51 51-105 2003 12
52 2003/12
50.5% 2 2
54 2003/12 Mezey 1985; Heywood 2002, 316-17
1973 Fiorin 1980 Jacobson 1992 Schroedel Sko
56 2003/12 Schroedel Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt Roosevelt Wilson Schroedel 1994 Neustadt 1990; Peterson 1990; Schroedel 1994
Sinclair 1999 3 3 104 1995-1998 Gingrich 1995 Sinclair 1999, Gingrich 434 Gingrich Gingrich
58 2003/12 1995, 21 1995, 39 4 5 4 5
6 6 堃
60 2003/12 1991 1998; 1999 2000 Sundguist 1988; Mayhew 1991a; 1991b; McCubbins 1991; Howell et al. 2000 Sundquist 1988
Mayhew 1991a, 638 Sundguist 1988 1 1991b Mayhew
62 2003/12 Jacobson 1991 Fiorina 1996, chap. 6 Krehbiel 1996; 1998 filibuster Cox Kernell 1991 McCubbins 1991 Kelly
1993 Mayhew Mayhew Edwards 1997 Howell 2000 1945 1994 landmark legislation Binder 1999; 20011947 1996
64 2003/12 Cooper 2001
1997; Binder 2001 Kelly 1993; Howell et al. 2000 1991; 1995; 2000; 2003 2000; 2001
66 2003/12 2001; 2001; 2002; 2003 2002 20
98.3% 33.3% 2002, 15 2003
68 2003/12 Bachrach and Baratz 1962; 1963 0.1 95%
69 1973-2003 b / 1 51-56 1972 1973/2-1976/1 233 13 5.3% 0.03 1 57-66 1975 1976/2-1981/1 a 471 35 6.9% 0.09 1 67-72 1980 1981/2-1984/1 597 18 3.0% 0.05 1 73-78 1983 1984/2-1987/1 527 17 3.1% 0.05 1 79-84 1986 1987/2-1990/1 612 28 4.4% 0.10 1 85-90 1989 1990/2-1993/1 807 240 22.9% 1.23 2 1-6 1992 1993/2-1996/1 913 794 46.5% 5.09 3 1-6 1995 1996/2-1999/1 995 931 48.3% 5.78 4 1-6 1998 1999/2-2002/1 811 1498 64.9% 6.64 5 1-3 2001 2002/2-2003/7 602 1254 67.6% 5.57 a.1975 10 b. ( 1975 ) 0.1 1.23 5% 22.9%
70 2003/12 13 20 1989, 29 111-113
20 7 5 5.78 6.64 8 5.57 7 225 30 8 5 8 5%
72 2003/12 1999 141 2001
51.8% 2001 54.7% 142 83 1999
74 2003/12 54.7% 31.1% 4.9% 50.5% 29.8% 3.7
2,3071,467 840 / 1-3 1999/2-2000/5 320 677 67.9% 3.00 201 3-6 2000/5-2002/1 491 821 62.6% 3.64 328
76 2003/12 Krehbiel 1996 Epstein 1980; 1998, 80-81
9 9
78 2003/12
10 10 Washington New York Times Post Congressional Quarterly Howell et al. 2000
80 2003/12 148 A 148 28%
11 B 62.4% 72.3% 26.7% 9.6% 22.4% 5.5% 11
82 2003/12 N 53 13 171 0 237 64 27 264 1 356 % 22.4 5.5 72.2 0.0 100.0 18.0 7.6 74.2 0.3 100.0 N 81 29 189 4 303 20 30 163 2 215 % 26.7 9.6 62.4 1.3 100.0 9.3 14.0 75.8 0.9 100.0 N 62 65 154 23 304 144 136 168 22 470 % 20.4 21.4 50.7 7.6 100.0 30.6 28.9 35.7 4.7 100.0 N 42 23 82 3 150 55 42 169 4 270 % 28.0 15.3 54.7 2.0 100.0 20.4 15.6 62.6 1.5 100.0 N 238 130 596 30 994 283 235 764 29 1311 % 23.9 13.1 60.0 3.0 100.0 21.6 17.9 58.3 2.2 100.0
61.5%
84 2003/12 N 49 104 84 237 106 126 124 356 % 20.7 43.9 35.4 100.0 29.8 35.4 34.8 100.0 N 73 115 115 303 58 79 78 215 % 24.1 38.0 38.0 100.0 27.0 36.7 36.3 100.0 N 132 114 58 304 289 119 62 470 % 43.4 37.5 19.1 100.0 61.5 25.3 13.2 100.0 N 35 51 64 150 93 103 74 270 % 23.3 34.0 42.7 100.0 34.4 38.1 27.4 100.0 N 289 384 321 994 546 427 338 1311 % 29.1 38.6 32.2 100.0 41.6 32.6 25.8 100.0 72
470 304 50.8% 60.0% 219 274 212 164 146
86 2003/12 69.2% 274 50.8% 164 N 237 164 356 181 60.1% 255 60.0% 146 N 303 182 215 129 72.7% 219 38.5% 212 N 304 221 470 181 70.7% 290 48.9% 160 N 150 106 270 130 67.7% 253 47.5% 173 N 994 673 1311 621 54.7% 50.5%
148 35.2% 2002
88 2003/12 33 28.9 7 20.6 19 16.7 4 11.8 1 0.9 1 2.9 1 0.9 2 5.9 1 2.9 1 2.9 1 2.9 50 43.9 14 41.2 10 8.8 2 5.9 114 100.0 34 100.0
10.0% 18.3% 52.0% 48.0% 26 52.0 47 48.0 5 10.0 18 18.3 19 38.0 33 33.7 50 100.0 98 100.0
90 2003/12
38.7% 2003 2003 10 27 2003 12 8 2003 12 15
92 2003/12 A 880615 880622 880622 880622 880622 880622 880622 881022 881130 881130 881130 881130 881228 881228 890115 890115 890115 890321 890328 890407 881230 890411 881230 890418 890104 890428 890106 890428 890106 890106 890106 890106 890106 890114 890114 890114 890114 890114 890114 890115 890523 890526 890526 890616 890620 890106 890113 890113 890630 890113 890630 890113 890630 890627
890630 900104 890630 900412 890630 890630 900504 890630 900504 890919 900504 891013 900511 891024 900511 891024 891024 891027 891027 900529 900529 891110 900601 891117 900626 891121 891124 891124 900927 901004 891128 901004 901004 891205 901004 891212 901004 891215 901004 891215 901004 891222 900102 900102 900104 900104 900104 900104 900511 900529 900529 900627 901011 901011 901012 901012 901012 901012 901012 900104 901025 900104 901025
94 2003/12 901025 901206 901030 901221 901030 901221 901031 901031 910104 901031 910104 901031 910108 910108 901031 910108 901031 910108 901031 901031 901031 901206 901206 901206 910108 910115 910115 910115 910116 910116 B
96 2003/12
1999 1999 3 3 1999 1999 6 3 2003 2003 6 13 2003 1989 2001 1998 61-90 2000 75-101 2001 2000 2001 13 3 251-304
98 2003/12 1995 2 1119-145 2001 15 3 61-78 2002 1998-2001 1994 1999 4 14 2001 81-104 1989 1999 83-123 2000 2002 2000
4 105-147 2000 1991 19 55-80 1995 2002 2003 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. Two Faces of Power. American Political Science Review 56: 947-52. Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S Baratz. 1963. Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57: 632-42. Binder, Sarah A. 1999. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. American Political Science Review 93 (3): 519-33. Binder, Sarah A. 2001. Congress, The Executive, and the Production of Public Policy: United We Govern? In
