase new projects. Weak punishment reduces the cost of project failure because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility intervention through informal ties and the multi-task balance. This study investigates the institutional origins of active inertia in government casts doubt on the government capacity in building local agribusiness and hence improves our understanding of government s limitation in economic development. How Does the Local Government Avoid Risks An Analysis of the Reform of Community Property Management in City A Sheng Zhiming 166 Abstract Government departments at different levels face various potential risks that need to be avoided in the process of social governance. This paper conducts case study of the community property management reform initiated by the Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in City A and illustrates how this local government department avoids potential risks through a series of institutional 245

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南京农业大学学报( 社会科学版) 第 16 卷单边委托与模糊治理 :基于乡村社会的混合关系研究田雄,王伯承摘摇要:当前,乡村社会利益主体之间关系呈现出复杂多变而非理性合作的态势其中,县乡干部与村干部形成共事与共谋冶关系,村干部与村民形成支持互利冷漠和反对冶等四种关系乡村利益主体之间多种混合关系形成的