100 2003/12 Congress Reconsidered, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. Cooper, Joseph. 2001. The Twentieth-Century Congress. In Congress Reconsidered, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. Cox, Gary W., and Samuel Kernell. 1991. Introduction: Governing a Divided Era. In The Politics of Divided Government, eds. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell Boulder. CO: Westview Press. Edwards, George C., III. 1976. Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power. American Political Science Review 70 (1): 101-13. Edwards, George C., III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. The Legislative Impact of Divided Government. American Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 545-63. Epstein, Leon D. 1980. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Fiorina, Morris P. 1980. The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics. Daedalus 109: 25-45. Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. Divided Government. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
101 Heywood, Andrew. 2002. Politics. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Foundation. Howell, William, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (2): 285-312. Huntington, Samuel P. 1973. Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century. In The Congress and America s Future, ed. David Truman. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall. Jacobson, Gary C. 1991. Explaining Divided Government: Why Can t the Republicans Win the House? PS: Political Science and Politics 24 (4): 640-43. Jacobson, Gary C. 1992. The Politics of Congressional Elections. NY: Harper Collins Publishers. Kelly, Sean Q. 1993. Divided We Govern: A Reassessment. Polity 25 (1): 475-84. Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1): 7-40. Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mayhew, David R. 1991a. Divided Party Control: Does It Make a Difference? PS: Political Science and Politics 24 (4):
102 2003/12 637-40. Mayhew, David R. 1991b. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press. McCubbins, Mathew D. 1991. Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits under Divided Party Control. In The Politics of Divided Government, eds. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Mezey, Michael. 1985. The Function of Legislatures in the Third World. In Handbook of Legislative Research, eds. Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson and Malcolm E. Jewell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. NY: The Free Press. Peterson, Mark. 1990. Legislating Together. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schroedel, Jean Reith. 1994. Congress, the President, and Policy-Making: A Historical Analysis. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe. Sinclair, Barbara. 1999. Transformational Leader or Faithful Agent? Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24 (3): 421-49. Skowronek, Stephen. 1984. Presidential Leadership in Political
103 Time. In The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Sundquist, James L. 1988. Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States. Political Science Quarterly 103 (4): 613-35.
104 2003/12 The Influence of the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch in the Process of Lawmaking: A Comparison of the Unified and Divided Governments Shing-Yuan Sheng Department of Political Science National Chengchi University Abstract The purpose of this article is to examine the relative influence of the legislative branch and executive branch in the process of lawmaking, under different periods of time of the unified and divided government. This research focuses on the fourth term of the Legislative Yuan. The research period of time ranges from 1999 February to 2002 January, divided into two periods: the first begins from February 1999 to May 2000, in which the KMT dominates the executive and the legislative branches. The second period of time begins from May 2000 to January 2002, in which the DPP dominates the executive branch and the KMT dominates the legislative branch. The research focuses on all initiations in the fourth term of the Legislative Yuan. The research findings show: First, the executive branch plays an important role in the process of lawmaking. However, the influence of the executive branch is quite different in the unified and divided governments. The initiation of the executive branch can be passed much easier and faster in the unified government than in the divided government. This finding shows that if the party of the executive branch cannot get a majority of seats in the legislative branch, it is more difficult for it to lead in the policy-making process. Secondly, The KMT and DPP legislators play quite different roles in the legislative process. In the unified government, the DPP legislators are much more aggressive in the legislative process. However,
105 the DPP legislators are much more inactive in the legislative process since the DPP gets the executive power. On the contrary, the KMT legislators are much more aggressive in the legislative process in the divided government since the KMT loses the executive power. Keywords: legislative branch, executive branch, legislation initiation, divided government, unified government, party politics